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HOW WE DEFENDED ARÁBI AND HIS FRIENDS.

A STORY OF EGYPT AND THE EGYPTIANS.

BY

A. M. BROADLEY,
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

AUTHOR OF "TUNIS PAST AND PRESENT."

ILLUSTRATED BY

FREDERICK VILLIERS,

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF "THE GRAPHIC" IN EGYPT.

الله ينصرك يا عربي

"God grant you victory, O Arábi!"

Cairo Street-ory, July, 1882.


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
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186110



Y&A

TO
WILFRED SCAWEN BLUNT AND LADY ANNE BLUNT,
ARÁBI'S BEST FRIENDS—HIS FRIENDS IN NEED,
THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED,
BY
THE AUTHOR.



Arábi Pacha to the Author.

TO MY DEAR FRIEND MR. BROADLEY.

Please keep all the documents connected with my case, to be delivered only to him who writes these lines. I give you leave to publish whatever papers you may think proper.

Cairo, December 15th, 1882.

احمد عربى
المصرى



[Ahmed Arábi the Egyptian.]

12/

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51

HOW WE DEFENDED ARÁBI
AND HIS FRIENDS.





أحمد عرابي المصري

AHMED ARABI PASHA.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

NEARLY two months have now elapsed since I first told the story of Arábi's defence in this volume. I have certainly much reason to be grateful for the kind indulgence which the majority of my numerous critics have shown me. The past sixty days have been unusually eventful ones in the history of Egypt, but I must frankly confess that I see nothing in the recent development of events which would cause me to alter or even to modify the general conclusions I arrived at. Since this book was published Cherif Pacha has resigned office as President of the Egyptian Council of Ministers, and Nubar Pacha now reigns in his stead. General Gordon is, as I write, on his road to Khartoum to prevent, if possible, any further disasters in the Soudan. The aims and objects of his mission are somewhat confused, but I take it he has been sent to Equatorial Egypt to bring about some settlement—the best settlement possible—under the circumstances. To the uninitiated observer his undertaking would certainly seem to involve several very patent contradictions of purpose. It is difficult to see

how he can act simultaneously as British Commissioner and Egyptian Governor-General; it is still more puzzling to understand how he can at once evacuate the Soudan, uphold the somewhat faded Khedivial prestige in those remote regions, and set up a trustworthy and respectable native government in the place of Egyptian and Turkish misrule. Up to the present time it would almost seem that we have accepted a maximum of responsibility and acquired only a minimum of power. The last state of Egypt must be even worse than the first if the intelligent Egyptian statesmen at Cairo can with impunity add to General Gordon's perplexities by requesting him to place on the throne of Darfúr (I presume as a first instalment of the trustworthy and respectable native sovereignty) a youth of eighteen, with forty-two wives, and addicted to chronic alcoholism, whereas the rightful claimant is a person of mature age, exemplary temperate habits, and comparative conubial respectability. If General Gordon's forlorn hope is to succeed, he must at once be made independent of Cairo.

In these recent occurrences I claim to find a forcible and practical confirmation of the views I have had the temerity to lay before my readers. Nobody has ever accused Nubar Pacha of a want of shrewdness, and I think I am entitled to assume that he has

selected as his colleagues the men he considered most suited for the different posts he assigned to them. It has been said it is true that Nubar has himself frankly described his Council of Ministers as a Cabinet of Nonentities. However this may be, he has undeniably appointed to high office Mustapha Fehmy, Mahmoud el Felaki, and Abderrahman Bey Ruchdi, and he has nominated Ahmed Pacha Nachát as Mr Clifford Lloyd's assistant in the Home Department. The reader of the following pages will see that these four men were intimately associated with Arábi in the Nationalist administrations presided over by Mahmoud Sámi and Ragheb. Nachát was one of the most prominent and energetic members of the Defence Committee at Cairo. I have now before me copies of several long and fervently patriotic telegrams to the Sultan which bear his signature and seal. Nubar Pacha, therefore, has unwittingly furnished us with the most eloquent and convincing proof that he, too, thinks with me that the best available stuff out of which Egyptian Ministers can be made to-day is still to be found in the broken ranks of the much-abused Nationalists.

The acclamation which greeted the announcement of General Gordon's departure on his arduous mission to the Soudan has been absolutely unanimous. He has been with good reason hailed throughout the length and

breadth of England as the one man endowed with the knowledge, energy, and honesty, requisite to save the situation. General Gordon, it is true, believes the removal of Ismail Pacha, "one of the ablest and most ill-used men in Europe,*" to have been the *fons et origo malorum*. He tells us that Ismail was the most capable ruler Egypt ever had, and that his withdrawal from power was a misfortune and an ever-to-be-lamented blunder. At the same time, while doing ample justice to his former chief, he sympathises deeply with Arábi and his cause. During the trial at Cairo he gave practical proof of the earnestness of his opinions by subscribing to the Defence Fund, and addressing a remarkable and characteristic letter of encouragement to Mr. Blunt. The deliberate opinion of General Gordon affords, if possible, more important evidence in favour of my late clients than the deliberate acts of the new Premier. Four days before leaving England General Gordon spoke thus of Arábi: — "*I think Arábi will eventually come back to Egypt.* I knew him well, for he was during eighteen months my subordinate in command of the garrison at Massowah. He is a man of fair ability, and Arábi is un-

* See the *Pall Mall Gazette*. There can be little doubt that the despatch of General Gordon at the eleventh hour to Egypt was in a great measure owing to the energy and enterprise of this paper, which has made the Soudan question its own.

questionably honest. He would make a good and popular Egyptian Minister, and he had, and has, a majority of the Egyptian people with him. England might well utilise his services and count on his good faith. To have killed him would have been both an injustice and a political blunder. We must not indulge in exaggeration about Arábi. He must be judged by an Egyptian and not by a European standard."

It would appear, moreover, that there is even a strong element of Nationalism in General Gordon's present work. Is he not to assure the Soudanese that he is come "to restore to them their liberty, and to remove the swarms of unpaid adventurers of various kinds who have been the curse of the country?" Does not this savour somewhat of Arábi's programme? It is not surprising that Mr. Lloyd detects an affinity between Arábi's charter and the instructions given to his subordinate Nachát to "do equal justice to rich and poor alike." Arábi and his cause must bide their time, and I do not think they will wait in vain. The present chaos will inevitably bring into existence a really strong National Government, or end in a declared and vigorous British Protectorate. In either case there will be no further reason for detaining Arábi and his friends in exile. The remedy I have proposed for the manifest sickness of Egypt is I am

aware generally described as impossible. I trust that the opinion of Gordon and the action of Nubar will be duly weighed by my readers during the present crisis. As Mr. Frederic Harrison very truly observes, when arguing from the text—"let us withdraw from Egypt,"—"great national crimes and disasters often arise because there are so many things which practical politicians are pleased to call impossible."

A. M. BROADLEY.

The Temple, February 1st, 1884.

PREFACE.

ON the 3rd December, 1882, Ahmed Arábi returned to his cell in the Daira Saniya Prison at Cairo, having pleaded guilty to a formal charge of rebellion and received a sentence of perpetual exile from Egypt. A year has passed away since then, and on the 3rd December, 1883, these pages, which tell in detail the story of his defence, and in part the story of his cause, will be submitted to the impartial judgment of Englishmen. They might well have been published earlier, but I preferred delay. I was anxious when writing them to exchange as much as possible the *rôle* of the advocate for that of the historian; I desired to see if the conduct of the seven exiles in Ceylon justified my belief in their loyalty and good faith; and it was necessary that the Egyptian Restoration should complete its first twelvemonths' work before it could be fairly criticised or weighed according to its fruits. It has thus

will try and show you something of the Egyptians as seen through Egyptian spectacles. The formula of "Egypt for the Egyptians" as we are accustomed to hear it used signifies very little; "Egypt for the Egyptians" as the device on the banner of Arábi and his friends meant a great deal. This is precisely what I hope to be allowed to explain to you. The author, who sees Egyptian things through Financial spectacles, has had his say; a similar boon has been accorded to the wearers of the tinted glasses I will venture to describe as representing Politics, Diplomacy, French Influence, Vested Interests, Anglo-Egyptian ideas, and the various echoes of the historical verandah of Shepheard's Hotel at Cairo. All these gentlemen have had a patient hearing and a fair and open market for their wares. The tribune being for the moment vacant I have, perhaps somewhat audaciously, stepped into the empty place, put on my Egyptian spectacles, and now invite the great and generous British Public to witness the panorama of Egyptian Nationalism, in which the principal characters will be sustained by my late clients. I can even promise more than this. From time to time I shall allow my audience to look behind the deceptive scenery of Egyptian state-craft.

I shall do my best not to weary those who

come to my Egyptian raree-show. I can even fancy some of my audience complaining that I give them too much comedy and not enough tragedy, but let me at once tell such candid critics as these that a deep vein of humour underlies the whole fabric of Eastern society and meets you at every turn. If I were to blot out all that is laugh-producing in my story, it would fail both to amuse and instruct my readers. Truth and life would equally be wanting, and I might just as well take off my Egyptian spectacles at the outset. We live in an age of special-correspondence and quick-history-making. I very much doubt if people now-a-days have time to master matter-of-fact political and statistical dissertations as our ancestors did in the old times before us. There is a tacit revolution against all that is dry. I have deviated somewhat from the "gravity suitable to the occasion," because the very nature of my panorama requires it; and in order that I may secure those readers who really wish to see Egypt and the Egyptians from an Egyptian point of view, but are not prepared to undergo a severe course of historical study to do so. In this I have to some extent followed the example of the doctor who doses an unsuspecting patient through the medium of medicated gingerbread nuts.

I am perfectly aware the solution of the Egyptian question I hint at will partake very much of the nature of a political showerbath. A shout of derision will come from the wearers of the tinted glasses, who have already shown their wares and essayed to convince the public of the sagacity of their different theories, and I can almost count those who will agree with me on the fingers of my hands. Strong, however, in my own personal convictions, I do not seek to apologise for or even extenuate the course which, I believe, both prudence and justice dictate to us as regards our dealing with Egypt. Few will refuse to recognise the failure of the Egyptian Restoration carried out under our auspices, and the hopelessness of "a fair start" under existing circumstances. The Restoration of Egyptian Nationalism would be a work worthy of England. It would, I believe, give prosperity, peace, and self-government to the Egyptians, and contribute materially to stay the flood of aggression in North Africa. Nothing could more enhance the prestige and influence of England in the councils of Europe than her spontaneously carrying out in the hour of success and victory the pledges she voluntarily entered into as to the aim and object of our expedition to Egypt.

While this volume has been passing through the press all England has been startled by the intelligence of Hicks Pacha's defeat in the Soudan. One of our most valued assistants at Cairo, whose name will more than once occur in the course of my narrative, has found an untimely grave in the fatal battle before Obeid. There appears to be no doubt that Edward Baldwin Evans, our faithful and zealous interpreter, has been one of the victims of this great disaster. The annihilation of the Egyptian forces by the Mehdi will certainly delay the evacuation of Cairo by our troops. At the same time it makes the beginning of the promised "fair start" a matter of increasing urgency. In another place I shall show my readers to what extent the ill-treatment and ignominy which were the lot of the rank and file of Arábi's army after Tel-el-Kebir has contributed to the destruction of Colonel Hicks's forlorn hope. Unless we are prepared to really give the country "a fair start," without delay, our quitting it at all will soon become an impossibility.

Last year it was my lot to write the story of the French Invasion of Tunis.* I now place before my

* *Tunis Past and Present—the Last Punic War.* 2 vols. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1882.

readers a narrative of the defence of Arábi and his friends, which, as a matter of course, necessitates an account of the Egyptian National movement, of which he became the leader by the tacit suffrages of all Egypt.

The ninth decade of the nineteenth century has been an all-important epoch in the history of North Africa. It has seen the conquest and permanent occupation of Tunis by France; it has witnessed the English expedition to Egypt. Much will, of course, depend on the resolution which is come to as to the nature of our stay in that country. If it is only to be temporary and always with a view to "a fair start," as Mr. Gladstone assures us, I may probably be spared from chronicling the last days of Tripoli in 1884, and the fall of the Empire of Morocco in 1885. Nothing else can save North Africa from becoming the 'vantage ground of European aggression.

Arábi and his friends are still waiting patiently in Ceylon for the justice which they, sooner or later, confidently expect. They believe in the good faith of England, both as regards their own fate and the ultimate destiny of Egypt. They are content to "abide the time fixed by the decrees of Providence," and

steadily refrain both from useless complaints or vexatious agitation. Arábi wrote to me thus shortly after his arrival in Ceylon :—

To my faithful and honourable friend and defender Mr. Broadley
(may God preserve him in his Holy keeping!).

After presenting you with my most heart-felt salutations, I inform you that we all arrived in good health at Colombo, in the island of Ceylon, on the 10th of January, 1883, after a sea voyage of 14 days.

We were very cordially received by the authorities of the island, who had secured houses for our accommodation, and who furnished us with nourishing food sufficient for the wants of our families during several days.

We join in offering our warmest thanks to the English authorities for the respect and kindness with which they have treated us, as indeed we always hoped from them. The town, the climate, and the face of the country itself, suit us perfectly. We purpose sending our children to the local schools and learning the English language ourselves. Once the question of the confiscation of our property is settled (as we trust it will be by your good offices) we shall lead a happy life.

All my brethren and their children send you their kind regards.

Please remember us to my brother Ahmed Bey Rifát if he is with you, and also to your beloved mother, who is the object of all our respect.

Your sincere friend,

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

24th Jan. 1883.

His letters have breathed the same contentment and resignation ever since. The seven exiles have

applied themselves diligently to the learning of the English language, and with excellent results. The intelligence of these “rough mutineers” must be of no mean order. A few days ago I received in English the following letter from the ex-Nationalist Premier, Mahmoud Sámi, who never opened a grammar before settling down in Colombo :—

Mutwal, 28th September, 1883.

MY DEAR MR. BROADLEY,

Although I have promised to write you a letter in English within six months, that time has not yet finished ; but I saw your letter to my friend Arábi telling him to ask me to write you a letter as you asked me. I write these few lines for you to see. Now I am doing well, hoping the same from you also, and glad to see that you have not forgotten me.

I am always,

Yours faithfully,

MAHMOUD SÁMI.

While Yácoub Sámi, Arábi's Under-Secretary,
writes :—

Wavertree House,
Slave Island,

Colombo, 20th September, 1883.

MY DEAR SIR,

I beg to inform you in these few lines that for a long time I have not got any letter from you. Now I am learning English a little. My teacher's name is Abú Sáli, but he is employed at the Government offices, and attends only two hours in the

morning. I am always glad to know of your health; therefore you will be good enough to send me always a letter informing me of your health in English. I cannot speak very good English, but I speak a little. This is my handwriting. I send to show it you, and I enclose a letter from my daughter written also in English and in her own handwriting. I am in good health, and my family too.

I am,

Yours truly,

YÁCOUB SÁMI.

A. M. Broadley, Esq.

During my stay in Cairo, Mr. Frederic Villiers executed a series of sketches from life, which now illustrate this volume. Their merits speak for themselves, and the Photo-Mechanical Printing Company has succeeded in reproducing them in fac-simile. It is true that no other artist had Mr. Villiers' opportunities, but I doubt if any one else could have better taken advantage of them.

A. M. BROADLEY.

Lincoln's Inn Library, London.

December 1st, 1883.

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HOW WE DEFENDED ARÁBI.

CHAPTER I.

MY RETAINER.

ON the 19th September, 1882, the British victory at Tel-el-Kebir was only a week old, and the first flush of national enthusiasm it had evoked had as yet shown no symptoms of dying away. In the midst of the prevailing new-fashioned martial ardour, and the exultant singing of songs of triumph, there was hardly any leisure for reflection, or time to think of the fate of our fallen foes. On the morning of that day, however, the *Times* published a lengthy letter from Sir Samuel Baker under the heading of "The Khedive and the Rebels," which advocated in unmistakeable language a very short shrift for the latter, as a suitable and necessary sacrifice to the future prestige of the former. "Europe and the world in general," wrote Sir Samuel, "join in well-deserved applause at the skilful and unhesitating strategy of Sir Garnet Wolseley. The question now arises

‘What is to become of Arábi and the ringleaders of the rebels?’ Those who defy the law must suffer the punishment determined by the law, and no exception should be made to this stern exigence of necessity. . . . Nothing could be more fatal to the true interests of Egypt than our advising moderation towards the vanquished. In the oriental mind clemency is a token of weakness. The Egyptians must learn, by a stern and unmitigated example, that the Khedive is the constituted head, and that he represents the Government of Egypt; that rebellion against his authority is high treason; and that the penalty of high treason will be inflicted without a chance of reprieve or pardon. If Arábi and the ringleaders of the late rebellion *are tried by Court Martial and punished*, there will be no question of the authority of the Khedive, provided that he is supported for at least twelve months by a sufficient British army of occupation.”

I had hardly finished reading this Draconian view of the case of Arábi and his friends when a note was brought me. I put down the paper to open it. The letter I had received was from Mr. Algernon Bourke, and it contained the wholly unexpected proposal that I should immediately go to Cairo at the expense and under the instructions of Mr. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, to defend the “rebels,” already tried,

condemned, and executed, theoretically, by the unbending code of Sir Samuel Baker.

Arábi was at this time a prisoner of war in the custody of our victorious troops, having given up his sword and "trusted his honour" to General Lowe on our bloodless entry into the Egyptian capital. His friend and companion, Toulba Pacha, had done the same, and they were now both carefully guarded by British soldiers in one of the lower rooms of the Abdin Palace. The prompt surrender of Arábi had certainly taken the British public by surprise: a final attempt at resistance before Cairo was, at one time, confidently expected; and, even when all was lost at Tel-el-Kebir, he might easily have destroyed telegraphic communications, and prolonged the "war-like operations" in Upper Egypt, or, with almost equal facility, he could have disappeared (as some of his followers seem to have done) across the wastes of the Libyan deserts, and sought hospitality and a refuge with the powerful chief Muhamed Senousi on the frontiers of Southern Tripoli. When the first tidings of his capture reached London, hardly anybody believed them, and even the compilers of the attractive contents-bills of the evening newspapers conscientiously preceded the intelligence with the words "rumoured" or "reported," although the less scrupulous vendors (then in the midst of an unprece-

dently fruitful harvest) carefully turned down that portion of the notice, when offering their wares to the eager and war-loving crowd. It was, however, perfectly true that Arábi was a prisoner, and our faithful ally, the Khedive, and his now complaisant courtiers were busy at Alexandria, organising, as fast as the repaired telegraph-wire could help them, a wide-spread descent on his most prominent friends and sympathisers, as an appropriate prelude to a triumphal entry into Cairo—"the City of Victory."

Arábi was not only a prisoner, but he was in danger of his life. The first expression of public opinion as to his fate in England—pronounced, it is true, amidst the sudden excitement of success—was hardly worthy of us. We heard for a moment only of the supreme necessity for signal vengeance, and of the undoubted propriety of exemplary punishment. These words, strange to say, too often came from the mouths of men professing the political creed called Liberal.* Telegrams in a similar strain came thick

* "If we have handed over the leaders of the revolt to the Khedive," wrote Sir Julian Goldsmid on the 26th September, "it is clear that he ought to be allowed to punish them for their offence according to Egyptian law. Consequently we ought not to interfere with the sentence which assuredly would be passed on Arábi and the other principal leaders in any European country as well as in Egypt, viz.—the *sentence of death*. . . . In the East clemency is looked on as weakness, and invites others to similar desperate ventures. I therefore urge that no maudlin sentimentality should be allowed to step in and stop the execution of the capital sentence."

and fast from Egypt. Zealous correspondents had interviewed Tewfik, Cherif, and Khair concerning their views as to the treatment of the vanquished. They had all been unanimous—Arabi must pay the penalty of his failure. Arabi and his friends must die.

For an instant, and for an instant only, it seemed as if the sanguinary doctrine of expediency would prevail. The reaction, however, soon came, and it was mainly the work of one man. Mr. Blunt had never been ashamed to call the "traitor" Arabi his friend, and, during the earlier stages of the national movement in Egypt, had often given him counsel and advice; but this was at the time when Mr. Chamberlain still believed in the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptians. Mr. Blunt and his wife, during their wanderings amidst the ruins of Syria and Arabia, had learned to love and appreciate the Arab race, and they sympathised with Arabi because they regarded him as the honest leader of an oppressed people striving for freedom. The imminent peril in which Arabi was now placed called forth an eloquent and indignant protest from Mr. Blunt, and his appeal soon found an echo. Mr. Blunt only wished that Arabi should have a fair trial. English public opinion is nearly always generous, and in this case it supported Mr. Blunt's demand—Arabi may be guilty, but he

must be heard in his defence before his doom can be pronounced. The advocates of expediency soon found themselves in a minority, and nearly the whole press began to clamour energetically for impartial justice and searching enquiry.

Mr. Blunt did not confine his efforts to words alone. He resolved not only to defray, if need be, the whole costs of the defence of his Egyptian friends, but to place no limit whatever on the expenses he proposed to incur. It was at this juncture, and before he appealed to the Government and the public with the object of securing a fair trial, that he offered me, through our mutual friend Mr. Bourke, a brief on behalf of Arábi. There was perhaps a strong bond of union between us which may to some extent account for this unexpected and flattering offer. We had both more or less identified ourselves with the cause of the North African Arabs, and we certainly both believed that their cause was a righteous one. I had, ever since the month of February 1881, devoted myself to the task of chronicling the march of French aggression in Tunis, and had acted professionally both on behalf of Mr. Levy, in the now almost forgotten Enfida case, and for the late Bey of Tunis, Muhamed-es-Sadek, during the acute stage of the French invasion, which preceded his acceptance of the Protectorate of the Republic. During the summer of last year I

published a detailed account of the French conquest of the Tunisian Regency (the "taking of Carthage" according to the diplomatic phraseology of the Berlin Congress), under the name of the "Last Punic War." The connection which exists between recent events in Tunis, and still more recent occurrences in Egypt, is a close one. The National movement in Egypt followed rapidly on the progress of aggression in Tunis, and only one short twelvemonth intervened between the shelling of Sfax and the bombardment of Alexandria. The hopes, aspirations, wrongs, and grievances of the North African Arabs in Tunis and Egypt are almost identical; and I must confess I now feel it difficult to answer the criticism of my French friends when they maliciously ask me if I still think their raid in Tunisia was really *the last* Punic War, and suggest that I should add the words "but one."

I was on the point of returning once more to Tunis when I received Mr. Blunt's proposal, and I lost no time in going to see him on the subject. My work in Tunis had prevented me from following very closely the earlier stages of events in Egypt, and I can assure my readers I had at this time no preconceived ideas or strong sympathy in favour of my future client; I had no great belief either in the ability or patriotic motives of Arábi, and had not wholly escaped the unfavourable impression concern-

ing him which was an almost inevitable consequence of the daily consumption of large doses of inimical special correspondence. When we met on the afternoon of the 19th September, Mr. Blunt, with his characteristic energy, urged my going out to Egypt at once on the mission he desired me to undertake. I, on the contrary, thought that it would be more advantageous to the case, and more in accordance with professional etiquette, to endeavour to obtain a retainer direct from Arábi before proceeding to Cairo. The vials of British wrath (which, during the progress of the military operations in Egypt, were generally at a white heat) had been so unmercifully, and I now think so unjustly, poured out on Mr. Blunt, (who had figured in the literature of newspaper contents-bills as "Arábi's English ally," and had been eloquently described by a noble Lord in the course of a solemn debate in the Upper House, as "only another Arábi in a frock coat,") that I felt my acceptance of a retainer from Arábi himself would improve and strengthen my position in Egypt, and give me at the same time a better claim to the all-powerful sympathy of public opinion in his favour. After a prolonged consultation Mr. Blunt agreed to adopt the course I proposed, and it was arranged that I should at once go to Tunis, and there, half way on my road to Egypt, await the retainer I sought to

obtain. Mr. Blunt meanwhile wrote to Arábi the following letter in explanation of our plans :—

September 22, 1882.

TO ARÁBI PACHA.

May God preserve you in adversity as in good fortune. As a soldier and a patriot, you will have understood the reasons which have prevented me from writing to you or sending you any message during the late unhappy war. Now, however, that the war is over, I hope to show you that our friendship has not been one of words only. It seems probable that you will be brought to trial either for rebellion or on some other charge, the nature of which I yet hardly know, and that unless you are strongly and skilfully defended you run much risk of being precipitately condemned. I have, therefore, resolved, with your approval, to come to Cairo to help you with such evidence as I can give, and to bring with me an honest and learned English advocate to conduct your defence; and I have informed the English Government of my intention. I beg you, therefore, without delay, to authorise me to act for you in this matter, for your formal assent is necessary; and it would be well if you would at once send me a telegram and also a written letter to authorise me to engage counsel in your name. Several liberal-minded Englishmen of high position will join me in defraying all the expenses of your ease. You may also count upon me personally to see, during your captivity, that your family is not left in want. And so may God give you courage to endure the evil with the good.

W. S. B.

This communication never reached Arábi. It appears to have gone diplomatically astray.

CHAPTER II.

AN INTERVIEW AT ASNIÈRES ON THE SEINE.

Two days later I left London for Tunis. My interest in Egyptian affairs was naturally somewhat intensified by the probability (for as yet it was only a probability) of my defending Arábi, and during a brief stay in Paris I called on the ex-Khedive of Egypt, who was then staying in the neighbourhood, and presented a letter of introduction from his son Prince Ibrahim. My conversation with Ismail Pacha interested me very greatly, although it did not much encourage me as to my future mission in the country over which he was once the most autocratic of rulers. At the time of my visit he inhabited a white-walled villa overlooking the Seine at Asnières. The house in question has little to distinguish it from its fellows in the Rue St. Denis, among which it ranks as No. 118, but it is just pretentious enough to enjoy the distinction of being known as the Château de la Terrasse. Its owner, Mr. Arthur, the house agent, had furnished it in the most florid style of modern

French upholstery, and it has on more than one occasion served as a temporary refuge for royalty under a cloud. The innumerable clocks, the buhl, the artificial flowers, and the many-coloured curtains and *portières*, remind one simultaneously of Constantinople palaces and Wardour-street; but they are in a measure atoned for by the shady garden and the view of the winding river below. Ismail Pacha received me in one of the *salons* of the first floor, a replica of the gayly-decorated apartments below. He bears his 52 years well; his light hair is scarcely streaked with gray, and he still wears the Turkish fez as of old. His auburn beard was cut close and carefully trimmed. He has grown somewhat stouter since his misfortunes, and this change is more noticeable on account of his stature not much exceeding five feet. He still dresses carefully in the inevitable frock coat, and wears jewelled pins and studs. Ismail speaks rapidly in the French language and with much French gesture. He generally closes one eye when he becomes animated. His calm and dignified manner could hardly fail to excite both interest and sympathy; he seemed anxious to talk at length on the Egyptian crisis, and expressed his opinion on all points discussed frankly and without the smallest hesitation or reserve. He began by observing that he was surprised to see that he was now accused in

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England of exclusively furthering French interests during his reign in Egypt. "Everything," he said, "was once English in Egypt. An Englishman was at the head of nearly every department, and this continued till the arrival of Mr. Cave. England and Mr. Cave desired French co-operation and participation, and England eventually got more of both than she wanted; but ~~it~~ was her own fault, not mine."

Speaking generally of a joint Control, he next remarked: "The original idea was excellent, and I readily agreed to it. The Control would have worked well and pleasantly enough if the Controllers had confined their zeal and attention to their financial attributions, but they were in a greater or less degree political agents from the first, and wished to rule the country as well as manage its revenues. French functionaries have always meddled with our internal affairs far more than their English colleagues, and to such an extent that I once said to Napoleon III. 'Your Representative interferes so much in Egypt that he leaves his English *confrère* no room to interfere at all, however much he may wish to do so.' When Controllers came to influence the appointment and removal of the Consuls-General, they obtained a power fraught with dangerous consequences in the future." Ismail Pacha thinks the supposed effect produced on the minds of the Egyptians by the appointment of numerous Euro-

pean officials to Government posts has been overrated. It was chiefly the way this patronage was distributed which did the harm. "I placed," he said, "Europeans of all nations in various branches of the Egyptian Administrative service, but always on account of the individual superior fitness of the nominees. No one complained of this, but when the time came that Europeans were appointed wholesale, merely because they were Europeans and 'protected' as such, and without any regard to their personal qualifications or their capability of discharging the duties they undertook, then the matter justly enough became looked on in the light of a very serious grievance indeed."

Ismail thus described the National movement:—"I do not for a moment believe either in the genuineness, extent, or patriotism of the so-called National feeling as it now exists, although real Egyptian nationalism is as old as my time. The present race of Egyptian nationalists have run wild from want of a strong leader, and the failure of their cause is the natural result of the weakness of the Egyptian Government on the one hand, and the success of Turkish intrigues on the other. Pan-Islamism is no new invention, but I would never hear of it. Different counsels have since prevailed; and we are now face to face with the consequences. I always managed by some means or other to control and direct the religious

fervour of my subjects in Egypt, but when the word of command came from Constantinople and not from Cairo, religious fervour became religious fanaticism, and the existence, influence, and temporary success of a man of the position of Arábi became a possibility. I remember Arábi well. My impression of him is unfavourable. Arábi can be painted in a word—he is what the French call a *blagueur*. He can talk, and do little else. The bravest men in his party are Ali Fehmy and Abd-el-Ál; they are soldiers, but I doubt if Arábi himself or any of them could intelligently define either ‘patriotism’ or ‘national feeling.’ I am astonished that half Europe seems inclined to regard him as the would-be saviour of his country. The truth is that the Egyptian people must lean on something and follow some one. The Egyptian Government was hopelessly weak, and Arábi and his friends knew it. He and his partizans achieved three visible and striking successes, and the Egyptians saw this, and saw, moreover, the representatives of great Powers practically in treaty with him. Arábi pointed triumphantly to these facts, and told the Egyptians he could and would restore Egypt to the Egyptians; and it is not surprising in the circumstances that the Egyptians clung to him as the stronger vessel. The movement he headed was from the first actively encouraged at Constantinople, but it is very improbable that either

the Sultan himself or any of his responsible Ministers were ever in direct communication either with him or his associates. Direct communication is not a feature of Turkish intrigue, as the desired effect can be produced without it."

As regards the new departure in Egypt, Ismail was sufficiently explicit. Egypt will be independent of the Porte. He believes a British Protectorate not only to be inevitable but to be the best thing for the welfare of the country. The success of the Protectorate, he thinks, will depend chiefly on the strength of the local subordinate Government. The deadlock and chaos at Tunis are the natural consequences of protecting a phantom. The Khedives of the future must rule with a strong arm and accept personal responsibility, as responsible Ministers are as yet rare to find in Egypt. A Chamber of Notables should be consulted in matters of internal arrangement only. To give it power to control or even interfere with foreign politics would be suicidal. Ismail Pacha has little doubt that a really strong Government in Egypt would to-day have a far better chance of success with a real British Protectorate than under a fictitious Turkish suzerainty. The ex-Khedive spoke bitterly enough of two subjects—his son Tewfik and the future of the Ottoman Empire. "For Tewfik's sake," he said, "I

‘kissed the carpet’ and humbled myself for seventeen years before His Majesty the Sultan. I obtained for him the much-desired firmán of direct succession, but he has shown himself to have ‘*ni tête, ni cœur, ni courage*’; and all these are wanted to rule in Egypt. He is my son, and I will say no more. The days of the Turkish Empire are numbered; the Caliphate has now practically succumbed to the untoward consequences of Panislamic intrigue; the Sultanate must soon follow it. The downfall of both has been hastened by the feeble diplomacy which has only irritated France in Tripoli, but has caused blood to flow in Egypt.”

■ I left the next day for Tunis. My subsequent visit to Egypt verified many things I learned in my brief interview with its once successful ruler, but I soon came to a widely different conclusion than his concerning the nature, extent, and power of that phase of Egyptian national aspirations which made Ahmed Arábi a leader of the people.

CHAPTER III.

FROM TUNIS TO ALEXANDRIA.

I ARRIVED at Tunis early on the morning of the 27th September. The political situation there had undergone little or no change since I left it three months before. Monsieur Roustan's successor Monsieur Cambon had deemed it expedient to adopt a policy which could hardly be considered an improvement on the militant energy of his predecessor. He sought by a kind of obstructive and chaos-producing apathy to starve the Powers into a speedy compliance with his own desire and that of his government for the abolition of the Capitulations—the last remaining visible sign of their interest in the country. Meanwhile Europeans and Tunisians were alike left to face as best they might the consequences of the prevalent confusion, and wait patiently for the better times which Monsieur Cambon promised them whenever the French Republic should alone reign supreme in the land. The Turkish newspapers (till the very eve of Tel-el-Kebir patriotic and devoutly Panislamic) had

carried the name and fame of Ahmed Arábi the Egyptian into every part of the recently conquered regency of Tunis. His success was prayed for in the mosques and shrines of holy Kairwan, and the lame old chieftain Ali Ben Hlifa, still despairingly holding out on the faith of the specious promises of the Sultan Caliph just over the Tripolitan frontier, once more began to take courage. "Can it be," whispered one Arab to another, "that at last a Saviour has arisen in Islam?"

When the Tunisian Arabs learned that the man of whom they hoped so much was defeated and a prisoner, they felt almost as keenly as their Egyptian brethren the bitterness of despair. There is no doubt whatever that our victory in Egypt saved France a third expedition to Tunis, and crushed in the bud an Arab rising which would have extended from Cairo to Algiers. Tel-el-Kebir (however much our neighbours may disparage our success) has, as a matter of fact, alone made the withdrawal of a great portion of the French army of occupation in Tunis either prudent or possible.

During the few days I remained in Tunis Mr. Blunt and I exchanged frequent telegraphic messages as to the varying chances of a real defence of Arábi being allowed, and my anxiety was not a little increased by the Havas Agency periodically announc-

ing either the speedy commencement of the trial, the expected execution of my client, or the certainty of foreign counsel being excluded from appearing on his behalf. Meanwhile my future junior Mark Napier had reached Cairo, and, with the assistance of Mr. Eve, was doing his utmost to open up communication with the prisoner himself. The period of suspense, however, came to an end at last. On the 9th October two short telegrams reached me. The first was from my colleague at Cairo,—“Access promised, come directly:” the other from Mr. Blunt,—“Counsel allowed, start at once.”

· Most unfortunately there was no steamer leaving for Malta, and it was not till the following Thursday (September 12th) that I finally commenced my journey. One of my few fellow-passengers was a French consul returning *malgré lui* to his post at Malta. During his stay there it appears he had undergone the indignity of being summoned before a native magistrate for contempt of court, and consequently, in the intervals of sea-sickness he never ceased to vituperate the Maltese, (he persistently described them as *les nègres*), the Republic which so cruelly sent him back amongst them, and the British Government which had so unjustly refused to avenge his wrongs. He next transferred his abuse to Arábi because he had not been fortunate enough to beat the English, and

assured me I was going on a fool's errand, as the prisoners would certainly be shot before I arrived; "that is," he added, "if you act as we should do under similar circumstances." In the dusk of the following evening we steamed into the harbour of Valetta. I at once traversed the well-known "streets of stairs" to the Grand Hotel, where I expected to receive my final instructions from Mr. Blunt. Salvo, the head waiter, an old acquaintance, saluted me with a broad grin. I saw the news of my mission had already reached Malta.

"Maltese very glad, sir," said Salvo, "you go defend Arábi, but English general surely hang him before you get there." Salvo was hardly more encouraging than my friend the French consul, but he gave me two telegrams, one from London and the other from Cairo, urging me to hasten as quickly as possible to my destination. Next morning I rose early to ascertain when the boat for Alexandria would leave Malta, and to my amazement learned there was no fixed service at all, and that I was one day late for the weekly boat from Sicily. Returning much disheartened down the Strada Reale—the Regent Street of Malta—I was greeted from his shop-door by one of the local celebrities, my friend Mr. Pietro Paolo Borg, a thriving tobacco merchant and dealer in lace, coral, and filagree silver. Mr. Borg, far from

answering the French consul's description of the Maltese citizen, may be considered a fair likeness of our own Henry VIII., and entertains the most profound respect for the British lion—the “*invitta Britannia*,” which has figured for a century in the verbose inscription over the guard-house opposite the Governor's palace, and which will always find a place in every Maltese petition for redress of grievances, as long as Malta forms part of the empire. I explained my difficulty to Mr. P. P. Borg. He told me that H.M.S. “*Hecla*” would leave at noon, and that if I applied to Admiral Graham he had no doubt I should get a passage. In justice to Mr. Borg I must say he did not give vent to the usual bloodthirstiness as regards *Arábi*, but on the contrary contented himself with expressing a devout wish that the rebels had prolonged matters a little, and so enabled him to sell more tobacco to the British soldiers going out, and more coral, lace, and filagree-work to the victorious army on its return. This is hardly to be wondered at, for Mr. Borg remembers the good old times in which he laid the foundation of his fortune as a camp-follower in the Crimea.

I at once descended the *nix mangiare* steps of happy memory, and, hailing a boat bearing the sign of the Black Cat (why every third boat in Malta is so named I am unable to say), soon reached the

"Hecla." I sent in my card to her commander, Captain Wilson, and preferred my request for a passage to Alexandria. He at once told me that if the admiral gave me leave he would willingly comply with my wishes. The "Black Cat" quickly conveyed me up the Dockyard Creek to Admiral Graham's office. I explained my errand to one of his subordinates, who came back in a few minutes with the much-desired permission. I sent for my luggage and returned to the "Hecla," which sailed half an hour after I joined her. During the voyage I was the guest of the ward-room officers, and I am glad to have this opportunity of acknowledging their kindness and hospitality. The "Hecla," a torpedo dépôt ship of 6,200 tons burden, had done excellent work of a varied character during the earlier days of the Egyptian expedition, which never seems to have been adequately recognised or understood, as she was, for obvious reasons, kept out of range. Captain Watson's unobtrusive services in helping to bridge the canal at Alexandria, as well as in organizing and working the Ironclad Train, and Commander Norcock's share in destroying, at great risk, the stores of ammunition in the forts, are, I think, worthy of record. During the passage I spent many hours in her laboratory looking at the models of every known engine of torpedo warfare, and it was certainly a

curious sensation to reflect that we were travelling placidly over a cargo of combustibles sufficient to destroy a city or reduce us in a second to unrecognisable atoms.

On the 18th October, at day-break, we entered the outer harbour of Alexandria. In the calm and peaceful scene around us it was difficult to realize the events then only three months old. We were, however, face to face with the ruined forts, the unrepai red light-house, and the shattered façade of the Ras-el-Tin palace. Before eight o'clock I landed at the wharf near the custom-house, and, hiring a carriage, was driven rapidly in the direction of the Cairo railway.

CHAPTER IV.

CAIRO.

EMERGING from a narrow and crowded street, I came suddenly on the scene of desolation which was once the Grand Square. Many of the ruined houses had been demolished, and the stones neatly piled up by the road-side. Now and again a solitary gable, a scorched sign, or battered brass plate marked the site of some particular shop or office, and I noticed more than one damaged escutcheon of a destroyed consulate still hanging to the calcined walls. The extent of the disaster hardly came up to what I imagined. What remains of Alexandria still entitles it to rank as the first city of Egypt. The centre of the square was filled by wooden shops and shanties, the greater part of which seemed to be devoted to the sale of spirituous liquors. There, amidst the ruins, untrammelled by licensing justices and excise officers, flourished the Prince of Wales Grog Shop, the American Bar, the British Tar, the Tel-el-Kebir and the Wolseley Arms. A fair Parisian had erected a *grand café* right across

the pavement, and obstinately refused to move except on the payment of a substantial indemnity.

I soon reached the railway station, where all was confusion, but I managed to register my luggage and secure a seat in a special train which would reach Cairo in the afternoon. Whilst waiting on the platform one or two things struck me particularly. I noticed in the first place the unobtrusiveness (if I may so call it) of our occupation. I only saw two English soldiers in Alexandria, one on duty in the town and the other at the terminus. In Tunis we had become accustomed to the continual sound and sight of the conquerors, the clanking of spurs on the pavement, the calling for absinthe at the much-frequented cafés, the music, and the never-ceasing marching and counter-marching. I cannot help thinking our plan caused less heart-burning. The contrast between an Egyptian crowd and a Tunisian one is very remarkable. In the one the main feature is dusky garments of dark blue or black; in the other gaudy colours and dazzling white. As to physique, my Tunisian friends have certainly the best of it. Before starting I secured a couple of Egyptian newspapers. The refugees (as they were called), who left Egypt in shoals in June, were now coming back in full force, and the carriage I travelled in was crowded to excess.

A few minutes after leaving Alexandria we passed

through Arábi's lines and earthworks at Kafr-el-Dowar, still apparently intact. My fellow-travellers were friendly and communicative. A French lawyer from Cairo was now returning thither with all his family. He admitted much could be said for Arábi, hinted that many persons in high places would be compromised, and frankly admitted that I had *un beau procès* in hand. My left-hand neighbour—an Italian professor of chemistry—went a good deal further. In his opinion Arábi was not altogether in the wrong, and he even went so far as to offer me some mysterious suggestions and wish me success. I next turned to my newspapers. They were certainly less encouraging than my fellow-passengers. In the *Egyptian Gazette*, the organ of English public opinion in Egypt, I found a long letter signed E. T. Rogers Bey, from which I cannot forbear making a few extracts. It began thus:—

SIR,

I cannot refrain from writing a few lines to you as the editor of the only English newspaper in Egypt, to express my firm opinion that there will be a miscarriage of justice if English counsel and lawyers be allowed to defend the arch-rebel Arábi. The forensic astuteness of the members of the English bar is such that they can logically make black appear white and vice versâ, and require other lawyers equally versed in the quibbles of the law to convince the judge and jury of the reality of the colour in dispute. I say there will be a miscarriage of justice because, after the English counsel has expressed his legal

opinion, there will be no man on the side of the prosecution capable of combating his arguments.

This at any rate was flattering, but the writer next turns from the lawyers to the clients:—

Bis dat qui cito dat is an old maxim which applies with tenfold force in the present case, and even the delay of justice amounts to a miscarriage, because the people of the country are in a state of rebellious ferment which would be crushed out by the immediate execution of the original leaders of the rebellion.

Surely it must be admitted that the absolutely disinterested and loyal ministers now in the Khedive's Cabinet know the character of the people of this country better than Englishmen who have never been in Egypt, or who have been here only a few weeks or even months. The former declare that the country can never be quiet until the rebels have expiated their crimes. The latter wish to give the rebels a trial upon English principles, which may last not for months but for years. The *unfortunate nobleman languishing at Dartmoor*, whose offence was mild in the extreme compared with that of the leaders of the recent rebellion, underwent two trials, each of which lasted for many months. If a similar procedure be allowed for Ahmed Arábi, Mahmoud Sámi, and the other rebels, it will certainly last for years. But this must not be allowed. The English who have resided in Egypt for years, and who are worthy of the title of Anglo-Egyptians, know the characters of the Egyptians as well as do the ministers, and thoroughly agree with them in the necessity of a condign punishment.

The natives in the villages, where agitators still deliver seditious harangues, and where Europeans are still insulted when they pass through, do not believe that Arábi is a prisoner, do not believe that they have done wrong in murdering Christians and in pillaging their property, nor will they be con-

vinced of the error of their ways until the arch-rebels be tried and receive their deserts.

Through the French contemporary of the *Egyptian Gazette* I learned that many people were preparing to go to Cairo to witness the coming trial; that the Minister of Justice intended to issue personal invitations, 3,000 of which he had already caused to be printed, and which were more in demand than the tickets for the first performance of "Aïda" at the Khedivial Opera House.

The heat was very great and the dust intolerable. We had fairly exhausted the local newspapers and every phase of Egyptian politics when the green trees of the Shoubra avenues, the minarets of the citadel, and the distant Pyramids came in sight, and we soon found ourselves in Cairo. The confusion here even exceeded that which I encountered at Alexandria, but I at length escaped in an omnibus with my scanty luggage (the chief part of which consisted of a few imposing-looking law-books) to the New Hotel, where I determined to stay till I could see Messrs. Eve and Napier. The New Hotel (once, I think, called the Hotel Khedivial) is one of the many memorials of the palmier days of the Khedive Ismail's reign. To all intents and purposes a palace, it overlooks the Esbekieh gardens and the finest quarter of Cairo; but as a speculation

it has signally failed. It has never been able to rival the shady comfort and old-world associations of Shepheard's, the hotel *par excellence* of the East. I had hardly finished unpacking, when my colleagues were announced (I had telegraphed to them from Alexandria), and we agreed to repair to the adjoining gardens to hold our first consultation as to the defence of Arábi.

CHAPTER V.

OUR FIRST CONSULTATION.

PREVIOUS to our meeting on the 18th October I had never seen Mr. Napier, but I knew Mr. Eve slightly, and our former acquaintance in the genial atmosphere of Great Queen Street helped not a little to that union of plans and ideas so essential to success. My first question, as might be expected, was—What has been done? Mr. Napier in reply at once gave me a clear account of his stewardship. “On the morning of the 29th September,” said Mr. Napier, “I chanced to be in my chambers at 6, Fig-tree Court, Temple. The purest accident brought me back from a long-vacation tour in the north of France before I intended, and on the day in question I certainly expected no visitors. About eleven o’clock Captain Laprimadie (Mr. Blunt’s agent) called, and asked me if I would start for Cairo that very evening and do my best to obtain access to Arábi, preparatory to your joining me, when we should, if permitted to do so, jointly represent him as senior and junior counsel on his trial. After a brief conference with Mr. Blunt and his wife I consented, and prepared to leave London

by the weekly mail train. On reaching Calais I found that every place was engaged in the sleeping-cars for Brindisi, but a private arrangement with the guard settled everything, and six days later I landed in Alexandria. Here I met my old friend Richard Eve of Aldershot, and I arranged that he should accompany me to Cairo as solicitor in the case. You doubtless found a good deal of confusion about the railway service, but it was far worse then. Next morning we both called on Sir Edward Malet. He told us he had already forwarded a telegram from Arábi, through the Foreign Office, directed to Mr. Blunt and Sir W. Gregory, asking for the assistance of English counsel.* He added that he imagined the British Government had no objection to our acting in that capacity, referred us for further information to Sir Charles Wilson, the recently-appointed British delegate at the Court of Preliminary Inquiry, and said the proceedings were being conducted in accordance with French military law. We then went to Sir Charles Wilson, who said that Arábi had been two days previously handed over to the custody of the Egyptian Government (gently tempered by the presence of a British corporal's guard outside the prison), and that per-

* The fate of this message was almost as unfortunate as that of Mr. Blunt's letter to Arábi. It was sent to Sir W. Gregory, who was abroad, and only reached him some time afterwards.

mission to see Arábi must consequently be sought for from Riáz Pacha, Minister of the Interior. Returning once more to the British Agency we obtained a formal letter of introduction from Sir Edward Malet to that functionary."

"Next day," continued Mr. Napier, "we attended on Riáz Pacha, accompanied by Colonel Stewart, at the request of Sir Charles Wilson, who introduced us to the Egyptian Minister. I told Riáz in French the object of our visit. He curtly declined to allow us access to the prisoner, as contrary to Egyptian law, but he promised he would write to Sir Edward Malet on the subject. Mr. Eve then telegraphed to you 'Access denied, if obtained promptly will send retainer.' On the 9th of October we once more called on Sir Edward Malet. He said he had heard nothing from Riáz, but admitted that the surrender of Arábi was conditional on counsel being allowed him for his defence. He added that the English Government would not interfere with the sentence if it turned out that he were guilty of the massacres of the 11th June, the burning and pillage of Alexandria, or the abuse of the white flag. Mr. Eve then drew up a notice, which we duly served on Riáz Pacha that afternoon."

Mr. Eve, with the gravity becoming Arábi's solicitor, put in my hand the following document which was probably a novel feature in Egyptian procedure,

and must certainly have startled not a little its recipient :—

To His Excellence Riáz Pacha, Minister of the Interior
to His Highness the Khedive.

I, Richard Eve, of Aldershot, England, as Solicitor for and on behalf of Ahmed Arábi Pacha, do hereby give you notice, that it is necessary that I, as such Solicitor, should have access to the said Arábi Pacha, and I hereby require that such access be afforded to me forthwith, in order that I may receive instructions from him to retain and instruct counsel for his defence on certain charges preferred against him, and under which charges the said Arábi Pacha is now in custody. And I further require that you should immediately on the receipt of this notice inform the said Arábi Pacha that I and the Honourable Mark Napier, an English barrister-at-law, Counsel for the said Arábi Pacha, are now in Cairo waiting to see the said Arábi Pacha, to take his instructions for his defence on his trial on the charges aforesaid, pursuant to and in accordance with the conditions under which the said Arábi Pacha was surrendered by Sir Garnet Wolseley, commanding Her Britannic Majesty's Army in Egypt, to His Highness the Khedive.

Dated this ninth day of October, 1882, at Shepheard's Hotel, Cairo.

RICHARD EVE.

Countersigned,

MARK F. NAPIER,
Barrister-at-law,
Temple, London

"Notwithstanding the notice," continued Mr. Napier, "Riáz Pacha made no sign. We gave him a respite on Tuesday, but the next day we returned

to the charge. Sir Edward Malet now informed us that Riáz had contended that the counsel to be employed must be native Egyptians, and not foreigners, and that he had telegraphed to the Foreign Office for further instructions. It was somewhat cheering, however, to learn from Sir Charles Wilson that Arábi had heard of my arrival, and was satisfied with me as his counsel. In the evening I drew up a short protest and sent it to Sir Edward Malet, as I thought it best to be on the safe side.

Shepherd's Hotel, Cairo,

SIR,

October 11, 1882.

I consider it my imperative duty, as Counsel for Arábi Pacha, to lodge with you the following protest against the conduct of the prosecution.

The following are the most serious causes of complaint:—

1. That Arábi Pacha has, since he was handed over by the British to the Egyptian authorities (the date was, I believe, the 4th of October), been subjected to strict confinement and to a course of rigorous interrogation. He has been denied permission to communicate freely, or at all, with his friends and legal assistants.

2. That notwithstanding the fact that Riáz Pacha was personally informed by me on October 7 that I was present in Cairo as counsel for the defence, and that I required immediate admission to the prisoner, he refused such admission, and has since persisted in such refusal.

3. That, having reference to the publication in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of the 3rd October of a statement that Lord Granville had written to say, "That every reasonable facility

would be afforded the prisoners in Egypt and their friends for obtaining counsel for their defence," no such facility has been afforded, but, on the contrary, every obstruction has been placed in the way of the prisoners' Counsel and Solicitor.

4. That no acknowledgment has been given of a formal notice served upon Riáz Pacha (of which I annex a copy), and that, so far as I know, the prisoner has not even been informed by the Egyptian Government of the fact that I am ready and anxious to assist him in his defence.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

MARK F. NAPIER,

Counsel for Arábi Pacha.

Sir Edward Malet, K.C.B., &c. &c.

"Next day our anxiety was increased by prevalent rumours in Cairo that Arábi had been ill-treated in prison. On the 14th October Sir Charles Wilson called on me, and brought us the good news that English counsel were to be admitted, and that Arábi could be seen. We accordingly drew up one more formal application for admission, and took it to Riáz Pacha. In the evening Sir Charles Wilson again came to see us, but it was only to say that the Khedivial Government had repented itself and that access was once more denied. Next day we learned that the Cabinet was sitting 'on us' for several hours, and preferred resignation to our assistance. In despair we once more had recourse to Sir Edward Malet,

who assured us that the trial would certainly not take place till we saw the accused, and that a fair delay would be granted us to prepare his defence. It is thus that matters now stand."

I at once expressed the heartiest approval of the good work thus done by Messrs. Napier and Eve. The British pluck they had shown had certainly effectually alarmed the Egyptian Government, and the inimical glances of the European residents and local disciples of Sir Samuel Baker and Sir Julian Goldsmid, showed their influence was already felt in Cairo. They had both been very outspoken as to the Egyptian National cause, and in Egypt it is not fashionable to call a spade a spade. We agreed to wait without delay on Sir Edward Malet, and that I should next day transfer myself and my belongings to Shepheard's Hotel.

While waiting for our carriage we strolled into the building which, six months before, served as the Egyptian House of Commons. By a strange irony of fate it was now prepared for the gala trial of the rebel leader. There was a brilliant array of velvet-covered chairs for the judges, comfortable seats and green baize boxes for the 3000 spectators, an imposing tribune for the Public Prosecutor, and a conspicuous platform on which to set Arábi on high before the

people. *There was no kind of provision for the accommodation of any counsel for the defence.* Money had been spent lavishly in providing Cairo with a novel spectacle, but destiny decreed it otherwise:—the Egyptian Senate House was never to witness the trial of Arábi; it was a year later to see the assembling of another Egyptian Parliament, but this time under the auspices of England and Lord Dufferin.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BALCONY AT SHEPHEARD'S HOTEL.

AFTER dusk on the evening of the 18th October we all three called on Sir Edward Malet, who lived in a handsome villa in the Ismaïlia suburb of Cairo. After the fashion of the East, his door was guarded by Turkish or Albanian janissaries in gorgeous costumes of blue and gold, who talked English with considerable fluency. After a few minutes conversation, I saw that Sir Edward was heartily tired of the *vexata quæstio* concerning the fate of Arábi. I pleaded at some length, and as eloquently as I could, our benevolent intentions towards the Egyptian Government, and expressed our earnest desire to assist the course of justice as far as was compatible with the duty we owed to our clients. I urged at the same time, very strongly, the example set us by the French in Tunis. "Had not the invaders of the Regency," I asked, "invariably assigned European counsel to those natives of the country whom they chose to call insurgents, and try by court-martial for opposing, as

far as gun-barrels made out of old gas-pipe enabled them to do so, 'the mission of civilisation' which invaded their fatherland? Were not even the prisoners involved in the Oued Zerga massacre of last year defended by French *avocats*?" "Could," I added, "either England or Egypt do less for a man who had met us face to face on the battle-field?" I hoped we left Sir Edward Malet half convinced, and at least somewhat persuaded, that English counsel were not quite as dangerous as they were supposed to be by Rogers Bey.

From Sir Edward Malet's we returned to Shepheard's Hotel, in the Esbekieh quarter of the city. It is nearly the only building in Cairo I am able to accurately describe, and it played an important part in the story I am going to tell, as I am sure it has done in every event connected with the political history of Egypt any time during the last thirty years. Shepheard's Hotel consists of a rambling and somewhat ruinous two-storied mansion on the left-hand side of the street leading from the railway station to the centre of the city. Its spacious rooms surround a quadrangle, and the garden in which it stands is shaded by luxuriant palm-trees and refreshing green creepers. A short flight of steps leads you from the street into a broad and cool roofed verandah, paved with marble, into which the principal entrance lead-

ing to the refreshment-bar and dining-rooms opens. Shephard's saw its brightest days when Cairo was the half-way house for open-handed Anglo-Indian travellers, who were ever crossing to and fro between Alexandria and Suez, and Suez and Alexandria. It was burned down some seventeen years since, but soon rose again from its ashes. The original founders of Shephard's are almost forgotten now; its actual proprietor, Herr Zech, resides in Europe; but his agents, Mr. Grosse and Signor Luigi, minister most efficiently to the wants of its guests. The verandah of Shephard's Hotel is something more than an ordinary lounge or pleasant site of oriental *dolce far niente*,—it is an Egyptian institution. When we hear in London that "European opinion in Cairo is deeply moved," that "European interests are threatened to their foundation," that "European public opinion approves," or that "Anglo-Egyptian sensitiveness is outraged," we should know that the inmates of the balcony at Shephard's have spoken. The varied forms of easy chair which fill that coolest of cool verandahs are intimately connected with the past, present, and future of Egypt. Its steps form a rubicon which the clamorous donkey-boys and pedlars in the street below hardly dare to cross. Never, I think, in the whole history of Shephard's, was its balcony fuller or more animated than on the night of the 18th

October. The bar within was crowded with junior officers of the army of occupation, while outside, in the short autumn twilight, sat Baker Pacha, who had just arrived from Constantinople to control, for a time, the bran-new Egyptian army; Dr. W. H. Russell, the past-master of special correspondence; Mr. Cameron, representative of the *Standard*; Colonel Synge, the victim of Albanian brigandage, and many other men of note and mark.

There was but one subject of discussion that evening—was Arábi to have European counsel? An enormous majority answered loudly in the negative, for Arábi had few friends. The balcony of Shepherd's Hotel almost unanimously vetoed the proposal, and, as a matter of course, the telegraphic echo in London declared that "European public opinion in Egypt was strongly adverse to any inconvenient innovation of the kind." One of Arábi's most prominent foes in the nightly senate at Shepherd's was, I remember, a German military officer attached to the English staff, who was particularly conspicuous on account of the number of decorations he usually wore. He never ceased to dwell on the absolute necessity of a short shrift for our prisoners of war, and more than all for Arábi. I am not sure that his advice on the subject was altogether disinterested, but I am rejoiced to

say he bet Mr. Eve a sovereign that he would never see his client,—and lost it.

I was glad to make the acquaintance of Mr. Cameron of the *Standard*, who had managed to see Egyptian things through purely English spectacles, and was almost the first to dissent from the general cry for blood and vengeance. He left Cairo next day for Europe, and has since distinguished himself in Madagascar and China. I cannot forget that it was Mr. Cameron who spoke to me the only words of encouragement I heard that evening amongst the various exponents of the *haute politique Égyptienne* in the crowded verandah of Shepherd's Hotel.

CHAPTER VII.

PRELIMINARY SKIRMISHES.

EARLY next morning (October 19th) I prepared to remove from the New Hotel to Shepherd's. Before leaving I had some interesting talk with the under-manager, a Swiss, who, while admitting the wonderful order maintained at Cairo during the Sixty Days War, was particularly bitter against Arábi. He was kind enough to caution me, in case of my client's acquittal, to avoid Alexandria on the return journey, as I might otherwise pay the penalty for his misdeeds in person. After taking possession of my new quarters at Shepherd's I paid a visit to Mr. Moberley Bell, the correspondent of the *Times*, who was also residing there, while Mr. Napier went to the Abdin Palace to ascertain the exact circumstances attending Arábi's arrest or surrender.

After lunch I was quietly sitting in the famous verandah, when a card was brought me. The name it bore was that of a stranger—"Monsieur Octave Borelli"; beneath was pencilled in Sir Edward Malet's

handwriting, "to introduce M. Borelli, legal adviser at the Ministry of the Interior." Before any of my new friends, the correspondents, had noticed my absence, I was in conference with the "counsel on the other side." Monsieur Borelli was one of the most charming and agreeable men I ever met. He had held high office in the French executive, disagreed with the Republican order of ideas, turned to Egypt in sheer disgust, and, in four years, attained the first legal position in the country. He was delighted to make my acquaintance, knew all about my Tunisian differences with M. Roustan, and was sure we should manage everything delightfully *en famille*. I very soon realized two most important facts; the first was, that the Egyptian Government had agreed to allow one or more of the political prisoners to give us their retainers; the other, that our Egyptian colleague cared very little what terms he agreed to, if a public washing of political dirty linen could be either entirely avoided or perceptibly curtailed. He proposed that we should by mutual consent draw up a sort of code of procedure. I replied that nothing could suit us better. He next suggested that the cross-examination of the witnesses should be confined to the preliminary examination or instruction, and that the evidence should be merely read before the court-martial. For strategic reasons I affected to demur.

“But, *mon cher ami*,” said M. Borelli, “you are not to be allowed to speak or even allude to politics. This, I admit, will greatly destroy the interest of the case, but if you will forego your cross-examination in public, I think I might allow a little, very little, speech, and permit some faint, very faint, allusion to contemporary politics.” I at once closed with the proposal. We thus gained three considerable advantages, viz., admission to the preliminary enquiry or *instruction*, which is forbidden by French law; a right to address the court, and, what was more important, to argue from a political point of view. Without knowing it, I had secured terms far in advance of the ideas of our own Foreign Office. I afterwards learned that by a despatch dated the 13th October, which must have arrived in Cairo the day after my conference with M. Borelli, Her Majesty’s Government expressed an opinion that “no arguments or evidence as to political motives or reasons in justification of the offence charged should be admitted, but only such as go to establish or disprove the charges made.” After some further discussion as to the details of our proposed arrangement, M. Borelli took his leave, promising to return later in the evening after seeing the Egyptian ministers.

I returned to the verandah. “Gentlemen,” I said to the correspondents patiently sitting there in search

of the latest intelligence, "I have some news for you. The verdict pronounced here last night has been reversed—Mr. Napier and I are to be allowed to defend Arábi." There was at once a stampede for the telegraph office. Even Dr. Russell scampered briskly off on a famous donkey in that direction, closely pursued by the zealous representative of the Central News. I need not say that Messrs Napier and Eve on their arrival shared my satisfaction at the first-fruits of our joint labours.

M. Borelli did not return, but I received from him a polite letter which was the commencement of an agreeable correspondence on his part, which I should recommend as a model of forensic inter-communication. As we agreed I gradually rose in the scale from *Monsieur* to *Cher Monsieur*, from *Cher Monsieur* to *Cher Monsieur et Confrère*, from *Cher Monsieur et Confrère* to *Bien Cher Ami*, and finally from *Bien Cher Ami* to *Très Cher Ami et Confrère*; and when we disagreed I fell in the scale proportionately to the extent of our divergence until I reached the lowest depths of *M. Borelli présente ses compliments, &c.* Here is my first letter, but it loses its fragrance in translation:—

DEAR SIR,

Cairo, October 19th.

I must beg you to excuse me if, in spite of my efforts to keep it, I missed our appointment of last evening. I believe that all the difficulties will be surmounted to-day, and as soon as

this is accomplished you will see me at your door. I am persuaded that an agreement between us will be an easier matter than it is with diplomats. Kindly induce Mr. Napier to accept my apologies.

Faithfully yours,
O. BORELLI.

At the same time I received a note from Sir Edward Malet:—

DEAR MR. BROADLEY, Cairo, October 19th, 1882.

A considerable step in advance has been made since I had the pleasure of seeing you yesterday. I have asked M. Borelli to call upon you and talk over the procedure of the court. He is legal adviser of the Ministry of the Interior and has been engaged in the preliminary investigation.

Believe me to be,
Yours truly,
EDWARD B. MALET.

I now realized the fact that we were really on the eve of the serious defence of the case, and I saw it would be a long and very costly business. I was convinced that we must take a house, as no native would be likely to run the gauntlet of the verandah at Shephard's, and engage a small army of clerks and translators to assist us with the accused, and copy the enormous record or *dossier* which we learned that the ingenuity of Borelli Bey and his assistants had constructed. I accordingly telegraphed to Mr. Blunt for instructions, and this is his characteristic answer:—

Broadley,
Shepherd's,
Cairo.

Home Government pledged to allow your pleading. Accept no compromise. Expenses your discretion. BLUNT.

We dined together in much better spirits at an excellent café in the Esbekieh Gardens. Later in the evening I made the acquaintance of some of our most notable opponents. It was difficult to recognise in such an eminently mild and amiable man as Rogers Bey (once British Consul at Cairo), the executioner of Arábi in the pages of the *Egyptian Gazette*. We also met Mr. Goodall, who advocated the most extreme measures with the greatest complacency, and who, I since hear, has done good service during the cholera epidemic; and finally, Mr. Philip, the editor and proprietor of the *Egyptian Gazette*, who fought us manfully to the very last, declared consistently that the punishment was more important than the trial, and soon became the inspired exponent of the political creed emanating from the verandah of Shepherd's Hotel. Now the fight is over I am the first to wish the "leading local organ" and Mr. Philip every possible success. Our talk lasted long into the night, but no one seemed inclined to surrender his opinion.

Next morning I again called on Sir Edward Malet. He seemed heartily tired of the whole business, and said his own attitude in the matter had been

thoroughly misunderstood. Some well intentioned ladies in England had even written him anonymous letters as to the dangers of bloodguiltiness in the matter of Arábi. At his suggestion we drove together to see Cherif Pacha the Egyptian Premier. As the Government offices were closed on account of its being Friday, we went to his private house. Cherif lives in a magnificent palace which once belonged to Ismaïl Sadyk the Mufettich. The effect of its white stone and still whiter marble is perfectly dazzling. Cherif received us in a room furnished with sofas and hangings after the manner of the East. There is a curious resemblance between the shabby old stucco palaces in Tunis and the smarter mansions of Cairo. In the latter case the gingerbread is gilded still; in the former it has been long since rubbed off. Cherif Pacha received me very courteously, listened patiently to my reassuring protestations, gave me coffee and cigarettes, and promised to facilitate matters if possible. Sir Edward Malet saw him alone, but I know he energetically supported my pressing request to be allowed access to our clients forthwith. Cherif Pacha might easily be mistaken for an European. He smokes cigars instead of cigarettes, plays billiards admirably, wears a sapphire ring of extraordinary beauty, and claims to be the real head of the Egyptian National party. In our first interview I avoided

all discussion, keeping steadily to the objects of my visit—a settlement of the defence question and admittance to Arábi's cell. In the result Cherif Pacha promised to communicate with Borelli Bey.

Towards noon Mr. Bell kindly accompanied me to visit our most formidable antagonist, Riáz Pacha, Minister of the Interior, who was still smarting under the effects of Mr. Eve's notices and protests. Riáz lives in a modest house almost under the shadow of the citadel, and in the very centre of the native town. He received me courteously, but spoke in a peculiarly spasmodic manner. I could not discover whether this was the result of choleric emotion or asthma. He tried vainly to talk about Tunis instead of Egypt. He seemed much struck with my account of the manner the French had managed their trials in Tunis, and at last very reluctantly said he should oppose our plans no longer, adding that "he hoped good would come of it, which he very much doubted." When I next saw Riáz he was no longer a Minister, and Arábi was on his way to Ceylon.

In the afternoon I received a note from M. Borelli asking Mr. Napier and myself to call on him at his house, to confer further on the proposed procedure-rules. Borelli Bey lives in a villa nearly opposite the British Agency, furnished in the most florid style of oriental luxury. With the aid of coffee and cigarettes

we got through a somewhat dry discussion as to the details, which ended in another reference to Cherif Pacha. The matter was one of very vital consequences, as some alterations now proposed would have prevented our acquiring the unassailable position I hoped to obtain from a stringent arrangement as to our future proceedings.

M. Borelli was good enough, later in the evening, to send us a note as to the charges against our client we should have to meet. This document is one of great importance. It runs as follows:—

Ahmed Arábi and others are accused,—

1st. Of having hoisted the white flag at Alexandria on the morning of the 12th July, in violation of the laws of war and *jus gentium*, and at the same time of having withdrawn his troops, and caused the burning and pillage of the said town.

2nd. Of having excited the Egyptians to arm against the Khedive (a crime provided for by Article 5 of the Military Penal Code and Article 55 of the Ottoman Penal Code).

3rd. Of having continued the war notwithstanding the news of peace (a crime provided for by Article 111 of the Ottoman Penal Code).

4th. Of having excited civil war, and carried devastation, massacre, and pillage into Egyptian territory (a crime provided for by Articles 56 and 57 of the Ottoman Penal Code).

In the evening we were introduced by Mr. Schnitzler, the agent of Reuter's Telegram Company, to the Khedivial Club, the favourite resort of the higher Egyptian officials. I here first met Sir Charles Wilson, who was to take so important a part in the expected trial.

Two days had now passed since my arrival, and somehow or other our access to Arábi appeared as far off as ever. I had concentrated all my efforts on an attempt to score a first success over the procedure question, but we never seemed to pass the goal.

Very early next morning (21st October) Borelli Bey's clerk brought me a letter, together with a neatly-copied document carefully stitched with green silk. I first read the letter :—

Cairo, October 20th, 1882.

MY DEAR MR. BROADLEY,

Here is the draft of procedure I am going to submit for the acceptance of the Government of His Highness. I beg you to inform me if it is in accordance with our verbal agreement. As to the delay of ten days, don't be frightened, and I beg you to accept it. In the first place, they will find it very much too long on my side, and in the second, I am sure it is sufficient. As a matter of fact the *instruction* against Arábi has not terminated, and I will delay its completion for some days to enable you to catch us up. A word in reply at once, if you please, to,

Faithfully yours,

O. BORELLI.

I glanced at the carefully-copied draft stitched with silk. It contained the very stipulations I had contended against, and would have ensured the conviction of the prisoners. I told M. Borelli's messenger that Mr. Napier and I would be with him in a few minutes. When we arrived there, during two weary hours we fought over again the battle of the

procedure. I called once more on Sir Edward Malet, who undertook to point out anew to Cherif Pacha the justice of my contention with M. Borelli. A third day was lost thus. The following morning M. Borelli's messenger came again. This time he brought another letter. I cannot forbear quoting it:—

Cairo, October 21st, 1882.

MY DEAR COLLEAGUE AND FRIEND,

At last the draft we prepared this morning by common consent has been completely ratified by the Government of His Highness. I also think we can include Abd-el-Ál, Ali Fehmy, and Sheikh Abdú in the first batch; then we will obtain the admission of a new element, understanding English and French, into the constitution of the Court.

You see I have kept my word as to our arrangements this morning. I am confident that, as far as you are concerned, you will do the same. We must meet at eight o'clock.

Very faithfully yours,

O. BORELLI.

An hour afterwards all was finished. Borelli Bey on the one side, Mr. Napier and myself on the other, signed the following agreement as to the procedure we consented to adopt:—

RULES.

Article 1.—As soon as the preliminary investigation shall have resulted in the accusation of one or more persons, notice shall be given them by the President of the Commission, informing them that their case will be sent before the Court Martial.

Article 2.—Every accused has the right to choose as his legal adviser a native or foreign lawyer residing in Egypt, at the time when the proceedings of the Court Martial commence.

In the latter case and before all communication with the accused, the advocate must be approved of by the Egyptian Government.

Each advocate may have the assistance of a second advocate, who shall not also address the Court.

Article 3.—All the records of the proceedings of the preliminary enquiry shall be open to the inspection of the advocates in the offices of the Commission.

Article 4.—The advocates shall have the right to produce witnesses and cause them to be heard on all questions relating to the case in the preliminary investigation, and may call all such witnesses as they deem necessary, and this in their presence and in that of the accused, and whether or not the said witnesses have been already heard or not.

Article 5.—The prosecution and defence may produce as valid evidence received before the Commission depositions recorded abroad before competent authorities.

Article 6.—The advocates are obliged to use all reasonable diligence in the proceedings and if their desire to uselessly prolong them be manifest, the President of the Commission may declare the investigation at an end.

Article 7.—The proceedings of the defence shall form an integral part of the preliminary enquiry, which shall be definitely closed either by the agreement of both sides or by order of the President, as mentioned in the preceding article.

Article 8.—The Court Martial may assemble seven days after the termination of the preliminary enquiry, and no further delay shall be sought for on any pretext. The Court has the right to grant fresh delay if urgent necessity arises.

Article 9.—No witness shall appear before the Court Martial either for the prosecution or the defence or by order of the Court.

Article 10.—The eighth day after the preliminary enquiry has terminated, the proceedings of the Court Martial may be

opened. The President shall order that the indictment, examination, and all documents produced in the case shall be read. This completed, the President shall invite the accused or their counsel to address the Court. After the defence the delegate of the preliminary enquiry may answer if he desires it, and in this case the accused or their counsel shall have a right to the last word. Before the termination of the proceedings both parties may deposit written statements of their case.

Article 11.—The judgment of the Court shall be pronounced in open Court.

Article 12.—*The defence shall be free*, but the President may stop any counsel introducing irrelevant matter or using insulting or offensive expressions against the constituted authorities of the country.

As soon as the formality of signing was completed Borelli Bey very good-naturedly set off in search of the order which was to admit us, a few hours later, to the presence of Ahmed Arábi.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARÁBI IN PRISON.

It now became necessary to obtain with as little delay as possible the services of clerks, interpreters, and servants, and prepare for a prolonged stay in Egypt. The task was a difficult one, as the employment we offered entailed a sort of social excommunication from the court faction now in power against those who accepted it. Hasan, one of the Egyptian donkey-owners, cared for none of these things. He loved Arábi and his friends, had a hearty and open contempt for the Khedivial party, and respected the English as victorious invaders and a sure source of income. Ever since he began life as a guide his chief care was to collect certificates from his European patrons. He possesses one from the Prince of Wales, whose liberal backshish elevated him at once from the lower order of donkey-boys to the higher caste of donkey-proprietors, and after whom he gratefully named the first member of his stud. Nevertheless Hasan had been a Nationalist, and cried *Allah yansu-*

rak yá Arábi ("God give you victory, oh Arábi") as loudly as his fellows. Hasan at once changed his dark blue shirt for a silk garment and yellow turban, appointed a deputy donkey-man to look after his business, and installed himself as our courier and factotum. His English is hardly classical, but he is a capital interpreter, is as nearly honest as possible, and can show a stranger Cairo and the Pyramids better than any of his rivals. He enjoyed our entire confidence and that of our clients, who had a wholesome dread of Syrians and Copts. I often used to talk of the crisis through which his country had passed to the faithful Hasan, who thus once expressed his own political views: "Arábi very good man; he tried do good for Egypt, but Arábi not like Hasan. When Hasan takes donkey to Pyramid Hasan thinks how he bring donkey back. Arábi brought we all to Kafr-el-Dowar and Tel-el-Kebir, but Arábi never thought what was to come next."

We engaged as our chief interpreter a straightforward young Welshman, Edward Baldwin Evans, who had recognised Mr. Stanley as a fellow-countryman in the deserts of the Soudan, spent a time in exploring the Red Sea coast, and returned to Egypt with the Indian Contingent. He did us good service, and remained with us to the last. Mr. Evans is now with Hicks Pacha in search of the Mehdi. We also

managed to engage two Armenian clerks, Najib Abcarius and Joseph Kanawaty, both fairly good translators and copyists.

We also decided to-day to leave the comforts of Shephard's Hotel, and hire a large flat in a house nearly opposite, known as the *maison du Mufti*, and rented by Mr. Grosse, Herr Zech's agent. The manager of the hotel undertook to cater for our wants and find us domestic servants. It is only just to them to say that they carried out their agreement to the end in the most liberal and satisfactory manner.

I now thought that our preliminary arrangements were sufficiently advanced to justify my calling on Sir Charles Wilson, who, with his assistants, Lieut.-Colonel Stewart and Captain Chermide, R.E., were living in the handsome mansion of Mr. Alexander Baird, and constituted what may be fairly described as the Egyptian Tyranny and Vexation Detective Department. Sir Charles Wilson had already won respect and fame as a Consul-General in Asia Minor, and no man could have been chosen more fit for the delicate functions he now had to discharge. Firm, intelligent, courteous, just, and a hater of all intrigue and oppression, he never swerved from the path of strict impartiality or shrunk from what he felt to be his duty. He quickly understood the position of the

Egyptian prisoners, the power of their enemies, and the true nature of the evidence gradually piled up against them. The name of Sir Charles Wilson will not easily be forgotten in Egypt, and his return thither would materially aid the fair start we have promised to give her. Colonel Stewart and Captain (now Major) Chermiside steadily followed the example set them by Sir Charles Wilson, and many a wretched prisoner in the remoter provinces of Egypt owes his liberation and life to their painstaking and careful investigation. In my first interview I explained to Sir Charles Wilson the negotiations which had resulted in the adoption of the Procedure Rules, and he promised, in case Borelli Bey's promised order duly arrived, to introduce us to Arábi in the afternoon.

An hour or two later I received at Shepheard's a brief note from Sir Charles Wilson:—

Cairo 21. 10. 82.

DEAR SIR,

Allow me to introduce to you Arábi Pacha's son.

Truly yours,

C. W. WILSON.

A few minutes afterwards, a thin and awkwardly-built young man of two or three and twenty entered my room. His complexion was darker perhaps than that of the ordinary Egyptian, and all intelligence of expression was hopelessly marred by the total destruc-

tion of one eye and a cast in the other. I can never forget his timid, hunted look, and for a moment he seemed hardly able to speak. I did my best to set him at his ease, and, as neither of our interpreters was at hand, I felt much relieved when I saw he understood the Arabic dialect of Tunis. He told me a sad story of the ill-treatment his mother and all his father's family had been subjected to, since the English had entered Cairo, but more than ever after Arábi's surrender to the Khedive, an arrangement which seems to have acted as a signal for the inauguration of a veritable reign of terror.

Messrs. Eve and Napier had hardly joined us, when a messenger from Borelli Bey brought the following order.

TO OSMÁN SHAREEF BIMBÁSHI, KEEPER OF THE PRISON AT THE
DAIRA SANIYA.

Admit Messrs. Broadley, Eve, and Napier, with their interpreter to see Ahmed Arábi whenever they come to the prison.

(Signed) RIÁZ,

Minister of the Interior.

I at once showed this to Muhamed Ibn Ahmed Arábi, who, even amidst his tears, hailed its arrival as an excellent omen. Without any delay, we all three started for the building known as the Daira Saniya.

In a shady street leading from the square surrounding the Khedivial Opera House to the Ismailia quarter, is to be found a vast two-storied mansion, which

might conveniently serve for a workhouse, a hospital, or even an hotel. A great gateway in the centre admits you at once to the paved quadrangle round which it is built, to the passages which lead to the apartments on the ground floor, and the broad deal staircase by which you reach the rooms and corridors of the upper story. The chambers on one side of the house look into the street with its avenue of plane trees ; the windows of all the other rooms open either on the quadrangle or on some back yards. This place is called the *Daira Saniya* because that department once utilized it for offices ; it has also served in turn for a giant hotel, a printing establishment, and a *depôt* for theatrical properties and lumber. Its many rooms, vast extent of white-washed walls, and long corridors certainly fitted it admirably for a prison. The Egyptian Government entertained the same opinion, took possession of it without the consent of the owner, gave it a fresh coat of drab paint throughout, grated and nailed up the windows, put strong bars and locks on the doors, and caused *Arábi* and about a hundred of his friends to be brought there the day before Mr. Napier arrived in Cairo. Opposite the entrance, a large hall on the ground floor paved with marble, filled one entire side of the quadrangle. A corporal's guard of British soldiers occupied the great gateway and the room immediately adjoining it.

On the staircase we met Sir Charles Wilson. The corridors were watched by Egyptian soldiers—all, I believe, Turks and Circassians—armed with rifles. It was warm weather still, and they wore their white summer uniform. Opposite the head of the stairs, a door from the passage (which ran the whole length of the building) led into a large room used for the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry. The adjacent apartment on the right was used as an office; next to it was the cell of Mahmoud Sámi Pasha, and next again that of Arábi. The corresponding room on the other side of the Court was afterwards assigned to us to accommodate our translators. On the doors were rough labels bearing the inscriptions in Arabic, Ahmed Arábi No. 1, Mahmoud Sámi No. 2, &c. As the windows were hermetically closed, the prisoners had been almost stifled by the heat. To remedy this an iron grating was being fixed for the purposes of ventilation over the door of each cell. Arábi's was in course of erection when we arrived, and we were obliged to creep under a ladder amidst a cloud of dust and whitewash to enter his room. The apartment in which he was confined was about twelve or fourteen feet square, and sufficiently lofty. It was lighted by two narrow windows looking into the street, but partially darkened by the grating and half-closed Venetian shutters. Directly Colonel Wilson became

visible, a tall strongly-built man rose from a carpet in the corner of the room nearest the window to greet him. We were then formally presented to our client. At the request of Sir Charles Wilson, Osmán Effendi, the chief gaoler, ordered the guards to bring us a small table and some chairs. The sole furniture of the room when we arrived was a handsome Shiráz rug, a mosquito curtain, a mattress, and some pillows, an embroidered prayer-carpet, a *korán*, and some brass and earthenware vessels. I must not be understood as complaining, for an oriental rarely wants more than this. Arábi wore a pair of undress military trowsers, with white shirt and jacket. He sometimes changed the latter for a black Stambouli or Turkish frock coat. In his hand he held nervously a small rosary, and he did his best to welcome us with as good grace as possible. After Sir Charles Wilson had left us, I presented him a letter from Mr. Blunt which Mr. Napier had brought out. He asked as to allow him to read it.*

While doing so I had an excellent opportunity of studying the face of one about whom all Europe had heard so much. In repose, an almost fixed frown and knitting of the brows can hardly fail to excite an impression of forbidding sullenness, but I soon found

* The letter was, I think, almost a duplicate of that sent to him by Mr. Blunt exactly a month before (*vide* p. 9).

out that this was the effect of deep and constant thought rather than of moroseness or bad temper. Arábi's habit of perpetually thinking has gained him many enemies amongst those who judge by first appearances. When his countenance lights up with animation, the change wrought in his expression is so wonderful that you would hardly recognize him as the same man. His eyes are full of intelligence, and his smile is peculiarly attractive. His complexion is lighter than that of his son, but his nose is too flat and his lips too thick to allow me to describe him as a handsome man. He is considerably over six feet in height, and broad in proportion. During his imprisonment his appearance was materially changed by the growth of a grey beard. After the manner of the Felaheen, a blue band was tattooed round his wrist, and he rarely, if ever, loosened his grasp on a small black rosary he perpetually ran through his fingers when talking. The cloud of anxiety which seemed to overshadow him at first gradually lifted, and before his imprisonment was ended he became almost cheerful.

During the reading of Mr. Blunt's letter he frequently smiled and raised his hand to his forehead in token of gratitude and acquiescence. This habit of Arábi's when perusing his correspondence always struck me as singularly graceful. His peculiar courtesy of manner has rarely failed to impress those with whom

he has come in contact. After he had finished reading the letter he asked me to allow him to use a pen and ink we had brought with us, to write first of all a few lines of thanks to Mr. Blunt and his wife. This completed, Mr. Eve suggested to him that it would be advisable that he should give him a written authority to retain Mr. Napier and myself as his counsel. He complied with the request at once, and affixed his seal to the document. My friend Mr. Villiers, the correspondent of the *Graphic*, took a tracing of it afterwards, but the translator at home fell into some unaccountable errors, and the following extraordinary version must have amused and puzzled the British public when it appeared three weeks later:—

EGYPTIAN COURT OF JUSTICE,
22nd October, 1882.

Verily, I have appointed Mr. Richard Eve, of Aldershot, London—*Officer Kátiyákt* and *Officer Sandáchaná*—to take for my defence Mr. Broadley, of *Long Street*, and Hon. Mark Napier, son of *Officer Campbell*—both the aforesaid.

I—AHMED ARÁBI.

I need hardly say it should read :

I have appointed Mr. Richard Eve, of Aldershot, Solicitor of the High Court of Justice, England, to retain for my defence Mr. Broadley, of Lincoln's Inn, and the Honourable Mark Napier, of the Inner Temple, &c.

This formality duly complied with, I asked Arábi to give us his full confidence and speak unreservedly

of his defence. He first observed that at the end of the campaign (like many other unsuccessful generals had done before him) he had delivered his sword and his honour to General Lowe, and had done so in full confidence that his former opponents in the field and not his political enemies would be the judges of his deserts. He had maintained order, observed the usages of wars in civilized countries, and acted toward his prisoners with humanity and kindness. Surely he could claim some better treatment from England than that which he had received at our hands? Was not our presence there to-day in spite of his enemies a sign that he was not altogether wrong? He had led the Egyptians in a struggle for freedom, and had achieved partial success, when our arms stopped his progress, and the very aspirations of which he was by the will of the whole nation the exponent, were wrecked in the defeat of Tel-el-Kebir and then hopelessly crushed out by the Turkish and Circassian cruelty which had followed it. "If you inquire," said Arábi, "you will discover and be able to prove that all Egypt was with me—the Khedivial family—the old men of Mehemet Ali's time, the Ulemas, the army, and the peasants, but in the presence of prison, arrest, torture, and threats, who will own me now? Why, I should not be surprised if my very children denied me to my face before the Commission of Inquiry." Arábi then

gave a circumstantial account of his own troubles when in prison,* and observed that, if he was treated thus, what could his more humble followers expect or hope for? He said that the Egyptians were timid by

* He subsequently delivered to me the following written statement on the subject:—

“ To my dear friend and defender, Mr. Broadley.

“ God give him protection.

“ In reliance on the good intentions of England towards Egypt, I myself gave up my sword and my person to the good faith and honour of England in surrendering to General Lowe, representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Britannic Army, while there were still in Cairo itself 35,000 soldiers, and an equal number in the various districts; and I remained with the English soldiers in all honour for twenty days—*i. e.*, from the night of the 15th of September to the 4th of October—and on the 5th of October I was put into the Egyptian prison, where I was insulted in a way which cries out against the honour of England and every Englishman; for I was searched by the servants and aghas of the Khedive's palace, and this was repeated four times, even to the length of taking off my boots from my feet; and on the night of the 9th of October, at half-past eight o'clock, after I had fallen asleep, my door was opened, and about ten or more persons entered my room, and one of them said, ‘Arábi, do you know me?’ I said ‘No; who are you, and what do you want from me at such a time?’ He said, ‘I am Ibrahim Agha, whom you were searching for. You dog! You pig!’ and he spat upon me three times, and he insulted and abused me in such a manner that I believed he had been ordered to kill me that night, and he went on in this fashion for about eight minutes, and then went out of my cell.

“ Conduct such as this could never please the faith and honour of England, especially towards me, who gave up myself in trust and confidence on the honour of the English nation.

“ AHMED ARÁBI.

“ October 29, 1882.”

nature and weak in physique; they had nerved themselves for the struggle in which they had been so completely worsted, and they now felt the bitter reaction of despair. Throughout the length and breadth of Egypt his adherents had been thrown into prison, and anybody who knew the country would understand the effect of this upon the minds of the people. He had himself been interrogated by the Commission, but he had little or no control over the evidence they recorded. From what he saw he feared the stoutest-hearted of his followers—such men even as Mahmoud Sámi and Yacoub Sámi—would quail under the moral and physical torture they endured and the abject helplessness of their present position. As regards his own conduct, he thought he had a good defence. “I divide it,” he said, “into two parts—what was done before the 11th July and what happened afterwards. At no time could I be fairly called a rebel. The Khedive shared our opinion that we should return the British fire and the Sultan repeatedly expressed his satisfaction at my proceedings. Afterwards the Khedive became your prisoner, and I continued to follow the orders of the Council of Ministers sanctioned and supported by the whole country, and still approved by the Sultan. If the Khedive and the Sultan are my superiors, I may have been your enemy, but I was not a rebel towards them.

All that I tell you I hope to be able to prove. I fear nothing, as I had no concern with the outbreak at Alexandria last June, or the incendiarism which followed the bombardment."

Arábi promised that as soon as he could see his son he would arrange to give us the papers necessary to make good his case. He said that he was anxious to place in our hands full instructions for his defence if we could obtain him a supply of writing materials, but he hoped we should not at the same time forget his fellow-prisoners, even if they had been induced to incriminate him. All he wanted in prison was a light to work by at night, and leave for his servant to bring his food direct to him. With a grim smile he explained to us the dangers of its passage through the hands of the Circassian sentries, and told us how nearly his friend Abd-el-Ál had been poisoned at an early stage of the National movement. It is hardly to be wondered at that Arábi under these circumstances implored us to use every exertion to obtain the placing of an English guard within as well as without the prison. After an interview which lasted nearly three hours we left the prison very favourably impressed with the conversation and demeanour of our celebrated client. In passing down the corridor between a file of the Turkish and Circassian soldiers on duty we heard a violent kicking at the

door of an adjacent cell. I afterwards learned it was Toulba Pacha endeavouring vainly to attract our attention. He had joined his friend Arábi in telegraphing to Mr. Blunt, and, having seen us through the key-hole, wished to claim a vested interest in the English counsel.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RECOVERY OF ARÁBI'S PAPERS.

NEXT day (Monday, 23rd October) was the great Moslem festival of the Kourbán Bairám. Everybody put on their holiday best, all Pachadom seemed fairly ablaze with decorations and ribbons, and the streets at an early hour were almost impassable by reason of the crowd of carriages and passengers. All the Cairene world and his wife rushed impetuously to do homage to the rising sun, after the manner of the ordinary Egyptian, and Tewfik Pacha was well nigh wearied with flattery and congratulations. Only the British guards marching up and down monotonously outside the palace served to remind him of the cost at which he had propped up his throne, and of the real sentiments of his outraged subjects. The private reception which he held the same day for the benefit of his male and female relatives who had espoused the National cause was hardly calculated to fill his mind with similar satisfaction; and it was somewhat embarrassing at the public levée when Ibrahim Agha

tutunji, who was accused of maltreating Arábi in prison, proceeded to hand round the amber-mouthed *chibuks* to the Foreign Representatives.

As soon as possible Mr. Napier and I went to the prison to wish Arábi the usual compliments of the day. We brought with us a leather despatch-case for his use and an abundant supply of writing materials. Arábi was more cheerful than on the occasion of our previous visit, and asked us to convey his compliments to Sir Edward Malet, with an expression of regret that he could not offer them personally, as he had done the previous year. I explained to him the great importance of any documentary evidence he might have to offer in his defence, and entreated him to give us a proof of his confidence by trusting us implicitly. I dwelt at some length on the relations of legal adviser and client as we understand them in England, and pointed out the imminent danger of any reservations on his part. Arábi seemed convinced by what we said. He merely answered, "To secure what you want I must see my son or my servant Muhamed Ibn Ahmed. I have still many papers safe, but a quantity have been taken from my house in Cairo and my tent at Tel-el-Kebir."

On leaving him I applied to the chief-gaoler Osmán Shareef bimbashi, but he sternly refused to allow either the son or the servant to enter the cell. This

worthy man had himself taken a share in the national defence, but his indiscretion was overlooked along with the misdoings of most of the Turks and Circassians, for it was hardly possible for Tewfik Pacha, even with the assistance of an army of occupation, to put all Egypt in arrest. Osmán Effendi was a sort of political thermometer. When the restored Khedive seemed omnipotent he was conveniently absent at the very hour when the valets and pipe-bearers came to work their wicked will; he treated the prisoners with decent civility after our admission as counsel; he felt an active and not altogether disinterested anxiety for their welfare when the more serious charges were abandoned; and after the formal trial became absolutely benevolent and almost patriotic. The very next morning I saw him busily engaged in adding the word Pacha in very large letters to the labels on the doors of their respective cells. Nothing in Egypt is so powerful as power. On the whole Osmán Effendi did his duty well, and I was very glad when Sir Charles Wilson interfered to prevent his premature promotion to the Soudan force as an official recognition of too great leniency towards those in his custody.

In our dilemma we appealed to Sir Edward Malet and Sir Charles Wilson, and we did not do this in vain. The same evening Arábi's faithful servant, the negro half-caste Muhamed Ibn Ahmed, accompanied

Sir Charles Wilson and myself to his master's cell. Muhamed respectfully kissed the Pacha's sleeve, and showed him a paper he had brought with him. I did not know what it was then, but I do now. An Egyptian princess who had supported warmly the now hopeless cause wrote him a letter sealed with her signet in which she advised him to place complete confidence in Mr. Napier and myself, and give us all the documents he still retained. Arábi then described to his servant the different places in which he would find the papers, and directed him to tell his son to give them to us "without fear or diffidence." No man I met in Egypt deserved more respect than poor Muhamed Ibn Ahmed, who has since accompanied Arábi into exile. He had probably no other property in the world than a blue shirt and a ragged cloth coat to cover it, but neither threats nor bribes could shake his allegiance to his fallen master. It was dark when we left the prison, and I asked him with some anxiety when he thought he could bring me the papers. He said it would take him all night to carry out the Pacha's orders, but that he had no doubt he could give them to me in the morning. I impressed on him the importance of the mission entrusted to him, and rejoined Mr. Napier at Shepherd's. Meanwhile my colleagues had been fully occupied. Mr. Eve prepared after the fashion of English solicitors formal briefs to

deliver to us on behalf of Arábi before leaving Cairo for England the next day, and Mr. Napier drew up from the Blue Books a clear and succinct narrative of events in Egypt during the past two years. I now felt the absolute need of a more than ordinarily able interpreter to assist us in the case, and one who could translate with facility into Arabic as well as from it. Such a man must be found if we were to present written statements in Arabic to the Court as I proposed to do. I at once thought of Mr. David Santillana, one of the most accomplished living Arabic scholars, who had lost his post of Secretary to the Tunisian Government for a too zealous opposition to the earlier stages of French aggression. That very evening I telegraphed to him at Rome to come to Cairo without delay.

The festival of the Kourbán Bairám was almost an eventful day at Cairo. A telegram arrived which brought the news of a serious rising in the Soudan under the auspices of the Mehdi. I met Dr. Schweinfürth, the celebrated traveller, who took the gloomiest view of the new misfortune, and much anxiety prevailed in the verandah of Shepheard's Hotel. It was extremely fortunate that no pardonable confusion was ever created in the public mind between the cause of the Mehdi and that of Arábi (as happened to the unfortunate Bey of Tunis, who was somehow or other

connected telegraphically with the massacre of the *mission* Flatters), or it might have been fatal to him at this critical juncture.

Next morning early Arábi's son and the youth Muhamed Ibn Ahmed came to my room.

Arábi's wife, they said, had got the papers, and some of the neighbours had frightened her with a report that her husband was to be surrendered to the tender mercies of the Sultan. Neither of them knew where she had gone. If I ever spoke sternly I did then. I conjured them both once more to perform at all risks what Arábi had told them to do. They seemed alarmed, and promised to make another trial. Two hours later they returned in a close carriage. I went across the verandah to meet them. Arábi's son put a large bundle into my hands. We retired to our common sitting-room. From a cloth, the chief feature of which was a yellow ace of clubs on a white ground (I retain it still), we extracted a large number of Arabic documents of all sorts and sizes. Having dismissed, with very hearty thanks, our visitors, Mr. Napier and I decided that it would be most prudent to deposit those papers in the British Consulate. I took them to Sir Edward Malet at once, and he agreed to what I proposed, and at my request allowed Mr. Ardern Beaman, a student-interpreter attached to the agency, and then doing duty with Sir Charles Wilson, to translate

them. Later in the day Sir Charles and myself attended at the British Consulate and placed our initials and a number on each separate document, finally leaving the whole of them in Mr. Beaman's custody. The recovery of these papers caused much excitement at Cairo, and, I have since heard, not a little heart-burning at Constantinople.

CHAPTER X.

A DIGRESSION FROM THE BLUE-BOOKS.

I MUST ask my reader's pardon if I leave Arábi for a moment busy with his written instructions at the Daira Saniya prison, in order to sketch as briefly as possible the course of events which brought him there. Rightly or wrongly, I think some recapitulation of this sort necessary to convey an accurate idea of the circumstances which immediately surrounded the disappearance of the national leaders for a time at least from the stage of Egyptian politics. History is made quickly now-a-days ; and, as facts crowd upon each other with astounding and confusing rapidity, the memory needs a good deal of assistance to enable us to keep up with the pace we were moving at. To really understand Arábi's position at the time I am now describing we must first take a glance at the past.

To do this a reference to the Blue-Books is amply sufficient ; for, strange to say, a very excellent defence for my client could have been compiled from their pages alone. The manufacture of Blue-Books is

a department of literature which is an essential feature of the age of special correspondence and quick history-making in which we live. Their aim is to disclose as little as possible, to make the rough smooth, the crooked straight, and to create pleasant impressions of a more or less ambiguous and indistinct nature. If they could appear at stated times in neat yearly volumes they would tell us almost nothing at all; but the stern necessity which compels their uncertain publication at intervals allows of much truth escaping between the joints. Mr. Seymour Keay* in his masterly pamphlet, aided only by the light of the Blue-Books, has very effectually told the truth about Egyptian finance. If he had spoken earlier I am inclined to think that the war in Egypt would have been averted, and that I should never have defended Arábi. Strange to say, although no single contributor to these same Blue-Books regarded even with tolerance the aspirations of Egyptian Nationalism, a not unfavourable history of its later phases (for the cause itself dates back to a time before the accession of Tewfik Pacha) can be constructed from them. I have unfortunately no space to apply again in detail the crucial tests invented by Mr. Keay, but I shall endeavour by the help of these

* *Spoiling the Egyptians.* London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1882.

records to write the brief narrative which I believe to be essential to the story I have undertaken to tell.

The curtain of the official and orthodox version of the Egyptian drama draws up somewhat abruptly. We hear nothing of the circumstances which attended an attempt to seize the persons of Arábi and his two fellow colonels in February 1881, or the civil and military grievances which fostered the growing discontent and gave an increasingly practical shape to the National cause. Upon this scene of vacillation, double-dealing, tortuous intrigue, and wanton tyranny, the Blue-Books are silent. Their history begins with the military *pronunciamento* of the 9th September following. It really seems to have amounted to little more than a military review, and there is nothing to show the soldiers who participated in it were even supplied with ammunition. Their bearing was certainly neither tumultuous nor disorderly. Colonel Arábi presented the popular demands, which were three in number: 1st. The resignation or dismissal of the Riáz ministry; 2nd. The convocation of a national parliament; 3rd. The raising of the numerical strength of the army to 18,000, the limit prescribed by law. Arábi had in anticipation of his action written letters to the French and English agents at Cairo setting forth the causes of the demonstrations. The Khedive yielded every-

thing with a somewhat suspicious alacrity, and three days later Cherif Pacha (the avowed champion of Egyptian Nationalism in the last days of Ismail's reign) held his first Cabinet Council with Mahmoud Sámi (Arábi's future chief) as Minister of War and Ismail Pacha Eyoub (Arábi's future judge) as head of the Department of Public Works.

The convocation of the old Chamber of Notables of 150 members, and the increase of the army, are successively decreed. Everything now seemed to be going smoothly, but appearances were singularly fallacious. Tewfik Pacha, while outwardly supporting the Egyptian Nationalists, had really turned his eyes expectantly towards his suzerain at Stamboul. The Porte successively proposed military intervention and the sending of an Imperial Commission. England and France strongly opposed both. Sir Edward Malet sees the Sultan, who deprecates the existence of representative institutions in Egypt. On his return to Cairo (October 2nd, 1881), Sir Edward writes a remarkable despatch showing that he was at this time perfectly aware of the existence of Turkish intrigues, and detailing the causes of the *pronunciamiento* of the previous month. He admits the actuality of the plot to arrest the three Colonels, the crying and continued neglect to carry out promised reforms, and the treachery of Riáz in his relations to the

officers. Four days later "the trusty Ali Nizámi Pacha and Fuád Bey, sent to the Khedive by the Sultan as assistants and advisers," land at Alexandria.* Great Britain and France now determine to send ships of war as an antidote. Sir Edward Malet writes (October 10th) that the "rumour causes great agitation among the natives," and Cherif tells him clearly that such a step will inevitably "*create disturbance among the whole Arab population, and lead to a general revolution.*" A compromise is, however, arrived at. The Turkish envoys are to return to Constantinople, Arábi is to join his regiment in the interior, and the ships are to quit Egyptian waters. Before leaving Cairo, Arábi visits the English Comptroller, Mr. (now Sir Auckland) Colvin, on whom his "bearing and language produced a most favourable impression." Since the 11th September, Arábi seems to have become by the tacit vote of his fellow-countrymen the recognized leader of the "national cause,"—an expression now frequently used on all hands in the despatches, although its very existence has since been denounced as an impudent fabrication.

Once more Egyptian affairs wear a deceptive appearance of peace. The new year (1882) opens with three important events, viz., the opening of the Chambers by the Khedive in a speech replete with a

* The story of their proceedings is told in a later chapter.

colourless kind of patriotism, the appointment of Arábi (still only Colonel Arábi Bey) as Under-Secretary of State for War, and the presentation of the Joint and Identic Note on the part of England and France. Lord Granville had unfortunately and apparently with much reluctance fallen into a trap insidiously laid for him by M. Gambetta, who had invented the project in question as a convenient instrument for the furtherance of French ambition on the banks of the Nile, but who, by a cruel decree of fate, only lived long enough to see it bear the bitterest of bitter fruit both for him and for France.* In this dual note France and England declared emphatically that they were determined to maintain the order of things in Egypt and support the Khedive.

Now comes a long, intricate, and acrimonious discussion as to the new rules for the organisation of the Chamber. On the 11th January, Lord Granville

* We must always bear in mind that according to the hereditary foreign policy of France, which never undergoes any perceptible change, Egypt is a part of the great empire of the future—*Carthage Gauloise*. Napoleon III. wrote hopefully of the time when “the French supremacy, established at the foot of Mount Atlas,” should “appear to the Arabs an intervention of Providence, and the glory of France resound from Tunis to the Euphrates.” The popular pamphlet, *La Régénération Militaire Française*, asserts boldly that “Africa belongs to-day to France, and, by the aid of her camels and dromedaries, France is to go to the Soudan, and from Tunis to the Euphrates”; while even M. de Freycinet plainly told Colonel Flatters that a French party must be formed in the Soudan.

writes or telegraphs that "Her Majesty's Government do not wish to commit themselves to a total and permanent exclusion of the Chamber from handling the Budget," but adds that caution must be observed, "*regard being had to the pecuniary interests for which Her Majesty's Government have been acting.*" He asks in conclusion what would be the result if the Chamber were to be allowed to deal with the revenues not appropriated to the payment of the public debt. Sir Edward Malet answers promptly (January 16th), by letter or telegraph, that the official salaries not regulated by contract would be under the control of the Chamber, which might abolish the Land Survey and "*dismiss many Europeans from the Administration.*" A despatch written three days later shows that Sultán Pacha, President of the Chamber (a timid patriot of whom I shall often have occasion to speak), at this time emphatically and repeatedly declared that he was in no way acting under the pressure of the military party, but that the course he proposed and advocated, *i.e.*, the voting by the Chamber of the "unappropriated" portion of the Budget, was sanctioned by the unanimous wish of the country, of which he was the true representative and spokesman.

The situation becomes more and more strained. Cherif Pacha seems to feebly hesitate between both sides, and on the 3rd February, after receiving a

petition from a deputation of the Chamber of Notables, the Khedive dismisses the Cabinet over which he presided, and called to office a purely National Ministry under Mahmoud Pacha Sámi. The different portfolios were distributed thus:—Ali Sadik, Finance; Ahmed Arábi, War; Mustapha Fehmy, Foreign Affairs; Hasan Sherai, Religious Trusts; Mahmoud Fehmy, Public Works; and Abdullah Fikri, Public Instruction. Notwithstanding the opposition of the French and English agents “in support of the pecuniary interests for which they were acting,” the Khedive on the 8th February approved the new organic law for the Chamber, including the Budget Articles, and on the same day Mustapha Fehmy presented a very logical and convincing memorandum protesting against the interference of the foreign Consuls - General in a matter of pure internal administration. Almost simultaneously the Sultan telegraphs to the Khedive that he should “leave this discussion of the Budget to the Chambers.” The new premier addresses to the Khedive a moderate and intelligent programme, and received the next day the following letter in reply; the original of which is now in my possession:—

4th February, 1882.

MY DEAR MAHMOUD SÁMI PACHA,

In accepting the task of forming a new Cabinet, with a full knowledge of the importance of that mission, you give a fresh proof of your devotion and patriotism. If I have entrusted you

with this duty, it is because I am acquainted with the noble sentiments of which you have given so many proofs in the various services you have rendered in the different posts you have occupied. I approve your programme and the principles which you elaborate in it. They are the very basis of justice, and are calculated to maintain and secure order in the country, as well as the safety of all those who inhabit it.

I agree with you that my Government should take the necessary steps for carrying out judicial and administrative reforms, and that it should also promulgate for the Chamber of Deputies Organic Laws in accordance with the ideas expressed in your programme.

My Government must also undertake the duty of developing as much as possible Public Instruction, Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry. In the carrying out of your plans you may always count on my sincere and loyal co-operation.

I pray God to crown with success our common efforts for the good of the country, and prosperity of the people!

MEHEMET TEWFIK.

Poor Mahmoud Sámi's scheme is almost a prophetic synopsis of Lord Dufferin's report, and the two may be read instructively side by side.

Sir Edward Malet now takes leave (March 17th), and things once again assume a peaceful appearance. Mr. Cookson is in charge, and on the 20th March he speaks of Arábi as likely to resist Turkish intrigues for the restoration of Halim. In April Sir Edward Malet returns, and the serenity of the situation is disturbed by the Circassian Plot against the life of Arábi, which is treated as genuine, and the existence of which is fully admitted by the Khedive, Tewfik who sees great

danger to himself from the same source. In his despatch of the 23rd April, Sir Edward describes this "young and amiable prince" as a sort of model constitutional sovereign, but observes that "he had been urged to place himself at the head of the National movement, a course which would have obliged him to get rid of the European officials." The Circassians are tried, and in the result simply exiled, the Khedive commuting the sentence originally passed upon them.

On the 14th May, in consequence of some alarming rumours, Sir Edward Malet was instructed to see Arábi and inform him that if any violation of the peace occurred the whole of Europe, as well as England and France, would hold him personally responsible, but that if he remained loyal, &c., "his acts and person would be favourably regarded." Arábi answers that he will guarantee public safety, so long as the fleets do not come to Alexandria, as it had been reported they would. Sir Edward Malet accepted Arábi's pledge, but he wrote to Lord Granville that the "*political advantage of the arrival of the fleet is so great as to override the danger it might possibly cause to Europeans at Cairo.*" It was resolved both in Downing Street and the Quai D'Orsay (where most fortunately for the peace of Europe M. de Freycinet had replaced M. Gambetta), to send the fleets to Alexandria, and to give the follow-

ing identic instructions to the Consuls-General at Cairo.

1st. To declare that England and France only interfered to re-establish the Khedive's authority and maintain the status quo (but the Khedive himself professed the most perfect accord with the programme of *mon cher Mahmoud Sâmî*, and that the principles of the National cause were the very foundation of justice itself). 2nd. To advise the Khedive to dismiss the Ministry on the first favourable opportunity. 3rd. To make it understood that if all went well (the first two courses of action being calculated in a very high degree to produce a precisely contrary effect) indulgence would be shown to Arábi and his friends.

Sir Edward Malet acted as he was directed. The second joint-note was presented, but Arábi declined self-imposed banishment, and the Ministry at first refused to resign. Some days later (May 25th) they surrendered their portfolios on the ground that Tewfik Pacha had accepted the identic-note contrary to their unanimous advice. The under-secretaries are directed to carry on the current business of their departments. Public meetings, however, supported Arábi, and he was reinstated as Minister of War. The fleet arrives at Alexandria to accord a moral support to the dual note. The Khedive, now apparently without any opposition on our part, takes refuge once more in an Imperial Ottoman Commission. On the 3rd of June Dervesh Pacha and Ahmed Essad, with their suite, set out from Constantinople. The English Admiral

now complains that new fortifications are being constructed at Alexandria, and a representation is made to the Sultan, who receives an assurance by telegraph from the Khedive that nothing of the kind would be done. Arábi now strongly denies that he used any undue influence to promote agitation for his restoration to office, and, although Sir Edward Malet contradicts this, no kind of evidence to prove it is placed on record. Dervesh arrives * (June 7th) and proceeds to Cairo.

At this time England seems to have placed some faith in the efficacy of Turkish intervention, for, on the 8th of June, the *sovereignty* of the Sultan over Egypt is very explicitly acknowledged, and we hear Musurus Pacha had been assured that "England was desirous of maintaining his Majesty's rights as such." Dervesh Pacha appears to have begun his mission by coquetting first with the Khedive, and then with the Nationalists, and to have done little or nothing else. We now see, from the despatches, that Omar Pacha Loutfi, Arábi's ultimate successor and actual Egyptian War Minister, was now at Cairo. It is no where apparent when he rejoined his post.

He was certainly in Alexandria on the 11th June when a serious riot (since known as the Alexandria massacre) broke out. Several Europeans and natives

* For some account of the proceedings of the Turkish mission, see *post.*

were killed before the soldiers quelled the tumult. The Blue-Books unmistakeably convey the impression that Omar Loutfi was almost a passive spectator of the scene,* and they establish clearly enough that the disturbance was planned and not accidental, that there was hardly any difference between the conduct of the mustaphazin or police and that of the mob, and that the troops alone exerted themselves to restore order and prevent further outrage.

Next day a meeting was held at the Palace in Cairo. In the presence of the Foreign Representatives and the Khedive, Dervesh Pacha and Arábi enter into a solemn joint compact "on their own responsibility to preserve order in Egypt and obey the Khedive, who is '*instructed by our august Sovereign the Prince of the Faithful.*' "

The crisis is now approaching. Arábi never ceases to complain of the "perpetual menace" of the fleet; while Sir Beauchamp Seymour writes despatch after despatch as to the "perpetual menace" of the forts. Dervesh cynically tells Sir Edward Malet that the army is to be concentrated at Alexandria in order that "its resistance, if needed, may be crushed at one blow," and Sir Edward Malet believes him. The

* "Two clerks, the brothers Onofrio, testify that they saw Omar Loutfi a few yards from Mr. Cookson, when that gentleman was felled by a blow from a club, and that, though surrounded either by soldiers or police (it is not clear which), he never did anything to assist him.

Khedive and Dervesh (June 13th) now go to Alexandria. It is clear something must be done, and done quickly. Lord Granville proposes that *the Porte should be invited to join the Powers in landing troops in Egypt*, but Sir Edward Malet (June 17th) at the eleventh hour counsels an appeal to the much abused *National Party*, the very existence of which is now denied. The Notables were to be summoned, an expression of the wishes of the country was to be sought for, and a constitution was to be promised. The whole was to “*produce a union between Notables and the Military Party, whose watch-words are patriotism and law.*” After much political marching and countermarching the Khedive decided (June 17th) to form a sort of coalition ministry under Rágheb, an old official of his father’s time. The new Cabinet comprised Arábi and one or two other members of the defunct Sámi cabinet. This step was brought about by the influence of Germany and Austria; but England and France declined to recognise the ministers, and Mr. Cartwright (who acted for Sir Edward Malet during an attack of fever) was instructed only to communicate with the President, and then exclusively concerning the preservation of the lives of British subjects. In the midst of the confusion Khedive Tewfik now appears as the object of a diplomatical tug of war. Dervesh and the

Sultan ordered him back to Cairo, Sir Archibald Colvin forbade him to quit Alexandria.

Nothing daunted, the octogenarian President of the Council issued (June 20th) a fair and liberal programme. All political offences, except participation in the events of June 11th, were to be amnestied, the Khedive was to rule constitutionally, in accordance with Ismaïl Pacha's rescript of August 28th, 1878 (in other words with the counsel and advice of his ministers); nobody was to be punished except in virtue of a legal enactment, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs should henceforth exclusively communicate officially with the foreign political agents. A week later (July 26th) the Sultan thinks he will send troops. At this time, it must be remembered, neither the Khedive nor any of his friends even breathed a suspicion of Arábi's complicity in the June riots, none of the evidence then adduced tended in any way to prove it, and he now finally received the Grand Cordon of the Mejidieh by the Sultan. Even Lord Dufferin, when he went for an explanation to the Yildiz Kiosk, was forced to content himself with the oracular assurance that "the time would come when he would entirely applaud the act." Tewfik next addresses to "*mon cher Râgheb Pacha*" as entire an approval of his programme as he had accorded four months before to "*mon cher Mahmoud*

Sámi," and on the 10th July Dervesh presents to Mr. Cartwright a really able protest against the threatening attitude assumed by the British fleet, in which he stated that the Khedive would stand or fall with his ministry. Three days before (doubtless under the influence of Dervesh) Tewfik had himself declared to Mr. Colvin that he could not abandon Egypt *when attacked by a foreign power*, and telegraphed to the Porte that *there was no truth whatever* in the reports of the forts at Alexandria being further strengthened after the receipt of orders to the contrary from Constantinople.

The councils held under the presidency of the Khedive and Dervesh are not even mentioned, but a full account is given of the bombardment. Much horror is expressed at the use of futile negotiations and the white flag "to gain time." The British representatives both at Constantinople and Alexandria (where the Khedive has now placed himself under our protection) are instructed to insist on the official proclamation of Arábi as a rebel. The Sultan "turns the conversation," while the inspired Turkish press boldly asserts, without fear of contradiction, that "Turkish troops are going to Egypt to protect the native population from the unjust aggression of the stranger," and loudly extols the piety and patriotism of Arábi. The Khedive hesitates, but at last dismisses Arábi,

appoints Omer Loutfi in his stead, promises pardon to those who return to their allegiance, and finally declares Arábi a rebel in a document of an ambiguous and unsatisfactory character, which was published nearly a fortnight after the bombardment (July 24th). Its opening sentences ran thus:—

Let all who read this Order know the reasons for which Arábi Pacha has been dismissed, and for the edification of everybody this is the truth :—

After a bombardment of six hours our fortifications were destroyed, 400 cannons rendered useless, and most of our gunners killed or wounded. Ahmed Arábi Pacha then came to the palace of Ramleh to give me the mournful news of the destruction of our forts. On his part the English Admiral demanded that I should evacuate the forts of El Adjemi, &c., in order that he might occupy them with his troops. The Council of Ministers, assisted by H.E. Dervesh Pacha, then met, and it was decided that the forts could not be given up without the sanction of H.I.M., the Sultan, but that, on the contrary, that their garrisons should be reinforced in order to oppose the disembarkation of foreign troops. At the same time a telegram was addressed to the Sublime Porte. Arábi Pacha then went to the Rosetta Gate at Alexandria without causing the execution of any military operation. I had him followed by an aide-de-camp to remind him to send the reinforcements to the place fixed upon. Arábi Pacha answered him that he would not send him a single soldier, and went towards Kafr-el-Dowar, leaving the town deprived of its defenders. The following day the English troops disembarked at Alexandria, the most important point of our country, and took possession of the town without a single shot being fired, a fact which would dishonour the Egyptian army if the indelible shame of it did not fall on its author—on Arábi Pacha.

And so on to the end. In a word, Arábi was declared a rebel because he did not beat the English at Alexandria.

A humorous element pervades to a very great extent every phase of oriental affairs. The Blue-Books have by no means escaped the infection, and I am reluctantly obliged to give up following the Constantinople despatches of Lord Dufferin. His highly diverting description of the eccentricities of the Conference, of his endeavours to obtain a proclamation against Arábi, and of the negotiations which successfully prevented a Turkish army going to Egypt, deserve a more popular form than a mere official record. Their gentle sarcasm and playful irony is, however, almost rivalled by the somewhat broader merriment of a sort of post-dated Court Journal composed by a talented junior member of the diplomatic corps—Mr. Gerald H. Portal—which tells us the details of the Khedive Tewfik's *mauvais quart d'heure* at Ramleh on the 11th and 12th July, and which appears with due solemnity as Inclosure 471 in Blue-Book No. 11 of 1882. The following extracts will give a faint idea of its merits:—

It was afterwards discovered that the chief baker of the Palace went to Arábi Pacha and informed him that the Khedive and his party, thinking that the Egyptian army was suffering severely, was highly delighted (*en était rayonnant*), and he asked that the troops be told off to attack the palace.

Shortly after Toulba's departure the Ramleh Palace had been

suddenly surrounded by cavalry and infantry, about 400 men in all, in the roughest dress, many being without even trousers, others without coats. The first thought of those in the Palace was of the Bedouins who had declared their fidelity in the morning; but it was soon discovered that nearly 2,000*l.* sterling had been distributed among these and other loyalists by Arábi's agents, in order to insure their absence, and that the Khedive was consequently left helpless, with his handful of attendants. Panic spread in the Palace; the servants became completely beside themselves with fear. The Khedive himself showed the most complete self-possession and calmness; he exchanged his slippers for boots and then ordered a rifle to be brought to him. Dervesh Pacha followed his example (as to the substitution of slippers for boots?), declaring, with tears in his eyes, his intention of dying at the feet of His Highness.

A General Council was called in the Palace to consider the dangers of the situation.

Dervesh Pacha advised that they should escape to Benha, and go from thence to Suez.

Others were in favour of going to Cairo. But the Khedive would not listen to this advice.

It was finally determined that the most important point was to inform the Admiral of the situation, and, if possible, to get within reach of the fleet. This state of uncertainty and anxiety continued till the next morning, when (July 13) the Bimbochi (Commander) of the troops, Munib Effendi, declared himself to be loyal to the Khedive. He was summoned to the presence, and His Highness made him a firm and impressive speech, which brought tears into his eyes. The other officers of his company were called up, and they all swore their devotion to the Khedive, and kissed His Highness's hand, and that of Dervesh Pacha.

A distribution of decorations by the Khedive followed, and confidence was greatly restored.

Zohrab Bey was then sent to the Admiral, to inform his Excellency that His Highness wished to go on board the "Mahroussa," or, better still, to the Ras-el-Tin Palace, should the latter not be destroyed.

At 1 o'clock Zohrab returned with the news that the Admiral had set a guard at Gabári and the arsenal. Whereupon, at 2 o'clock, Tigrane Bey was sent to announce to the Admiral that the Khedive would start for the arsenal in an hour.

At about 4 o'clock His Highness arrived at the Ras-el-Tin Palace, having been met on the road by Sir A. Colvin and Mr. Cartwright, while at the foot of the staircase he was received by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour.

At length (August 9th) Lord Dufferin obtains from the Sultan *the draft* of a proclamation setting forth that "the Ottoman Government considered Arábi a rebel," but it does not appear to have been officially published till the end of the war. Two days before the Khedive (now entirely docile) was pleased to pronounce an amended anathema on Arábi, which began as follows:—

To all Egyptians.

WE, the Khedive of Egypt, bring to the knowledge of the public that Ahmed Arábi Pacha has committed odious deeds, whose consequences to Egypt and its inhabitants are such that the Powers are not favourably disposed to Egyptians, and look upon them as an uncivilized people.

These deeds consist in the disobedience of Arábi, and his incitations to revolt, and to the intrigues which led to the first massacre in Alexandria and the latter events in Tanta and other towns, which put a stop to commerce and agriculture, and especially in his disobedience to the orders of His Imperial

Majesty the Sultan,* which were given with a view of causing the cessation of the demonstrations which he very wrongly continued to make on the fortifications of Alexandria, which have resulted in the ruin of those forts and the death of the men in them.

The record of the Blue-Books published prior to the trial of Arábi now almost terminates. Cherif and Riáz (who has returned from his sojourn at Geneva) succeed Rágheb (August 27th), while Omar Loutfi remains their colleague at the War Office, as a reward for his devotion to the Khedive; Sir Garnet Wolseley's orders are declared (August 22nd) to have the same force as those of His Highness, and a little later (August 28th) the Egyptian Government are required by Lórd Granville to agree not to execute any prisoner-of-war surrendered to them in the course of the "military operations" without the consent of England. The series concludes with an account of the negociations which led to our being allowed to defend Arábi and several of his colleagues who had been thus given up to the local authorities. Here the story of the Blue-Books ends.

The result of their perusal is scarcely edifying, when one reflects that they make a page of English history. There is no mention of our road to the East being menaced, and for a long time nothing is said of

* This is in direct contradiction to the Khedive's own telegram to the Sultan on the eve of the bombardment. See p. 93.

that obligation "to restore order," which seems to be the English equivalent for the *mission de civilisation* of French opportunism. Mr. Justin M'Carthy * very truly observes that "not often in history is the real and inspiring motive of a war proclaimed in so many words by those who carry it on. Not often, indeed, is it seen, naked and avowed, even in the minds of its promoters themselves." If anything at all transpires from the Blue-Books as to the reasons for our "military operations" in Egypt, they will be seen to exist only in the necessity of the defence of British pecuniary interests in that country. These same unwilling witnesses, I think, make it sufficiently clear to the mind of any impartial person that the movement headed by Arábi was the genuine outcome of the national aspirations of the Egyptians, that complete unison existed between public opinion and his proceedings as a popular leader, and that, in view of the action of the Sultan and the Khedive, no charge of rebellion or high treason could be fairly sustained either against Arábi or his friends.

* *A History of Our Own Times*. London, 1882. Vol. i. p. 119.

CHAPTER XI.

THE TWO COLONELS.

EXACTLY a week after my arrival in Cairo, we moved into our new quarters in the *maison du mufti*. Two entrances, opening into different streets, admitted of a considerable amount of free visiting, and gave much trouble to the police agents who were told off to watch us. The arcade over which the house was partially built served as the dormitory of the corps of Cairo lamplighters, and late in the evening we could only reach our door by walking over their bodies in the dark. Before the arrangement was explained to me, I innocently imagined it to be a part of the system of *espionage*, to which we were naturally subjected according to the customs of the country, and which cost one or two of our clients very dearly. A great room in the centre of the house served as a general office for ourselves and our clerks. I once jokingly called it the *Bureau de la défense nationale*, and this was telegraphed to Paris, with the addition that 50,000*l.* had been subscribed for its support. .

The chamber in question was in form an irregular pentagon, and had once done duty as a fashionable gambling-saloon. During the nine weeks we inhabited it, it witnessed several curious incidents connected with our work, and not a few very agreeable meetings. We had not been there a day before the wisdom of our change of residence became evident. The passage of the verandah had presented a formidable difficulty while we were at Shephard's Hotel, but now the friends and relatives of the nationalist prisoners began to come to us. At first they showed a preference for inconveniently early hours in the morning, or the gloom of an Egyptian twilight; but they soon found out that the presence of our English troops removed all real cause of fear. Arábi's son and servant for many days told us sad tales of the persecution the family was subjected to in their hiding-place in some obscure part of the city. Beshir, a Nubian slave of Toulba Pacha's, came to ask us to defend his master, and affixed his seal with becoming gravity to a power of attorney. Muhamed Fehmy, a nephew of Ali Fehmy Pacha, preferred a similar request on behalf of his uncle, as also did a diminutive black-eyed boy of fourteen, named Saïd, whose intelligent face betrayed the negro blood which flowed in his veins, on the part of his father, Abd-el-Ál, whose side he had never left during the war, till he surrendered at Damietta, only to be sent to a prison in Cairo. At this time, a Cir-

cassian miscreant, named Abderrahman Effendi, was systematically ill-treating the unfortunate relatives of the fallen "rebels," and the complaints of our visitors were, in consequence, almost endless. After a time, however, this wanton tyranny died out, for its authors commenced to doubt whether the prisoners were, after all, quite as defenceless as they imagined.

We visited Arábi in prison during the following morning (October 25th), and found him busy at work with his instructions. He wrote with great rapidity, but he frankly said his memory sometimes failed him, owing, he supposed, to the excitement he had lately gone through. Arábi was anxious to have a light in order to work after dark, but our application was refused, owing to an alleged attempt having been made to introduce petroleum into the prison. For the same reason, the jail authorities prevented the prisoners' servants from giving them their food. The matter of light was always a vexed question, and till almost the end of our stay in Egypt it was a monopoly of the guards, who sold matches to those in their custody at a profit of some thousands *per cent.*

Arábi was very indignant at the petroleum story and wrote the following note to Mr. Bell, the correspondent of the *Times*, as he imagined it to be directed against him, and he desired to publicly contradict it.

You have perhaps heard that my servant entered my rooms in the prison and left with me a bottle of petroleum in order that I might burn the prison. In due justice to me you ought to deny this report, for I never have been allowed to see my servant from the date when I was first brought here (October 5th). And, besides, why should I burn myself and die against the law? Had I wanted to do such a thing, I could have done so when guarded by English soldiers. At the same time I must point out to you that had I despaired of my innocence being proved, I had plenty of time to have left this country and have reached a neighbouring one, or even England, the shelter of most fugitives. But I threw myself on the honour of the English in Egypt, thinking that I was as safe as in entering London.

Arábi was greatly pleased at the prospects of our also defending Ali Fehmy and Abd-el-Ál as they had all three stood in the foremost rank of the National movement ever since they had been imprisoned and rescued together as far back as February 1881. He wrote a short letter of introduction to each, begging his friends to give us their full confidence as he had done.

Later in the day we received a visit from Borelli Bey. He hardly seemed in his usual good spirits, and spoke despondently of his overwork and the difficulties of the trial. Our conversation ended in a joint project of compromise, which I subsequently communicated to Sir Edward Malet, but which fell through for some unknown reason. Things were not yet ripe for a settlement of this kind.

In the afternoon we called at the English hospital, which had been established by Lady Strangford at the large house once rented by Arábi, and in which she was now working indefatigably to alleviate the prevalent suffering of our troops. The sight of soldiers' funerals saddened us day after day; and a well-known French artist made one of them the subject of his picture for the coming *salon*. The reaction of fatigue and privation is often fatal when the excitement of an advance ceases, and at Cairo disease seems to have been actually engendered by the poisonous liquors sold in the Maltese and Greek canteens which sprang up round each camp.

On our entering Cairo Arábi's furniture had been almost all destroyed in search of treasonable papers; the divans and cushions were ripped up, the floors were opened, and the ceilings pierced. Lady Strangford asked for the house, and the Khedive gave it her. I never heard how he acquired it himself. The airy, lofty rooms (three months before crowded with admiring visitors) were suited admirably to their present use, and their careful arrangement left little to desire. It was difficult to conjure up now the homely scenes of Arábi's domestic life, so well described by Lady Gregory.

Lady Strangford had, I fear, heard everything unfavourable to Arábi, and nothing to his credit.



ARABI'S HOUSE. — LADY STRANGEFORD'S HOSPITAL.

A large black cat with a white tail which still haunted the rooms in search of their former occupants was generally believed to be possessed with a malignant spirit. Even the Khedive's sister had told a friend of Lady Strangford that it would be providential if Arábi fell ill and was brought to the hospital, so that he might have a cup of coffee given him, after the manner of the East. I tried to interest Lady Strangford in my client, who next day sent her his portrait and a message that nothing pleased him better than the present use his old house was put to. I did not tell him the anecdote of the Khedive's sister, but he begged me to reassure her ladyship as to the excellent qualities of the much-abused cat.

Poor Arábi had soon to put Lady Strangford's kindness to the proof. A young son fell ill; no loyal native doctor would attend the rebel's child. Muhamed Ibn Arábi came to us in his tribulation. The matter seemed urgent. Our faithful Hassan ran off in search of Dr. Grant Bey. Mr. Napier applied to Lady Strangford's physician, Dr. Sieveking. Both went at once on their errand of mercy. The special correspondents favourable to the Palace immediately telegraphed the circumstance as a proof of Arábi's unpopularity; those inclined to be lenient towards Arábi cited it as an example of the cruelty of his

enemies. To crown the whole, both doctors commenced a fierce polemical discussion in the *British Medical Journal* as to who should have the honour of attending Arábi's child, and as to what Arábi's child was suffering from. The following paragraph in the *Times* at last settled the question, but entirely destroyed any little romance it could claim to possess :—

ARÁBI'S CHILD.—The *British Medical Journal* understands that Arábi's child, who was recently reported to be dangerously ill, and to whom the Egyptian doctors, for political reasons, refused their assistance, was found, when brought for treatment to the British doctors, to be suffering from a severe attack of itch.

I trust Lady Strangford's hospital may long flourish in Cairo as a memorial of the brighter side of the English occupation.

Next morning we obtained permission to see our three new clients, Ali Fehmy, Abd-el-Ál, and Sheikh Abdú, although a formal recognition as their advocates was not as yet forthcoming. The two former occupied adjoining cells in the corridor at right angles to Arábi's room. Ali Fehmy is a spare, intelligent looking, dark-complexioned man of about forty. His expression is pleasing, and he welcomed us very heartily. Arábi's letter gave him evident pleasure, and he raised it several times to his lips and



علي فحيمى

ALI FEHMY PASHA.

forehead. He was dressed in a dark grey dressing-gown or overcoat with brass military buttons. One leg was covered with bandages, and he limped somewhat painfully from a wound received at Kassassin. The cell in which he was confined exactly resembled Arábi's, only its window looked into the courtyard. He readily signed an authority for us to act on his behalf; and, as he was, as he confessed, "no penman, like Arábi," he suggested our allowing him the services of one of our clerks to write his instructions from dictation. Ali Fehmy was one of the staunchest of Arábi's friends. He had married from the harím of the Khedive Ismaïl, was once in high favour with Tewfik, and commanded the bodyguard. His wife was almost affluent, and they lived in one of the most beautiful houses in Cairo. He had everything to lose and nothing to gain by following in the footsteps of Arábi. Ali Fehmy said once, "I have only one word to say in my defence—I am an Egyptian." Before the Commission of Inquiry he neither fawned nor quailed. He answered every question firmly, and never sought to excuse himself by heaping blame on others. When all was over he went into exile without a murmur. In our first interview he said more about his brother than himself; for the former, on the simple accusation of being "the kinsman of a rebel," had been cast into a dungeon in Upper

Egypt. I mentioned the circumstance to Sir Edward Malet, and through his good offices the man was at once liberated.

Abd-el-Ál Pacha presented a striking contrast to Ali Fehmy. Stout, almost ruddy, and loud of speech, he was the personification of a bluff soldier. He greeted us almost boisterously, and declared he feared nothing now. But when the first excitement of our meeting was over he complained bitterly enough of what had happened in the earlier days of his imprisonment.* I may mention that, although the

* This declaration was afterwards given me by Abd-el-Ál:—

“To Mr. Broadley, the lawyer, my defender in the case to make clear my rights.

“Since I am going to tell you what I have had to suffer from the tyranny, falseness, and servitude I have had to serve under the Khedive for two years past, I will declare all these things to you later on, when you examine me. Now, I will declare the blows and insults I have suffered in the prison I am now in.

“First of all, two aides-de-camps and cavasses of the Khedive came to me, and searched me in an outrageous fashion, and took from me papers and the keys of my safe-cupboard, which belongs to me, in which is money of my own, and money deposited by ladies in my hands. And in this cupboard are papers of the highest importance to me in this case. The above-mentioned key is now in the possession of the prefect of police, and I beg of you to ask it from him, and to give it to me, that I may get out the necessary papers.

“Again, I would tell you that on the night of the 27th of last month, at half-past five o'clock (Arabic time) about, there came to me Ibrahim Agha, the tutunji of the Khedive, and with him three other persons, and he is the only intermediary for spreading intrigues and sedition. And, after he had entered my room, he came close up



عبد العال حايي

ABD EL AL PASHA.

whole story of Ibrahim Agha tutunji was indignantly denied at the Palace, Abd-el-Ál's keys were subsequently restored to me on my earnest application. Abd-el-Ál in a white cassock, with a broad gold waist-band and a black robe or baaracan, presented an almost imposing appearance.

As the prison authorities declined to lend us any more furniture, we were obliged to furnish all our clients with small deal tables and rush-bottomed chairs. We were now in daily expectation of hearing something definitely from Borelli Bey, but to our surprise he made no sign. The papers of the case were to us, as yet, only a sealed book.

Next morning (October 27th) Osmán Effendi peremptorily declined to admit us to our new clients, on the ground that our order was signed by Ismaíl Eyoub Pacha, and not by the Minister of the Interior.

to me, and said to me, 'Abd-el-Ál, do you know who I am?' I said, 'I do not.' He answered, 'I am Ibrahim Agha, the tutunji of the Khedive.' Then he approached me, and spat in my face, and hit me in the face twice with a pen, and said, 'Wait! you have fallen, you sons of dogs; I will show you!' and then he and those who were with him went out from my room. This is what I experienced at the hands of Ibrahim Agha, and I declare it to you; and, first, I beg you to seek for the key and give it to me, that I may get out the papers necessary for my case; and, secondly, to examine into what I have suffered from Ibrahim Agha, for a prisoner awaiting his trial ought not to be struck and insulted till after the trial is over.

"October 29, 1882."

"ABD-EL-ÁL."

Everything bore the appearance of storms a-head, and I went once more to Sir Edward Malet. After what I heard from Abd-el-Ál (he told me a long story, which turned out to be quite true, of an attempt to poison him some months before) I felt justified in urging very strongly the removal of the Circassian guards and the direct delivery of the prisoners' food.

On my return to the prison I was greeted by an Egyptian (he said he was a Russian subject), and who introduced himself to me *à titre de confrère*, as the counsel of Mahmoud Sámi. I omitted to mention that a few days before my arrival each prisoner had received a notice that he would be tried on a certain fixed day—the 15th October—and a request to at once select a counsel from a neatly ruled list of 80 persons. Arábi merely remarked that “he had heard too much of the trial of Midhat Pacha to fall into a similar trap,” but Mahmoud Sámi, a weaker vessel, had yielded, and the “Russian subject,” a youth of 18, was his choice. My *confrère* suggested an immediate communication of my plan of defence, but I thought it best, like the Sultan, “to turn the conversation.” Subsequent events showed I had acted prudently.

Somewhat later in the day the proper order arrived for our admission, and I paid a first visit to Mr. Blunt's personal acquaintance Sheikh Muhamed Abdú. The

label on his cell door described him as "journalji" or journalist. At first sight I was a little disappointed. The ex-editor of the Egyptian official journal was a small spare dark-complexioned man entirely dressed in white and wearing a white skull cap. His eyes were intensely black and piercing, and he wore a carefully clipped black beard. The only thing in his cell was a brass ewer, a very humble mattress, and a *koran*. The enthusiasm of the "three Colonels" seemed to be almost wholly wanting in Sheikh Abdú, and even after reading Mr. Blunt's letter to him which we brought with us he seemed to hesitate. He was evidently under the influence of the fear of despair, which had entered into his soul. It was difficult for a moment to recognise in him the patriotic writer and the most militant speaker at the meetings of the council which ruled in Cairo during the sixty days' war. Sheikh Abdú reflected long, but he at last determined to throw in his lot with the rest. The truth soon came out. Sheikh Abdú had not escaped the nocturnal visit of the Circassian guards, but his account of the incident was couched in timorous, half-hearted language.* It took some time

* "With my highest respects to the Khedive, may God preserve him!

"I declare that Ibrahim Agha, the tutunji, came to me on the 5th of this month and abused me, and with him were many of the cavasses of the Khedive's household. They came to search me, and after

Everything bore the appearance of storms a-head, and I went once more to Sir Edward Malet. After what I heard from Abd-el-Ál (he told me a long story, which turned out to be quite true, of an attempt to poison him some months before) I felt justified in urging very strongly the removal of the Circassian guards and the direct delivery of the prisoners' food.

On my return to the prison I was greeted by an Egyptian (he said he was a Russian subject), and who introduced himself to me *à titre de confrère*, as the counsel of Mahmoud Sámi. I omitted to mention that a few days before my arrival each prisoner had received a notice that he would be tried on a certain fixed day—the 15th October—and a request to at once select a counsel from a neatly ruled list of 80 persons. Arábi merely remarked that “he had heard too much of the trial of Midhat Pacha to fall into a similar trap,” but Mahmoud Sámi, a weaker vessel, had yielded, and the “Russian subject,” a youth of 18, was his choice. My *confrère* suggested an immediate communication of my plan of defence, but I thought it best, like the Sultan, “to turn the conversation.” Subsequent events showed I had acted prudently.

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to gain the confidence of Sheikh Abdú, but when we at last succeeded no one spoke more boldly or gave us more trustworthy information. Before leaving his cell he begged us to defend also his old chief Ahmed Rifát Bey, who was a good French scholar, and could give us very valuable assistance.

On the following morning I found Arábi busy with his defence. He suddenly exclaimed, "Do you wish to have a proof that the people of Egypt were with me—look here." He drew me to the window. Through the nailed-up Venetian blinds I saw a number of women and children weeping on the opposite side of the road. The crowd became daily larger and larger till the guard was obliged to disperse it. I never saw Arábi so vexed as he was at this.

I had obtained permission for Abd-el-Ál's son to pay a visit to his father, and their meeting in prison was a touching sight. Abd-el-Ál was much reassured to see searching me in the most careful manner, they took from me three volumes—two volumes of the book *Ikd-el-Feríd* on moral science, and the first volume of a History of the Middle Ages, translated from French into Arabic at the Egyptian Press. And when I asked them who took away the books—where are you taking them to? and surely you are going to take them and deliver them to my house; he answered, 'Have you got a house?' Then I was quiet, and for eighteen days I saw neither a book nor a man, till a person belonging to the English Government came and asked how I was getting on, and I asked leave for a Koran to be brought to me, and he gave leave, and I was as pleased as if I had been let out of prison.

"MUHAMED ABDÚ."



SYMPATHIZERS OUTSIDE ARABI'S CELL.

his keys again, and he directed the boy to unlock his safe and give me a small box of papers. Accompanied by Mr. Macdonald, the Correspondent of the *Daily News*, I drove to the house of Abd-el-Ál, a handsome stone building on the outskirts of the city. Evident signs of the desolation which had befallen its inmates were not wanting; the small garden of palms and myrtle before it was neglected, and we heard the sounds of weeping within. We took coffee in a deserted arbour of brick and stucco in the garden, and little Saïd brought out the papers.

A week has now passed since I saw Arábi. When I entered his cell on the following day he was almost in good spirits. I asked if he had finished his work. He replied by another query, "Do you take me for a steam engine?" but he opened his despatch-case, and showed me the completed papers, as well as one or two letters he had promised to write. He asked earnestly for some Arabic newspapers. I hesitated, because I knew the nature of their contents. As he still pressed me on the subject, I promised compliance. He had yet to learn through them a bitter lesson as to the instability of human friendship, and the difference between failure and success.

CHAPTER XII.

ARÁBI'S WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS.*

UNAIDED by any written memoranda or means of reference, and in accordance with his own suggestion, Arábi, in six days, composed a voluminous statement of his case. He supplemented it afterwards by additional notes as they became necessary, and made one or two corrections before the time for his trial arrived. Considering all the circumstances under which these instructions were composed, and the effect which the excitement he had gone through had unquestionably produced on his memory, Arábi's brief forms an excellent answer to those who insist on treating him as a wholly illiterate military adventurer.

He begins with an account of the grievances which weighed heavily on the Egyptians, and united both the civil and military populations in a general league for the common safety. He shows how this

* The greater portion of this chapter appeared in the *Nineteenth Century* (December 1882). It has been reprinted by the kind permission of the editor, Mr. James Knowles.

unhappy state of things was intensified and made worse by a system of vexatious tyranny and intrigue which appears to have characterised the Egyptian administration prior to the *pronunciamento* of the 9th September. As an example of the events which appear to have been only too common at that time, he tells the story of the lady Aisha Hanem, who, on an allegation of undue interference by supernatural means in the affairs of the Khedivial family, was banished either over or under the Red Sea without a hearing or a trial.

Arábi thus describes the beginning of the acute stage of the National movement :—

Immediately the better class and educated Egyptians became aware of these matters they all assembled in Cairo and held a meeting, at which it was decided that, to improve the then existing state of affairs, a council (Chamber of Deputies) should be appointed to watch over and preserve the lives, property, and rights of the Egyptian people, and to create just laws, according equal treatment and rights to every one. Petitions were signed on all sides praying that Cherif Pacha might be appointed Prime Minister, on the proposal of Sultán Pacha, acting in the name of the nation, and I, being favourably known to the people, was asked to represent them and pray for reforms.

On the 9th of September, 1881, I wrote to the Minister of War informing him that the troops intended presenting themselves at the Abdin Palace to demand justice for themselves and their families, and on that afternoon (Friday), at three o'clock, the troops assembled there in perfect order. Previous to the meeting I wrote to the representatives of the Foreign Powers,

assuring them that their subjects had nothing whatever to fear on account of the demonstration being held, and that everything would be conducted in a perfectly orderly way. I further informed them that it was our intention to ask His Highness to grant constitutional rights to the country.

Mr. Cookson, Her Majesty's Consul at Alexandria, was then in Cairo, and intervened for us with the Khedive, who heard our complaints and granted all our demands, declaring that they were just and legal, and afterwards gave orders for the appointment of Cherif Pacha as Prime Minister. The troops hereupon retired crying, "Long live the Khedive!"

When Cherif Pacha hesitated about accepting the post offered to him, petitions supported by 4,000 seals were presented to him, begging him to save the country from tyranny and slavery, and to rid it of the existing Ministry, which had squandered seventeen millions of the public money instead of using it to pay the just debts of the country. Amongst other things they had discharged almost every native from the service, though their pay was small, and had given all responsible posts to Europeans, indifferent to the laws of right or wrong.

He next sketches briefly the events which led to the accession to power of the Mahmoud Sámi Ministry on the Budget question four months later, concerning which he only makes the following trite observation:—

I will not here enter on the question of the Budget, for it is too well known. The Egyptians never sought to interfere with that portion pledged for Egypt's debts: they only asked to control the remainder. The whole nation demanded this. *Could such a desire be condemned if it concerned any other nation than Egypt?* It was only one of the great grievances under which the Egyptian people groaned, and was felt alike by the army and the whole population.

He then comes to the time of the Circassian Plot:—

The Circassians were sentenced to exile in the Soudan. Knowing that the climate there would be most trying to men born in a cold country, and would possibly be fatal to them,* I asked my friends to assist me in pleading with the Khedive, to send the condemned men back to their own country, for I have always made every effort to save the lives of people who have even threatened my own.

All my friends agreed with me, and we wrote a petition to His Highness, which must still exist, asking him to accept our intervention, and to treat these people mercifully.

Arábi thus describes the cause which, in his opinion, led directly to the events which ended in the war:—

On the night just before alluded to, the Prime Minister and myself were invited to a party at the house of Omar Bey Rahmi, when a messenger arrived to say that the English and French Consuls-General were at the house of the Prime Minister, waiting for an interview with him. On arriving at his house, he was informed by the Consuls that the life of the Khedive, and the lives of Europeans, were in danger. He hastened to reassure them, and to state that he was responsible for public order, but at the same time inquired their reason for supposing any danger. They replied that His Highness was their authority, and he had been threatened by Mahmoud Pacha Sámi, and that his life

* An extraordinary mistake in punctuation made this sentence, as originally published, read very differently. The transposition of the full stop and comma caused Arábi to appear as saying, "The Circassians were sentenced to exile in the Soudan, knowing that the climate there would be most trying to men born in a cold country, and would possibly be fatal to them!"

and the lives of Europeans, were in danger. The truth of this assertion by the Khedive was denied by Mahmoud Pacha Sámi ; and he stated that his conversation with the Khedive had reference only to the Circassian exiles.

I say truly that this invention of the Khedive's is the *immediate* cause of the evils which have befallen Egypt.

He thus continues :—

It was now that the English and French Consuls demanded the dismissal of Mahmoud Sámi Pacha's Ministry, and also that I should be banished from the country, whilst Ali Fehmy and Abd-el-Ál Pachas were to be sent into the provinces. The Home Office, to whom the request was made, rejected the proposal as interfering with the liberty of the people.

A meeting having been called at Cairo to decide upon the question, it was at once determined to urge the rejection of every proposal of the kind ; and when this news reached the provinces all the Notables and rich men came to Cairo at once and confirmed this decision. They also gave to me documents signed by them, and bearing the seals of all the Members of the Courts, Ulemas, merchants, Notables, &c., in support of our action. In addition to this, a declaration was made by the Ulemas, that, in accordance with principles of the religious law, the Khedive, if he thus acted, could no longer be rightfully regarded as the ruler of the country. Some of these papers are in my possession and some in that of Mahmoud Sámi Pacha. The Khedive, however, accepted the proposals, contrary to the decision of the Council, upon which the Ministry resigned (May 26).

On the morning after the resignation of the Ministry I was visited at my house by the Consuls of Russia, Germany, and Italy, who asked me if Europeans were safe, and begged me to give my word of honour to this effect. I replied that, having resigned office, I was no longer responsible for the safety of the public, and consequently could not comply with their request.

On being pressed by them, however, and knowing that the army would do nothing to disgrace their profession and that civilians would follow their example in keeping the peace, I gave my word that I would watch over Europeans in Egypt, and would guard their interests as my own.

The same night the Members of the Chamber of Notables assembled at the house of Sultán Pacha, and I was invited to attend (May 27). All requested me to maintain order, and there were present many of the Ulemas and judges of Egypt.

I gave them to understand that I had resigned office, and could no longer be responsible for the public safety. Sultán Pacha and Suleimán Pacha Abaza, replying for the members, said that they had appointed me, and would not accept my resignation, adding that they would go to the Khedive and request him to reinstate me in my former position. The same night a discussion took place as to the past and present state of the country, &c., and all agreed that the Khedive ought to be dethroned if he persisted in the course of action he had adopted. Next morning the President of the Chamber of Notables and Suleimán Pacha Abaza came to my house, and the latter delivered to me an order from the Khedive to assume office again. I thanked His Highness, who received me very cordially.

I immediately resumed my duties, and no disturbance whatever took place during the twenty days after the collapse of the Ministry, though Cairo was full of Bedouins.

It was now (June 8) that Dervesh Pacha arrived from Constantinople, and, having made an inquiry into the conduct of the army, declared that it had always been obedient, and had maintained public order, and that there was no blame attached to it. Thereupon he asked the Sultan for about two hundred decorations for officers and civilians, and for myself he demanded the "Medjidieh" of the first class.

Everything went well until the unfortunate massacre in Alexandria took place on the 11th of June.

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Yácoub Pacha Sámi was at once sent down to Alexandria to inquire into the matter, and he was followed by two regiments of infantry and some artillery, in order to secure public safety both in and out of the town. The Khedive himself told me afterwards that the affair originated between a Maltese and a donkey-boy, and that the crowd which assembled was fired upon from the windows of the houses in the neighbourhood. I then wrote to Yácoub Pacha, and instructed him to examine closely into the case, and to use all his energy to find the man who had been the cause of the dire event.

Rágheb Pacha now becomes Prime Minister.
Arábi continues:—

Before the Rágheb Ministry had come into office, the fortifications of the country were attended to as usual, but at this time orders were given by the Khedive, under instructions from Constantinople, to cease working at them, stating that the secretary of the English Embassy had informed the Sultan that he considered the fortifications threatening to the British fleet, and unless we abstained from further work the fleet would bombard the town.

We wondered that it did not strike them as being threatening to this country that a foreign fleet should be menacing Egypt, but the works were stopped, and the Khedive reported accordingly to Constantinople.

After the formation of the new Ministry, and on the 4th of July, my decoration, with a firman by His Majesty the Sultan, arrived from Constantinople, and with his own hands the Khedive presented them to me, and expressed his satisfaction and gratitude for my faithful services and attention to my duties. I warmly thanked His Highness, and also telegraphed to Constantinople, thanking the Sultan for his high consideration. I was favoured with a telegraphic reply expressing His Majesty's satisfaction with my good conduct and fidelity to the service.

After I received my decoration Dervesh Pacha invited me to go to Constantinople to live with His Majesty the Sultan and with other friends. I gave the same reply as given to the French Consul—namely, that the people would not permit me to go; and, as they were warmly attached to me, I could not desert them. Dervesh Pacha also spoke to Rágheb Pacha, the Prime Minister, on the same subject, and in reply he informed him that it was absolutely impossible for me to leave the country, seeing that I had taken up the cause of the natives, and had their rights, liberty, and prosperity at heart; also, how that my sole object was to procure just laws, for natives and Europeans alike, and to gain for my countrymen a reformed and just government.

I now feel it a duty to Egypt and myself to clearly state at this point my relations with His Majesty the Sultan, during the recent events in this country. They began in this wise.

Talát Pacha, the Circassian, was sent in November, 1881, on a mission to Constantinople on the part of the Khedive. He was instructed to represent to the Turkish Ministers and to the Sultan that Egypt was in a state of rebellion, that it was proposed to form an Arabian Empire, and that Ahmed Arábi and the British Government had come to an agreement upon that point. These rumours, spread by Talát Pacha, began to gain ground at Constantinople—we had no special agent there to contradict these falsehoods. I was therefore obliged to have recourse to the learned and pious Sheikh Muhamed Zaffer, the Sultan's confidant and spiritual adviser, whom I knew by fame, although I had never met him personally. I wrote to him, through Ali Rágheb, contradicting all the projects which had been attributed to us, and requesting him to explain to His Majesty the loyalty of my feelings, and my strong attachment to the fundamental principles of our sacred law, which make it a duty to obey the Ameer El Moumeneen (Commander of the Faithful).

The Sheikh was pleased to answer through Ali Rágheb aforementioned; his letter, written in the Turkish language, stated that he had laid before His Majesty the contents of my communication, that the Sultan was satisfied with my loyalty, and commanded me to persevere in my obedience; but added that His Majesty desired me to defend the country at all costs from invasion, lest it should share the fate of Tunis, and that he cared neither for Ismail, Hálím, or Tewfik, but for the man who should carry out his instructions. So, also, wrote Ahmed Rátib Pacha, with whom I had a long personal conference when he was in Egypt, and whose letter came along with that of Muhamed Zaffer.

Shereef Ahmed Essád, who came to Cairo with Dervesh Pacha, also concurred in these injunctions, and took charge of a petition to the Sultan on our behalf. He also wrote me, later on, a letter in a similar strain.

During the early part of the hostilities I telegraphed several times to Constantinople. About the beginning of August, I telegraphed to Bessím Bey, one of the Sultan's chamberlains, stating what had taken place during the hostilities, and submitting that the war was a legitimate and a legal one, that the Khedive had gone to the enemy, and was therefore in exactly the same position as the Bey of Tunis.

On the 12th of Ramadan, 1299 (August 6, 1882), I telegraphed to Bessím Bey, stating that Dervesh Pacha, instead of advising the Khedive to remain with his people, had allowed him to join the enemy, and that the town of Alexandria had been delivered to the British Admiral.

When the news reached me that the Porte proposed sending troops to Egypt, knowing that this would be injurious to the Egyptians, I telegraphed on the 8th of Ramadan (August 2, 1882), to Bessím Bey, stating that Egypt was sufficiently provided with men, arms, and ammunition, to defend the country, and protect the Sultan's rights; and that we were unanimous in our decision to stand by those rights.

Never, during those negotiations or afterwards, up to the present time, has the Porte disapproved of our doings. The Sultan has, both by act and letter, often approved them. How can I then be a rebel? Is not the Sultan admitted by Englishmen to be sovereign of Egypt?

Arábi now gives a short account of the War:—

The famous nation, the friend of humanity, the nation which emancipates the slave, and respects the laws of right and wrong, declares war against a poor country, the sole offence of which was to resist their ruler when he ceased to respect the rights and laws of his people! In this war her sons have shed their blood uselessly in fighting that very country which was Egypt's sole hope, and to which she looked for the redress of the wrongs and injustice inflicted upon her children. This treatment we are unable to understand, for the English people are known to be just and merciful.

On the 10th of July Sir Beauchamp Seymour wrote to the commandant stating that guns were being mounted in two of the forts, and that unless the arming of the forts were discontinued at once he would bombard the forts next morning and would raze them to the ground.

Upon this a Cabinet Council was held at the Ras-el-Tin Palace. It met about 11 a.m. on the 10th of July. It was presided over by the Khedive in person, and the following personages were present, viz., Dervesh Pacha and Kadri Bey, the Sultan's envoys, Rághheb Pacha, Ahmed Reshid Pacha, Abderrahman Bey Ruchdi, Suleimán Pacha Abaza, Hasan Pacha Sherai, Mahmoud Pacha Fehmy, Ismaíl Pacha Hakki, Marshli Pacha, Reouf Pacha,* Muhamed Pacha Saïd, Kassim Pacha, Ibrahim Pacha Ferik. I was also there as Minister of War. The Khedive took notes of

* Afterwards President of the Court Martial which tried Arábi for rebellion.

the opinions of the members in his own handwriting. It was first of all decided to send a deputation to the Admiral, consisting of the Ministers of Finance and the Interior, a naval officer, and one Dekran Bey, to inform the Admiral that no new guns were being mounted in the forts, and to tell him that he was at liberty to send one of his officers, if he desired it, to test the truth of this statement.

The deputation came back with the intelligence that the Admiral insisted on the disarmament of the fort.

The Council again met at 3 p.m. and sat for an hour and a half. After a long discussion on the subject of the Admiral's demand, it was agreed that it would be altogether shameful and dishonourable to remove the guns. We had been always particularly careful to avoid fighting with any power, and especially with England, but in this case we decided to do it *in defence*, but not before the English fleet had first thrown five or six shells at us.* The Khedive now shewed apparently great energy and

* I obtained from one of my clients an authentic copy of the Khedive's resolution to declare war against England. It runs as follows:—

“The communications and letters of the Admiral of the British squadron state substantially that eight guns have been placed in the El-Silsileh, Caïd Bey, and Saleh forts subsequent to the cessation of the works of defence; that this act is considered as a threat to the British fleet; that, in consequence, the Admiral requests the Egyptian Government to authorise him to dismount the guns in Ras-el-Tin fort and on the southern side of the Eastern harbour, and that in the event of refusal on the part of the Government he would bombard the forts at sunrise on Tuesday the 11th of July.

“The Council, after due deliberation, decides that the El-Silsileh and Caïd Bey forts and the guns placed in the eastern harbour cannot constitute any threat for the vessels which are in the western harbour; that, after the order of His Majesty the Sultan, and contrary to what is alleged, no new guns have been placed in position, neither have any

courage, and repeatedly said that should the war take place he would himself carry a rifle and be to the front with the troops. The Khedive and Dervesh Pacha both telegraphed to the Porte that resistance had been decided on. After dusk the Khedive, with Dervesh Pacha and all his family, went to Ramleh.

Next morning at the appointed hour a shot was fired from the fleet, which was followed by fifteen others. Then we decided to reply, and so the war began. The bombardment lasted without interruption for ten hours and a half, and until most of the forts were wholly or partially destroyed. A portion of the Ras-el-Tin Palace was demolished, besides several other houses in the town, and particularly those near the railway station, which lies in a line with Fort Demas, where my staff and I were. The shells came over the fort and into the station.

During the bombardment, messages were continually sent to us by the Khedive and Dervesh Pacha, through Múheddin Effendi, encouraging us to defend the place, offering us many congratulations, and exhorting the gunners at the forts to do their best, which they did, with guns which were, as it turned out, no match for those of the English.

warlike preparations been made, and the requirements of the Admiral are contrary to the laws of public international right.

"Nevertheless, in order to preserve the good relations which exist between the Khedive and the great British Empire, and to give a manifest proof of the good intentions of the Egyptian Government towards it, the Council decides on dismounting three guns in the forts in which work may have been undertaken. The Admiral can have these three guns dismounted in one fort or one gun in three different forts.

"The President of the Council of the Ministers is requested to write to the Admiral in this sense. If he refuses and persists in his intention to bombard the forts, these must not answer till after the fifth shot has been fired; they will then reply to the fire, and God, the best of judges, will decide between them and us."

We were much astonished afterwards to see the Khedive at the Ramleh Palace, where he remained as if no war was taking place between his Government and the English. After the bombardment was over, I went myself to Ramleh about sunset, taking with me the Council, and informed the Khedive of what had taken place on that day, and he cordially thanked the soldiers for their steady and energetic behaviour. I also asked His Highness for instructions relating to the forts which were still standing. A Council was held, attended by His Highness, Dervesh Pacha, Toulba Pacha, some of the other Ministers, and Ismail Hakki Pacha, to decide what course to take after all the forts were destroyed, and whether the war should be carried on or not. *It was agreed that, should the English again fire, a flag of truce should be hoisted to prevent further damage, and to open communications for peace.* Toulba Pacha was to be sent next morning to Admiral Seymour to inform him that the Egyptian Government had nothing against England and did not wish for war, even supposing that we were strong enough to oppose her. I gave instructions for the forts to hoist flags of truce, and then went to Báb-el-Sherki for the night.

Next morning (the 12th July), about two hours after sunrise, the ships resumed bombardment on the town. The white flags were immediately hoisted on the forts, but the firing continued until they had thrown twenty-five to thirty shells. Toulba Pacha then went in a boat to see the Admiral, and was received by one of the officers. He informed the Admiral of the Khedive's submission, &c., and was told that the Admiral required three forts to be occupied by British troops, viz., Adgemi, Fort Meks, and Fort Arab, and requested that the Khedive should give orders to this effect by three o'clock p.m., failing which the firing would recommence and the forts would be taken by force.

Toulba hurried to Ramleh, and I followed him with the Prime Minister. We had only an hour and a half in which to decide, therefore a Council was held at half-past two p.m. under the presidency of the Khedive and Dervesh Pacha, there being also

present Kadri Bey, Rágheb Pacha, Reshid, Ismaïl Hakki, Abú Gebal, Toulba Pacha, and myself. The decision arrived at was that, as the Khedive had no right to cede Ottoman territory to a foreign power, it was necessary to communicate with Constantinople. In the meantime Toulba was sent again to the admiral, but did not arrive at the beach until the time was up, and was told that an officer had waited until the appointed hour, and, not receiving the Khedive's reply, had returned on board. *At the Council the Khedive gave orders for our troops to occupy Fort Adgemi, and resist the landing of British troops.* I explained to His Highness that the infantry could not go, as the place was too exposed to the fire of the ships, and besides that it was liable to be cut off from Alexandria. The Khedive was in appearance very angry, and said, "Why do you call yourselves soldiers if you cannot prevent the landing of an enemy in our country?"

Arábi, after going to the house of Rágheb Pacha, returned to Ramleh. He thus describes what follows:—

After remaining at Rágheb's house for about an hour we were summoned by the Khedive, and went together to Ramleh Palace, and His Highness asked me why four regiments of infantry had come to Ramleh. Being ignorant of the cause, I replied I thought it must be for the purpose of strengthening the guards at the Palace. He replied that the guards were quite sufficient, and ordered the infantry to attend to other more important duties. I went out and inquired of the officer in charge how they had come there and by whose order, and he replied that the commander of his regiment, Suleimán Bey Sámi, had given the order. I then gave instructions for them to join the troops, and left myself for Alexandria.

On approaching the waterworks I met with a large crowd of people, including some soldiers, all marching towards the Mahmoudieh Canal, in a pitiful state—women and children crying, abandoned by their protectors. I got out of my carriage

and walked with them as far as Bab-el-Sherki. where I found Aïd Bey, who informed me that the flight was caused by the fear of another bombardment. The few people who were left in the town now commenced to fly, together with many of the soldiers, with their wives and families, all in great disorder. Aïd Bey told me he had sent for his men to prevent the exodus, and I myself stood in the gateway and stopped the passage of troops retreating. They told me that Suleimán Bey Sámi with a body of troops had become wild with rage and intended to burn the town. I immediately sent for him, and he came accompanied by a body of irregulars. I asked him if it was true that he had threatened to burn the town. He replied "No"; and stated that he had stationed troops at the ends of the streets leading down to the harbour to stop the landing from the ships. Some silk was found in the possession of his men, which I ordered to be handed in to the zaptieh. I went among the troops, and exhorted them to behave like men, and to preserve the town. While I was doing this, I saw some Bedouins leaving with the people, and carrying pieces of Manchester goods, &c.; also other Bedouins were entering the town fully armed, having come from the Palace at Ramleh, where they had been waiting for the right time to plunder the town. These people, ignorant of the consequences, looted and set fire indiscriminately. I kept encouraging the soldiers not to leave the town, when Hasan Pacha Sherai, Suleimán Pacha Abaza, Hussein Bey-el-Turk, guard to His Highness, and Múheddin Effendi, guard to Dervosh Pacha, came and informed me that the soldiers had surrounded the Palace at Ramleh. I was much surprised to hear this, and sent Toulba Pacha at once to disperse them, and discover the reason of it. I also inquired why infantry had been sent there at all, and was informed that, some ships having been seen in that direction, they had been despatched in case of an attempt being made to land. The Khedive expressed to me his thanks, by sending Hussein Bey-el-Turk with Toulba Pacha to give me his best wishes.

The confusion among the troops was so great that it was an utter impossibility to collect them together, but it was absolutely necessary to put them in camp in a suitable place, and try and make them forget what they had suffered. I ordered their commanders to proceed with their troops to the Mahmoudieh Canal, and Ragheb Pacha and myself got into a carriage and went as far as the Ramleh railway station—he going one way to see the Khedive, and I in the direction of the troops to try and stop those that were flying with the crowd.

At sunset I reached the railway bridge that crosses the Mahmoudieh Canal, and there, just beyond the bridge, I chose the camping-ground. The soldiers came from Alexandria and Ramleh during the night, it being at 2 a.m. when the officers and soldiers I had left in Alexandria arrived, they having been delayed by the immense crowd of people, animals, and carriages on the road.

Toulba Pacha came to me and said that there was no truth in the story about the troops surrounding the Ramleh Palace, and he told me that the Khedive was much pleased with me, and had sent Hussein Bey-el-Turk with him to express this pleasure, but, in consequence of the crowded roads and the darkness coming on, the former had been obliged to return to the Palace. On the morning of the 13th of July the troops in the camp amounted to only one-third of the army at Alexandria, the remaining portion having gone with the populace. We discovered that our camp was exposed to the fire from the ships, so we removed our troops some distance further to a place called Esbet Horshid, some 5,000 metres to the south of Melaha station. The troops remained here for a day, and we collected together about half the army. On that day special trains were sent to Ramleh to bring the Khedive and his family, but they returned empty—bringing the news that His Highness had gone into Alexandria with his family, and was under British protection.*

* Arabi afterwards wrote a more detailed account of his own move-

On Friday, the 14th of July, I went with the troops to Ezbet Kengi Osmán, where we settled down and commenced to fortify our position. On the day of the bombardment the Prime Minister telegraphed to various places in the country announcing the state of war, and that the country was under military law, by which all offenders would be tried and punished.

Alexandria having been abandoned both by the army and the people, the Khedive entered the town and surrendered himself up; it was not, according to our law, either permissible or fitting for the ruler of a country to act thus, and side with a nation that was fighting against us, and which he himself had in solemn council decided to resist. The laws of man and the word of God forbid such dishonourable acts; and such a man cannot be a Moslem, therefore he ought not to rule over Moslems.

This matter was telegraphed to Yácoub Sámi Pacha, telling him to consult with the Council, and a telegram was sent to Constantinople with regard to the same subject. On the 17th of July I received a telegram from the Khedive holding me responsible, and stating that I was the cause of the war in continuing to make fortifications; he also requested me to come and have a personal interview with him. I concluded from this that he was a prisoner, and that he had been induced to send for me in order that I should be arrested. To save himself he wished to put all the blame upon my shoulders. I replied to him by telegraph to the effect that the fact of his having sided with the opposing forces had affected the people very much; and I asked him to submit terms of peace, and I would come to Alexandria. He never replied to this, so I telegraphed to the Sub-Minister of War, asking him to discuss the peace question with the Khedive and Prime Minister. Information was sent all over the country to say peace would be secured, and to stop all fortification, &c.

ments during the bombardment at my request. He also addressed a letter to Lord Charles Beresford, giving further information on the subject (see *post*).

In the meantime we had daily skirmishes with the enemy, from which I concluded that no peace would be arranged. I wrote to the Sub-Minister of War, informing him of what was taking place, and also to all the governors of provinces, demanding an immediate supply of fresh troops, and that no orders but mine were to be obeyed.

A meeting was called at the Home Office in Cairo to consider the state of affairs, and it was attended by all the ministers, heads of departments, governors of provinces, Ulemas and Notables of the country, and it was resolved to send a messenger to Alexandria to learn the real state of affairs, and to request the Khedive and his ministers to come to Cairo, his capital. These emissaries were to report to the Council in case he showed an inclination to remain in Alexandria in the hands of the English. Those selected to form this deputation were, Ali Pacha Moubarek, Reouf Pacha, and two Ulemas, viz., the Sheikh of Riwa-el-Safaidi and the Sheikh of Ali Niel; and two merchants—Ahmed Bey Sioufi and Saïd Bey-el-Shenak, the agent for Southern Tripoli. At Kafr-el-Dowar they informed us that a Moslem had deceived Moslems, therefore he was no longer one of them. They also told me that they were instructed to say that a proclamation, signed by the Khedive, bearing date the 20th of July, had been issued to the public dismissing me for disobeying orders. These orders were to defend Fort Agemi against an attack of an English landing-party. He accused me also of having abandoned Alexandria much too soon, and without any cause, and blamed me for retreating on Kafr-el-Dowar, &c. This question was debated in council, and the Khedive telegraphed to Yácoub Pacha Sámi, instructing him to cease all war preparations. A Council was then held, and it was attended at Cairo *by over five hundred persons* of note, viz., three princes—the Sheikh-el-Islam, the Kádi of Egypt, the Mufti Sayed-el-Sadat, Sayed-el-Bakri, priests and Ulemas, the Chief Rabbi of the Jews, the Coptic Patriarch, agents of the Ministries, heads

of departments, governors and judges of all the provinces, the principal men of the country, Notables, merchants, private *employés* of the Khedive, and also several of the oldest people in the country.

The Council made a minute examination into the Khedivial orders and communications, also into my own letters and telegrams to His Highness, and after a short debate it was agreed unanimously to disregard the Khedivial orders, and to prevent him from interfering in public affairs. At this Council a resolution was carried appointing me to the command of the army, and to defend the country. This was signed by all those present at the Council, and a telegram to this effect was sent to His Majesty the Sultan, with the names of the most distinguished men who had assisted at the Council.

Having been officially appointed, a provisional Government was formed. The members of it were, Boutros Pacha, Hussein Pacha Dramanli, Yâcoub Pacha, Ahmed Pacha Nachât, and several others. It was a Government somewhat resembling a republic, or rather a committee of national defence, until such time as we could arrange for a permanent government. I took no part in any of these Councils, neither did I vote on any particular subject, and all I know of its proceedings is contained in a letter addressed to me calling me "the preserver and defender of the country," and in which I was authorised to carry on the war, begun by the Council presided over by the Khedive in person.

The Egyptian people made heavy sacrifices for the sake of securing to their country liberty, justice, and independence; some gave all they possessed, others the half, but all gave some mite to the national cause, as can be proved by numberless letters and telegrams. The war was supported both morally and materially, and nothing was wanting on the part of the Egyptians to defend their native land. They voluntarily offered themselves for enlistment *en masse* in the army; some indi-

viduals supplied as much as thirty horses and three thousand ardebs of grain. The telegrams and the communications received at the Ministry of War from those benevolent patriots and from the governors of the various provinces fully testify to the truth of these statements; so much so, that within the space of thirty days an army of volunteers numbering a hundred thousand men, with eight thousand horses and four thousand mules, was supplied, the war stores filled with provisions, and considerable sums of money flowed into the War Treasury. Such spirit of patriotism and display of zeal on the part of the Egyptians has had no precedent in the history of Islam. Moreover the Ulemas and Notables of Cairo never ceased for a moment to give us their moral support and advice on all occasions.

From these facts it is quite evident that the Egyptian nation cannot be treated as insurrectionists acting from a spirit of fanaticism, but, on the contrary, as a nation seeking their liberty by justifiable means. I may add that a considerable quantity of cattle and fruits were supplied gratis to the various camps at Rosetta, Kafr-el-Dowar, and Tel-el-Kebir. These supplies came principally from the chief Dairas at Cairo, from Riáz Pacha, and Khiari Pacha (notwithstanding their absence from Egypt), also from the various Dairas of the Khedive's family. The communication in cipher telegrams never ceased between Kafr-el-Dowar, Cairo, and Constantinople, until the telegraph wires were destroyed at the former place.

Arábi now proceeds to enumerate all the measures he took for the maintenance of order and the preservation of the lives and property of Europeans:—

The Government promptly took the necessary steps to arrest all the looters they could, and sent them to the Council with letters stating the nature of their crimes and the quantity of

loot in their possession, in order that they might be punished according to the laws of the country; and this is well-known to one of the departments connected with the Ministry of War at Kafr-el-Dowar.

On the occasion of the massacres at Tantah, in which several Europeans were killed by some people from Alexandria, I immediately changed the Mudir, Ibrahim Pacha Adham, who was sent before the Council to be tried for not having kept his province in a peaceful state; and I at once sent a division of infantry and cavalry to Tantah, Ziftah, and other places, to maintain order.

A short time before this incident I issued a circular to all the provinces, governors, and administrations, giving strict orders for the safety of all Europeans then remaining in the different localities, in conformity with the Moslem law, which enjoins us to shelter all those who live with us as brethren, even Englishmen, when not carrying arms in the field against us; and thus gave help and protected all those desirous of leaving the country.

At this time many expressed that wish, and never did we fail to send them under escort to Ismailia, as can testify M. de Lesseps, the acting Italian Vice-Consul at Zagazig, and M. Dupont, acting French Consul at the same place. The various despatches sent by me to the Ministry of War and to the Prefects of Police at Mansoorah, Zagazig, and other places, fully confirm these statements. The result of these instructions was a re-establishment of friendly feeling between most of the Europeans and natives; so much so, that many European merchants from Port Saïd and Ismailia returned to Cairo. Despatches were also sent to the Prefect of Police at Cairo and to the various Mudiriehs in Lower Egypt, to see that fugitives from Alexandria were so distributed as to be charitably supported and have some means of livelihood.

Towards the beginning of August a certain Mr. De Chair,

an Englishman, was taken prisoner by us. We received him well and treated him kindly, and sent him to Cairo with a letter to the Ministry, giving instructions that he should be properly housed, and to appoint an officer knowing English to keep him company, also to forward all letters and telegrams which he might wish to despatch to his family or his commander, and provide for their safe delivery at their destination. He was so well treated that I even received a telegram of thanks from his mother.

On another occasion we captured two officers, one doctor, and nine privates, Germans, who landed near Abourkir by mistake. On application being made by their Consul at Alexandria, they were at once set at liberty, having been well treated. Two other officers were also taken prisoners near Salheih, and on them was found the sum of three hundred pounds; they were kindly treated and sent to Cairo with all care.

Such is our method of dealing with our prisoners, though we have been called barbarians. I would ask, why should not we, at the present moment, be treated equally well?—especially by a power like England! And again, why should we have been imprisoned by our enemy the Khedive, who first told us to fight, and then desired to see us in this miserable plight, thereby hoping to show that he had not been with us in our war with England.

My efforts for the public welfare can be known on reference to my various communications with M. de Lesseps; and his instructions to me were to respect the neutrality of the Canal, as the ships of war would not touch it; and, until the vessels entered the Canal and bombarded Nefish, I strictly adhered to these instructions. I then wrote to M. de Lesseps, stating that, as the ships of war had entered the Canal, I wished to know if the laws of war still demanded of me to regard it as neutral. This gentleman's reply was, that I must act according to the

laws of war. I then telegraphed to Rasheed Pacha, and to the chief engineer, Mahmoud Fehmy Pacha, to make a dam across the Sweetwater Canal, provided the circumstances of the war permitted them to do so. The perusal of the letters of M. de Lesseps to his wife, and to his son in Paris, will testify how strictly I respected the neutrality of the Canal. In proof of this, the mail steamers were passing regularly; and when the troops attempted to stop the postal arrangements, I telegraphed to the director of the Suez boats to retain everything in its former working order, it being for the public welfare; and thus the postal arrangements were carried on without interruption until the landing of the British troops at Suez.

We did not attempt to place any of our troops to protect the Canal; for, after what had been said regarding its neutrality, we never imagined we should have been attacked from there, and so we neglected to make trenches and fortifications for a chain of defence. When the English occupied Ismailia and fought with us near Mahsamah on the 25th of August, our troops retreated before the cavalry, and our chief engineer, Mahmoud Fehmy Pacha, was taken prisoner. On the same day I went to Tel-el-Kebir, leaving Toulba Pacha at Kafr-el-Dowar; and Ali Pacha Fehmy came down from Cairo with the 1st regiment of infantry to reinforce me there, and to assist in making trenches and fortifications, so that we might have communication between Salhieh, Tel-el-Kebir, Dár-el-Brydah, and Jebel Itaka.

We had two skirmishes near the Kassassin Bridge, on both of which occasions each side fought bravely; in the latter engagement Rasheed Pacha and Ali Fehmy Pacha were both wounded, and were sent to Cairo, Ali Pacha-el-Ruby joining me in their stead.

Before our trenches, &c. were completed, the British forces attacked us suddenly at sunrise, the firing lasting for some time, when suddenly in our rear appeared a division of cavalry and

artillery, which caused the flight of the Egyptian troops on Wednesday, the 29th of Shawal, 1299, which day corresponds with the 13th of September, 1882.

After the flight of the troops I left for Belbeis, the English artillery following close behind me. When I arrived there I met Ali Pacha-el-Ruby, with whom I went by train to Cairo.

In Cairo we found a Council at the Ministry of War, all the princes being present. After a long discussion, all being confident that England had no intention of annexing Egypt, it was decided to offer no more resistance, more especially as England was renowned for dealing always towards others with equity and humanity, and we were confident that if the necessary inquiries were instituted and the feeling of the people generally understood England would do her utmost to put a stop to all injustice and give back freedom to them. I accordingly sent a telegram on the 11th of September to the Commander of the Abassieh troops, which numbered about 35,000 men, ordering him to hoist a flag of truce and in person to proceed and meet the commander of the British troops, informing him at the same time that the war was altogether at an end, it being understood that the intention of the British Government was to preserve the country from ruin.

The English troops arrived in Cairo at sunset, and were met by Riáz Pacha and Ibrahim Bey Fouzi, the Prefect of Police, a deputation from Benha having been previously sent from there to meet General Wolseley.

At 1.30 a.m., Ibrahim Bey Fouzi came and informed me that General Lowe desired to have an interview with me at Abassieh. The same day the officer in charge at Kafr-el-Dowar came up to Cairo, and was summoned with myself to this interview. We thereupon went to General Lowe, in accordance with his request, and I sent also for Colonel Ali Bey Yusef, who was then at the Citadel.

When Toulba Pacha and myself met General Lowe, he asked

us whether we were willing to give ourselves up as prisoners to the English Government. We replied in the affirmative, on the condition that we should be delivered into the hands of the *English* Government. We thereupon took off our swords, and delivered them to General Lowe, who was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, telling him, at the same time, that we only gave ourselves up to the English Government because we were confident England would deal with us justly, it being the prayer of humanity and that of our children that England would see us restored to our rights and privileges; and we appealed to him as the representative of the English Government and of all Englishmen.

At the same time we informed the General that we had at Abassieh 35,000 men, and a similar number at Kafr-el-Dowar, Rasheed, Damietta, and other places, but for the safety and peace of our country we had abandoned all idea of resistance, and had surrendered ourselves, being confident that England had no wish whatever to annex the country. The General agreed to this statement, and we remained with him three days, and then were sent to Abdin, where we were under the surveillance of Colonel Thynne up to the 4th of October, and were treated kindly and well. After this we were handed over to the Egyptian authorities, and lodged in the Egyptian prison on Thursday, the 5th of October. This was a sad and memorable day for me, for I was separated from my friend Toulba Pacha, and placed in a room, where there was not even a chair, and I was locked in! My servant came, but the guard refused to allow anything to be brought to me, except a carpet and a blanket.

Directly after this, a party, evidently "told off" to insult and menace the prisoners, appeared, and searched me, taking away all my private papers, which were wanted by the Commission of Inquiry. Following this, a second party, mostly the Khedive's *employés*, and among whom were Osmán Bey, the

manager of the Khedive's stables, and Hussein Effendi Fouzi, attached to the Khedive's household, arrived, and with them the Turkish Agha, who rides in front of His Highness, being one of his body-guard. On their arrival they searched me all over, even taking off my shirt, but found nothing, except a charm or talisman which I wore, but this was taken by force from me. When I said that I would myself take it off, some one cried out in a loud voice, "No, I was ordered to do this, and even to take off your boots and to search them!"

About an hour later, the editor of the Arab paper *El Ahram*, Beshara Takla, came to visit me, and, as I thought, to console and sympathise with me, he having adopted our cause previous to the war, and having sworn on his honour and religion that he was one of us, speaking in favour of the liberty of our country. In fact we esteemed him a patriot! But when he entered, he was most insulting, and said, "Oh, Arábi, what have you been doing, and what has happened to you?" I was then certain that the man was a traitor, and without honour. As I did not answer him, he left me.

Following closely on this, another party, almost entirely composed of the Khedive's attendants, Turks and soldiers who guard His Highness, came in. My carpet and blanket were searched, after which they left the room, remaining outside all the night as guard over the prisoners.

On the night of the 9th of October, at about 9.30 p.m., having undressed myself and lain down to sleep, I heard the door opened, and a group of about ten or twelve persons came into my room; but, being in total darkness, I was unable to distinguish them. Suddenly one of them cried out in a loud voice, "Eh! Arábi; don't you know me?" Thinking that I was about to be murdered, I got up, and replied, "No, I do not;" when I heard shouted, "I am Ibrahim Agha;" and he swore at me, calling me a dog and a pig, and spat at me three times. I stood quite quiet, and gradually perceived that it

really was Ibrahim Agha, tutunji to the Khedive, and whose accomplice had been sent to Syria some time ago for having stolen some diamonds from the Abdin Palace.

Ever since I was surrendered to the Egyptian authorities, when my meals arrive, one of the guards, a Turk, takes them from my servant, opens the door for a minute, deposits the food, and promptly closes the door, treating me like a wild beast in a cage.

The native Government has taken measures to arrest nearly all officers, from the rank of major upwards, including colonels and lieutenant-colonels, and they are now imprisoned. Many Ulemas, Members of the Chamber, Notables, and others have shared the same fate, in Cairo, Alexandria, and the provinces.

This war has no precedent in history. The present Khedive was the cause of a foreign fleet coming to Egypt; he then himself encouraged us; finally withdrawing from us altogether to side with foreign troops. The Sultan, the real Sovereign of this country, also sided with us, and loaded us with marks of his approbation. His representative concurred in our resistance, and his trusted officer exhorted us to defend the country from what they termed the rapacity of England. The opening acts of the war were carried on in his name. Then we suddenly found the English troops fighting for the Khedive, the Egyptian troops being styled "rebels."

If the Egyptian troops were really the only "rebels," and our defence a mutiny how is it that so many of the Civil Notables, Ulemas, and Members of the Chamber, as well as others, were incarcerated and shared the same fate? On the other hand, I contend that if the army, and indeed the whole Egyptian nation, had participated in what the Egyptians believed and declared to be a righteous and just cause, England, one of the first nations of Europe, noted for her justice and equity, should not consent to crush our hopes in order to please one single man—the more so, as by the religious laws of this country this man has no right to rule as a prince over the people.

England having always respected the laws and religious views of other countries, we cannot understand why she should have followed a course which must appear as a mystery in the annals of nations. Egypt declared no war with England, but defended herself, and now that we trust England will ascertain the real truth we hope all friendly relations, which have existed for years, will be renewed, she having always hitherto respected the rights and privileges of Egypt.

The cultivation of the country, the preparations against a "high Nile," and the general tranquillity then existing, prove that there was no intention of going to war with any one. The provisional Government spared no pains to protect the property of Europeans all over the country. If I were a rebel, with a standing army of 70,000 men, fully equipped, storehouses full of provisions, plenty of ammunition, and canals intersecting the land everywhere, why should I have surrendered?

If I had anything to fear or to be ashamed of, why should I not have escaped, as I easily might have done, to a neighbouring country, or even to England, the refuge of many political unfortunates in past times?

But the truth is, I am no "rebel." I led the nation in seeking the liberty of our country, and employed all honourable means to this end, respecting the laws, not thinking of self, as others say, but for the welfare of Egypt. I became commander of the troops appointed to defend the country in a lawful manner, and by order of the Sultan, the Khedive, the Chamber, and with the sanction of the nation. As regards accusations of massacre and incendiarism, I laugh them to scorn. With powerful adversaries such as mine, some miserable persons may be induced to speak against me; but would, I ask, my then subordinates, or any one else, have run the risk of doing these grave things, without a written order from me?

There is no proof nor evidence to contradict the facts I have stated, and I therefore beseech you, my defenders, and my esteemed friend, Mr. Blunt, not forgetting those other Englishmen

who are lovers of humanity and defenders of the truth, to read this my personal statement carefully and correctly, written in my own handwriting, giving to you all detail from beginning to end of the late events; and this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Written in my prison, at the Daira Saniya in Cairo, this 29th of October, 1882.

AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

CHAPTER XIII.

SOME OTHER CLIENTS.

THE *vekil* or agent of Shepherd's Hotel was at this time amongst the unfortunate inmates of the Daira Saniya, and there was much lamentation amongst the ladies of the Khedivial family, with whom Osmán Pacha Fouzi was a general favourite. Osmán in his youth had been a memloup of the great Mehemet Ali, and in his old age was still the faithful agent and factotum of his daughter the Princess Zeineb (the owner of Shepherd's Hotel), and his only surviving son Prince Hálím. A Circassian by birth, a Turk by education and ideas, a Hálímist in politics, a wag, a French scholar on a limited scale, and a bon-vivant of established reputation, old Dély Osmán, (or cracked-brain Osmán,) was singularly out of place amongst the Egyptian Nationalists. He had supported Arábi, it was true, but only because he hoped against hope, that Arábi's movement might end in the realisation of his life's dream—the accession to power of his master's son. Sympathy with Egyptian

aspirations he had none, but he thought they could be utilized and turned to good account by a judicious application of Turkish intrigues. He represented the great harím influence of Cairo, which declared itself strongly against the present régime. During the war Osmán used to repair to the tomb of Mehemet Ali, and, shaking vigorously the wooden sarcophagus which covered his grave, call loudly on the founder of the race to send some more worthy descendant to oust the feeble Tewfik from his throne. At the request of Mr. Grosse, the chief agent of the hotel, we consented to do what we could for Osmán Pacha Fouzi. For reasons I have before explained, we had already accepted the retainers of Toulba Pacha and Ahmed Bey Rifát. We, therefore, formally applied for an authorisation to defend eight of the political prisoners who were now awaiting their trial, including amongst the number Yácoub Sámi Pacha, of whose extraordinary ability as Arábi's Under-Secretary for War we had heard a great deal.

In the course of the morning of the 30th October we received an autograph letter in French from Ismaïl Pacha Eyoub, President of the Commission of Inquiry, authorising us to defend the eight persons in question. We repaired to the prison at once, and Mr. Beaman, (then acting as Colonel Sir Charles Wilson's interpreter,) introduced us to Toulba, who seemed



طلبہ حضرت

TOULBA PASHA.

hardly able to express the satisfaction he felt at our arrival. Toulba Pacha is emphatically one of those persons who, to borrow a French phrase, *ne paye pas de mine*. He was at best a timorous mortal, short of stature, pallid from anxiety and chronic asthma, and possessing a countenance singularly void of expression. It was difficult to imagine him commanding the artillery at Kafr-el-Dowar or bearding the Khedive in the presence of his Council. All through their troubles at Cairo he clung to Arábi like a weak child to a strong father, and exhibited an almost touching affection for his chief. He at once gave us his procuration, and set to work dictating his defence.

Our reception from "deli" Osman was by no means so satisfactory. At our entrance a tall, haggard old man, with a fair complexion, a well-shaped Roman nose, and an unkempt gray beard, slowly rose from a carpet in the corner of the room. We explained our errand. "Arábi!" he exclaimed; "*I don't know the man!* Don't you understand that as a Turk, and the son of a Turk, I can have no community of ideas or interests with the Egyptians? Have you not heard, I worship the very ground on which any descendant of Mehemet Ali treads? I am Tewfik's devoted slave, and cannot imagine for an instant why I am here. I utterly repudiate both Arábi and his cause." We proposed to retire. To

this he demurred: his friend Mr. Grasse had sent us, and he supposed we could defend both Arábi and himself without any inconvenience. For obvious reasons we saw nothing more of Osman Pacha till Arábi's trial was over. He used to kick his cell door very vigorously whenever we passed, and often, I think, wished he had not been so hard on his Egyptian fellow-prisoners.

Yácoub Sámi (to whom Sir Charles Wilson introduced us) had been the very heart and soul of the resistance at Cairo. Although a Turk by birth, he had thrown in his lot with the nationalists, and had organized in a masterly manner the vast supplies and large reinforcements from every part of Egypt which had been sent to Arábi first at Kafr-el-Dowar and then at Tel-el-Kebir. He was at the same time one of the moving spirits of the Cairo National Council, and, when all was over, he had arranged for the surrender of the troops all over the country. Strange to say from the moment he was thrown into prison he became utterly and hopelessly demoralised. Like the rest he had been ill-used in his cell—beaten, insulted, and spat upon; before the Commission he had been treated with studied indignity. His mind had become almost unhinged from fear, and he had shamelessly denied his loudor and his cause. He told us the story of his sufferings with many bitter tears, and when he read

Arábi's letter he fairly gave way altogether. At last he plucked up courage, signed eagerly enough an appointment for us to act in his behalf, and asked us to tell Arábi that he hardly deserved the kind words he had written him. Yácoub Sámi is a short, somewhat thick-set man, with a fair complexion, very marked and expressive features, and accustomed to wear glasses. I formed the highest opinion of his ability and talents. I afterwards discovered that his cell window looked into a yard filled with large wooden chests of a very solid appearance. I ignore still their use or why they were placed there. The prisoners who saw them believed they indicated a means for a summary jail delivery. I shall never forget poor Toulba's face when he was moved into a room on that side of the building, in consequence of an allegation that he had been talking on his fingers to the clerks of a bank next door.

Our eighth client was Ahmed Rifát Bey. His cell showed signs of superior comfort and even elegance. Books, embroidered cushions, a Persian carpet, a looking-glass, and elaborate mosquito-curtains, indicated a certain amount of culture in its tenant. A slightly-built pale young man of about thirty years of age, and entirely European appearance, came forward to receive us on our entrance with all the signs of considerable satisfaction. Rifát spoke French like a French-

man, and said the moment he heard of our arrival (he occupied a cell above the street at the extreme end of the prison, corresponding precisely with that of Arábi at the opposite corner, and had often seen us go in and out of the prison) he had resolved to speak out boldly, although he had also received domiciliary visits of a minatory character since his arrest. All he wanted was pen, ink, and paper, to present us with a written defence. He told us at our first interview something of his history. "My father," he said, "is Káni Pacha, who lives at Constantinople. He has been more than once Minister of Finances, and they call him 'the only honest Turk.' I was educated at Paris, and went through the training necessary for the legal profession, but before I took my degree I returned home to marry a daughter of Kámil Pacha, the Imperial Master of Ceremonies. I was next sent back to Paris as attaché at the Embassy, but I lost my post for visiting the exiles of the *jeune Turquie* party. Shortly afterwards I was appointed Director of European Correspondence at the Foreign Office of the Porte, but I resolved to seek my fortunes in Egypt. Ismail Pacha first employed me, and I gradually rose, till on the accession to office of Mahmoud Sámi in February last I became Secretary of the Council of Ministers, and Director of the Press Department. I am a Turk, and have certainly no motive to tell you

what is not true. Arábi had on his side the sympathy of the whole of Egypt. He also gained mine. Arábi was the leader and spokesman of an enslaved and deeply-wronged people striving for freedom, and all Egypt was with him in his struggle. He was betrayed by the Khedive, and deceived by the Sultan. The National cause is hopelessly broken now, and the Egyptians, like all oppressed people, are cowards, and cannot withstand the moral demoralization of their complete defeat. Who can dare bear witness in our favour now? Even I trembled and faltered before the Commission of Inquiry, which only sought to force me to compromise my chiefs. In spite of all this, if we have a fair trial in the light of day, Europe will learn the true nature of Arábi's conduct, and the universality of his cause will, in spite of the power of our enemies, become apparent. Arábi need fear nothing then." Our interview with Ahmed Bey Rifát was certainly encouraging, and I returned to Arábi to report the progress we had made.

I found Arábi's usual placid temper much disturbed. He had insisted on reading the *Jowáib* (an Arab paper published at Constantinople under semi-official auspices), which had extolled him as a hero up to the eve of Tel-el-Kebir, and, as might be expected, denounced him as a rebel the moment he fell. The number which had last arrived was more than usually

virulent, and he begged me to allow him to answer it. I saw no valid objection to his doing so, and he addressed the following letter to the Editor of the *Times* :

SIR,

I have seen in No. 1105 of the *Jowab*, under the heading of the arrest of the seditious in Egypt, an article saying that so many rebel officers, and so many Bedouin Sheikhs, and such a one of the Ulema, and such a Mudir, and such an interpreter, or merchant, or clerk, have been arrested and sent to prison. Now, all ye champions of liberty, if it is the soldiers who are rebels, why have so many Notables and Ulemas, and Kadis of such different condition, been imprisoned and ill-treated? And if the whole of the nation of every class was of one mind in one work, and that the liberation of their country and its defence, why then are they to be stigmatised by the name of rebel?

In truth's name this is evident tyranny that they should be treated as such. The war was in accordance with the laws of God and man, consonant to a solemn decree of a Council under the presidency of the Khedive and Dervesh Pacha, the envoy of the Sultan. And after the soldiers and inhabitants had left Alexandria, the Khedive returned and went over to those who were fighting against his country, a thing prohibited by every law.

The entire Egyptian nation was unanimous as to the necessity of suspending Tewfik Pacha for having transgressed the prescription of the divine and highest law, and demanded the continuation of the defence of the country by a decree which was made known to His Majesty the Sultan. After that are we rebels? I say that we were defending our country in a way approved by the laws of God and man, and whoever says the contrary is a slave to passion and money. I add that the Ulema of Islam and the Moslems of every country of the world,

allow that we never exceeded the limit laid down in God's book, and deprecate the ill-treatment we receive, which is contrary to all justice.

Oh, ye just men! Is it fair that the sons of the country should be deprived of every office, and that foreigners should take their places, together with those who have come to Egypt, like Circassians, Albanians, and Bulgarians, so that even down to lowest ranks, such as the *ousbashis* of the army, the places are given to others than the sons of Egypt? Are not the Egyptians as good as the Bulgarians and other foreigners? But we shall find amongst the champions of humanity some to defend the right against the tyranny of the time which blackens the face of man.

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI, the Egyptian.

On the last day of October we presented ourselves for the first time before the Court of Preliminary Inquiry, which sat in a long room, occupying the centre of the first floor of the building, and separated only by one or two small apartments used as offices from the cells of Mahmoud Sámi and Arábi on the one side and Ahmed Bey Rifát on the other. The walls were bare and white-washed. Three narrow windows led to a balcony overlooking the entrance and the street. In the middle of the apartment was a large oval table covered with a green baize cloth. Around this table were grouped, seated on very homely chairs, the President, the subordinate members of the Commission, Sir Charles Wilson, Mr. Beaman, and one or two secretaries. Coffee and

cigarettes freely circulated, and such time as could be spared from them was passed in reading almost interminable papers, and in the indiscriminate questioning of prisoners and witnesses by the President and his colleagues, very often all speaking at once, while the secretary was supposed to keep a record of the answers thus obtained.

The President, Ismail Pacha Eyoub, received us with marked courtesy, and invited us to be seated near him. Ismail Eyoub is really a remarkable man. His own career has been a chequered one. While undergoing banishment in the Soudan he somehow or other contrived to acquire a fair knowledge of English, French, and German. By one of the turns of fortune so common in oriental history he next became governor of the very province which had been the scene of his exile, and succeeded in sending a satisfactory balance of revenue to Cairo. His enemies pretend he was not unfriendly to the Slave Trade, which contributed not a little to his financial success, but I never heard any proof advanced in support of the assertion. Since his return to Cairo he has held several posts in a creditable manner, including the titular presidency of the International Tribunals, and the portfolio of Public Works in the Cherif Cabinet of 1881—82.

Ismail Eyoub had joined the National cause like

everybody else, was even a member of the Council of Defence at Cairo, and took part in a famous congratulatory picnic held under the shade of Arábi's tent at Kafr-el-Dowar. Like a prudent man he had not burned his ships and contrived to come to terms with the successful Palace faction in the early days of the Restoration. As a sign of his complete submission, he had accepted the invidious task of helping to judge his fellow-rebels. His character presented a curious combination of uncommon intelligence and great weakness, and his endeavours to please everybody in the discharge of his duties were highly diverting. Between Riáz Pacha, Lord Dufferin, the Khedive, and the counsel on both sides, he had a very difficult task to perform. His really sound judgment and good feeling generally pointed out the course he should take, but at the critical moment his moral courage failed him, and he often went hopelessly wrong. An ordinary spectator would have thought him prejudiced and arbitrary, while his experiments at speaking diplomatically certainly savoured strongly of deliberate prevarication.

I need say very little of the other members of the Commission. They had been selected almost entirely from the Turkish and Circassian parties, and their whole future evidently depended on the successful result of their inquisitorial labours. Ali

Ghaleb Pacha and Yusef Choudy Pacha were both Circassian memlouks. They had left the army with Osmán Pacha Rifki, and the latter had been twice degraded and once exiled to the Soudan. Muhamed Zeki Pacha was the creature of the Minister of the Interior Riáz. On the promotion of Ismail Eyoub he became President of the Commission, and did his utmost to harass the prisoner and ourselves. Although a near relative of the lady Aisha Hanem, he had endeavoured to gain favour by loudly applauding her deportation, and the escape of Arábi drove him nearly to frenzy. Every one of his decisions were reversed by the Ministry, and I am glad to say he did not even get a decoration when he went with his colleagues to give the Khedive an account of their stewardship. Sáad-ed-Dine Bey had been Governor of the Behereh, and had gained credit by ill-treating some peculiarly obnoxious prisoners on their road to the Soudan. Muhamed Hamdy Bey, a Turk, was the brother-in-law of the prisoner Ahmed Rifát, against whom he entertained a strong personal animosity. He has adroitly managed never to furnish the details of his administration of the late Mustapha Fazil Pacha's estate, notwithstanding the repeated and energetic reclamations of the Sublime Porte. Muhamed Hamdy was told off to give out papers to our copyists. Till Arábi's case was disposed

of he was impertinent and disobliging. He even went so far as to smudge a quantity of telegrams with ink, and, throwing them on the table before the indignant Commissioners, accuse our employés of defacing them with some sinister object. Unfortunately I discovered *the ink was still wet, and none of our clerks had been at work since the previous day.* After Arábi's escape from the death Hamdy regarded as a certainty, he became friendly and even servile, made friends with poor Rifát, and thanked me with tears in his eyes for having saved the honour of his family, and generally protected the Egyptians. Mustapha Rágheb Bey, Suleimán Yousry Bey, Mustapha Khoubroussy Bey, and Muhamed Moukhtar Effendi, were nonentities of the genus sea-lawyer. They all showed themselves adepts at brow-beating the prisoners and witnesses, and none more than Suleimán Yousry. When the star of the Nationalists seemed to rise once more Yousry used to haunt our steps to obtain a special certificate and recommendation, which he said would materially help him with his superiors.

To these gentlemen Ismail Pacha Eyoub (a tall, thin Egyptian, with an intelligent and expressive face) solemnly introduced us, on the morning of the 31st October. "Your presence," he said (for he had prepared a set speech for the occasion), "forms an epoch in our history, and must be considered as a

land-mark in our progress. It is the first time these several thousand years that foreign lawyers have appeared before an Egyptian Court. We hail their arrival as a sign that England has determined to give us judicial reform and better tribunals." (He apparently forgot that this was one of the revolutionary demands of the prisoners next door.) "As an Egyptian," he continued, "I rejoice at their being allowed to plead. We have all heard of Mr. Broadley in Tunis. We hope that he will understand us and help us here." Coffee, cigarettes, and mutual admiration terminated the interview.

We found Rifát Bey busily employed in writing his defence. Our visit seemed to have rekindled his old enthusiasm, and he had that morning managed to see his young son, a clever boy of nine in a picturesque uniform, who had been, with his little brothers aged eight and seven, expelled from the Khedivial school for the unpardonable fault of being the children of a "rebel." The eldest had offered a rude shock to restored Egyptian loyalty by offering in person, to Tewfik Pacha's son Abbas, a boy of his own age, a petition written by himself for the release of his father. Rifát gave us at this interview an interesting account of the proceedings of Dervesh Pacha during the eventful month which preceded the bombardment. "If you want a proof of the

Sultan's ideas regarding us," he said, "I can give you one. A day or two before the 12th of July Dervesh Pacha gave to me as a mark of His Imperial Majesty's approval of my conduct as a member of the nationalist party, a *firmán* raising me to a Pacha's rank. I was requested to keep this a secret at the time, but if you go to my house with a letter from me my wife will give it you."

Later in the day I drove to Rifát's house, a large airy building near the Abdin Palace. He had lived almost entirely as a European, and I saw there a French governess, who had brought up all his children. Rifát could boast a good library, arranged in a spacious room, looking out on a shady garden. It had been since his imprisonment turned topsy-turvy in search of written treason. After a long talk with the governess on Egypt and the Egyptians, I succeeded in obtaining the paper in question, which amply bore out all Rifát had said, and formed one more link in the "rebels" plea of justification.

Ismail Eyoub having promised us in our brief interview speedy communication of all the evidence till then recorded by the Commission and the documents on which the prosecution proposed to rely, we engaged fifteen additional clerks to copy them both in Arabic and French. The Commission placed a

small room at our disposal adjoining Rifát's cell, and we purchased more deal tables and large supply of stationery and office requisites. Our new copyists were chiefly Copts, Syrians, or Frenchmen, and, as no question of confidence was involved, we left the patronage to M. Borrelli's assistant, a very intelligent young Egyptian *licencié-en-droit*, named Hechmat.

The records of the Commission were given up very slowly at first, and I hardly wonder at it. Borelli Bey had evidently not thought it worth his while to devote those talents, which had more than once evolved an Egyptian Constitution in a single night, to such a task as this. Overwhelmed with weightier labours of importance, mere mechanical work could well be left to subordinates. Arábi was condemned *d'avance*; the success of his enemies was the most cogent proof of his rebellion, and the elastic consciences of the judges who were to play a part in the gala show of a nominal trial were not expected to be inconveniently over-scrupulous on the question of evidence. A neat and presentable *dossier* was all that was wanted; clear handwriting, superfine paper, and much green-silk stitching would cover a multitude of internal defects and save appearances. It thus came about that the testimony collected was worse than useless in a legal point of view. To procure a complete copy of it, Mr. Blunt spent nearly 500*l.* It will remain

in his hands as a convincing proof of the absence in Egypt of that justice for which Arábi asked in vain; the most complete exemplification of everything that is deplorable in the hopeless confusion of ideas pervading the judicial systems of the East. Hearsay had been piled upon hearsay, opinion had been recorded upon opinion, impression had been asked for after impression, but direct, reliable, trustworthy evidence there was none. The accused had never been present at a single hearing of the witnesses against them; no sort of cross-examination had taken place, nearly half the testimony consisted of letters written *in absentia* at the request of the Commission, and the administration of an oath had been consistently dispensed with. Some of these declarations, taken in different parts of Egypt as far apart as Dan from Beersheba, agreed even to the most trivial word and minute punctuation, and afforded a convincing proof of the circulation of a "model" deposition.

I will not weary my readers even with an attempt to describe at length this ponderous record of judicial absurdities, through which I was compelled for many dreary days to plod. After such men as Lord Dufferin and Sir Charles Wilson have weighed it and found it wanting, I may dismiss it from the story of Arábi's defence. Its gist was simple enough:—"Everybody now *thought* Arábi a rebel and Tewfik a model sovereign; the whole Egyptian nation had acted from a

terror of Arábi and the army; some persons *had heard* Arabi had burned Alexandria, and considered it *probable* that he had something to do with the massacres of June; nobody had any doubt now that Arábi deserved ill of his country, he had not succeeded, and should certainly be punished." Hardly a question had been asked which was not of the kind technically described as leading, and internal evidence of undue influence was afforded almost by every page. Whole days had been consumed in those humorous trivialities so congenial to the oriental mind; twenty witnesses had been examined to prove that the accused Mahmoud Sámi had said that "the Khedive should pack up his portmanteau, and go to Shepherd's Hotel, while one of the gravest items of accusation against some of the Notables of the Shar-kiya province was that of having "shot at some dogs and cats dressed up to represent Sir Garnet Wolseley and Sir Beauchamp Seymour!" I need say little more of the *ex-parte* record of facts put together by the Egyptian Government against Arábi and his friends.

At the beginning of November our two offices were in full working order. The clerks and translators at home were engaged on the statements made to us by our clients; those in the prison were mechanically copying the brief for the prosecution (which when completed was nearly two feet in height), and

was now being gradually doled out to us day by day by Muhamed Hamdy Bey on behalf of the Commission. Mr. Blunt and his wife were doing their utmost to help us at home. Collections of newspaper extracts (carefully compiled by Lady Anne Blunt) reached us by every mail in order that we might intelligently follow the treatment of the case at the all-powerful bar of public opinion at home; we were promptly furnished with a sufficient supply of French and English law-books bearing on the subject of the coming trial; each Parliamentary Paper reached us as it appeared, and I was fairly overwhelmed by suggestions from all quarters as to the course I should pursue, some of which were of a very extraordinary character.

American ladies seemed to vie with each other in asking for Arábi's autograph and wishing him "a safe deliverance from his enemies," for the strongest sympathy he enlisted abroad at that time certainly came from across the Atlantic. As to the advice proffered me I need only refer to two instances. An English barrister wrote from the Temple to suggest that, "as Arábi's surrender had been illegal, he was still technically in British custody, and consequently a writ of *habeas corpus* should be obtained from the High Court of Justice against either Sir Garnet Wolseley or Sir Edward Malet." From

Monsieur Henri Duveyrier, the celebrated traveller,
I received the following letter:—

Paris, 18, Rue Pigalle,
1st November, 1882.

SIR,

I respectfully inform you that my experience as a traveller in the desert of Sahara twenty-two years ago lets me think that Arábi Pacha must have had some relation with the Mussulman religious confraternity (*trika*) of Sídí Muhamed-es-Senoûsi, which is a most deadly fiend of Christians (*sic*).

If my supposition be correct, Arábi Pacha's culpability would be in some way lessened, he being then an agent of a committee overpowering his own feelings and dispositions.

I do not know if this hint may be of some use to you, but I should be very thankful if you had the kindness of informing me if Arábi Pacha is or is not a member of the religious confraternity of Sídí Muhamed-es-Senoûsi and has or has not been upheld by the association.

I am, Sir,

Yours most respectfully,

HENRI DUVEYRIER.

Our great office in the *maison du moufti* had now become a favourite place of resort, and I made there several pleasant and not easily to be forgotten acquaintances. Mr. Chirol, a writer possessing an exceptionally accurate knowledge of the politics of the East, and who was then discharging the duties of Special Correspondent of the *Standard*, was one of our frequent visitors, as also was Mr. John Macdonald, his able colleague of the *Daily News*. Many

of the Egyptians also now began to see us with increasing freedom, and amongst them a very intelligent man, Selamah Bey, an excellent English scholar, who had been at the head of the Posts and Telegraphs during the troubles, and had, notwithstanding his nationalistic proclivities, managed to escape with simple dismissal and social excommunication.

We saw a good deal of Mr. Bernard, Special Correspondent of the *New York Herald*, who claimed a monopoly in what he called "picturesque" telegrams. One he showed me announcing my arrival was certainly very picturesque indeed; it ran thus:—"Mr. B., Arábi's counsel, has arrived. He is tall and stout, talks much of his client's innocence, and wears coloured silk shirts with cords and tassels, instead of white shirts and neckties," &c. He went on to say that the cords were looked on as emblematic of Arábi's inevitable doom, continuing in the same strain through several lines, and all this at the cost of four shillings a word. As an honest republican Mr. Bernard became very well disposed towards Arábi, and at last conceived a plan of *purchasing* him by a happy combination of the resources of Messrs. Gordon Bennett and Barnum. "Nothing," he said, could be easier; "Bennett's yacht will take him off quietly. For the first twelvemonth Arábi shall write

three-quarters of a column every week for the *Herald* on Egyptian politics, and then Barnum will run him on the platform in the States. We will give 250,000*l.* down and allow Arábi 1,000*l.* a-year." I of course regarded the proposal as a joke; but when, later on, the question of exile was being considered, Mr. Bernard made it in sober seriousness both to Lord Dufferin and his secretary. Strange to say, he was not singular in his idea. I heard from Sir Edward Malet that a Count Zizinia (if I remember the name rightly) offered a precisely similar sum for the "exclusive privilege of exhibiting Arábi in all the principal cities of Europe during one year."

Neither were the French correspondents altogether strangers to our *bureau*. Even M. Gabriel Charmes, of the *Journal des Débats*, with whom I had already crossed swords polemically over the Tunisian question, and of whom I shall have occasion to speak farther on, called occasionally. The special *artiste* of the *Illustration* took his little revenge for my too well-known dislike to the French annexation of Tunis. He depicted me in his paper as a dotard of eighty, holding a huge quill-pen, after the manner of the old masters, and wearing an enormous wig of the time of Louis XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

WHAT ARÁBI'S PAPERS CONTAINED.

ON the 1st November Mr. Beaman handed to me fair copies of his translations of Arábi's papers, 69 in number. By dint of sheer hard work he had completed his difficult task in nine days, and notwithstanding the pressure of his official duties. If the great case had been fought out to the bitter end, many of the documents entrusted to us by Arábi would have been of the highest importance to his plea of "not guilty" on the charge of rebellion, while others at any rate could have been urged with almost equal force in support of an allegation of what the French call "extenuating circumstances." I only purpose giving in this chapter a few examples for the purpose of illustrating what I now assert, and it is useless to do more, for the purport of many of them is identical, and their accumulation only serves to prove the extent and intensity of the movement he headed, the very existence of which has been since so gratuitously called in question.

Arábi was never able to find the more explicit letters of the Turkish envoy Ahmed Essád, but other communications from the same person, found in Arábi's house, plainly refer to those which are missing. His wife had fortunately preserved, in their original sealed envelope, the following missives from the Yildiz Kiosk:—

From Muhamed Zaffer, Chaplain to the Sultan.

To his Excellency the Egyptian Minister of War.

Excellency,—I have presented your two faithful letters to His Majesty the Sultan, and from their contents he has learnt all your sentiments of patriotism and watchfulness, and especially have the promises you make of your efforts to guard faithfully and truly His Majesty's interests been a cause of lively satisfaction to His Majesty, so much so that His Majesty ordered me to express his pleasure and his favour to you, and further bade me write to you as follows : viz.—

“As the maintenance of the integrity of the Caliphate is a duty which touches the honour of every one of us, it is incumbent on every Egyptian to strive earnestly after the consolidation of my power to prevent Egypt from passing out of my hands into the rapacious grasp of foreigners, as the vilayet of Tunis has passed, and I repose all my confidence in you, my son, to exert all your influence and to put forth every effort to prevent such a thing happening. You are to beware never for one moment to lose sight of this important point, and to omit none of the precautionary measures which are called for by the age in which we live ; keeping always before you as a perpetual goal the defence of your faith and of your country, and especially you must persist in maintaining your confidence and the ties which bind you.”

“That country—Egypt—is of the highest importance to

England and France, and most of all to England; and certain seditious intriguers in Constantinople, following in the path of these Governments, have for some time past been busy with their treacherous and accursed projects. Since they have found it to their profit jealously to promote these intrigues and seditions in Egypt, it is the especial desire of His Majesty that you should keep a very careful eye on these persons and things. According to the telegrams and news sent by the Khedive Tewfik, one of this party, we see that he is weak and capricious, and also it is to be remarked that one of his telegrams does not corroborate another, but they are all in contradiction. In addition to this I may tell you that Ali Nizámi Pacha and Ali Fuad Bey have spoken to His Majesty most highly in your favour, and Ahmed Rátib has repeated to His Majesty the substance of the conversation he had with you in the railway carriage between the stations of Zagazig and Mahsa, and, as His Majesty places the greatest confidence in Ahmed Pacha, he desires me again for this reason to express his trust in you, and to say that, as he considers you a man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness, he requires you above all things to prevent Egypt from passing into the hands of strangers, and to be careful to allow them no pretext for intervention there. The orders which Ahmed Pacha Rátib will receive on this head will be separately communicated to you. Both my letter and that of Ahmed Pacha Rátib, by order of His Majesty, have been written by one of His Majesty's own private secretaries, and, after we have affixed our seals to the letters, we also put an extra special seal on the envelopes. In a special and secret manner I tell you that the Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Hálím, or Tewfik; but the man who thinks of the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind him to the Caliphate, who pays due respect to His Majesty and gives free course to His Majesty's firmans, who assures his independent authority in Constantinople and elsewhere, who does not give bribes to a swarm of treacherous sub-officials, who does not

deviate one hair's breadth from his line of duty, who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our European enemies, who will watch against them, and ever preserve his country and his faith intact—a man who does this will be pleasing, agreeable to, and accepted by our great lord, the Sultan. If I have not entered into any further details in this letter of mine I beg you to excuse me, because Ahmed Pacha Rátib only arrived three days ago, and yet in that time, owing to his declarations of your fidelity and true intentions, His Majesty has expressed his full confidence in you. I only received the message I have just given you yesterday, and I hope to be able to send you by next week's post a more detailed letter. In every case be careful not to let any letters you send fall into strange hands, but try to get a special messenger, and as for this time it would be better if you were to send your answer by the hand of the man who brings this letter.

Your servant,

MUHAMED ZAFFER,

(February 22, 1882).

4 Rebi-al-Akhir, 1299.

Another of the same date, from Ahmed Pacha Rátib, aide-de-camp and Secretary to the Sultan, is as follows:—

I related to His Majesty the Sultan the conversation we had on the railway between the stations of Zagazig and Mahsa on my return to Stamboul, and it caused great pleasure to His Majesty, and he ordered me to communicate to you his Imperial compliments. I related to His Majesty all the kind treatment I received at your hands, and the courtesy my eyes witnessed while I was in Cairo, and His Majesty was extremely gratified thereat, so that the satisfaction he felt in your devotion and fidelity was increased manifold. People had made him think that you were acting, I know not how, contrary to right, and

had succeeded in perverting His Majesty's ideas about you ; but now that I have exposed the true statement of the case to him I swear to you that His Majesty deeply regrets ever having paid any attention to these false and lying statements about you, and, as a good proof of this, His Majesty has commanded me to write this letter, and to express to you the sentiments which follow. It matters nothing who is Khedive of Egypt. The thoughts of the ruler of Egypt, his intentions and his conduct, must be governed with the greatest care, and all his actions must tend to secure the future of Egypt, and to uphold intact the sovereignty of the Caliph, while he must show the most perfect zeal in upholding the faith and the country's rights. This will be required of him. Of the persons who have been on the Khedivial throne, Ismail Pacha and his predecessors gave bribes to Ali Pacha, Fuad Pacha, Midhat Pacha, and other representatives of the Sublime Porte, traitors, and, after shutting the eyes of the officials, dared to overtax and oppress the Egyptians, and in addition to this they made heavy debts and brought the Egyptians under a grievous yoke, and to-day in the eyes of the world their state has specially appealed to our pity ; but the whole position is an extremely delicate one, which calls for the necessity of finding a speedy and sure remedy. Therefore, it behoves you above all things to prevent anything that might lead to foreign intervention, and never to stray from the just and true path, nor to listen to any treacherous falsehoods, but in every way with watchful care to hinder the seditious projects of foreigners. This is the great hope of the Sultan, and, since we two shall correspond in the future, you must take the necessary precautions to prevent our letters from falling into strange hands. For this, the easiest way at present—and there is no safer channel you can find—is to trust your correspondence to the true and trusty man who carries this letter and that of Sheikh Muhamed Zaffer. I would also add that it is indispensable that you should send secretly some officer who knows

well what is going on in Egypt, and who is a trusted friend of yours, to present at the footstool of His Majesty reports on the state of the country in true detail. I beg you to send the answer by the man who brings this letter.

AHMED RÁTIB,

Aide-de-Camp of the Sultan,

4 Rebi-al-Akhir.

(February 22, 1882.)

It is important to bear in mind the date at which those letters were written and the position of the persons who wrote them. Ahmed Essád had been sent by the Sultan on several secret missions to Egypt since the beginning of the year 1882. To facilitate this correspondence he had been appointed to an ecclesiastical post in Arabia, and Mr. Redhouse describes him as "substitute for the Sultan in the Prophet's Mosque at Medina, Chief Preacher and Chief Precentor therein." Muhamed Zaffer was the Sultan's confidential spiritual adviser, who alone has a right to sit in his presence, and who occupied a suite of rooms in immediate vicinity to the imperial apartments. He had also been charged with the delicate negotiations as to the movements of the Tunisian Arabs on the Tripolitan frontier. Ahmed Rátib was one of the Sultan's most trusted aides-de-camp, and had already taken an important (although secret) part in the first Turkish Mission to Egypt.

The following are Arábi's firmans of rank issued on the 14th March and 24th June, 1882:—

We, the Prince of generous princes, and chief amongst the great and noble, endowed with honour and grace and with the special gift of God's favour, on the representation of the Khedive of Egypt that one of the princes of our imperial army in Egypt, as a man of reputation and dignity, merited the rank of Pacha, have advanced Arábi Pacha to this rank, and, having granted it to you and because you are worthy of it, the decree for that object has been issued from my Imperial Divan.

You then, because you have merited this favour and honour, and because you are invested with the rank of *Mir-Liwa*, must always show the greatest zeal and energy in carrying out all our orders, and display all constancy, caution, and fidelity, and you must ever beware of acting in any way prejudicial to the authority of the Caliph or contrary to law and justice.

(The Sultan's seal.)

Again:

Seeing the honesty, zeal, talent, and perfect intelligence which adorn the honourable and pure character of Arábi Pacha, the great amongst the noble, the prince of generous princes, the Minister of War over our imperial Egyptian army, we feel it incumbent on us to double our favours and honours upon him; and therefore, according to this imperial decree, which I have issued, the first grade of the order of the Medjidieh has been graciously conferred on the before-mentioned Arábi Pacha, and this Berát confirming it is issued accordingly.

(The Sultan's seal.)

These documents, coupled with others of a similar character, included amongst them letters and tele-

grams addressed from the Porte and Yildiz Kiosk to Rágheb Pacha and Mahmoud Sámi, which we hoped eventually to obtain, would have conclusively proved the authority of the Sultan for Arábi's action, and its continuity up to the very eve of his defeat. Nor, I contend, does this defence in any way detract from Arábi's claim to be ranked amongst true patriots. He always acknowledged the suzerainty and religious supremacy of the Porte as entirely consonant with the movement he headed. Thus wrote Mr. Blunt when publishing by authority six months before the war the programme of the Egyptian Nationalists:—

They acknowledge the Sultan Abd-el-Hamid Khan as their Suzerain and Lord, and as actual Caliph or Head of the Mussulman religion; nor do they propose, while his empire stands, to alter this relationship. They admit the right of the Porte to the tribute fixed by law, and to military assistance in case of foreign war. At the same time, they are firmly determined to defend their national rights and privileges, and to oppose, by every means in their power, the attempts of those who would reduce Egypt again to the condition of a Turkish Pachalik. They trust in the protecting Powers of Europe, and especially in England, to continue their guarantee of Egypt's administrative independence.

From this profession of faith Arábi never deviated.

The remaining papers given to us by Arábi showed quite as conclusively (to borrow his own words) that "all Egypt was with him." Petitions and addresses bearing hundreds (sometimes thou-

sands) of signatures and seals, from the chief men of every part of the country between Assiout and the mouth of the Nile, testified to the public approval of the National Cabinet, the existing universal faith in Arábi, the intense unpopularity of the Joint Note and "of him who accepted it," and the ardent wish of the Egyptians to follow the banner which had been raised. Other petitions and addresses couched in a similar strain poured in on the Imperial Commissioners to be placed at the feet of the Commander of the Faithful. Arábi possessed authentic copies of many of these. The Ulema of El Azhar had weighed Tewfik in the balance and found him wanting. They, too, joined in the general cry which echoed from one end of Egypt to the other, "*Allah yansurak yá Arábi*"—"God grant you victory, oh Arábi!"

The following address came from the chief inhabitants of the wealthy district of Sharkiya:—

The Ministry which was formed with the consent of the Chamber under the presidency of Mahmoud Sámi Pacha, from the day it assumed the reins of government, has sought to better the condition of the country and has striven to lay down principles of justice, to support the rules of order, and blot out the defects of the times preceding its formation.

It adopted the most efficacious measures for rooting out the tyranny which has ruined the country and defaced its beauty. It commenced, with all possible zeal and intelligence, to give justice to those who sought it. We, therefore, chief men of the

province of Sharkiya, and having the most important interest in the same, do demand the maintenance of this Cabinet, that it may complete its good measures, which, if God so wills it, are for our profit and welfare. We pledge ourselves to support this Ministry as we would defend our honour, our property, and all that is cherished by us.

The principal inhabitants of Alexandria spoke thus :—

In the name of God the Clement and Merciful, praise be to Him and blessings on the Prophet of God.

We verily believe that the presence of the fleet off our city can be for no other purpose than to carry out the Note presented by the two Consuls-General of England and France to the Egyptian Government.

In the demands set forth in this Note, an attempt is made to strike at the rights of the people and their country, to annul the firmans of the Porte, and openly and plainly to intervene in affairs of purely internal administration. It asks also the banishment of Egyptians and the dismissal of those who are our Ministers. This can mean nothing else than taking possession of our country. We have heard that His Highness the Khedive has accepted the note in question without finding fault with a word of it. He has done this although Egypt is a dependency of the Porte, who has granted to its ruler the full direction of all its internal affairs, and the submission to the Note destroys at once our privileges and those of the Porte. We of Alexandria reject the Note of the Powers, and he who accepts it must absolutely and for ever sever his cause from ours.

We refuse to separate ourselves from the Porte, to attach ourselves to any foreign power, even should we die for it, for better is it to die for the life of the country than to live while the country is dying.

Addresses of this kind seem to have poured in from all parts of the country, from Rosetta, from the Dakhalia, from Mansoorah, from Gharbieh, and the Fayoom. Their language is different, but their object is one—to support Arábi in his opposition to the Joint Note, to protest against the arrival of the fleet, and to solicit the favourable intervention of the Sultan. The Bedouin Sheikhs follow the example of their brethren of the cities, and their petitions are perhaps the most curious of all. In a score of them the fate of Tunis is pointed out as a warning and example. To reproduce these documents would fill a volume.

For my present purpose one other example of them will suffice;—the judgment of the great theological doctors of the El Azhar (a Moslem university almost as old as Islam itself) upon the Khedive Tewfik.

Here is the *istifta*, or question:—

Oh ye Notables and most learned Ulemas, who give wise counsel to the Moslems, who keep the Mussulman law spotless and pure, and who watch over the execution of its precepts, incline your ear and answer to the questions put by the Egyptian Nation in the following lines. Give sound advice, and may you be guided aright, and may God work well through you and point out the straight path!

What say you of a Sovereign who, being named by the Prince of the Faithful to govern his subjects with justice, and to act according to the rules of God, has violated the compact and sown dissensions among the Moslems, and has broken their staff

of unity? This so-called sovereign has even gone so far as to prefer the government of the Infidels to that of the Faithful, and has asked nations who are straying from the path of the true religion to establish their power in the Mussulman country over which he rules.

He has been the cause of making his subjects bend before the force of the stranger, and has even gone so far as to use every effort to defend that force.

And when the Faithful counselled him to change his conduct, he refused, and stubbornly continued in disobedience to the Sultan, and the Holy Law. Knowing this, can this sovereign legally continue to reign, to enable strangers to strengthen themselves in the country of Islam, or must he not be deposed, and another appointed in his place, who will watch over and keep the law?

*Fetwa—*or Opinion.

Thanks to God, and prayers and peace to our Lord Muhamed, the Messenger of God, and to his relations, friends, and those who love him!

In this case he shall be cast out, and in his place shall be named one who will watch over the law and defend it, and respect the rights of the Prince of the Faithful, our Lord the Caliph, Successor of the Messenger of the Master of all men.

The Most High has said "Ye who believe, take not the Jews and the Christians as Masters one over the other, and he among you who makes one of these his master shall be considered like to them." He hath also said (Praise and honour to him!) "Do not this, for then will there be troubles on the earth, and great disorders." Again He hath said (may He be praised and exalted!) "He who does not govern in accordance with that which God has shown by revelation he is truly an infidel." Also He hath said (praise and glory to Him!) "He who does not govern according to the revealed will of God, is a sinner."

And again, "He who does not govern according to the revealed will of God, that man is an oppressor." Again, "Tell the deceitful that they shall have a terrible punishment, those who take to themselves friends among the unbelievers instead of from among the faithful. Do they seek after power? Know that all power belongs to God alone!"

He hath said (praise and glory be to Him!) "Ye who have believed, take not my enemy and yours to show kindness to him." And again, "He who doeth this, shall be considered as erring from the right way." And again, "Ye have a fair example before you in Abraham and those who were with him. They said in truth to those among whom they lived, 'We retire from you, and purify ourselves from you, and from all that you worship in the place of God. We will know you no more, and henceforth enmity and hatred shall reign between us for ever, until you shall worship the One God.'" He hath said (praise and glory be to Him!), "In Abraham and his companions you have a good example, for those who trust in God and believe in the last day. He who rules is God, the Almighty to whom praise is due. He who makes friends of the Infidels is a tyrant."

The Prophet of God hath said (God's blessing and peace be on him!), "He who honours the power of God on earth, God will honour him on the day of the Resurrection, and he who despises the sovereignty of the Lord upon earth, God shall despise him upon the last day."

God, praise be to His name, is Omnipotent and Omniscient. May God bless our Lord the Prophet Muhamed, the most Noble, and his family and friends, great and powerful!

Here follow the signatures of the eight great religious chiefs of the El Azhar. The senior Muhamed Eleish died in the early days of his tribulations, but his legitimate successor Hasan El Edwi was one of the most remarkable of the prisoners I met in the Daira Saniya.

Arábi's papers, I believe, are more than sufficient to rebut any charge of rebellion in the ordinary sense of the word. They show at any rate that if he rebelled at all he did so as the leader of five millions of people, and at the head of the whole Egyptian people.

CHAPTER XV.

THE BATTLE OF THE PROCEDURE RULES.

NOVEMBER opened with the strongest indications, both on the part of M. Borelli and the Commission of Inquiry, that they were both anxious to escape, if possible, from the Procedure Rules, which they had agreed to on the part of the Government, and I had accepted on behalf of our clients. We, on the contrary, saw in them our sheet-anchor, and determined to cling closely to them accordingly. On going to the prison as usual (November 2nd) we were surprised to find the Commission in solemn session, although, in virtue of our agreement, we were now entitled to be present at the further examination of witnesses. Mahmoud Fehmy, Arábi's Minister of Public Works and Chief Engineer, was entering the room between a file of soldiers just as we arrived. I sent in a note to M. Borelli, asking him to tell me what all this meant. He begged us to be patient, assuring us with becoming gravity that he did not think the

treasonable language of Mahmoud Fehmy in regards to the Khedive's portmanteau very material to the merits of the case.

As I insisted on presenting a formal protest to the Commission, he was again sent out to set matters straight if possible. The incident ended in a written compromise, by which we agreed that "the Commission might, during four days, to count from the 3rd November, hear *in camera* the witnesses already summoned, and *no others*. After this, the Commission should give notice to the legal representatives of the accused if there were sufficient grounds for continuing the inquiry. (*Instruction.*) From that day, and after such a time as was necessary for the examination of the record of the case, the inquiry *could only be resumed* in the presence of the accused and their advocates; and in conformity with the arrangement of the 21st October."

While the negotiations were in progress, the sitting of the Commission was suspended; M. Borelli went backwards and forwards to confer with the president, and the compromise was finally signed by both of us in an adjoining office communicating with the court-room by an open door. When all was over Ismaïl Eyoub offered me his congratulations in the presence of his colleagues. The importance of what took place will soon be seen. Ten days later

the Commission was instructed by Riáz Pacha to deny that they had cognizance either of this arrangement, or the first agreement entered into by Borelli Bey on behalf of the Khedivial Government.

While waiting in the corridor I was suddenly addressed in good English by a short, thickset, and very much bronzed Egyptian, wearing an old tattered naval uniform, and carefully guarded on either side by a soldier. To avoid suspicion he hardly moved his lips. With many interruptions he told me the following story:—"My name is Ali Rágheb. I was a second officer in the service of the administration of the Khedivial steamers. On several occasions I was ordered to bring letters to Arábi from the Yildiz Kiosk. I once or twice took back his replies. After the bombardment I was arrested on reaching Alexandria. I had some cypher letters with me not for Arábi but for other people, the contents of which I did not know. The Alexandria Court Martial condemned me to ten years' hard labour in the Soudan. This means death. I beg you to call me as a witness for Arábi. I will testify in his favour. He was the chosen leader of all of us Egyptians, though he is deserted now. Can you present an appeal against the sentence passed upon me?" Later on I asked to call Ali Rágheb as a witness. The Commission immediately ordered him to the Soudan. Sir Charles Wilson prevented this, and

I tried in vain to move the authorities in his favour. It was, however, hopeless. The sentence was *fifteen* years and not ten as he imagined. What has become of him since?

The following days were passed in reading the various statements given us by the prisoners, and in examining such depositions as we managed to obtain from the Commission. The materials for a really tenable defence now seemed almost within our grasp. It became increasingly difficult for the Egyptian Government to conceal the true state of the case, unless, as Arábi himself very aptly remarked, it could invent "a chain capable of binding five millions of people." In the course of a tedious search after a complete copy of the *Moniteur Egyptien* (almost as inconvenient a record as our own Blue-Books), I made the acquaintance of Monsieur Léon Jablin, who had formerly been its publisher. I not only obtained from him what I required, but he gave me unasked much new and valuable information in favour of my clients and their cause. M. Jablin had published in the spring a well-written pamphlet explaining the ideas and aims of the Nationalists, entitled *l'Egypte Nouvelle*, which is well worth reading still. When I saw him he was selling off his possessions preparatory to returning home. "Riáz Pacha and I," he said, "cannot live in the same country now."

I also had the good fortune to meet Mr. M'Culloch, an excellent Arabic scholar and one of the most intelligent employés of the Egyptian Post Office. He had been "in at the death" when Arábi's tent was sacked, and was profoundly impressed by the thousands of telegrams which were found there, and which eloquently testified to the universality of his cause. Mr. M'Culloch never believed in Arábi till then. He was now not only convinced but even enthusiastic in his defence. Apart from the Khedive and his mother, hardly a single male or female member of the reigning family had failed to send his or her offering of money or provisions to the camps, or his or her laudatory telegram or letter to the leader of the people. Mr. M'Culloch had seen all these, and he had even copied some of them. Here is a single specimen :—

Prince Ibrahim,	to	Arábi Pacha,
Cairo,		Kafr-el-Dowar.

To H.E. the protector of the rights of Egypt, Ahmed Pacha Arábi. I offer to your Excellency my most sincere and ardent compliments and my public salutations, begging you to present the same to the chiefs of the army and to all the officers and soldiers, those possessors of genius and zeal. I tender you my hearty and continued thanks for your solicitude on behalf of our dear country, so precious to all Egyptians. I am delighted that the men of our country have offered themselves with the object of defending it against the enemy. I ascribe this to your good endeavours, which have been confirmed by victory. I pray God that he may perpetuate your happiness, crowned by triumph

and safety, and that I may receive a continued report of your health and security, of the continuation of victory, and of the rout of the iniquitous enemy. God can give us triumph through the intercession of the Prophet, for He is Almighty.

IBRAHIM

Through the good offices of Mr. Robert Oliphant, one of our clerks, we frequently saw Mr. Garwood, who had been till lately traffic-manager of the Cairo and Alexandria Railway. From him we obtained many details as to the singularly efficient manner in which Arábi had maintained order and peace at Cairo down to the day of his defeat. Even during the war the accounts of the Railway Company had been kept up to date with scrupulous exactness, not a piastre had been wrongfully appropriated from the receipts. These very books could have shown conclusively that "all Egypt was with Arábi" in deed as well as in word. Mr. Garwood gave us many instances in support of his assertions, and told us a very curious story of an adventure which happened to him just before the commencement of hostilities.

"The evening before Arábi left for Alexandria," he said, "I was sitting with Mr. Oliphant in the balcony of Shepheard's Hotel, when we were accosted by a Turk, who spoke French, and was familiar to us as an hanger-on at the Government offices. Some refreshment was ordered, and the man joined our party. After a few remarks on the subject of what had recently


taken place, he said to me somewhat abruptly, 'Could you not manage for a great reward to leave the railway bridge at Kafr Zayat open when Arábi goes down to Alexandria to-night?' Seeing the horror his proposal excited, he affected to laugh, and said he was only jesting; besides, how could he seriously make such an offer to Englishmen? He almost forced us to drink some wine he ordered as a sign of our belief in his protestations. After he left, Mr. Oliphant fell into a state of coma and I became violently ill, and I think the terrible sickness which supervened saved my life. Late at night we both went to the police-station, where our depositions were taken. Then came the exodus of Europeans and so the matter dropped." Mr. Oliphant fully confirmed this strange story.

Another of our visitors was Signor G. B. Messidaglia, who had, in the days of Gessi Pacha, been one of the three subordinate governors of the Soudan. He had remained in Cairo during all the anxious time before Tel-el-Kebir, and, although personally opposed to Arábi, was loud in his praise of the order maintained by his subordinates. "Never," he said, "was there so much real security at Cairo as during the so-called reign of terror." He showed me a paper signed by all the Italian colonists attesting the praiseworthy conduct of Ibrahim Bey Fouzy, Arábi's Prefect of Police. Before leaving once more for the

Soudan (where he again did good service) Signor Messidaglia gave me a rough print of the bombardment, which had attained great popularity in Cairo during the operations at Kafr-el-Dowar. It was coloured green, red, and yellow, all attempt at perspective being entirely dispensed with. Arábi was waving his sword triumphantly, while one ship at least was on fire and another sinking. M. Gabriel Charmes* sees an unpardonable crime in the favourable and one-sided versions of the "warlike operations" published and telegraphed by the Nationalists to encourage the Egyptians. If the trial had gone on I should have produced a collection of French official papers, which would have shown conclusively that M. Gambetta in 1870 sinned in this respect far more unblushingly than Arábi.

It was now decided to fit up, regardless of expense, a new court in the great hall of the Daira Saniya prison. Workmen now began to toil at it day and night with almost feverish impatience. In order I suppose to protect its occupants from cold a splendid floor of marble slabs was ruthlessly ripped up, and wooden planks laid down in its place. I well remember poor Ali Fehmy taking me to his cell-window, which looked into the central quadrangle, and saying, "Do you wish to know what kind of people govern us? Look

* *L'Insurrection Militaire en Egypte*. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, August and September, 1883.



THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AS SEEN FROM CAIRO, JULY, 1882.

there! Do you want to learn how Egyptian money is spent? Look there!"

The day after these preparations commenced (November 5th) I again met in the corridor of the prison Mahmoud Sámi's lawyer, Yusef Kámil. He asked me to see his client, and I accordingly accompanied him to the cell in which he was confined. The ex-Prime Minister is a little below the usual height, with a pale and almost refined face of the Turkish type (although he claims an admixture of Egyptian blood, and his family has been domiciled in Egypt for three generations at least), and he seemed to feel his present position very acutely. His full name is Mahmoud Sámi Baroudi, or the "Powder-manufacturer," an affix which now has lost its significance. Looking at the frail figure before me it was difficult to realize the dark tale of vengeance for a marital wrong which is always urged against him by his enemies. His second wife—a princess of the house of Yeghen, connected in some way with the Khedivial family—has shown the deepest affection for her husband in the midst of his tribulations. In his present position prudence dictated the most formal interchange of compliments on both sides, but before many weeks had passed I was destined to know more of Mahmoud Sámi.

I now often saw Ismail Eyoub, who used many

blandishments to persuade me to change the procedure, and who entirely failed to understand the meaning of cross-examination. According to his honest conviction, a man of mean condition or a disgraced Nationalist might be treated with undisguised contumely, while it was rank treason to approach in anything but the most servile language a "loyal" Pacha or Bey. It also began slowly to dawn upon him that in virtue of our rules of procedure we were now entitled to cross-examine many people in high places, including the Khedive himself, who, with Riáz and Cherif, had tendered written ex-parte diatribes against the rebels. Ismail Eyoub was evidently uncomfortable. If Arábi was to have a fair trial he really could not understand why the English had come to Egypt at all.

As the Commission persisted in making no sign, we were forced to commence a correspondence, for if we did nothing we were sure to be accused of delay. We asked to be allowed to see others amongst the prisoners whom we proposed to call as witnesses. Our request was met by an abrupt refusal. We prayed with becoming humility for information as to the code by which our clients were to be tried. The answer was contained in two words—"military law." We applied for the summons of witnesses, but no reply of any sort was obtainable.

On the 7th November we were invited to a conference of the Commission. Even the coffee and cigarettes which as usual formed a prelude to discussion were powerless to infuse any cordiality into the proceedings. We soon found ourselves undergoing a process of cross-examination with a view to destroy our procedure rules. How long would our examination of witnesses last? Who was actually to put the questions? Whose interpretation was to be binding? Were the accused ever to be allowed to speak? Would we object to furnish the Commission with "Arabi's papers" at once? Were not prisoners in England condemned after simple interrogation? Supposing we confounded the witnesses in cross-examination, and Borelli Bey made them contradict themselves in re-examination, which version was the Court to believe? The next day we forwarded to Ismaïl Pacha Eyoub a discreet reply in writing, couched in the most conciliatory language and in strict accordance with the convention entered into by Borelli Bey on behalf of the Egyptian Government.

Our interpreter, Mr. Santillana, now arrived, and his great ability, coupled with a complete mastery of the Arabic language, gained him at once the confidence of the prisoners and even excited the admiration of

the Commission. He at once became a zealous sharer in our increasingly arduous labours.

A very disagreeable incident now occurred. The *mudir* or governor of Zagazig was a near relative of Riáz Pacha. He had once previously been removed from his post, and he suspected two of the chief inhabitants of the province to have been in some degree instrumental in procuring his discomfiture. Their positions were now by a turn of fortune reversed; Ferid Pacha was once more governor of Zagazig, and his opponents, Emin Bey Shemsi and Ahmed Bey Abáza (two strong adherents of Arábi), were in prison at Cairo. Could such a rare opportunity for a little seasonable vengeance be possibly missed? Shemsi and Abáza were removed to Zagazig, and given up to the tender mercies of their former enemy. That they were thrust chained into a dark and bedless cell nobody denies, but a story became current that they were compelled to clean the prison, and otherwise treated with inhumanity and indignity. Amongst Shemsi's many employés was a young Syrian clerk named Nicola Karmi, who claimed the rights of a British subject as the grandson of one Curmi, a native of Malta. Karmi had been at his home in Beyrout during the recent troubles, and only returned to Zagazig to find his master in jail, and his

family overwhelmed with grief and fairly beside themselves with consternation.

Karmi had heard of our defending Arábi, and he determined to see if we could do anything to alleviate the condition of his master. By the desire of the Shemsi family he came to Cairo, and on the afternoon of the 8th November called on us to know if we could undertake Shemsi's defence. He was tracked from our door by spies, arrested on a charge of sedition, and, although a Christian, a British subject, and an absentee during the war, sent at once by train to Alexandria and deported as a dangerous political firebrand to Beyrout. Next morning we received two despairing telegrams from poor Karmi now on his involuntary journey southwards. We could do nothing. Sir Edward Malet was (I think, to his regret) unable to interfere with the Khedivial prerogative of expelling suspected persons from his dominions.

Our prospects now seemed gloomy enough. The Commission of Inquiry had become openly hostile, and was apparently determined to force upon us a procedure of its own making. Borelli Bey, with whom we had originally come to terms, showed a manifest inclination to have as little as possible to do with the business; we could only obtain the records of the prosecution in such small instalments as to prevent

any general examination of the case; our position was greatly damaged by the designedly open intimidation committed in the matter of Karmi, and the public at home seemed disposed to chafe at a delay which was attributed to our desire to indulge in speeches of Tichbornian dimensions. Almost in despair we wrote the following letter to the *Times*:—

To the Editor of the *Times*.

SIR,—In order to prevent serious misconception in England, we venture to ask you to allow us to say a few words on the subject of the coming trial. A feeling seems to have somehow or other arisen in England that the rebellion itself admits of no denial, and that the only difficulty is the ultimate disposal of the persons of its leaders. We regret that our duty does not allow us to hasten the very necessary settlement of Egypt by accepting this conclusion.

The prisoners deny there has been any rebellion in its legal sense. They say, and will prove if time is allowed them, that the Sublime Porte from first to last approved their action. Certain letters in the possession of Arábi Pacha have been already published, and their contents are corroborated strongly by the striking narrative of the tortuous diplomacy of the Yildiz Kiosk unfolded in the last published Blue-Books. We also hope to prove that His Highness the Khedive, for a long period prior to the commencement of hostilities, wavered systematically between the retrograde party and the Nationalists; but that after the arrival of Dervesh Pacha he acquiesced at three Cabinet Councils, as also did Dervesh Pacha himself, in the early phases of resistance—an assertion to a great measure borne out by the ambiguous terms of the subsequent proclamations issued both at Constantinople and in Egypt. Other points

of law, we believe, can be raised in opposition to the charge of rebellion between the 20th of July and the 13th of September, especially as under the Ottoman code the rebels must wage war against the Sultan, who, we respectfully contend, incited them by word and deed to wage the war they waged against a common foe.

We should ill serve our client if we relied on mere legal technicalities. Of course, we must insist on a definition of the substantive law to be applied to the case, and we have settled the procedure by a code of our own, *ad hoc*. But we chiefly rely on our proofs that Arábi, rightly or wrongly, really headed a National movement, that he received the moral and material support of nearly the whole of Egypt, and that he was only deserted when he failed to secure success. These facts we feel sure of establishing. More than this, we shall prove that the recent contest was the most humanitarian war known in the history of nations, that it was characterised by a total absence of the horror of ordinary warfare, and that the efforts of its leaders were uniformly directed to preserve order and secure the safety alike of person and property. As regards the crimes of Alexandria, we have, as far as any information is given by the papers already communicated to us, yet to know our accusers. All we can say at present is that all the subsequent conduct of Arábi Pacha is in itself the most striking evidence in his favour. Abd-el-Kader was only sent into exile at Damascus, yet his raids in Algeria far exceeded in gravity and cruelty any allegations made against Arábi even by his bitterest foe.

We only obtained access to Arábi on the 22nd of October, and to our other clients some days later. Since then no one can accuse us of want of diligence. We have worked incessantly, with the assistance of a staff of twenty translators and clerks, at the examination of the documents on both sides. The prosecution commenced communicating their proceedings on

the 1st of November, and this work is to-day very far from completion. Till this is done we are wholly unable to begin the most necessary cross-examination of witnesses.

We have no desire to "air our eloquence" before the Egyptian tribunals, and are quite willing to present only written defences in Arábi to be read in open court. But what we do ask is the material time to examine the existing documents and evidence, in order to prove the defence we have indicated above. Without this concession the deliverance of Arábi Pacha can neither be good nor just, and we submit it is quite as important for those with whom the responsibility for the future of Egypt mainly rests to know the whole truth as to recent events as to hurry over a merely formal trial simply because Arábi Pacha blocks the way.

We are, Sir, your humble servants,

A. M. BROADLEY, }
MARK F. NAPIER, } Barristers-at-Law.

Cairo, Nov. 8.

That same evening Lord Dufferin arrived in Cairo.

CHAPTER XVI.

LORD DUFFERIN'S ARRIVAL.

NOTWITHSTANDING the difficulties related in the previous chapter, a rent in the clouds now and again served to cheer us in the midst of our troubles. More and more testimony in favour of Arábi was forthcoming. Mr. Napier had procured some valuable evidence as to the circumstances which followed the bombardment at Alexandria ; even Wilson Bey, a Government engineer, confessed to us that the manner in which Arábi had caused his house to be guarded was beyond all praise ; while the Superiors of one or two religious orders were prepared to attest the exemplary good treatment they had received during the war.

Even the intense interest felt in the trial waned perceptibly in presence of the excitement occasioned by Lord Dufferin's mission. The Khedive and his Ministers knew full well that he had baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Yildiz Kiosk, and his advent in Egypt was awaited with fear and trembling. In the midst

of the prevailing nervous expectancy, I fancy even Ismail Eyoub did his best to give his hard-worked Commissioners a little breathing-time to see what turn things would now take. This wholly unlooked-for sending of Lord Dufferin to Egypt seemed to operate as a political shower-bath on the various rival factions, each of which hoped for some advantage from the new and improved order of things, which was about to be inaugurated under the ægis of England. The Khedive was above all anxious and ill at ease, for he felt that Lord Dufferin must know a great deal too much of the Constantinople end of the tangled skein of Turkish intrigue in Egypt. Nubar Pacha resolved to hasten back to the land of his adoption to charm his Lordship with well-worn platitudes about systems of finance and judicial reforms; Riáz and Cherif (ministerial irreconcilables) were both anxious to see on whom his choice would definitely fall; while the vanquished Nationalists in their cells fervently trusted that some justice and relief to them would be a consequence of his coming.

In the midst of this clamour of speculation Lord Dufferin quietly took up his temporary residence in the gilded Kasr-el-Nousa Palace, at the end of the shady Shoubra Avenue, and dwelt in the same apartments which had been tenanted by two generations of Turkish Commissioners within the past twelve months.

In one of these rooms Lord Dufferin received Mr. Napier and myself on the morning of the 11th November. He gave me at once the very fullest opportunity of stating my case, and I carefully narrated every incident which had occurred since our arrival down to the time of our interview. He listened most patiently to all I had to say, and, as an expert diplomatist, said very little himself. I felt, however, perfectly convinced that the Nationalists need no longer despair of justice.

On the following afternoon we received (in answer to one of our numerous applications) three packets, which we were assured contained all the papers belonging to Arábi, Yácoub Sámi, and Ahmed Rifát. I immediately asked Arábi to point out any document he considered of importance to his defence. There were none: letters, telegrams, &c., as described by Mr. M'Culloch, had somehow or other miscarried *in transitu*, and all that remained were worse than useless. Arábi had always maintained a very chivalric silence about his French sympathizers, but amongst the papers handed me by the Commissioners I by chance found one very curious letter, dated some time early in June. It was written by Voisin Bey, who is or was in the Khedivial service, and describes himself as an "ancien officier de marine." He tells Arábi that he has been on board the French ironclads and inter-

viewed the Admiral. He is now in a position to assure the "loyal and patriotic defender of his country" that the French fleet has come merely *to watch the movements of the English*, and in no way to attack the Egyptians. Voisin Bey says he has not failed to impress on the French officers the true state of the case, and "the valorous conduct of the leader of the Egyptian people." In Voisin Bey's remarkable letter we have a fair example of the first-fruits of Anglo-French alliance.

The following day saw the commencement of a new Moslem year, and the beginning of the fourteenth century of the Hegira. Islam had expected great things of the first of Mohurram, 1300, but even the voice of prophecy could now awaken no enthusiasm in Cairo. The Commission of Inquiry thought it proper to mark the date by a manifesto. A species of decree was sent to us substituting an entirely new and original procedure for that agreed upon between ourselves and Borelli Bey. The following is a short summary of its provisions:—The inquiry will in any case, be resumed on the 25th Nov., and the whole case comprising cross-examination and the production of evidence, must, under all circumstances and without any possible excuse, be completed in thirty days. Counsel can only examine witnesses through the President, who may stop any question he thinks fit. The

accused can only appoint counsel after the completion of the preliminary examination. The counsel for the defence must surrender their documentary evidence to the Commission of Inquiry before it completes its labours.

There was no possibility of mistaking the meaning of such a radical change of front. The work of nearly a whole month was rendered useless, for the very idea of a fair trial was now out of the question. We could do nothing but present a respectful answer*

Cairo,

12th November, 1882.

To His Excellency Ismail Pacha Eyoub, President of the Commission of Preliminary Enquiry.

EXCELLENCY,

We beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this day's date.

We hasten to inform you that on behalf of our clients we respectfully decline to accept the conditions therein set forth as totally at variance with the arrangement arrived at with us by H.E. Borelli Bey on your behalf, and on behalf of the Government of His Highness the Khedive, as we shall be able to prove when called on so to do.

We regret extremely that a stern sense of duty to our clients compels us to thus place on record our total disagreement with the terms of your letter, from which we confidently appeal to the high sense of justice of H.H. The Khedive and his Ministers, whose sanction (combined with your approval and adoption) gave legal force to the agreement signed on your behalf by H.E. Borelli Bey.

We are, Excellency,

Your obedient humble servants,

(Signed) A. M. BROADLEY, } Barristers-
MARK NAPIER, } at-Law.

to Ismail Eyoub, and bring the matter to the notice of Lord Dufferin. Our letter to the President was followed by other communications calling his attention to the various queries which he had left unanswered, and our reasons for considering as obligatory and official the Procedure Rules which we could only frankly confess we owed to "the great experience, the spirit of conciliation, and the well-known legal acumen of H.E. Borelli Bey."

Our clients meanwhile continued working at their defences and wholly unconscious of the storm which was raging around us. Sheikh Abdú compiled for our use an intelligent analysis of his Official Journal, and gave us a great deal of information about the earlier days of the National movement. He vividly described how Arábi became the popular hero of Egypt, and how thousands of Egyptian fathers called their children after him, while the name of Tewfik was obliterated from the land.

For reasons I shall presently relate Riáz Pacha grew bolder and more obstructive, till at last, on the 14th November, we were refused admittance to all our clients except Arábi on the ground that an anonymous letter had been received stating that some of our clerks, without our knowledge, had been carrying on communications between some of the prisoners and their friends, with a view of exciting a popular rising.

Sir Charles Wilson, however, promptly interfered on our behalf, and the proposed restriction was removed.

Many noteworthy events occurred on that day in the prison. Arábi told us of a curious dream he had had during the night, which had somewhat startled him. There is nothing ludicrous in such a confidence on his part. Arábi is an Egyptian, a well-read, able, and gifted Egyptian, it is true, but still an Egyptian and nothing more. Orientals have always more or less believed in visions since the days of Saul and David, who were great men in their times, and there is nothing astonishing in Arábi talking about his dream. Arábi had dreamed that in the night an enormous serpent attacked him in his cell; its head was as Abd-el-Hamid and its tail as the Khedive Tewfik. At last he killed it with his sword. The dream had somewhat disturbed Arábi's usual composure.

A curious scene was going on in Abd-el-Ál's cell, nothing less than a grave criminal trial. Many months ago his ward, a young Circassian named Muhamed Husny (who used actually to accompany his guardian's little son Saïd on his visits to our office), had been detected in the act of attempting to poison the Pacha in his evening bowl of tea. The case somehow or other had hung fire, and it was now being suddenly completed. Many long rolls of evidence were read, and at last a sentence

of eleven years imprisonment in the neighbourhood of the White Nile was formally pronounced *séance tenante*. Next day a very great man, one Hussein Pacha (a member of the Court Martial), called on me and said that he had been appointed guardian of this interesting young poisoner, in the place of Abd-el-Ál. By my client's direction I afterwards went to his house, opened his safe, and counted out 3,000 Egyptian guineas, which I consigned to Hussein Pacha's agent. The ward, still at liberty, made vain appeals to me to give him ten pounds for himself, as, he said with apparent sincerity, it was all he was ever likely to see of his property.

In the corridor of the jail that afternoon I met Ismail Eyoub. He made me understand he did not bear malice, and fervently prayed that all our differences would somehow or other be settled by diplomacy. Just then two prisoners strongly guarded ascended the staircase. They were Suleimán Bey Sámi and Hasan Moosa-el-Akád, who had that day arrived from Crete. The great crisis of Arábi's fate had now arrived, but his dream proved a good omen after all.

CHAPTER XVII.

AHMED RIFÁT'S STORY.

Two days before Lord Dufferin reached Cairo, Ahmed Rifát Bey, who had been, as I have before explained, Secretary of the Nationalist Council of Ministers, gave me a general statement of his defence, as well as a variety of notes and memoranda to assist me in preparing for the coming trial. Rifát Bey compiled his narrative in French, which he writes correctly and fluently, and I intend him to tell his story as nearly as possible in his own words.

“Is it a dream,” writes Rifát, “that I have seen all Egypt carry on, during two entire months, a war regularly declared by her Khedive against a great power like England, and uphold in his functions Arábi, who had been entrusted by the Khedive himself with the conduct of that war? If all this is only a vision; if I must continue in ignorance as to why a civilian like myself should remain a long time in prison awaiting my trial by court-martial, while the very civil and religious authorities who are responsible

for the war are still in liberty, and if I am still to remain in constant dread of ill-treatment in my cell by a band of *janissaries* and valets as happened on the day I was thrust into it,—then indeed I have little to say in my defence. No words of mine could help to solve the enigma offered during nearly two years by the sphinx of the Egyptian question.

“But it is not so. A bright ray of justice has even reached my cell. The very Englishmen who have defeated us in battle now demand for us an impartial trial. We can entertain no possible illusion on the subject,—England and the English people are our real judges. I do not fear to speak plainly now.

“Europeans are grievously mistaken when they try to understand the East by the light of the preconceived ideas created by another kind of education, and a widely-different social condition. Hence it is that the East generally remains a mystery—a sealed book. Some writers even imagine that such political distinctions as those of Conservative, Liberal, and Radical exist in Egypt. There is but one political party either in this country or in the East—I will call it *le parti des affamés de justice*, ‘the eager seekers for justice.’ Honest men of all classes belong to it even down to the smallest peasant-farmers, and the very fellahs themselves. According to their varying intelligence they all desire to share in the benefits

conferred by such political institutions as Europe possesses; to be governed with justice and equity, to see an honest and uncorrupt administration put an end to abuses of power, and to feel as little as possible the caress of the *courbache*. 'The eager seekers for justice' ask, in a word, security for life, honour, and property.

"This craving for justice is the great idea which has taken possession of the heart of orientals since the old landmarks destroyed by time have become insufficient to protect them from vexation and tyranny. But the want of any real popular institutions, coupled with the absence of fair-dealing tribunals and just laws, have enfeebled the political idea I have tried to describe, and have reduced it to a *sentiment très timide*.

"It seemed almost like a star in winter. As soon as it appeared it was quickly hidden by clouds. The first tangible proof of its existence was the promulgation by the Sultan Abdul Medjid of the Hatt Humayun of Gulhané which guaranteed to the subjects of the empire security of life, honour, and property. When in spite of the opposition of Abbas Pacha its operation was extended to Egypt the *sentiment timide* became bolder. The increased contact with Europe and Europeans began to create for the Egyptians a patriotism of their own.

"Tewfik Pacha came to the throne with many

professions of his intention to inaugurate a new era of things as a strictly constitutional sovereign. The fallacious appearance of harmony and prosperity was soon overshadowed by two great errors,—the unjust solution of the Mukábala question,* and the excessive employment of Europeans. The Egyptian is neither malicious or fanatical. He does not detest the European, in whom he even recognizes some sort of superiority, but if he is contemptuously pushed out of the way, and a European twice, thrice, or even four times more highly paid than he is, to do, or rather to make the Egyptian do, some Egyptian task for which the European will be credited and the Egyptian not even thanked, he will not rebel (for an Egyptian never rebels), but he will pour into some friendly ear his complaint, *quelle injustice!*

“Then came the tyranny and mismanagement of

* “The repeal of the law of Mukábala,” says Mr. Keay, “had the result of practically confiscating both the 17,000,000*l.* which the cultivators had paid, and the valuable right which they had thereby purchased to a reduction in perpetuity of 50 per cent. in the rental of their lands from the year 1885. Consequently, not only have the landholders lost their 17,000,000*l.*, but a confiscatory tax on land, amounting to 1,700,000*l.* sterling every year, is raised from 1,000,000 cultivators, and paid over to the bondholders. And yet people wonder that there is discontent in Egypt, which hapless country, they protest, has been raised from misery to unalloyed happiness by the *Deus ex machinâ* of the European Control!”—*Spoiling the Egyptians* (London, 1882), p. 49.

Osmán Pacha Rifki, the Minister of War, who managed to give the name of 'Circassian' to a faction he involuntarily created. Riáz Pacha would have fain stayed the tide of discontent if he could, but it was now too late. The deep current of military grievances soon joined the equally strong flood of civil ill-humour. Together they formed the last phase of Egyptian Nationalism. The *pronunciamento* of February, which resulted only in the change of a Minister, was followed by that of September, which entailed the fall of the entire Cabinet. In the interval the prevalent feeling of dissatisfaction in the army had been greatly aggravated by the discovery of certain intrigues on the part of Yusef Kámil Pacha, Director of the Private Daira (estate administration) of the Khedive, to induce the officers of his regiment to get rid of their colonel, Abd-el-Ál.*

"During the demonstration at Abdin, I was in the company of Haider Pacha Yeghen, a relative of the Khedive, who told me he had repeatedly advised Tewfik to dismiss the Riáz Cabinet as opposed to the legitimate aspirations of the country. The sequel to these events is now a matter of history ; Cherif Pacha accepted office, and apparently adopted the National programme. A few days later Sultán Pacha, at the

* The papers given me by Abd-el-Ál prove conclusively the existence of this plot.

head of a numerous deputation, waited on him, and demanded in the name of the whole country the fulfilment of his promises. The Parliament of Egypt was duly summoned.

“Then came the Turkish mission of Ali Nizámi Pacha to Egypt, of which I prefer to give you a separate account.* After the departure of the envoys the elections were proceeded with, and at length the Chamber was duly opened under the presidency of Sultán Pacha. Both he and Cherif Pacha delivered speeches breathing the most liberal and exalted patriotism, although the force of the last-named oration was purposely somewhat attenuated in the version of it which appeared in the French edition of the *Official Journal*. The effect of these parliamentary discourses was to raise the strongest hopes all over Egypt, and fan into a blaze the now fully kindled flame of Egyptian Nationalism. A fresh era had commenced, and a new historical epoch had been inaugurated. ‘Egypt for the Egyptians’ was no longer to be an empty phrase. Four months later Cherif fell under the reaction of disappointed expectations and unfulfilled promises. He declined to follow the inclination of the Chamber in the matter of the Budget, and he dared not touch the compact battalions of the European employés. He succumbed to the

* See *post*.

National aspirations he had so greatly helped to foster, and resigned his post to be succeeded by Mahmoud Sámi Pacha. This was in February, 1882, and I became Secretary of the Council of Ministers.

“The prevailing popular enthusiasm found other vents than in mere parliamentary discussion. Two clubs, or *sociétés de bienfaisance*, afforded the now fully recognized National Movement (of which Arábi had by his own merits and force of character become the chief) a congenial arena. They had been founded in the most regular and legal manner, and the highest Egyptian functionaries vied with each other in enrolling themselves as members. The first, called ‘El Makaçid-el-Haïrié,’ had, as honorary president, Prince Abbas, the elder son of the Khedive, and, as vice-president, Sultán Pacha himself, while the same offices in the second (El Tewfik el Haïrié) were filled by the Khedive’s younger son and the new Premier, Mahmoud Pacha Sámi. Although political discussion was forbidden by the rules, these places of resort now became (with the full knowledge of the authorities) the scene of a series of brilliant fêtes, in which orator after orator pictured in vivid colours the coming regeneration of Egypt, the free admission of Egyptians to every species of State employment, and the approaching end of foreign interference and social superiority. Egyptians were intoxicated at the

prospect held out to them. The *sentiment timide* gave place to the most confident anticipation. It was then the walls echoed again and again with shouts of 'Long live the Khedive!'

"The new Ministry, with Arábi himself as head of the War Department, seemed to be the most fitting solution of existing difficulties. He had already been depicted by those who did not know him as a successful mutineer who hated the Turkish and Circassian races, but those who did, saw in him the defender of the very idea of justice. His name had in a few months become a banner around which both the army and the chief men of the country were ready to rally. Few people have had more intimate relations with Arábi than I have, and I unhesitatingly declare that I have always found him an honest and upright man, entirely devoted to his country and his creed. Arábi was neither a great diplomatist nor skilled politician; nor was he capable as a military chief of resisting the superior prowess of England, but as a really honest and unambitious Egyptian he was well able to lead his countrymen in their crusade for justice.

"I remember very well the first evening after the formation of the new Cabinet, when we all met at Mahmoud Sámi's house. Borelli Bey submitted a project he had drawn up for a ministerial programme, in which he had dexterously avoided the crucial diffi-

culty of the Budget. Arábi Pacha took a seat opposite him, and demonstrated so clearly the vital importance of this question from the Egyptian standpoint that the draft was amended in accordance with his wishes and thus approved by the Khedive.

“The Ministry worked well until the Circassian Plot happened, which seemed to suddenly disorganise everything. The flagrant attempt to poison Abd-el-Ál, through the agency of his young Circassian ward Husni, was undoubtedly followed by a plot on a larger scale against Arábi. I was absent from the Councils in which the matter was discussed, but I prepared a draft petition later on, in which the Ministers themselves asked for a commutation of the sentence.

“The relations between the Khedive and his Ministers now cooled, and an open rupture was with difficulty avoided. In my official capacity I drew up the record of several very acrimonious discussions. A reconciliation had somehow or other been arranged, when to our consternation (25th May) the French and English Consuls presented an identical note demanding the withdrawal of Arábi from Egypt and the dismissal of the Ministry. By order of my superiors I prepared a suitable answer at their dictation, which Mahmoud Sáni and Mustapha Fehmy took to the Khedive. For a long time it had been evident that Tewfik was determined to trust to Europe, to break definitely

with the cause he had almost ostentatiously affected to support, and crush the very aspirations and hopes he had himself so much contributed to excite. The Ministry resolved to reject the Note, while the Khedive decided to accept it. Only one solution was possible, the Cabinet resigned. Popular opinion, however, so strongly supported Arábi that he was re-appointed Minister of War two days later, and on the demand of the Consuls-General guaranteed the public peace.

“Dervesh Pacha* arrived a fortnight afterwards.

“On the 10th June I was sent for to the Palace, where I found His Highness with M. Sinadino, the banker, and Sala Pacha, the director of the Slave Trade Suppression Department. He told me these gentlemen were his witnesses, and asked me to give a proof of my fidelity by giving up to him the official minutes of the late Cabinet, which I have previously alluded to. On leaving the Palace I began to think compliance with such a request would constitute something very like a breach of faith towards my former chiefs. I went to see Arábi, the only one of them who was still in office, and informed him of the order I had received. At that moment the documents in question were in my possession. Arábi told me I might give the Khedive a certified copy, but that he

* See *post*.

would hold me personally responsible if I parted with the originals, which formed the only record of the conduct of the Ministry. In consequence of these instructions, I wrote to the Khedive's Secretary, explaining my position, and offering to send him the copies I was authorised to give him.

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"In the Rágheb Ministry, formed on the 20th June, I was re-appointed Secretary of the Council, but the bombardment of Alexandria three days later prevented my joining my post. Next day official telegrams from Rágheb Pacha announced that war (*el harb*) had been declared between Egypt and England, and that consequently the whole country was placed under martial law.

"Yácoub Pacha Sámi, the Under-Secretary for War, invited all his colleagues, as well as the heads of the different departments, to attend at the War Office, where he informed them that every section of the administration, including the press, must obey orders transmitted to him through the Minister of War, and that any one who failed in his duty would be punished in accordance with the provisions of martial law.

"Two or three days later we heard Alexandria had been burned. Crowds of its unfortunate inhabitants inundated Cairo, which now almost resembled a

city taken by assault. The want of reliable news occasioned general anxiety. Any certainty of information now seemed impossible. On going to the War Office, I found that Yácoub Pacha and the Prefect of Police had taken all necessary measures for the preservation of order, and that the refugees from Alexandria were to be distributed in the different provinces.

“ At this juncture, or shortly afterwards, Hussein Pacha Dramanli (Under-Secretary for the Interior), received an intimation from the Minister of his department at Alexandria that peace had been concluded, and that, consequently, all war preparations should cease, and the Alexandrian refugees should be sent back to their native place. Arábi's despatches, however, were couched in very different language. We heard on good authority that the Khedive was completely in the power of the English Admiral, and that miliary operations still continued at Kafr-el-Dowar.

“ The country was really without a government when I received a note from Hussein Pacha, my immediate superior, informing me that I was appointed a member of the Executive Committee [*Medjlis-el-Orfi*], which was to meet at the War Office. At the same time a general assembly composed of all the heads of departments, many Ulemas (divines) and employés,

was held at the Home Office. The latter resolved to send a national deputation to Alexandria to ascertain the truth, and in case the Khedive and his Ministers were not really prisoners to request them to resume their functions at Cairo. A copy of this decision was forwarded by telegraph to Constantinople.

“ Before anything could be definitely ascertained, telegrams and despatches from Arábi Pacha announced that the Khedive (who was at that moment either a prisoner or fugitive) had dismissed him and countermanded the war, which, as a matter of fact, continued. Arábi asked to know the wishes of the country respecting the course he should pursue.

“ A more numerous meeting than the first (at which even the Princes of the Khedivial family, the patriarchs, and heads of the different religious communities, together with all the chief men of the country, were present) decided to support Arábi Pacha against the will of the Khedive, who had acted in opposition to the Civil and Religious Codes of Moslem law, and to continue preparations for war until an answer was received from the Sultan, to whom a *procès-verbal* of the proceedings was telegraphically addressed.

“ After this meeting all divergence of opinion completely disappeared. In the eyes of the Egyptians Arábi was now nothing less than the servant and

defender of his country—the representative of five millions of people who were resisting the invasion of their fatherland by a foreign army. Even persons once opposed to his views shared completely the general opinion. I even remember Yácoub Pacha Sabri, once a memloup of Abbas Pacha, and a warm partisan of Tewfik, saying openly that ‘up to the time of the bombardment he had always sided with the Khedive against Arábi, but that now the Khedive had gone over to the English he was too good a Moslem to uphold him any longer.’ In company with Hussein Dramanli I once questioned the Chief Judge of Cairo (Mollah Effendi) on the same point, and he answered us with considerable emphasis that ‘not only the Khedive, but even the Sultan himself, owed his position both as Sovereign and Caliph to the will of the empire.’

“The energy displayed by all classes of the population from the Princes and Princesses down to the youngest children speaks for itself. The Government Registers will afford an unanswerable testimony upon this head. Two actual employés of the Government will also be able to say much. Khalil Bey Iffet is still governor of the province of Miniéh. He was the first to send down reinforcements and supplies of grain, and he did so with so much energy and zeal that a circular of Arábi’s holding him up as the example and

model of a true patriot was published in the Official Gazette. Osmán Pacha Ghaleb is to-day Perfect of Police at Cairo, yet barely three months ago as Mudir of Siout he sent 10,000 ardebs of wheat to Arábi's camp. In every mosque and in every house in Egypt prayers were daily offered up for the success of our arms. Even Ismaíl Pacha Eyoub accompanied me to Kafr-el-Dowar to wish Arábi a 'happy Bairám and a speedy victory.*' While doing my duty towards the country of my adoption, and acting in precisely the same way as thousands of more important persons who are free and even in high office to-day, I did all I could for the preservation of good order, and with that object I suppressed in the native press many articles tending to excite fanaticism and discord, and increase the prevalent dislike of foreigners.

"I leave my fate with confidence wholly in the hands of England, for sooner or later she will assuredly do justice to the now broken cause of Egyptian Nationalism. What trust can I place in the judges who are to try me to-day for acts in which they shared themselves six weeks since? Unless England will help us, solace for the seekers after justice in Egypt is now further off than ever."

* See *post*, Chapter XX. page 240.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE NARRATIVE OF ARÁBI'S UNDER-SECRETARY.*

“MY name is Yácoub Sámi. I am a Turk by birth, and from my youth up have been employed in the army and the War Office. I have seen much service in the field, and gained many medals and decorations. Three years ago, like many of my comrades, I married a lady from the Khedivial harím. In the earlier days of Arábi's movement I had little sympathy for him, and, indeed, received a bayonet thrust in my thigh during the disturbance which followed the release of ‘the three Colonels,’ when Osmán Pacha Rifki fled to an upper room and locked himself in, leaving me to face the infuriated soldiers. But a time arrived when the aspirations I once thought to be only Arábi's became those of all Egypt. Then I joined him with my whole heart. I am ashamed to say I have disowned the cause we have fought for, and spoken against Arábi before the Commissioners appointed by the Khedive to examine into our case. I did this because I had

* The translation follows the Arabic text as closely as possible.

undergone treatment which deprived me of my senses for a time, and I have resolved to repudiate what I have been forced to state. Indeed my own acts are the best contradiction of the words wrung from me. No man can organize through fear a commissariat for 100,000 men. Before I relate my conduct as late Egyptian Under-Secretary for War at Cairo, I will explain to you all that has happened to me since our surrender. If I do not do this I can never gain your respect.

“When Arábi returned to Cairo after his defeat we all determined to persist no longer in a resistance which it was now felt to be hopeless. I went to meet the English Generals, and carried out the surrender of the 35,000 troops near the city to their complete satisfaction. So well had I discharged this duty that official recommendations were obtained for me from the Khedive, and I proceeded to Kafr-el-Dowar, where I addressed the Egyptian officers and pointed out the impossibility of continuing the war. On my earnest advice they followed the example already set by the Cairo troops. The English officers expressed great satisfaction at all I did, and after remaining in the camp some days I was ordered to proceed to Alexandria, and accompanied the British colonel in command ‘in all honour’ to the Gabári Station.

“When the train arrived, Hasan Effendi Fouzi,

assistant master of ceremonies to the Khedive, descended from it. When he saw me he called out, 'Get out of your carriage and go with that officer,' pointing to a Circassian named Muhamed Láma, who had formerly been convicted and exiled for the plot to assassinate Arábi. This man had many policemen with him, and I was dragged by them with every circumstance of degradation through the streets of the town. After being imprisoned at the Rás-el-Tin school I was reconducted on foot to the railway station, and placed in a truck used to convey grease and oil, where it was impossible to sit down. I was then transferred to a break-van, and so brought to Cairo with Ali Pacha Roubi, Mahmoud Pacha Fehmy, and others. We were led through the crowded streets, having a file of soldiers under a Circassian officer on each side, to the common prison, where we were thrust into a small room. Fifteen of us underwent much ill-treatment there for five days. Then English officers came to see us, and we were brought here to the Daira Saniya. The afternoon after our arrival four messengers of the Khedive, wearing swords, rushed into my room and violently assaulted me. Their acts were watched from the door by that same Hasan Effendi Fouzi. At length they went away, but the guards outside my door used to knock at intervals during the whole night, so as to prevent my

ever sleeping more than a few minutes together. In the meantime my house was entered twice by the police, and all my papers removed. My family were also insulted in every possible way. Suddenly one day the door of my cell was opened and I was brought before the Commissioners sitting in a neighbouring room. They often all spoke at once and always in a menacing manner. In answer to their questions I believe I said I had acted in fear of Arábi. It is not true, and I desire to rectify my answers, being no longer in fear for my children's life, which affected me more than my own personal danger.*

“Others have doubtless related to you in detail the different events which led to the bombardment of Alexandria by the fleet and the resistance of the forts in reply. As I am a soldier, and not a politician or historian, I will only speak of the way the defence of Egypt was organised in Cairo and the share I took in the same. In the first place the Prime Minister told us war was declared, then the Khedive informed us peace was made, and finally Arábi telegraphed to us that the Khedive was really a prisoner and that hostilities were still going on. It was decided to hold

* Yácoub Sámi then goes on to show the active part taken by Ismail Pacha Eyoub and the other members of the Court in the organization of the National Defence.

a National Council, composed of all classes of the inhabitants, to discuss what course should be adopted. It was in this manner resolved to send a deputation to Alexandria for the purpose of inviting the ministers to return to Cairo, when the National Council should once more assemble for deliberation, but that meanwhile the war preparations should not be suspended.

“ A special train was immediately brought to Kasr-el-Nil, and the envoys proceeded in it to Alexandria, and Arábi Pacha was informed of the decree the Council had given, and requested to facilitate the passage of the Commissioners to Alexandria, in order that they might get information as to the true state of affairs. After their departure the Under-Secretaries decided that a Council composed only of ourselves was insufficient, that the presence of Notables advanced in age, who had taken part in other administrations, and who were better informed than we were, was necessary, and that young men of capability should also attend. In consequence the National Council passed a decree choosing H.E. Jiaffer Pacha, president of the law court, and upon the arrival of H.E. Ismaïl Pacha Abú Gebel from Alexandria he was also appointed with H.E. Marashli Pacha and H.E. Ibrahim Pacha Khalil. Besides these were selected Ibrahim Pacha Sámi, Ahmed Pacha Nachát, the Minister of the Daira Saniya, Riáz Pacha, the

commander of the Cairo division, Hasan Pacha Muzhar, the commander of the artillery, Ismaïl Pacha Eyoub, Rashíd Pacha Husni, general of division, Khalil Pacha, Ali Bey Yusef, colonel of the 3rd regiment of infantry, Ahmed Bey Neer, colonel of the 2nd regiment of cavalry, Ahmed Bey Rifát, secretary to the Council of Ministers, and Muhamed Bey Ramadan, the chief clerk of the Daira Saniya. This council (called the *Medjlis-el-Orfi*), composed of the above-mentioned members, assembled nightly at the Ministry of War during the month of Ramadan, in order to investigate the papers of each administration, and by common agreement to issue the requisite answers to the same.

“ During the existence of this Council public safety was secure, nor was it ever said that a single person was plundered of anything. Some time after the commencement of hostilities the Russian and Italian consuls came to me at the Ministry of War, and stated that they had about 2,000 subjects who desired to leave for Ismaïlia, but were afraid of their being murdered on the road by desperate men from Alexandria and other marauders. I immediately arranged for the necessary trains at Kasr-el-Nil and the Cairo station, and gave them an escort of officers and soldiers to protect them on the road to Ismaïlia, and on inquiry from these consuls you will be convinced

of the steps I took for the preservation of life and public security. After a time (I forget the date) a despatch arrived stating that Arábi Pacha had been dismissed from his post of Minister of War, and another letter came from Omar Pacha Loutfi, stating that he had been appointed Minister of War in place of Arábi, and accompanying the same was a copy of the Khedive's commands nominating him to that post. I laid these papers before the Council, composed of the persons of rank already mentioned, who decreed that as this was a most important matter, and as the Envoys gone to Alexandria to summon the Ministers had not returned, a General Council should be called, composed of the Princes in Cairo, all the nobles, the judges and wise men, the chief merchants of the city, the local governors, and four or five persons of distinction from each province, including the judge and chief merchants, besides the grandees, learned men, and judges of Suez, Damietta, and elsewhere, in order to consult regarding the dismissal of Arábi Pacha.

“ They were all written to, and met at the Ministry of the Interior, and upon the Council being complete, Ali Pacha-el-Roubi, the Under-Secretary for the Soudan, rose and spoke, but I could not hear his speech as I was sitting at a distance at the end of the hall, which was composed of more than 400 persons.

After he sat down, I, in my position of President, took my station in the centre of the assembly, and stated that a notice had been received from the Khedive's Divan stating that His Highness had issued a decree dismissing Arábi Pacha. I also read aloud the contents of Arábi Pacha's before-mentioned communication, and explained what he had written to the provinces and administrations concerning the matter. I said, 'What is your opinion regarding this dismissal?' 'If other orders are issued by the Khedive, are they to be executed or not? State your opinions.' The entire assembly with one voice declared that Arábi Pacha should not be dismissed, and added, 'As the Khedive has gone over to the invaders, his orders are to be cancelled.'

"This decree was then reduced into writing in the presence of the assembly by a clerk of the Ministry of the Interior, nominated by Hussein Pacha, the Under-Secretary of that department, and duly sealed by the members, under the supervision of this Pacha himself. I then went to the War Office in order to carry on its business, and two or three days after H.E. Hussein Pacha brought me the decree, with the former one also, in order that they might be preserved in the archives.

"In accordance with the spirit of these decrees the governors and the Egyptians generally were

requested to make preparations and furnish the supplies for the soldiers with the greatest rapidity ; the Governor of Siout, H.E. Osmán Pacha Ghaleb (now the Chief of the Police), telegraphed stating that higher orders of the people under his jurisdiction gave a voluntary contribution for the war to the extent of ten thousand ardebs of corn and a number of horses and camels; and another telegram from H.E. Danish Pacha, the Governor of the province of Gharbia, informed us that all the people of his province gave as a voluntary contribution the entire amount of corn and cattle which the province had been assessed to send, *i.e.*, they refused to accept payment. In this manner messages were constantly received from the governors, sheikhs, and inhabitants of all the provinces, setting forth the zeal of the people in giving voluntary contributions, and the assistance they rendered in sending in the reserves and new recruits, whereas at the time of the Abyssinian war, in the reign of the late Khedive, not one-tenth part of the men could be possibly collected. From this it can be seen that the movement was a perfectly united one on the part of the Egyptian nation in the defence of their country and their lives."

CHAPTER XIX.

SHEIKH MUHAMED ABDÚ — ULEMA AND JOURNALIST.

SHEIKH Abdú was perhaps the most gifted man in the ranks of the Egyptian Nationalists. An elegant writer, a profound Arabic scholar, and an eloquent and impressive speaker, he exercised an appreciable influence amongst the more educated classes of his fellow-countrymen. He had unquestionably greatly helped to make public opinion a real factor in Egyptian progress. Sheikh Abdú was no dangerous fanatic or religious enthusiast, for he belonged to the broadest school of Moslem thought, held a political creed akin to pure republicanism, and was the zealous Master of a Masonic Lodge. His unselfish patriotism alone prevented some of his more fervent associates from openly resenting his more than suspected unorthodoxy. Even his friend Arábi had said once upon a time that "Sheikh Abdú's head was better fitted for a hat than a turban."

The whole character of Sheikh Abdú was an example of great intellectual strength overclouded for a time by moral and physical weakness. His mind

and body alike seemed crushed out beyond hope of recovery by the cruel reaction born of shipwrecked hopes and the agony of despair. Like his fellows, he had been insulted and ill-treated in prison, but even his own account of his sufferings is weak and equivocal compared with theirs. It was only towards the latter days of his imprisonment that he seemed to recover from the shock of his first arrest, and began to treat us with that confidence which we endeavoured to deserve. At times it was almost difficult for us to realize that Sheikh Abdú was the author of the bold and picturesque expositions of the aims and objects of the Egyptian Nationalists, forwarded by him barely six months before to Mr. Blunt. It will be equally difficult for Englishmen at home to understand the complete demoralization which disappointment, coupled with menace and bodily torture, can work even on the strongest and bravest of Egyptian minds. The organizer of the nocturnal domiciliary visits to the political prisoners after their transfer to Egyptian custody was doubtless aware of their great importance in an oriental point of view to the success of the coming trial. As a matter of fact they contributed most materially to defeat the very object which they were intended to effect.

Sheikh Abdú composed a memorandum of his defence in scholarly Arabic, which, as a literary feat,

greatly delighted our interpreter, Mr. Santillana, but which I am inclined to regard as too much akin to an apology. The position he very astutely assumes is legally and technically almost unassailable. All through the drama of the Egyptian Revolution his *rôle* had been purely that of an obedient and faithful subordinate. Before the curtain rose he had become the editor of the Egyptian *Official Gazette*, and in this capacity had from first to last obeyed the orders of his lawful superiors as they succeeded one another on the stage. His narrative only becomes interesting when he comes to the question of his own personal opinions and experiences. As to the discharge of his public duties, the text of his justification is passive obedience to competent authority ; his defence of his behaviour as a private citizen revolves itself into an ingenious and convincing syllogism :—

My patriotism and that of Sultán Pacha are identical ; we acted and thought as one man ; Sultán Pacha has been made “ Sir ” Sultán Pacha, and got a present of 10,000*l.* besides, therefore his patriotism must be good and commendable : *ergo* our conduct is equally worthy of praise. Why then should I be in prison awaiting my trial for my patriotism, while Sultán Pacha becomes an English knight, and obtains a reward of 10,000*l.* for his ?

Sheikh Abdú's account of the intimate connection between Sultán Pacha and Arábi is an important element in the history of the National movement.

Up to the time of the Abdin *pronunciamento* Sheikh Abdú's views were wholly in opposition to those of Arábi, whom he regarded as the successful exponent of purely military ideas. He says that the various popular meetings held with the aim of obtaining a constitution under the presidency of Sultán Pacha, which immediately followed it, at once changed the position of Arábi from that of the leader of the army to that of the leader of Egypt. Sheikh Abdú writes :—

Then and then only, along with Sultán Pacha and all Egypt, I became a follower of Ahmed Arábi. From that time I saw day by day the Notables of Cairo, the most learned sheikhs, the most eminent men in Egypt, waiting constantly upon Sultán Pacha and Arábi Bey. I saw Sultán Pacha entertaining at his house, time after time, Arábi Bey and his colleagues, and sheikhs celebrated for their piety and learning taking advantage of the new era which had then begun by petitioning for the dismissal of the Sheikh El Islam at the El Azhar university. The newspapers were unanimous in their praises, and assured the country that its liberties were now beginning to be an accomplished fact; all classes of men were loud in their eulogies upon Arábi, and called the movement a regeneration of the country. Even Cherif Pacha recalled by telegraph Adeeb Effendi Ishak, the learned and able manager of an Arabic paper called *Misr el Kahira*, which was printed in Paris, and had always opposed Riáz Pacha, as a man who was betraying the country to the English. I met this gentleman the first night of his arrival, and I heard him say, in a very full meeting, "Arábi Bey has indeed accomplished a glorious feat." This learned man was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Translation in the Department

of Public Instruction, and was afterwards promoted to be a second clerk to the Egyptian Assembly on the request of Sultán Pacha himself.

Sultán Pacha was now called the father of his country, and the one theme of his discourses was the undue predominance of the foreigner in our midst. While he was shouting "Egypt for the Egyptians," I preached peace and conciliation. I held aloof while Sultán Pacha and his friends seemed never tired of courting Arábi. While I stayed at home the "father of his country" was now organising a banquet to the officers, now seeing off Arábi to Rás-el-Wadi, and now assisting at Abd-el-Ál's departure for Damietta. Arábi became Minister of War amidst the loud applause of Sultán Pacha and his friends, who collected a special committee of Notables to congratulate Arábi on his fresh honours. Twice it was rumoured that Sultán Pacha had only yielded to undue military pressure; twice Sultán Pacha begged me to *emphatically deny the assertion as an infamous calumny on his character as a good citizen* in the Official Journal.

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Sheikh AbdŪ thus writes of the events of the war:—

Can anybody doubt that our struggle was a national one when men of all races and creeds—Mussulmans, Copts, and Jews—rushed to join it with enthusiasm, rendering all the assistance in their power, believing it to be a war between the Egyptians and England? I never heard it said that the Khedive was fighting against his own army, for it was generally known that the war had been commenced with his consent and order. This impression was confirmed when it became known that the Khedive had removed Arábi from office for not having obeyed his order to continue the resistance, and to fortify some positions in order to prevent a landing.

About this time the Ulemas began reading Bokhary at the

university of El Azhar and at Sidy Hussein, and public prayers were offered up for the success of Arábi's troops and the defeat of the English. The Khedive's Imám (chaplain), the pious and learned Sheikh El Abiary, was prominent in the vivacity of his patriotic zeal. This man published the soul-stirring poem written by Ibrahim Doraid when the Tartars took Bagdad, in the time of Molasem, the Abassid Khalifa, which is a prayer to God Almighty. The sheikh added to it some stanzas of his own composition, and requested the people to read it and recite it publicly, after the reading of Bokhary. He also asked me to insert it in the paper, so that the army might read it too. This was perfectly justifiable, as the war was believed by all to be a Moslem war against Infidels; and the same sheikh I have mentioned was the man who preached the sermon on the return of the Khedive to Cairo after the war, exhorting all men to obey him.

The Princes, all the Notables, the Ulemas, the attendants of the Khedive, and even women, contributed horses, grain, money, and stores for the army. The governors, officials of every rank, and clerks, all displayed the utmost zeal in procuring the needful supplies, in collecting recruits for the army, and for the military works that were being carried on. Osmán Pacha Ghaleb, who is now Chief of the Police of the capital, and who was at the time I speak of Governor of Siout, forwarded several thousand ardebs of grain from his province, besides many horses and other animals, and pushed forward so zealously the enlistment of men for the army that he received the thanks of the War Department. He is now, I repeat, by the Khedive's appointment, Chief of the Cairo Police. It is the same with Khalíl Bey Iffat, who was named a Mudir by the Minister of War, and displayed so much ardour and zeal that a long telegram of thanks was sent to him, and was also published in the *Official Gazette*. He is now Governor of Miniéh, the Khedive having appointed him to that post.

The sister of the Khedive, the Princess Jamíla, the wife of

the late Saïd Pacha, Khairi Pacha, the Khedive's Chamberlain, Aly Moubarek, now Minister of Public Works, Yusef Pacha Choudy, one of the members of the Commission of Inquiry, Mahmoud Bey, the Khedive's Secretary, Ali Haidar Pacha, the actual Minister of Finance, all presented, either personally or through their Dairas, the most generous offerings to support the war, and their names are to be found in the numbers of the Official Gazette, and the registers of the different provinces will, if still extant, show what offerings came from them.

I saw the people going to the war quite willingly, whether peasants or Bedouins, and showing the utmost eagerness to fight the English : even the Copts shared the general enthusiasm, and were encouraged by their chiefs. The youths of Cairo used to parade the town at night, singing songs in praise of Arábi, and whenever the subject of war was mentioned at any meeting a general prayer was offered for the success of our arms.

Some time later Sheikh Abdú drew up a note as to the occurrences at Alexandria on the 11th June, which, along with two or three other statements of a similar nature, has since given rise to much heart-burning. It is, perhaps, improbable that the exact truth will be ever ascertained, but one fact stands out prominently in the discussion, viz., that such a catastrophe was distinctly contrary to the best interests of Arábi, that for him it meant little short of absolute social and political ruin, and if brought about by his suggestion involved a deliberate moral suicide, while on the other hand the results of the same event to his enemies would be eminently advantageous. The whole matter assumes a wholly different aspect when

viewed by the widely-different lights of Western and Eastern state-craft. The former would hold such a proceeding as the stirring-up of a massacre or even a riot as an unpardonable crime, while the other would regard it as a justifiable and perhaps masterly move on the diplomatic chess-board. Sheikh Abdú clearly saw it was a matter of life and death with the Khedive and the Palace party to discredit Arábi, now, no longer by the will of Egypt alone, but by the consent of all Europe, responsible guardian of the public peace, and he believed that they had not hesitated to adopt this very questionable means of check-mating their too successful and now also too powerful adversary. Other people in Egypt both think and assert the same. This is what Sheikh Abdú wrote :—

When the disagreement arose between the Khedive and the Mahmoud Sámi Ministry, it was rumoured in Cairo that the Khedive would endeavour, through some of his followers, to cause a riot in Cairo itself, so much so that special precautions were taken to prevent disturbance, and as long as they were in office the Ministry especially watched this matter.

And the Khedive sent for Ibrahim Bey Tewfik, Mudir of Beherah, and required of him that he should assemble the sheikhs of the Bedouin tribes, and bring them to him. And when he saw them he received the sheikhs with great cordiality and made them promises, and directed the Mudir to order them to collect 3,000 Bedouin Arabs, and bring them into the capital from the side of Ghizeh, hoping thus that, there being no discipline among them, disturbance would result in the town. But the sheikhs found it difficult to collect so many men owing to the fear the tribes had of the soldiers.

And having failed in this, the Khedive wrote to Omar Loutfi, then Governor of Alexandria, a cyphered telegram, and told him, "Arábi has guaranteed public safety, and published it in the newspapers, and has made himself responsible to the Consuls, and if he succeeds in his guarantee the Powers will trust him, and our consideration will be lost. Also the fleets of the Powers are in Alexandrian waters, and men's minds are excited, and quarrels are not far off between Europeans and others. Now therefore choose for yourself whether you will serve Arábi in his guarantee, or whether you will serve us."

And on the day of the event I went to the office of the Court, and saw that the Court officials were in great joy and merriment on account of what had happened, and were exaggerating the news of it, and they scoffed at Arábi's pledge to keep the peace. Now it has always been the custom that the men of the Court say nothing but what is agreeable to the Khedive. Every day indeed as news reaches them they talk and laugh if it is agreeable to him, and if otherwise they feign all the sorrow they can.

And twelve days after, when I was in Alexandria, I heard all the people saying with one voice that it was the Governor (Omar Loutfi) who made it go so far, for he was there, and did not give any order to prevent it, or go to the place except after some time, or ask for the regular soldiers in spite of their being so near the scene of action, and all the people said this was at the instigation of the Khedive. And I heard from them that near the end of the massacre the Governor was pacing from point to point, and there was an European at a window holding in his hand a revolver, and one of the Bedouins said, "Shall I shoot that one, O Pacha?" and he said to him, "Shoot him," and the Arab fired a bullet at him and killed him. And much of the stolen goods entered his house, and the houses of his relations on that black day."

I heard also from them that he incited some of the people during the massacre with encouragement, and made signs to the police (mustaphezin) not to take any notice, saying, "Let them die, the sons of dogs."

When the Commission was formed to inquire into the causes of the event, Omar Loutfi was not questioned about anything at all. On the contrary, the Khedive directed him to resign under pretext of illness.

Omar Loutfi was Governor of Alexandria during the riot. He was the person legally responsible for security, and he neglected it completely, even if we do not say that he helped to increase the disorder. Now, if that was in obedience to Arábi—as he (Loutfi) pretended, although his office was now in immediate dependence on the Khedive, since the Khedive had issued a special decree declaring that after Sâmi's resignation all matters relating to the interior devolved upon the Court—how came he (Loutfi) to be appointed Minister of War as a recompense of his obedience to Arábi, and his disobedience to his Lord the Khedive? But if it was negligence of his own, how is it that with that negligence and incapacity he was appointed Minister of War? How is it that he was not asked a single question, although he was the first person who should have been questioned? Truly the march of events proclaims aloud the cause of the riot to be the Khedive in concert with Omar Loutfi.

The caution and timidity uniformly displayed by Sheikh Abdú give a weight to his declaration which I could hardly attach to that made by any other man in his position. Till some radical change takes place in the social condition of the Egyptian we can never solve the riddle of the 11th June, and the various surmises concerning it must always be a

matter of opinion and probability. It is difficult, however, to believe that a man like Abdú, who even preceded his complaint of being spat upon in prison with a respectful dedicatory preface to His Highness the Khedive, would have put forward such a theory, unless he had really some deep insight into the mazes of an Egyptian palace intrigue. One thing I can personally attest, and that is the corroboration of his story by others, with whom he had no possible means of communication.

On the evening of the 1st January, 1883, I bid farewell in the dark to Muhamed Abdú, who escaped at last with three years' banishment from Egypt. I have since heard he is living in poverty and misery at Beyrouth. If Egypt is ever to walk alone or ever have a fair start, it cannot easily spare such men as Sheikh Muhamed Abdú—Ulema and Journalist.

CHAPTER XX.

HOW THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY EXAMINED RIFÁT BEY.

THE arrival of the two prisoners from Crete (to whom I have already referred) seemed at once to endow the Commission of Inquiry with unwonted vigour and zeal. They suddenly determined to make progress with something, and I think very unfortunately for their peace of mind, that something happened to be the continued examination of Ahmed Bey Rifát, ex-Secretary of the Council of Ministers, and once correspondent of the *Temps* newspaper. Early on the morning of the 16th November, I received an Arabic note addressed by the Commission to "our beloved friend Mr. Broadley," requesting my attendance at 10 o'clock.

After the usual prologue of compliments, coffee, and cigarettes, poor Rifát, looking very nervous, was introduced and accommodated with a seat by my side. I believed I greatly scandalised the loyal propriety of the members by shaking hands with my client. I shall never forget the unmistakeably mali-

cious twinkle of Ismaïl Eyoub's eye as he very deliberately produced an ancient and very dirty copy of the *Temps*, containing a decidedly unflattering comparison between French civilisation and English bullets from Rifát's patriotic pen. "*Mon cher ami*," said the President, "after this you must, I think, retire from the defence of such a man," and he tossed the ancient and very dirty newspaper across the sea of green baize which separated us. I read the article and wrote a few words on a slip of paper:—"If I had been in his place I should have said the same." The following dialogue then ensued:—

President: You see the number of the *Temps* dated 16th August. It contains a telegram signed by Ahmed Rifát, addressed to the Governors of the Interior, directing them to contradict rumours of massacres at Cairo, and the report that Arábi had received money from Hálim Pacha. Did you send this?

Ahmed Rifát: Yes, by order of the National Council, of which you were a member yourself.

President: I entirely deny being present when the matter was discussed.

Ahmed Rifát: Telegrams were often transmitted in this form. False news having been sent to Europe it was decided to contradict it, and the telegram was submitted to the President of the Council. The message was an expression of general feeling,

the war having then become a national one. I cannot recollect whether your Excellency signed the minutes of the Council's proceedings, but I do recollect that on Friday, 18th August, you went with me to Kafr-el-Dowar by special train, in company with Reouf Pacha, Osmán Pacha Fouzy, and Hussein Pacha Dramanli, in order to wish Arábi Pacha success and a good Bairám.

President : I might stop you, but as you are speaking of me you can go on.

Ahmed Rifát : Your Excellency will remember we all dined with Arábi in his tent, and were afterwards shown over the fortifications by Toulba Pacha. We only went away when the English ironclad train approached and our guns were being got ready for action, and even then your Excellency complained as an old soldier of not being allowed to take part in the fighting.

President : Every one knows I went there, including the Khedive. It was a picnic from motives of curiosity. Tell me, are the thoughts expressed in the telegram your own ?

Ahmed Rifát : Yes, my own and everybody else's as well.

President : You were director of the press. The *Taïf* published articles abusing the Khedive. How came you to let them appear ?

Ahmed Rifát : Show them to me.

Two numbers of the paper without date were then put in, and containing articles uncomplimentary to both the Khedive and the English.

Ahmed Rifát : I will answer both as to those particular articles and as to the way in which I carried out my duties generally. What the *Taïf* and other papers have said was the result of the excitement of the popular feeling against the Khedive, after the two Councils held at the Ministry of the Interior. The *Taïf* only expressed what little boys in the street used to say. Such ideas were not confined to any paper. As to the general discharge of my official functions, I say that after the Prime Minister, Rágheb Pacha, telegraphed from Alexandria that hostilities had broken out between Egypt and England, and gave notice that the country was to be under martial law, the Minister of War issued a proclamation that no papers were to be issued without its approval. I continued to discharge my duties, and submitted all important matters to the National Council. The great object in view was to prevent the publishing of articles which might excite fanaticism. One day Hasan Effendi Shemsi published an article containing an incitement to fanaticism and personal attacks. I blamed him for it, and he left the staff of the *Muñid*. The paper *El Fostát* published a very fanatical

article. In the presence of H.E. Butros Pacha, and other members of the Council, it was resolved to suppress the paper.

President : You suppressed the *Fostát* and the *Mufid* because they were exaggerated, but is not your saying that the *Taif* expressed the popular feeling (particularly in the two numbers now produced) a proof that you concurred in those sentiments and approved those expressions ?

Ahmed Rifát : In the General Assembly which met at the Ministry of the Interior, at which Ulemas, Generals, and Notables were present, it was decided that the Khedive had violated the Divine law. As an Egyptian, I could not dissent from the whole people and punish the *Taif* in contradiction with my own thoughts.

President : Then was what the *Taif* said approved by you ?

Ahmed Rifát : I do not understand what your Excellency means by approval, and I therefore refrain from replying to the question.

President : You said before that the Khedive had ordered you to give up some minutes, and you preferred to follow Arábi's orders. How do you explain this ?

Ahmed Rifát : I trust I may be allowed to express some reflections which occur to me in reading the

procès-verbaux. I have remarked some mistakes which are attributable either to myself or the copyist. I first said——

President : You must now answer questions. You will have your interrogatories read to you and may then make any remarks you please afterwards. Now you must only answer questions.

Ahmed Rifát : I am doing so. In my interrogatory of the 7th and 9th ult. this question is reported incorrectly. M. Borelli asked me then the same question, and I answered that, the Khedive having ordered me to give to Muhamed Bey Khalil the minutes of the Councils in the presence of M. Sinadino and Sala Pacha, I at once promised compliance, but being Clerk of the Council I could do nothing without the knowledge of one at least of the Ministers. As Arábi was the Minister of War and Marine to His Highness, and the minutes in question were connected with his department, I took them with me, intending to inform him of the circumstance, and then give them to the Khedive. Arábi Pacha, however, ordered me not to give them up, saying that I would be held personally responsible if I did so. I at once wrote to Muhamed Bey Khalil, informing him of what had happened, but I only got a verbal answer.

President : You were one day at Hussein Dra-

manli's house when a telegram was read, stating that an English ship full of bloodhounds had arrived ; that the Sultan had received a telegram from Prince Bismarck congratulating him on the alliance between Turkey and Germany, that the English would always be beaten and the Egyptians always victorious, and that the Khedive had repented and felt sorry. You answered, "God forbid ! How could the Khedive show his face in Egypt, even allowing that this impossible fact should take place. Could he find a house or room wherein to sit ?"

Ahmed Rifát : I remember nothing about it.

President : As Director of the Press, do you know anything of the pamphlet entitled "Paradise is under the Shadow of the Swords" ?

Ahmed Rifát : I know nothing of it as Director of the Press. I think I was told the War Department had given orders for the seizure of this pamphlet at the Post Office. Yácoub Sámi Pacha could answer the question much better.

President : At a preceding meeting you said the threats of the military were heard by one or two persons. Give me the names.

Ahmed Rifát : I cannot remember them.

President : We will now adjourn.

Two days later these proceedings were once more resumed. I took, as before, almost verbatim notes of

everything that passed. On the appearance of Rifát (no longer quite so nervous) he was again interrogated as follows:—

President: 'This paper (producing one) was found at the War Office. It is the Turkish draft of a telegram to Bessím Bey, Imperial Chamberlain, at the Yildiz Kiosk, without date. Did you draw it up or write it?

Ahmed Rifát: It is a copy of a telegram I composed with the approbation of the *Medjlis-el-Orfi*, or National Council. It was approved by Reouf Pacha,* Ahmed Pacha Nachát, Butros Pacha, Ismaíl Pacha Abú Gebel, and others, and given to the telegraphist after certain corrections. I have an impression it was not transmitted owing to the cutting of the wires.

President: What is this? (Second document produced.) Is this your writing?

Ahmed Rifát: No. It is a copy of the former telegram addressed to the Grand Vizier. All our communications with Constantinople during the war were sent in this manner—in duplicate.

President (producing a second telegram to Bessím Bey): Did you draw this up?

Ahmed Rifát: Yes, but by order always of the National Council. I remember Jiaffer Pacha, Mareschli

* President of the Court Martial.

Pacha, Ahmed Pacha Nachát, Ahmed Pacha Hassanin, and Ismaïl Pacha Abú Gebel were those who considered it most necessary to keep Constantinople informed of all that passed. You will observe that most of these personages have affixed their seals to the telegrams.

President : And this ?

Ahmed Rifát : It is the usual duplicate for the Porte.

President : And these two documents ?

Ahmed Rifát : My answer is the same as in the last case.

President : And these also ?

Ahmed Rifát : These are in my handwriting. I see by the note of the telegraphist they are dated August 2nd. The first is signed and sealed by nearly all the members of the National Council, and strongly insists on the necessity of an answer being given as to the two assemblies held at the Ministry of the Interior, the decision of which had been telegraphed to Constantinople. The second is a translation of a despatch giving an account of the taking of Suez. They are both addressed to Bessím Bey at the Yildiz Kiosk.

President : Are the contents of these papers in conformity with your own convictions, or were you obliged or forced to send them by others ?

Ahmed Rifât : I have already said the telegrams were sent to Constantinople by a decision of the National Council, in which the feeling of the country was represented by several members whose fame dates from the time of Mehemet Ali, and of the other assemblies previously held at the Ministry of the Interior. At the first meeting it was the Armenian Patriarch and Latif Pacha who put forward this idea. I was appointed to the National Council by the Under-Secretary of State for the Interior. I was never forced, and the contents were never contrary to my own ideas.

President : According to one message I see the Canal was to be blocked up. Surely this was not your opinion ?

Ahmed Rifât : It was a necessity of war. I regretted it being so.

President : In one telegram it is said that the burning of Alexandria was really caused by the English bombardment, and imputed falsely to the Egyptian soldiers. How about this assertion ?

Ahmed Rifât : I could not know the truth about this. I have since heard Alexandria was not burned by the English fire, but I do not think it was burned by the Egyptian soldiers.

President : By whom, in your opinion, was Alexandria burned ?

Mr. Broadley : I respectfully object to this question.

President : We think it quite regular, but I will ask something first. If you were not sure why did you telegraph ?

Ahmed Rifát : I have already answered. It was the decision of the *Medjlis* (Council), and based on the information we had.

President : Was the information founded on rumours or on letters to the Council ?

Ahmed Rifát : I cannot say. The President of the Council may perhaps be able to answer you.

President : As the burning of Alexandria is now a well-known fact, and you say you think neither the English soldiers or the Egyptian soldiers did it, who then in your opinion was it who set fire to the town ?

Ahmed Rifát : The Council being at Cairo, and all communication with Alexandria being cut off, I only learned that the English had not burned the town after the occupation of Cairo. I heard a eunuch in my employ had said so after I was in custody at the Prefecture of Police.

President : Did your servant say who it was ?

Ahmed Rifát : I did not ask him, and he did not say.

President : In one of the Constantinople despatches it is said the National Council ordered the

Governor of Suez to tell the English Admiral that the Council at Cairo was the sole legal government in Egypt. Is this your conviction?

Ahmed Rifát : I said the day before yesterday the power of H.H. the Khedive was suspended by the decision of the General Assembly held at Cairo, which was formed of all the great men of Egypt in the capital as well as in the country. In consequence of that the real *de facto* government of Egypt was the National Council, accepted and supported by all the nation, and which undertook the defence of the country. Hence the telegram to Constantinople, and hence the telegram sent to Suez to which you allude.

President : Did you affix your seal to this decision, and, if you did so, did you do it voluntarily?

Ahmed Rifát : I sealed it. I did so of my own free will. Neither I nor any one else was constrained to do it.

President : The case is adjourned till to-morrow.

Things reached a climax at the adjourned sitting. Such was the solemnity which now prevailed that even the coffee and cigarettes were dispensed with. The President began by reading a question of the dimensions of a small *brochure* :—

President : In your first statement you said that the menaces you heard, and the events which had taken place, *e. g.*, the burning of Alexandria, had a

certain effect on your mind, and you added that you heard something would take place at Cairo of the kind which happened at Alexandria, and that consequently you had agreed with Ali Pacha Shereef to take refuge with your family through a small door, and you also admitted you were in terror of the military force, and you said all this was confirmed by what you had heard from and in the presence of certain persons, *e. g.*, that Yácoub Sámi Pacha threatened to take the police force and go to the battle, and so leave the town without a guard if the civilians were not of one mind with the soldiers, and, moreover, that if the civilians were enemies from within he would attack them sooner than the enemies from without. Lately, however, you have said that the articles in the *Taïf*, containing criticisms against the Khedive and exciting the ideas of the populace, were in conformity with your opinions; and, moreover, that you signed voluntarily the minutes of the meetings of the National Council, and have even qualified this Committee, said to be notoriously an instrument in the hands of the military party, as the *de facto* government of the country. Explain this contradiction. Were the military proceedings calculated to cause you fear at one time and not at another?

Ahmed Rifát : When you questioned me as to the minutes demanded from me by the Khedive

(a subject concerning which I had been already examined), I said I had many rectifications to make as to my interrogatory of the 7th and 9th October, conducted in the absence of my legal adviser, and you answered me I could only make observations on a specific point and not generally as to the whole interrogatory. As the question now proposed amounts to a *résumé* of my answers on the different occasions of my private examination both in the absence and presence of my advocate, I now ask your Excellency to be allowed to make observations on all the interrogatory, and such as I shall support by proof and evidence. Otherwise I beg your Excellency to question me on any fact point by point, and I will answer readily and frankly.

President : You may do this in writing.

Mr. Broadley : Will it form part of the *procès-verbal* ?

President : Yes.

Several Members of the Commission objecting to this the President withdrew his permission.

President : Explain your contradiction as to the two interrogatories on the subject of the fear of the military.

Ahmed Rifát : If you will allow me to speak frankly I can explain these contradictions. This is a

right allowed even to the most common criminal, and I claim it.

President : You may do so if you confine yourself to the point at issue.

Ahmed Rifát : I have been grossly ill-treated in prison. Ibrahim Agha, tutunji, the Khedive's pipe-bearer——

President : Stop ; this is not the question. We all know nobody ever complained of the tutunji but Arábi and Abdul Gaffár.

Sir Charles Wilson : This is not so. I feel it my duty to say that when I made my weekly visit all or nearly all the prisoners complained of this man's visit and conduct.

President : We must send for M. Borelli ; he is the *ministère publique*.

Mr. Broadley : I venture to ask you to note this. As M. Borelli's agreements, as such, are repudiated, I trust the Court will now uphold M. Borelli's official engagements.

President : Send for M. Borelli.

[M. Borelli arrives after one hour's delay.]

Mr. Broadley : I appeal to you, Sir, if the Court is not bound to record the whole answer of an accused person ?

M. Borelli : Yes, but he should be brief.

President : Then, as the *ministère publique* says so, Rifát Bey may answer.

Ahmed Rifát : Colonel Wilson knows something of our treatment at the Prefecture. One after another the guards used to come and mock us. Hasan Dramanli was treated like this. When I was brought into the courtyard of the Prefecture I saw an officer, named Ahmed Effendi Kánil. He seized me by the arm and said "Put this man between the ranks of soldiers, who are to conduct him." I was much alarmed because on the night of my arrest the Prefect of Police had told Mahmoud Sámi and myself that death was inevitable, and that if an inquiry was made it would only be for the form. The moment we arrived at the new prison (October 4th) we were confined in separate rooms. The next night the door of my cell was opened with a great noise, and in rushed a great number of Turkish *cavas* (guards), aides-de-camp, and pipe-bearers, all servants of the Khedive, and headed by Ahmed Kánil and one of the aides-de-camp. They shouted at me and made me rise. Kánil seized me by the shoulders and felt all over my body from head to foot. I was terrified to death. They made me close the window-shutters and said I should not have a bed. The next day the windows and part of the door were nailed up. Two days later I was brought up for examination. I ask

your Excellency if an interrogatory made under these circumstances has any legal or equitable value ?

President : You may go.

I need hardly say from the time he left the Court till the day he quitted Egypt (in all probability for ever) forty days later, under a sentence of five years' exile, he was not further meddled with. Even Ismaïl Eyoub had quite enough of interrogating so quick-witted and malignant a Nationalist.

CHAPTER XXI.

SULEIMÁN SÁMI THE APPROVER.

THE adage that "truth is stranger than fiction" has rarely received an apter illustration than in the story of Suleimán Sámi. No other incident connected with the closing scenes of the drama in which Arábi played the principal part can claim the dramatic interest which attaches itself to the details of Suleimán's capture in Crete, his subsequently turning approver in Cairo, and the very short shrift he secured for himself six months later on the gallows hastily erected amidst the ruins of the Great Square in Alexandria. I only saw Suleimán Sámi once. He was the son of Daoud Pacha, an old Egyptian functionary, and was sometimes called Suleimán Sámi, sometimes Suleimán Daoud. His correct designation was, I believe, Suleimán Bey Sámi-ibn-Daoud. He had unquestionably taken a prominent part in the military operations at Alexandria, and there can no longer be any doubt that he personally superintended the burning of a portion of the European quarter of

the city. Like all other military officers of his rank, he was well known to Arábi, with whom he had been prior to the war on terms approaching to intimacy. After the defeat at Tel-el-Kebir he disappeared together with one Hasan Moosa el Akád, a Cairene merchant and landowner, who was persistently described as an incendiary and a fanatic, but who was in reality only an active Egyptian politician of doubtful honesty. By some unaccountable infatuation they found their way to Crete, where they were at once recognised and arrested. Their precipitate flight seemed conclusive evidence of guilt, and the Turkish governor sent them back to Egypt with becoming promptitude.

I happened to be in the corridor of the Daira Saniya, when the two prisoners arrived. Suleimán's face seemed perfectly livid from fear. His countenance was, I remember, singularly unprepossessing, and he wore a drab military overcoat and patent leather shoes. Hasan Moosa, clad in a snow-white turban and a tight-fitting robe of chocolate-coloured cloth (a costume which became admirably his slight figure, olive complexion, and typical Egyptian face), seemed perfectly unconcerned, giving a cheerful nod of recognition to every one he met. He was perfectly accustomed to this kind of thing, for his whole life had been almost spent in arrest and exile. The new

comers were placed in adjoining cells next to that of Abd-el-Ál, and I left the prison wholly unconscious of what was about to occur.

Just at this time our work was peculiarly arduous. I was examining each deposition as it came to hand, and devoting as much time as possible to the study of such points of Moslem and international law as would be useful at the approaching trial. Lord Henry Lennox was now in Cairo, and Arábi expressed a desire to see him. Riáz Pacha, however, returned a somewhat decisive answer in the negative to a request for admittance which Lord Henry preferred. This happened on the day following the arrival of the two fugitives; and some hours were consumed in the purposeless interrogatory of Rifát Bey, which now seemed to have all at once become a matter of importance in the minds of the Commissioners.

It was late in the evening when I saw Arábi, who told me something unusual had taken place. He said that, as soon as Sir Charles Wilson had left the prison, the members of the Commission, who had separated, reassembled, and remained in the building till late at night, and he could plainly hear that a sitting was going on in the adjoining room, which seemed to last without interruption during several hours. Through the nailed-up Venetian blinds he had seen more than one mounted messenger from the Palace come and go.

Arábi was aware of the agreement we had obtained, which was now to make our presence admissible and essential at these examinations, and he at once suspected that some foul play was on foot. Rifát Bey and a grim old Major of infantry named Kadr Kadr Bey, (who shared his cell, and was only accused of participation in the twice amnestied *pronunciamentos*,) fully corroborated all Arábi had said. Rifát had, moreover, heard from the guards that Suleimán Bey Sámi had been interrogated during six consecutive hours. I asked all three prisoners to draw up a statement of what had passed, and returned home much upset at the manifest unfairness with which I conceived we had been treated.

In the evening I learned certain facts connected with the arrival of Suleimán Sámi at Cairo which enabled me to confidently anticipate the next move on the part of our adversaries, viz., the admission of Suleimán Bey to give evidence as an approver on behalf of the prosecution. From the moment he arrived at Alexandria till he reached the prison at Cairo he had never been for an instant out of sight of the zealous agents of the Khedive. The Governor of Alexandria had taken him in a close carriage to a wayside railway station some distance from the town, where he was placed in a separate compartment, and under the personal care of the Sub-Governor conveyed

to Cairo. We were not long kept in suspense. The *Egyptian Gazette* on the following morning was in unprecedented demand. It contained a full, true, and particular account of the declaration of Suleimán Bey Sámi, the self-confessed burner of Alexandria. The statement in question filled nearly three columns, and was "to be continued"; next day a further instalment covered two columns more, and was also "to be continued," but for some reason or other the remainder has never appeared from that time to the present, and, in all probability, never will.

Party feeling once more ran high at Cairo. The verdict of the verandah of Shepheard's Hotel was almost unanimous:—Suleimán Sámi's story should, of course, be treated as conclusive, and Arábi's doom must be looked on as settled accordingly. A very cursory perusal of the latest effort of Ismaíl Eyoub's genius, however, speedily showed me the real value, or, more correctly speaking, the real worthlessness, of the almost endless statement of Sámi. He had tried to prove too much, and I saw at once his allegations were wholly incapable of corroboration. Sámi pretended that Arábi had verbally ordered him, in the presence of several persons he was unable to point out, to burn Alexandria. He also declared Arábi had sent him to the Ramleh Palace to kill the Khedive, but that on his road he met Sultán

Pacha, (not yet K.C.M.G., but still the "Father of his Country,") and Hasan Pacha Sherai. At the sight of these personages he repented himself, confessed his criminal intention, and, abandoning his impious design, returned from whence he came. As regards the incendiarism, it was manifest that no corroboration was possible, and the doubtful evidence of an accomplice could not possibly carry conviction as to the incitement to murder. I was already in possession of the depositions of Sultán and Hasan Sherai, neither of which contained the faintest allusion to such an occurrence, which that of Sultán, at least, would certainly have done, if there had been any ground for the assertion.

It was necessary, however, to take some steps for protecting the right secured us by our convention with Borelli Bey. We addressed a letter to Ismail Pacha Eyoub in the following terms:—

We have learned from the public prints that two persons named Suleimán Daoud and Hasan Moosa-el-Akád, have been examined by the Commission as witnesses against our client, Arábi Pacha, in our absence, and in the absence of the accused, and contrary to the provisions of the agreement signed on the 2nd November by H.E. Borelli Bey on behalf of the Commission.

We protest respectfully against these infractions of an agreement binding on all parties, and, consequently, against use being made at any stage of the trial of the evidence so obtained, which we consider as entirely null and void.

The undisguised glee with which the Court party contemplated the treachery of Suleimán was not destined to be of long duration. Several persons whom he indicated by description or otherwise as witnesses were confronted with him on the very next day, but they refused one and all to support his story. Hasan Sherai in his prison and Sultán Pacha in his palace flatly contradicted his romantic account of the alleged *rencontre* on the Ramleh road. A European of strong anti-Nationalist opinions was present when the delegate of the Commission came to respectfully interrogate the Father of his Country on the subject. Sultán met the question put to him with an emphatic denial. "What a pity," exclaimed his visitor, "a different answer would have settled the whole business." Did some scruples of conscience torment Sultán Pacha's mind even at the eleventh hour? I think so.

There is a vast difference between the principles and practice of Freemasonry in England and on the continent of Europe. Our own system embraces nothing more exciting than charity and good-fellowship; foreign Masonry is almost avowedly an appropriate and convenient arena for political discussion, and both political and religious agitation. The two creeds have absolutely nothing in common but a few outward and visible signs, which convey to the minds

of those who use them very different significations. In Egypt the tenets of continental Masonry, with its Republican watchwords of *Fraternité, Liberté, Egalité*, had evidently overshadowed for a time at least a strong English element which once prevailed in her numerous Lodges. Although none of the leaders of the National party belonged to the brotherhood, a large number of their subordinates were amongst its most active and zealous members. Sheikh Abdú had been made Master of his Lodge, and many of the Deputies in the Egyptian Chamber had hastened to join the craft. The "hungry after justice," as Rifát (also a Mason) usually described the Egyptian patriots, found a strange fascination in the mystic tie which was to unite all men in the common bond of liberty, and believed the same machinery which had helped the Italians in their struggle for freedom and unity would materially assist the Egyptian cause.

I must now explain the reason for this abrupt digression on Egyptian Masonry. At every period of my stay in Egypt, and more particularly at every acute crisis through which the fate of Arábi passed, I received a series of anonymous letters giving me many valuable hints, and informing me of all that was going on in the enemy's camp. A great majority of them bore unmistakeable signs of a masonic origin. Some came through the post, others were left at my

house by an unknown hand. At the critical moment I am now describing I received the following advice:—

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“ Dear Brother,

“ Victory for Justice ! I have the honour to inform you that Sultán Pacha denies ever seeing Suleimán Sámi on the road to Ramleh. He has lately told several people that Arábi neither burned Alexandria, nor gave any orders that it should be burned. He said also he had ascertained this personally when he went to speak to Arábi about the soldiers who surrounded the palace at Ramleh on the 12th July. Sultán Pacha found Arábi outside the gate Báb-el-Sharki loudly lamenting over the looting and burning and upbraiding the soldiers for what had happened. He even caused plunder to be snatched from the soldiers and burned. Sultán asked who had done this thing. Arábi answered ‘ They say it is Suleimán Sámi.’ Please pay a visit to Sultán. He has much to say to you. Indeed he is waiting for you. He will corroborate all I now say. Please burn this.

“ From your Brother.”

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The brief triumph occasioned by the supposed success of the secret examination of Suleimán Sámi seemed to have emboldened the Commission to set all our agreements with Borelli Bey openly at defiance. On going to the Daira Saniya prison on the morning of the 19th November I found the Commissioners on the point of examining a venerable Maltese renegade who had suddenly, and after the lapse of five months, recollected some phrases uttered by Arábi during the

bombardment, which he now pretended had some occult and mysterious meaning. Ismail Eyoub first essayed a little persuasion, laying much stress on the fact that His Excellence the witness was a Pacha, "*and a Pacha could not lie.*" The following dialogue then took place between us:—

President : We intend to-day to examine a fresh witness against all the prisoners.

Mr. Broadley : I venture to submit this cannot be done unless you allow the accused to be present, as it is contrary to the amendment of the Procedure Rules agreed on by Borelli Bey on the 2nd of November in the name of the Commission and acted on by it since.

President : *The Commission repudiates this agreement.* The accused cannot be present.

Mr. Broadley : I trust I may point out that M. Borelli left the sitting of the Commission to sign the agreement, that it was signed in an adjoining apartment in the presence of some members of the Court, that the President congratulated me on terminating the difficulty, and that for some days it was held to be in force and acted on accordingly. I must also observe M. Borelli was officially introduced to us as the accredited legal adviser of the Ministry of the Interior and the Commission.

President : I will write to M. Borelli.

[An hour's delay, after which a letter arrives.]

President: As M. Borelli says we can go on with the evidence we shall do so.

Mr. Broadley: As I can consent to no deviation from the rules agreed to, I beg leave to tender a written protest and withdraw.

Accompanied by Mr. Santillana I paid a long visit to Arábi, who did not seem much moved at Suleimán Sámi's accusation, beyond feeling deeply the treachery of which he was the victim. I was soon convinced of the truth of the assurances he gave me. As to the story of Suleimán's mission to kill the Khedive he at once pointed out its inherent improbability. "I have never knowingly wronged or harmed a human being," said Arábi; "for three months at Cairo the Khedive's life was jealously guarded by me day after day. If I had ever wanted to assassinate him I could have done so at any moment. Why, then, should I suddenly conceive the idea of killing him in the midst of what I then thought to be our common misfortunes?" "*Have I then need,*" he added, "*to solemnly swear to you that what Suleimán Sámi says is a lie?*" At my suggestion he promised to write a full account of his movements on those eventful days, but he asked me to send him his faithful servant Muhamed, who had been all the time at his side. "When I think of the

bombardment," he said, "the old stunned feeling here (pointing to his head) seems to return and my memory becomes confused. I want to question Muhamed on one or two points." A day later he completed the paper I required, and this is Mr. Santillana's translation of Arábi's story of all he did during Lord Alcester's "warlike operation :"—

"During my stay at Alexandria with the Ministry, from July 7th to the 10th, I used to go in the morning to the Ras-el-Tin Palace, and come back after sunset, on account of the prolonged meetings the Ministers then held. At night I used to be at the Ministry of Marine.

"On the 10th of July a Council of Ministers and others was held under the presidency of the Khedive; the Ottoman delegates were present. It was decided that we should reply to the fire of the English ships after they had fired five or six shots. The Council was dismissed at five o'clock that day. The Khedive with his family left for Ramleh Palace. I proceeded to the Ministry of Marine and gave the necessary instructions to the commander of the forces; the infantry were to assist the artillerymen, as the latter were under the full number necessary to man the guns.

"On the morning of July 11th, 1882, at 7 o'clock a.m. the ships opened fire; the forts answered

according to orders. As the missiles fell very thick on the Ministry of Marine, I proceeded with Toulba Pacha to the Damas Fort, near the Báb-el-Jadíd (New Gate), which, being very high, allowed of our seeing the other forts. Shells fell very thick on our way, and one of them burst as we were near the Báb-el-Jadíd, and killed two officers, six men of the police force, and the horse of a carriage that was standing by.

“ I remained in the said fort up to half-past ten, Arabic time (four o'clock p.m.) During the bombardment all the ministers came to us, as well as messengers from the Khedive and from Dervesh Pacha, with compliments from H.H. and Dervesh for the splendid attitude of the troops, although the fortifications were in an unfinished state and the English ships so powerfully armed. At three o'clock of that same day there came from Cairo Omar Bey Rahmi and Sheikh Muhamed Abdú. We had also with us the Chief of the Alexandria Police, Mustafa Bey Sobhi and Suleimán Bey Sámi. The latter seemed to have lost his head, and talked nonsense, which I paid no attention to, as I was speaking with the Chief of the Police about carrying away the dead and wounded who were in the forts and the streets. I heard Suleimán Sámi saying, ‘ We must stop the

Canal.' I interrupted for a moment my conversation with the police officer to remark, 'The Suez Canal is neutral, and must not be touched.'

"After I had done talking with the Chief of the Police I blamed Suleimán Sámi for having left his troops at such a moment and for coming to trouble us with his nonsense, and ordered him to go back to his post; he left us then. There were present then Toulba Pacha, Omar Bey Rahmi, and Sheikh Muhamed Abdú.

"The fire having ceased, I left the fort. I found that a very great crowd had assembled near the New Gate; the people surrounded me and prevented my proceeding forward; they were terribly frightened; I reassured them and calmed them. His Excellency Rágheb Pacha came up and drew me away from the crowd. He took me to his house, where there were present Sherai Pacha, Suleimán Pacha Abaza, Zobeir Pacha, Sultán Pacha, and Ismaïl Hakki Pacha. After our afternoon prayer we all went to Ramleh Palace to submit the state of affairs to the Khedive. This was about sunset. We remained there till two o'clock. A Council was held during this time under the Khedive's presidency, at which Dervesh Pacha was also present. It was decided to hoist the white flag if fire was opened again from the ships, as a sign that

we wanted to negotiate. Toulba Pacha was appointed to go to the English Admiral and inform him of what had been decided.

“I then proceeded to Báb-el-Sharki (the Eastern Gate) and gave orders to the Commandant de Place at Alexandria to hoist the white flag if the fire was opened next day. I spent the night there in the room reserved to the officer in command of the Báb-el-Sharki post. After midnight Toulba Pacha came and took from me the instructions which the Council had decided upon. There were in the room with us during most of that time, Omar Bey Rahmi and Khalíl Bey Kámil.

“Next morning at 6 o'clock, July 12th, Mahmoud Pacha Sámi arrived: I enquired about the time and reason of his coming to Alexandria. He said he had come during the night, and had gone to the Police Office, and then to the house of the President of the Council, Rágheb Pacha, and others, and had at last put up at a private house in the town for the night. He had come, he said, to see how matters stood, as a soldier, ready to fight for his country. I thanked him. Soon after, Mahmoud Pacha Fehmy, Aid Bey, and Suleimán Bey Sámi came, and a conversation ensued as to what was to be done in case the British Admiral persisted in reopening fire, and as to what quarters the army might take in case it was obliged to abandon the town. I

gave permission to Mahmoud Pacha Fehmy and Khalil Bey Kámil to proceed to Mahmoudieh and make a reconnaissance from Hadjr Ennawatia to Kafr-el-Dowar, and draw out a plan of any locality they might think most suitable. They went on their errand. The Chief of the Police took my directions for giving assistance to the wounded who were in the more distant forts, such as Fort Adgemi, El-Meks, and to the inhabitants on the side of Gabári. After this Toulba Pacha went to the Ministry of Marine to carry out his mission. At half-past nine the ships opened fire, and I went out of the room to see the hoisting of the white flag, and the persons present left me to go to their different posts. After twenty-five or twenty shots had been fired the attack ceased : half-an-hour afterwards a messenger came to me from the Khedive. I proceeded to Ramleh Palace, and submitted to the Khedive the result of the hoisting of the white flag from the forts, and told him that twenty or twenty-five shots had been fired. I remained there until Toulba Pacha came at half-past one o'clock p.m., and reported that the British Admiral wanted the occupation of three forts, viz. the forts of Meks, El Arab, and El Adgemi, and that he wanted an order to that effect from the Khedive at half-past one.

“ A Council was held, under the presidency of the

Khedive, and in the presence of Dervesh Pacha and Kadri Bey, the Ottoman Envoys, of Ismaíl Pacha Hakki, of Toulba Pacha, and the Ministers. After deliberation, it was decided to submit the matter to the Sultan, as the Imperial firman did not give the Khedive the right to cede any part of Egypt to any foreign power, and to send back Toulba Pacha to the Admiral to inform him of this decision. The Khedive then ordered me to send soldiers to occupy Fort Adgemi, in order to prevent a landing of the English. I exposed to His Highness the difficulties that prevented my doing so. He looked angry, and said, X “Why are you soldiers if you cannot prevent the enemy from occupying your country?” The Council was then dissolved. After a quarter of an hour the Khedive sent for me, and in the presence of Dervesh Pacha asked me what was the reason of the presence of four companies of infantry at Ramleh. I had no knowledge of this fact, and told him so, and said that I supposed they had come to reinforce the guard of the palace. He said that there was no necessity for their presence, that the guard he had before was quite enough, and it would be better to order them off to some other part. I went out and inquired for the officer in command of the detachment: I found it was Ali Abú Hashím, of the 6th infantry. I asked why the four battalions had come, and by whose orders.

He replied that Suleimán Sámi had ordered him to reinforce the guard at Ramleh. I told him to return to his post, as his services were not required there, the guard at Ramleh being quite sufficient.

“At four o'clock I left in the direction of Alexandria; on my road I met a great many fugitives from the town: on approaching Bá-b-el-Sharki I saw a great crowd of people, a medley of soldiers and citizens, going in the direction of Mahmoudieh, with their wives and their children, all crying. On my inquiring the reason of all this, I was told by some that the English were going to fire upon the town, and by others that the bombardment had already begun.

“On my reaching Bá-b-el-Sharki, at five o'clock p.m., I found Colonel Aid Bey, who informed me that it was rumoured in the town that the English would begin fire again, and that the inhabitants and even the soldiers had left in disorder. He said he was trying to assemble the soldiers of his regiment. I urged him to do so, and to prevent his men from disbanding. I stood myself before the gate to stop the soldiers. I was told by Mahmoud Pacha Sámi and Omar Bey Rahmi that Suleimán Sámi was with a detachment of soldiers in the Monshia, that he was in a state of frenzy, and wanted to burn the town, and would listen to no

advice. I sent immediately for him. I think my messengers were Ibrahim Bey Fouzi, and another officer whose name I do not remember. I directed Aid Bey to send four companies to prevent the soldiers from pillaging the shops. At eleven o'clock or thereabouts Suleimán Sámi arrived with a couple of battalions in complete disorder. I asked him whether it was true that he wanted to burn the town; he denied having ever had any such intention, and said his soldiers were only occupying the streets leading to the Port in order to prevent the landing of English troops. But as I observed that some of the men had linen and other stuffs in their possession, I ordered him to seize them and to identify those upon whom they had been found. I did not cease encouraging the soldiers, and reminding them of the honour of their flag, and so sought to prevent their leaving the town, and precipitately abandoning their resistance. I even told them I had decided not to quit the town, and that I would die there,—and asked if they would leave me alone? While all this was going on, there came up Hasan Pacha Sherai, Suleimán Pacha Abaza, Hussein Bey-el-Turk, aide-de-camp to the Khedive, together with Múheddin Effendi, aide-de-camp to Dervesh Pacha, and found me there. They told me that the soldiers who were at Ramleh, both the infantry and cavalry, had surrounded the palace, and

prevented any one from going in or out. They asked me the reason of all this; but I was exceedingly surprised at hearing it myself. Soon after I sent Toulba Pacha, who had just come up, to order the soldiers to leave the palace, and to enquire as to the causes of their behaviour. I declared before all persons present that I had nothing to do with what was going on there. I then asked Suleimán Bey Sámi why he had sent infantry soldiers to Ramleh. He said that having found some carriages that were going there, he had sent four companies to reinforce the guard, of his own accord, and without having any orders for it.

“Toulba Pacha having reached Ramleh Palace, the soldiers dispersed. He had the honour to see the Khedive; and it was ascertained, after inquiry, that the soldiers, having been told that the inhabitants and the military at Alexandria were leaving the town in a disorderly manner, had conceived some fears for the palace, and had surrounded it. The Khedive thanked them for it, and sent Hussein-el-Turk, his aide-de-camp, with Toulba Pacha, to present me his compliments. The messenger did not find me, and I know this from Toulba Pacha, who told it me when he joined me later in the day.

“Seeing that it was impossible to take the troops back to Alexandria, and that a few of them only

were at Báb-el-Sharki, and many officers, amongst whom Nessím Bey, commander of the coast at Alexandria, having informed me that the ships had approached Fort Silsileh, in order to bombard the Báb-el-Sharki barracks, and cut off the retreat, I thought that it was necessary to choose some convenient spot as a rendezvous for the soldiers. I therefore ordered the officers of the different regiments to go, with all the soldiers they could collect, to a convenient position on the Mahmoudieh Canal. I went with Rágheb Pacha, President of the Council, in his carriage, as far as the place where the roads meet, in front of the Christian cemetery. I alighted, as he was going to the Khedive's, at Ramleh Palace, and went on to the canal in great haste, in order to be the first there, and to preserve order amongst the soldiers. The troops continued to arrive there between sunset and daybreak."

If the trial had gone on, Arábi's statement could, I believe, have been substantiated. Ibrahim Bey Fouzi would certainly have given evidence, and one Hasan Effendi-el-Shemsi,* (the ex-editor of the Arab newspaper *Mufid*,) stated openly, at a time when all the prisoners were still at the Cairo Pre-

* Notes of Ahmed Bey Rifút

fecture of Police, that he was standing near Arábi and Mahmoud Sámi when Suleimán Sámi came up to them almost beside himself, and said something about burning the town. They both strongly dissuaded him from any act of the kind, but Suleimán suddenly rose in manifest anger, and turned quickly towards the town. Arábi asked El-Shemsi to overtake him, "lest he should do some act of folly," and bring him back. El-Shemsi did so, but the moment he touched Suleimán's arm the latter gave him so violent a push with his shoulder as to throw him down. When he rose, Suleimán was already some distance off.

A few days later the depositions recorded by the Commission, coupled with what Lord Dufferin appropriately enough called the "tainted" evidence of Suleimán Sámi, were found wholly inadequate to connect Arábi with the burning of Alexandria. They were insufficient even to make out a *prima facie* case against him. The attempt to implicate him in the events of the 11th June at Alexandria was, if possible, a still more conspicuous failure.* A few days later Suleimán Sámi's cell was empty. He had been suddenly hurried down to Alexandria to await trial for his self-confessed crime. The

* It was at this time I received the statement of Sheikh Abdú and others on the subject.

morning before he left Cairo for ever he had seen Arábi cross the quadrangle below, and return a few minutes afterwards condemned only to simple exile on a formal charge of rebellion. Suleimán Sámi's whilom friends now became his implacable foes. Might he not tell inconvenient stories of his interview with the Governor and Sub-Governor of Alexandria on his road to Cairo, or reveal what really happened at the secret sitting of the Commission of Inquiry? In the jail at Alexandria, it is true, Suleimán Sámi made several feeble attempts, first to attenuate and then to deny his original declaration. He was now, however, to be tried by that very Moslem law which declares explicitly that "the confession of a man may be well taken as conclusive against himself, but cannot be held sufficient to condemn others he accuses therein." The Alexandria Court Martial unhesitatingly condemned him, and while dawn was breaking on the morning of the 9th of June Suleimán Bey Sámi Ibn Daoud was brought from his prison, half dead with terror, and hanged by the neck till he was dead, in the midst of the very ruins he had helped almost a year before to create. Whether the burning of Alexandria constituted a crime, when viewed as a military expedient, is a very difficult question. Suleimán Sámi admitted the incendiarism, but pleaded in justification the orders of his lawful superior.

Arábi consistently denied this assertion, and Suleimán Sámi entirely failed to prove it. A strong presumption that it was false, arose from the fact that Suleiman's statements were wholly discredited in every particular where corroboration or contradiction was possible. I consider his execution fully justified. Of one thing there can be no doubt: no man ever died in Egypt more despised or more unpitied.

CHAPTER XXII.

HOW WE CAME TO DEFEND MAHMOUD PACHA SÁMI.

ON the afternoon of the 19th November I received a wholly unexpected visit from Mr. Broadway, who for many years had held the almost fiduciary position of dentist in ordinary to the Khedivial family. Mr. Broadway had begun life as a soldier, but had many years ago very prudently abandoned the pursuit of arms, for the more profitable business of stopping and extracting the teeth of Egyptian grandees. My visitor was evidently a man of no little force of character, and I afterwards learned he had long waged a costly war of actions for slander against a rival practitioner, who lived opposite him and described himself on a still more imposing brass plate than Mr. Broadway's as "Dentist Extraordinary to the *Princesse Mère* and all the members of the Khedivial family." Mr. Broadway lost no time in coming to the object of his visit;—"I want you," he said, "to defend Mahmoud Pacha Sámi. I bring you a letter from his wife, but I assure you there are some much

greater people behind her, and I have even had to tear the crown of a Khedivial princess off the envelope. The Pacha's wife is herself a princess of the Yeghen family, and we have no notion of his being made a scape-goat for the rest of the prisoners. Even the great *Princesse Mère** has made up her mind to this, and the whole of the other princesses have determined to tell Lord Dufferin their opinion of Tewfik Pacha. Please read this," and he handed me a torn envelope containing a short note duly sealed in Arabic.

Mr. Santillana translated it:

I, the wife of Mahmoud Pacha Sámi, do hereby appoint Mr. Bradley, the English Advocate, to defend my husband before the Commission of Inquiry and the Court Martial in case he should be obliged to appear before one of those courts, or both. I give him full powers with regard to the defence of my said husband, accept personally full responsibility for all costs of the same, and deliver him this mandate which shall at all times be a witness of my act. (Seal.) ADEELA, wife of Mahmoud Pacha Sámi.

"But," I asked Mr. Broadway, "has not Mahmoud Sámi retained a native lawyer to defend him?" "To hang him, you mean," promptly answered Mr. Broadway. "Yusef Kámil was a beggar a month ago, he is well to do even now, and when the Pacha is hung he will be a very rich man indeed." I could only express a hope that matters were not quite so bad as he imagined, but he would accept no refusal.

* The venerable mother of Ismaïl Pacha.

“The Princess Adeela,” he said, “has sworn to save her husband, she will go to Lady Dufferin; if necessary, she will even throw herself at the feet of Lord Dufferin himself; but you shall defend him as well as Arábi.” I promised to ask the requisite permission of Ismaïl Eyoub. I afterwards learned that the same evening Mahmoud Sámi’s wife forwarded a petition in furtherance of her views to Lord Dufferin. Ismaïl Eyoub would not hear of such an innovation as a change of advocates, and the matter had, therefore, to be treated diplomatically. Three days later (November 23rd) I was sent for to the Daira Saniya. I met Yusef Kámil in his usual state of health unsuspectingly leaving his client’s room. Mahmoud Sámi afterwards told me he had assiduously endeavoured to persuade him to “propitiate the Commission” by signing a declaration inculpating Arábi in the “unlawful use of the white flag” at Alexandria. Ismaïl Eyoub called me into his room, and, with an undeniable twinkle in his eye, gave me a short letter, which read as follows:—

To our beloved friend, Mr. Broadley.

Whereas Yusef Kámil, the Counsel of Mahmoud Pacha Sámi, has been suddenly afflicted with such sickness as will prevent his continuing the defence, you are hereby permitted to appear for the said Mahmoud Pacha Sámi in his place.

I then saw the efforts of his faithful wife had not

been unavailing.* From the day of her husband's arrest she had caused all her luxurious furniture to be removed from her room, and sat almost literally in sackcloth and ashes as a sign of her great grief. She still only lives in the hope of his return. With a refinement of cruelty the loyal native papers now and again intensify her sorrow by romantic stories about her absent husband having found fresh attractions amongst the beauties of Ceylon. The object of so much wholly disinterested affection can hardly be the cruel heartless man his enemies describe him.


As soon as I received the necessary permission I visited Mahmoud Pacha Sámi in his cell, in which I now placed the usual deal table and cane-bottomed chairs. His first request, I am glad to say, was to be allowed to write a letter of thanks to his wife. I need hardly say I readily granted it. Then followed the old story,—ill-usage in prison, the reaction of despair, and confessions of miserable weakness before the Commission. Mahmoud Sámi had profited more by the "European contact" than Arábi, he was better versed in modern politics and diplomacy, and he was, perhaps, more able and intellectually powerful than

* During the proceedings at Cairo the Egyptian press stated at intervals that Mahmoud Sámi's wife had determined to repudiate him and seek for a divorce. Nothing could be further from the fact.



محمود سامی

MAHMOUD SAMI PASHA.



his former War Minister, but he lacked the intense feeling, the wholly unselfish patriotism, and the heart-born qualities of Arábi, which begot a magnetic influence of character it was difficult to resist. Arábi thought *only* of Egypt, Mahmoud Sámi also thought of Egypt, it is true, but he thought a little of himself and his ambition as well. But then it must be remembered that the race of Egyptian Ministers which preceded them thought exclusively of their own personal interest and aggrandisement, and nothing at all of the country they pretended to assist in governing.

Our eight original clients (we had decided for the time being to defend Major Kadr Kadr instead of Osmán Pacha Fouzy) had now completed their defence, and time hung somewhat heavily on their hands. The perusal of the productions of the eminently loyal Egyptian press (in which Arábi was now openly charged with selling his country to the English at Tel-el-Kebir) caused so much distress, that I discouraged it, and allowed some of our translators to write out in Arabic extracts from such of our English newspapers as had the courage to see the Egyptian question in the simple light of right and wrong. A picture had just appeared in the *Illustrated News* which encouraged the prisoners greatly. It was described as "Preparing Evidence for Arábi's Trial," and nothing could have been more true to

life. The villagers, the policemen, the soldiers, the officers, the Pachas, and last but not least the sticks, were all there, while a Coptic clerk seated on the floor was busily engaged in recording a deposition. "Ah!" said Arábi, with a sigh, "if I could believe people in England would understand that picture how happy I should feel. They would see what I meant when I cried out in vain for justice."

At this time we saw a great deal of two gentlemen who were afterwards destined to write about Egypt from two very different points of view. I allude to Mr. Mackenzie Wallace, the well-known correspondent of the *Times* at Constantinople, and M. Gabriel Charmes,* who was then representing the once influential *Journal des Debats* in Egypt. Mr. Wallace was an indefatigable seeker for facts, who conscientiously endeavoured to help if possible the future of Egypt by his observations, and by suggestions founded on experience. I placed at his disposal Arábi's papers, and all the information I had in my power as to the history of the cause he had fought for. He doubtless heard far more than I could tell him on the other side. Mr. Wallace has apparently no hesitation in coming to a decision. What was first called "an insignificant military revolt," and then "a great military rebellion," was, he soon saw, neither one nor the other. Arábi had been chosen by the tacit

* See *ante*, p. 164.

suffrage of an entire country to lead a movement wholly national in its conception, and distinguished amongst other similar movements by its unanimity and its universality.* In a word, Mr. Mackenzie Wallace confesses with praiseworthy frankness that all Egypt was with Arábi, and Arábi at the head of all Egypt. I hail this impartial testimony as to the pure patriotism of Arábi and his friends, and I wish I could agree with him as cordially in other conclusions he has arrived at. Mr. Wallace does justice to the fair fame of Arábi, who, after having the whole wealth of the "Garden of Paradise" at his command, had nothing to give up to his victorious foes but the "few paternal acres" which yielded him an income of less than 200*l.* a year. I am convinced if Mr. Wallace had had the same opportunity of studying Arábi's character which fell to my lot, he would have recognized it in far higher and more practical qualities than those belonging to a dreamer of dreams or talker of platitudes.

M. Gabriel Charmes had a very different object in view. Arábi had failed to beat the English, and it consequently became expedient to treat the whole question in such a manner as to render both Arábi and the English as odious and ridiculous as possible in the eyes of a sympathetic French audience. This task

* *Egypt and the Egyptian Question*, by D. Mackenzie Wallace. London, Macmillan & Co. 1883.

was eminently congenial to M. Charmes' state of mind at the time he wrote. He had just before championed in his paper and in a book the militant policy of his countrymen in Tunis. The very name of Tunis had, however, in spite of M. Charmes' efforts, become hateful from one end of France to the other. He had also for long years, and with rare disinterestedness, toiled hard to prop up with his pen the institution once known in Egypt as the Dual Control, but, although its sworn enemy Arábi had failed, the Dual Control itself was also manifestedly tottering to its fall. In a spirit of very natural irritation M. Charmes compiled for the *Revue des Deux Mondes** a narrative of what he was pleased to call the "Military Insurrection in Egypt." Unlike Mr. Wallace, M. Gabriel Charmes neither cared nor sought for reliable facts; to blacken Arábi and the English it was far more effective to rely solely on a ready pen and undeniably fertile imagination.

A single instance will suffice to show the real nature of M. Charmes' romance. He asks the French people in sober seriousness to believe the following account of Sir Charles Wilson's relations with the Egyptian Government on the subject of the ill-treatment of the accused persons in prison. "One day," he writes, "Sir Charles Wilson arrived at the Ministry

* August 15th and September 1st, 1883.

in a fury of just indignation. 'What,' he exclaimed, 'you promised me not to subject the prisoners to torture and yet one of a peculiarly atrocious character has been inflicted upon them. You deprive them of repose. During the whole night your soldiers march up and down the corridors with thick shoes, and so prevent everybody from sleeping. How do you think that the accused under these circumstances can have collected ideas and prepare a proper defence?' *

"The same evening the guards received a supply of slippers, and were enjoined to move about slowly. Next day Sir Charles Wilson returned. 'It is always the same thing,' he said. 'Arábi cannot sleep, his cell is low, damp, and cold, and his health is in imminent danger.' The same night Arábi was moved to a lofty, well-warmed, and spacious chamber, in every way worthy of its inmate. The following morning Sir Charles Wilson was again at the Home Office. 'You pretend to carry out my suggestions,' he exclaimed, 'but your behaviour remains unchanged. Arábi's mattress is positively so hard that he cannot sleep upon it.' The softest of woollen mattresses was immediately placed on Arábi's bed. Again Sir Charles Wilson comes back to the charge. 'I admit,' says he, 'the mattress is good,

* *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1883, p. 111.

but he has no mosquito curtains. The mosquitos which buzz all night around his head prevent all concentration of thought, and hinder the preparation of his defence.' A mosquito curtain was hung in Arábi's room. Sir Charles Wilson is not even then contented. Once more he arrives at the Ministry. 'Now,' he exclaims, 'I am convinced of your premeditation. You are resolved not to let Arábi sleep at any price. Your mosquito curtain is in holes, through which the insects enter more easily than into the room itself.' The mosquito curtain is changed. Sir Charles Wilson even then is not appeased. He comes back once again. 'You must understand,' he exclaims, 'that Arábi is now alone. His wife must see him from time to time. It is really a species of torture to deprive him of *les charmes de son intérieur*. The visits of his wife will be both a solace and a consolation.' That night Arábi's wife penetrated to her husband's cell. Here my information stops, but I believe this brave colonel felt it a manifest injustice that Arábi was not permitted to transport all the women of his harím to the prison. British cant alone prevented him from making a request which would bring a blush to the cheek of the many English ladies who were now assembling in great numbers at Cairo, only a few steps distant from Arábi's prison."

I need hardly say that no single word of this amusing story has any foundation in fact, nor do I think it necessary again to refer to M. Gabriel Charmes except to rebut an equally groundless aspersion which he has thought fit, with a want of gallantry hardly to be expected in so eminent and zealous a Frenchman, to cast on an English lady.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PROJECTS OF COMPROMISE.

THE week which followed my first professional interview with Mahmoud Sámi was fated to see both the beginning and the end of Arábi's trial. No outward indications of the approaching and unexpected solution were visible. Our habitual interchange of letters and protests with the Commissioners of Inquiry showed no signs of abatement; fresh obstacles were invented and practised with a view of hindering our access to the prisoners; and even Ismaïl Eyoub gravely assured us he could not in any way admit the binding force of the Borelli Conventions, although I had, at the very time he said so, an official letter in my pocket stating implicitly that he had been directed to give them the most complete recognition.

Arábi was awaiting his "good delivery" with confidence and much patience, passing his time happily enough in reading or writing. Abd-el-Ál and Toulba were both somewhat seriously ill, the former suffered from low fever contracted amongst the marshes of Damietta, and the latter from long-

standing chronic asthma. I sometimes thought Toulba would never live to leave Egypt. An English military surgeon* watched their ailments with unremitting attention, while the jail authorities sought some small revenge for our suspicions of Turkish doctors and Circassian guards by frequent and pressing requests to taste our clients' medicine before they took it, or by invitations to repair to the prison long after dark to attest the absence of any foul play in the *bond fide* application of a mustard plaster. Sheikh Abdú and Ahmed Rifát were both now eagerly looking forward to a public trial: the former had almost recovered his normal strength of mind, and helped us greatly by preparing an exhaustive memorandum of the Moslem law on which we intended, in a measure, to rely, as well as an analysis of his own *Official Journal*. He, too, was much reassured by a comforting vision. Tewfik, he dreamed, had succeeded in winding a long and heavy chain tightly around his body, but by a sudden effort he burst his bonds asunder and was free.

On our part we had used every exertion to prepare for the coming struggle in a manner suitable to

* Surgeon-Major Warren. Dr. Jackson, of Lord Wolseley's Staff, visited Arábi and Toulba several times at Abdin before they were surrendered to the Egyptian authorities.

the importance of the interests intrusted to our care. Given the application of any known system of law (which was impossible), and given also a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal (which was still more impossible), the issue raised between the Khedive Tewfik and Arábi presented, in a legal and technical point of view, almost unprecedented attractions. Nobody could reasonably find fault with the assertion of the Egyptian lawyer (who was my travelling companion, six weeks before, between Alexandria and Cairo), that the indictment preferred by the Khedivial Government against the "rebels" afforded all the opportunities (to use his own words) of "a beautiful case." The conspicuous absence of even the most elementary attempt to secure either the one or the other of the *desiderata* I have indicated, as a matter of course very materially affected the position in which we found ourselves.

In the brief extract of the intended charges given to us by Borelli Bey certain sections of the Ottoman Military and Penal Codes are glibly cited with apparent regularity, but it was an open secret that these laws were inapplicable to the case in hand. The old Egyptian Military Code of the time of Mehemet Ali (now a dead letter) contained no adequate provisions for a similar contingency, and the Imperial Ottoman Military Code could only be brought into

operation after the going through of certain formalities, not one of which, in the present instance, had been complied with. The required authority of the Sultan was absent; the fiat of the Grand Sereskérat (Ottoman War Office) had never been even demanded; the rank of the various component members of the Court was insufficient for its legal constitution, and even some of them (including the President) had actually been examined as witnesses against the accused before Ismaïl Pacha Eyoub acting as "committing magistrate."

But this was not all—the very basis of the Court Martial was wanting. On the 17th September Mehemet Tewfik had solemnly decreed the total disbandment of the Egyptian Army — *l'armée Egyptienne est dissoute*. Ten days later, by a second edict, he constitutes the Court Martial before which our clients were to appear. The Ottoman Code declares clearly enough that "active service" is a requisite qualification for every person serving on a Court formed in accordance with its requirements. A court-martial and a disbanded army involve wholly irreconcilable ideas. It is not to be wondered at that Ministers at home were somewhat puzzled on the subject, and this bewilderment must have reached a climax when Sir Edward Malet (November 14th) telegraphed:—

Tigrane Pacha tells me that the Court Martial for the trial of Arábi and the other prisoners *is not instituted under any legal code*, but simply by Khedivial decree and in virtue of his Highness's prerogative, there being no provision in the codes for the summoning of courts-martial, but only for calling councils of war for the trial of military offenders.

We had, therefore, ample means of commencing our defence by an elaborate plea against the jurisdiction of the Court.

But there were other elements at hand to sustain a defence on this same basis. Had England, having once received Arábi's surrender as a prisoner of war, a right to give him up to any other authority than her own, to be tried by that authority for acts committed in the field against her? Could an Egyptian court-martial, for example (even if legally constituted), convict Arábi or any one else of using the white flag exclusively to the detriment and prejudice of the English forces? England would not surely plead she was acting *with* the Khedive at the very time when the Alexandria forts, in obedience to his orders, were answering as best they could the fire of our ships?

We were perhaps, if possible, even in a stronger position as regards the merits of the four specific charges upon which Borelli Bey originally intended to rely. The first on the list was "the illegal use

of the white flag in contravention of the *Law of Nations*." Borelli Bey was far too good a lawyer not to have understood the humour—the broad, undisguised, self-evident humour—of such an accusation.

"It is a bad joke (*une mauvaise plaisanterie*)," he said frankly, "which has been invented to please you English." He confessed that he was wholly unable to understand by what legal sanction the more than doubtfully constituted court-martial was to judge matters cognizable only by the comity of nations and the *jus gentium*. But this was not all. "Had not," we could have asked, "the hoisting of the white flag at Alexandria (equally with the reply of the Egyptian guns to the attack of our fleet) received the direct sanction of the Khedive, who by force of circumstances now denounced the act as an accuser? This historical incident of the white flag had doubtless greatly irritated Lord Alcester, who imagined he had been deceived by it, but his very natural annoyance was manifestly insufficient to place the act he complained of in the category of crimes. Succeeding generations of jurists have consistently found a valid justification for "deceit in warfare," and declared that the exhibition of a flag of truce is no just impediment to the doing of such acts as may be lawfully done during the continuance of hostilities, *e.g.*, the withdrawal of troops

or the bringing up of reinforcements. By a parity of reasoning the presence of such a flag entails no obligation for the cessation of an attack on the part of the belligerents in whose sight it is hoisted. I forbear from quoting any of the many great authorities on this well-established point, except the latest and, perhaps, the most reliable. Sir Garnet Wolseley, on the eve of setting out for Egypt, and exactly three weeks to a day after the bombardment of Alexandria, published a fourth edition of his *Soldier's Pocket Book*.* He describes minutely the typical behaviour of the bearer of a flag of truce with "a mission to gain time," and dwells almost picturesquely on the deliberate adjustment of trappings, the judicious "dawdling over duty," and the "dismounting to look for imaginary stones in his horse's feet," he must practice to achieve success. "The G. O. C.," he says, "should not for a moment allow any absurd and false ideas of humanity, or sentimental notions about chivalry, to influence his decision. Never for one moment suspend any movement or operation you may be engaged in because the enemy has sent you a flag of truce; *his object may be to gain time* for the arrival of reinforcements or for the execution of some flank or turning movement." A very few days

* *The Soldier's Pocket Book for Field Service*. London, Macmillan and Co. (1882), pp. 285-6.

after the publication of the *Soldier's Pocket Book* Sir Garnet Wolseley in person gave the "gentlemen of the press" at Alexandria a striking example of the utility of "deceit in war." Surely what Grotius and Vattel taught and Lord Wolseley of Cairo approved was no crime merely because it was practised by the Egyptians?

So much for the incident of the white flag. With it, however, was ingeniously blended the burning of Alexandria. This accusation might be viewed in two distinct lights, either as an act of necessary strategy or the result of wanton incendiarism wholly independent of any military consideration. On the first point much might be said in its defence. Devastation in war is no less allowable than deceit. The destruction of towns and the laying waste of fields before an invading and close-approaching enemy have alike received the high sanction of historical precedents, thickly scattered over nearly every page of the chronicles of modern warfare. Arábi was not bound to say anything at all, but from the very first he solemnly denied the accusation altogether. The burden of proof was on his adversaries, and they wholly failed to substantiate their charge. Arábi could have produced strong evidence in his exculpation; it might have been unnecessary to do so, but it would certainly have laid suspicion to rest for ever. On the

question of the massacres of the 11th June not one tittle of proof was ever forthcoming. To discuss it further is only to waste time, for it was formally and explicitly abandoned.

Only one count of this curiously drawn indictment really remained; the variously described charge of "rebellion," now set out as "causing the Egyptians to arm against the Khedive," now as "continuing the war after the news of peace," and now as "exciting to civil war and carrying devastation over Egyptian territory." Our line of defence on this head was clear and unambiguous: the Sultan was Arábi's *suzerain* (or, as Mr. Gladstone said, his *sovereign*), the Khedive was his immediate superior, and the representative of his suzerain or sovereign. The war was deliberately begun with the joint concurrence of the Khedive, his responsible ministers, and the Sultan's envoy Dervesh Pacha. Three days later the Khedive, then in our custody or under our protection, countermanded the war. His very position rendered all his acts and orders *ipso facto* null and void.* He was now a "chief of the state in captivity." There was, however, an additional reason for not treating his commands either as binding or effective. The joint concurrence which authorised the commencement of

* Calvo, *Le Droit International*, vol. iv. p. 354. Paris, 1881.

hostilities was wanting to legalize "the news of peace." Even if the Khedive was still a free agent, his decrees required the confirmation of ministerial sanction, but his Ministers still persisted in their original decision, and proclaimed the continuance of the war by telegraph throughout the length and breadth of Egypt. Arábi's next acts were perfectly constitutional. He fell back on the will of the whole nation, as expressed by the great national councils held at Cairo. His sovereign, the Sultan, made no sign of dissent, and when the Khedive (in an Egyptian point of view still a prisoner) dismissed Arábi and proclaimed him a rebel, it was solely on the ground of his ineffectual resistance to the invaders of the country. The Sultan's tardy anathema only reached Egypt in the very last few days of the struggle, and there is reason to doubt whether it was ever promulgated officially at all.* In addition to these facts we have the general injunctions sent to Arábi by the order of the Sultan, in which he was enjoined to save Egypt from the fate of Tunis, and protect her to his utmost from every infringement of the sacred rights of the Caliph. Legally Arábi was no "rebel," morally his only title to the name was his want of success. Englishmen very naturally called

* See *ante*, Chapter X. page 97.

him so, just as the French, a twelvemonth before, were accustomed to describe the Tunisians as "insurgents."

If the case had been tried out to the end we should certainly have endeavoured (hoping against hope) to base a broader defence of Arábi's conduct on the general law of Islam, binding alike both on him and his Moslem judges. I sometimes doubt if even their bran-new loyalty could have been proof against such an appeal as this. The plenary justification which could be found for Arábi amongst the tenets of the international law of Europe was capable of much more effective treatment and a far greater variety of illustration by the light of those old-world codes, the sanctity of which was a primary article of faith both with Arábi and his accusers. Arábi had from the first acted in strict accord with the duties of a good Moslem, while those now arrayed against him had violated every precept of the Prophet's creed.

One of the characteristic features of European law is the predominance of the military over the civil power in time of war; as soon as martial law is proclaimed, the former, after the old Roman idea of imperium, absorbs the latter. The Muhamedan conception of the state of war is entirely different, and it places Arábi's conduct during the campaign on the pedestal of strict Moslem constitutionalism. In accordance with

the Islamic idea, the civil and military authorities are never thought to be irreconcilable with each other: both can subsist, and both can work, each of them in its proper sphere, for the common weal and safety of the land: the appointment to the command of the army does carry along with it any supreme and uncontrollable authority over the other departments of the State, and only invests its bearer with the fullest action with regard to military operations. This notion, peculiar as it is, seems to have been literally followed by the Provisional Government constituted at Cairo. Arábi was only invested with the command of the forces; but he was by no means a dictator, in the legal and political acceptance of the word: beside him, and above him, there was an Assembly of Notables, from whom he derived his power, to whom he was to account for his actions, and who had reserved to themselves the control and management of the civil business of the Egyptian State.

The great strength of our defence, in a purely legal aspect, was equalled by the variety of circumstances we should have been able to urge in extenuation. We could have shown conclusively that Arábi's brief struggle for Egyptian independence was perhaps the most humanitarian war known to the history of modern times; that it compared favourably with the

warlike operations of more refined and civilised races, and that it justly gave the fallen leader of the Egyptian Nationalists a valid claim to the sympathy of his successful adversaries. I have already referred to the conduct of Arábi; Ali Fehmy, too, had done his utmost to protect Mr. De Chair during his imprisonment at Cairo. He was accustomed to visit him daily, sent him meals prepared by his wife from his town house, and even provided him clothes suitable to the heat of an Egyptian summer.

Monsieur Ferdinand de Lesseps was good enough to send me for my use, if necessary, a file of all the telegrams he had received from Arábi while at Ismaïlia, together with the copy of a letter he had addressed to Mr. Blunt. This is what M. Lesseps says of Arábi:—

When we were together in Egypt at the commencement of the year, Arábi was Minister of War, and I called on him once at his office. During my visit he was surrounded by the principal inhabitants of Cairo; the vast courtyard of the Kasr-el-Nil Palace was thronged with peasants (*fellahs*), and even the anti-chambers were almost inconveniently crowded. He seemed to hold the highest place in public estimation, and that very evening I saw him at the theatre occupying a place in the royal box at the side of the Khedive.

In the course of the conversation I had with him he used the following words:—"I know, M. Lesseps, you have always loved *liberty* and *progress*, and they are the only two things I desire for my country." I also met him at the banquet given

at the New Hotel in honour of the fête of American Independence, when he returned thanks for the Khedive.

I returned subsequently to France, and only arrived in Egypt again after the bombardment of Alexandria. From that time up to the occupation of Ismaïlia by the English troops, I never saw Arábi, our relations being entirely confined to correspondence. I have transmitted a copy of this correspondence in Arabic to the President of the tribunal which is to try him at Cairo. Its sole aim was the preservation of the neutrality of the maritime canal (to which object Arábi always remained faithful), and the protection of the life and property of Europeans in Egypt.

I send you a French translation of these documents, which do honour to the man whose defence you have so generously undertaken. It seems incredible to me that the Commander-in-Chief of an army can incur the punishment of death after surrendering his sword to a victorious English general.

(Signed) FERDINAND DE LESSEPS.

Arábi's letters and telegrams fully bear out M. de Lesseps' expressions of commendation. It is only at the last moment when the English troops were actually landing at Ismaïlia that he spoke of the necessity of blocking the canal. Till then he relied on M. Lesseps' repeated assurance that its neutrality would not be invaded. The main feature of the correspondence is a continued anxiety for the safety of the European residents. I select one telegram at random:—

To His Excellency my honoured friend M. Lesseps at Ismaïlia.

I have received your message in French, and in conformity to your suggestion we have given orders to the head of the Cairo police to look after the safety of the Europeans who are

in the Abassiyah hospital at Cairo, and to allow them full liberty to go away or remain there. I have also written to the Governor of the province of Sharkiya to redouble his exertions for the safety of the Europeans at Er Rakadiyeh, and assure their complete immunity from molestation.

ARÁBI.

Of the *universality* of the National Movement I have spoken at length elsewhere.

Such, in a few words, was the defence we intended to present on behalf of Arábi. I was at the same time painfully conscious that our labours, as far as the Cairo tribunal was concerned, were almost certain to be fruitless. The Court of Inquiry and the Court Martial were merely the expression of the triumphant minority; its chosen means for giving a quasi-legal and respectable form to the hitherto inevitable consequence of an eastern faction-battle, the disappearance of the weaker, the survival of the stronger. Reluctantly in some cases, willingly enough in others, the various members of these courts became the docile instruments of the Egyptian triumvirate of the Restoration, Tewfik, Cherif, and Riáz, all of whom had over and over again pronounced in favour of condign and exemplary punishment. It was all so natural to a student of oriental politics: Arábi had hopelessly overthrown the two Ministers, and, but for our saving arm, Tewfik's fall would have been in all human probability still more complete than their's. Arábi, the

common adversary of all three, was now lying low in the dust, and who had a right to step in between the avengers and their vengeance ?

Statesmen in the East are accustomed to the most startling turns in the wheel of fortune; beggars become premiers, and premiers become beggars; men leave their prisons to fill high offices and enjoy royal favours; presidents of assemblies and ex-grand viziers are tenanting dungeons in every part of the empire, and nobody knows what may happen to-morrow. Only one fixed principle pervades the whole, and that provides for the weakest always going to the wall. The bare notion of inquiry, fair trial, and good justice in the case of Arábi was more surprising to the victors than the very falls they had previously suffered themselves. They looked on the "disappearance" of the vanquished as a part and parcel of the victory, and never for an instant imagined that the free expression of this idea might possibly interfere with its realization. Ismaïl Eyoub and Reouf, I feel sure, secretly detested the whole proceedings over which they were called to preside, but they had made up their minds to go through the business as a part of their destiny, and thanked Providence or kismet that they had prudently sailed sufficiently close to the wind to avoid the possibility of being in Arábi's shoes themselves. They were

both very much relieved when their functions were at last limited to a formality, and Reouf almost embraced me when we met by accident four months later at the Cairo Railway Station.

Before such a tribunal as this our chances of success were reduced to a very forlorn hope indeed. It was under these circumstances that I honestly did my best to practically transfer the venue of the case from Cairo to the bar of the all-powerful court of public opinion in Europe and in England, for I knew full well it was the only means of obtaining the fair trial we asked for. At a very early stage of our labours we became convinced that the tainted atmosphere of Egyptian justice, coupled with the prevailing "reaction of despair," would inevitably be fatal to Arábi and his friends unless some strong antidote could be discovered. When we knew how righteous their cause was our anxiety for their safety was for a moment increased, but the strong antidote soon came to our assistance in the shape of a marked change in intelligent public opinion at home.

About the 27th November all parties interested in the business became in a greater or less degree disposed to accept a reasonable compromise. The English Government were keenly alive to the inconvenience of the block in Egyptian affairs entailed by the presence of the great mysterious trial still looming

in the distance. Both the Government and public opinion were by this time convinced that no sentence of death could under any circumstances be carried out, and that the only real difficulty remaining was the disposal of the prisoners. The position of the English Government was a difficult one; several millions of pounds had been spent in crushing out a movement which was at different times described as "a military rising" and "a great rebellion," and the task of solving the conundrum of when is a war not a war had turned out to be both vexatious and costly. After what had passed it was hardly to be expected that Mr. Gladstone would sanction any course which would result in a declaration that Arábi was not a rebel after all, and that England had therefore been innocently levying war against the Sultan, the Khedive, and Arábi at the same time. The Government were pledged to the existence of a real rebellion, and if that was formally admitted they cared for little else, but any thing like an execution was entirely out of the question. I was convinced Lord Granville would not hear of death, or even banishment to the Soudan (since Sir Edward Malet stigmatised it as necessarily fatal), but I was equally sure he would not interfere with any other sentence passed—as, for instance, a lengthy term of imprisonment in an Egyptian jail, which, in fact, would be hardly preferable to capital punishment

or the White Nile. I doubted if public opinion then (for the reaction in Arábi's favour was still quite fresh) would press the Government for more than this. The Foreign Office was, I feel sure, alive to the many advantages of avoiding a trial, provided always that the recognition of the rebellion could be obtained without it.

Turkey was more disposed than any other interested party to let bygones be bygones, and to get rid of the nightmare of Arábi's trial at any cost. I have strong reason to believe she even induced Germany to intervene in Downing Street with a view to avoid the much-dreaded "washing of dirty political linen" at Cairo.

The Egyptian Government had at this epoch also come to be of the same opinion. After the almost simultaneous failure of Sámi's endeavour to compromise Arábi, and the attempt of the Commission to violate the rules of procedure, Cherif had been plainly told that no capital punishment would be tolerated for an instant. Sir Charles Wilson had faithfully reported to Lord Dufferin the wholly inconclusive nature of the evidence relied on by the prosecution to do more than establish against the accused a charge of "successful rebellion against the Khedive." The great anxiety of the Egyptian Cabinet was now to get the "rebels" out of the country "*en bloc*" (as the

Khedive himself expressed it), with the greatest possible celerity. Riáz never recovered Lord Dufferin's self-denying ordinance in the matter of blood-shedding ; he visibly drooped from the moment he realised it, and, as we shall presently see, retired ten days later into private life.

On behalf of the accused we were equally disposed to concur in any reasonable project of compromise. I was convinced that the fate of the prisoners depended wholly on England, that England would not interfere at all except in the manner I have just indicated, and that a prolonged trial would entail enormous expense, inevitably degenerate into a tiresome wrangle, and probably end after all in a less satisfactory manner for our clients than the solution we might reasonably expect from a well-considered arrangement "out of court."

Monday, the 27th November, consequently found all the interested parties in such a frame of mind and state of opinion as to justify strong hopes of a speedy solution by compromise. How the British, Egyptian, and Turkish Governments, and the counsel for the prisoners, all happened to be of this one way of thinking, I have tried to point out.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE EVE OF THE TRIAL.

WHEN all the parties to a given dispute have come to believe in a compromise as the most desirable solution of the difficulties it presents, the details of the arrangement by which it is to be formally effected are really a matter of secondary importance. In the present instance a somewhat peculiar combination was certainly necessary. First of all the real penalty to be inflicted on the "rebels" was not to exceed simple exile; in the second place the English theory of the "rebellion" must in some manner be supported and asserted; and thirdly it was considered desirable to avoid unnecessarily wounding Egyptian *amour propre* and doing more damage than possible to what was euphoniously still called the "Khedivial prestige." We were of course mainly interested in the first article of the compromise, the principle of which we were now prepared to accept from a strong conviction that our clients would inevitably fare worse if we rejected it, as the English Government was evidently not prepared to help them, except in the manner and to the extent I have already mentioned.

Lord Dufferin had been just three weeks in Egypt,

and his influence was now very generally felt. The Egyptian Government at last saw clearly enough that neither wholesale vengeance nor petty tyranny would be any longer permitted, and that they must resign themselves to a novel policy, founded on European ideas of justice and clemency. Bitter and cruel was the disappointment of the Egyptian triumvirate, but Cherif soon made up his mind to accept the inevitable with the best possible grace. Tewfik found for a time some consolation in a feeble dallying with French journalists, while Riáz resolved to retire awhile from the scene and plot in silence. Lord Dufferin's only alternative was to choose between the almost honest worship of the rising sun which Cherif was prepared to offer, and the too obviously insincere platitudes and false *bonhomie* of Nubar, now in search of a portfolio. He wisely elected to cleave to the former. Courteous, accessible, and soft of language, Lord Dufferin managed to adroitly keep out of sight an unbending will, and a strong determination to have his own way. His manner of treating the Egyptian Ministry resembled the pressure of an iron hand covered with a velvet glove. The phrase, I know, is a somewhat hackneyed one, but no other expression I can think of represents so exactly the idea which I wish to convey. The Egyptians felt acutely the touch of the iron hand, but the velvet glove deprived them of all

power of complaint. Lord Dufferin with admirable patience listened to my story of our battle with the Commission of Inquiry, and allowed me to draw up for his perusal short notes on the various aspects of the Arábi case, and the defence we proposed to offer. He laid great stress on the inability of public opinion to influence in any way the action of the British Foreign Office, and he made me realize very clearly, by inference, the point up to which we might hope for support. I remember one day his showing me casually a despatch from Lord Granville, in which an opinion was expressed that "the length of the defence" should not be left to us. I also felt, almost unconsciously, the iron hand in the velvet glove.

One of the peculiar gifts of Lord Dufferin's mind is a wonderful power of combination and conciliation. How the question of compromise came finally to the surface I am unable to say. I think it originated from a passing allusion to the proposals of Borelli, in the old *cher ami et cher confrère* days. Up to the time of which I am writing not one word on the subject had been said to Arábi, who was quietly and confidently awaiting his trial. To Lord Dufferin and Lord Dufferin alone must belong the credit of inventing the nominal-plea-of-guilty part of the arrangement, which gave all I could ask (under the circumstances in which I was then placed) for Arábi, and saved, at

any rate as far as the appearances were concerned, both the policy of England and the prestige of her protégé. The talents of Lord Dufferin, so conspicuously displayed in the small matter of the Arábi compromise, might have exercised a great and appreciable influence on the weightier matter of Egypt's future. Time only was necessary to allow the same power of combination and conciliation full play. But it was not to be. The ink of his famous Reorganization Scheme was hardly dry when the "masterful hand," which might have given it life, was abruptly withdrawn. Its author probably knew that this was to happen when he penned it, and perhaps this in a measure accounts for certain features in it which sometimes irresistibly remind the reader of a political testament or a political satire.

The proposed compromise required long and careful discussion, but when its conditions were finally agreed upon, it presented an appearance of great simplicity. Conflicting interests having been reconciled as much as possible by the "masterful hand," the Khedivial Government appeared on the scene only to carry out mechanically what had been already arranged for them. Truth forbids my according even the faintest measure of praise to the conduct of the Egyptian authorities; they followed with the worst possible grace the guiding of

Lord Dufferin, and lost no opportunity of causing the prisoners to feel as acutely as possible the bitterness of their departure. Instead of making the best of the situation, and so securing whatever good name and fame might be obtainable from a seemingly generous action, they spared no pains to induce everybody to believe that their hand had been forced. French journalists were almost openly encouraged to describe England as unjustly coercing the Khedive into sparing the lives of his rebellious subjects, with whom from the first she had been in secret league, with the sinister object of occupying the country to the particular prejudice of the "natural preponderance of France." It was perfectly clear that these articles emanated from the Palace and from no other source; but I am unable to say whether Tewfik Pacha or Riáz can claim the credit of so original a policy. No sooner was the existence of a compromise suspected than Borelli Bey was permitted to inspire a telegram declaring that "he retired from the case rather than participate in a legal farce," and the loyal Egyptian press obsequiously followed a *mot d'ordre* which was so congenial to the feelings of the French in Egypt. Nothing, I think, can better illustrate the hopeless instability and falseness of the cause we went to Egypt to support than this bootless palace intrigue which was originated, organised, and carried on almost

in Lord Dufferin's presence, and which has since culminated in the romantic chronicles of M. Gabriel Charmes.

The details of the compromise were as follows:—All other charges against Arábi, Mahmoud Sámi, Toulba, Ali Fehmy, Abd-el-Ál, Yácoub Sámi, and Mahmoud Fehmy Pachas, save and except that of simple rebellion, were to be withdrawn. They were to be arraigned before the Court Martial on a charge of simple *rebellion*, to which they would plead guilty. A sentence of death was to be recorded on this plea, but an Edict commuting the punishment to exile from Egypt was to be immediately read. The prisoners were to lose their rank and property * by subsequent decrees, but none of the possessions of their wives were to be forfeited. The prisoners would give their *parole* to proceed to any British possession indicated, and remain there till permitted to depart.

In consequence of the forfeiture of their property, the Egyptian Government undertook to provide a suitable allowance for the support of the seven

* When we consented to this clause we believed that such forfeiture was in accordance with Moslem law. It now appears that it is in direct violation of the *Hatti Shereef*, or Organic Law of the Ottoman Empire, and contrary to every known precedent in Egypt. It is doubtful whether, under these circumstances, it can have any legal effect, but, as a matter of fact, our clients (with one exception) had hardly any property at all.

prisoners and their families in exile. The Egyptian Government was to convey, at its own expense, the exiles to the country appointed for their residence.

Abdul Gaffár Bey, Colonel of Cavalry, was originally included in the list of prisoners to be dealt with in pursuance of the arrangement, but, at the last moment, to his great disappointment, he was told he might go where he liked, and that his term of banishment was only for eight years.

Before accepting the conditions of compromise two things were necessary, viz., to consult Mr. Blunt by telegraph, and to obtain the assent of our clients themselves. To preserve anything secret in an oriental country is almost an impossibility, but, for a wonder, nothing more than a strong suspicion of something unusual going on transpired at Cairo between the 27th November and 1st December, when the project, in the form I have explained it, received on all sides a definite acceptance.

On the 29th November Mr. Blunt, after due deliberation, accorded us complete discretion as to the course we should pursue. He felt with us that no better terms were at the time attainable, and he confidently left the complete vindication of Arábi to history, and the cooler judgment of the future. Up to this advanced stage of the negotiations we had

never even hinted the bare possibility of a compromise to Arábi. He was prepared for his trial, and seemed to contemplate the ordeal without trepidation. His principal anxiety was the fate of those whom he called "his brethren in chains."

Meanwhile the Commission went on with its routine work as if nothing at all unusual was in the wind. The over-crowding of the jails throughout Egypt had now become a public scandal, and it was absolutely necessary that something should be done. A sub-commission was told off for the purpose of going through the different cases, and releasing merely suspected prisoners (they formed as a matter of fact a large majority) on bail or recognizances. Major Macdonald was deputed to watch their proceedings on behalf of the British Government.

On the morning of the 28th November (while anxiously waiting Mr. Blunt's reply to our telegrams) I went to the jail, where I found both Commissions hard at work. Ismail Eyoub was occupied in putting the finishing touches to the *dossiers* of the first batch of prisoners. Each of the accused in turn was brought into the room and asked somewhat sarcastically if he wanted "the English lawyers." Omar Ráhmi, Arábi's Secretary, who had been induced to shamefully betray his old master, assumed an expression of great Moslem sanctity, and modestly declared his conviction that the perfect justice of his

case rendered all infidel assistance quite superfluous in the land of Islam. A thrill of subdued applause seemed to run round the green baize table. The next in turn was Mahmoud Fehmy, Arábi's Minister of Public Works—the Engineer of the Egyptian lines at Kafr-el-Dowar and Tel-el-Kebir. Mahmoud is a short, plain, very swarthy, thick-set man of forty, with a pair of merry, twinkling eyes. He had been captured while taking a view of our movements on the Canal, when he persistently declared, in spite of his very black face, and very broken French, that he was only a French *colon* looking after his cotton-fields. The same question was put still more tauntingly to Mahmoud Fehmy, who, being built of very different stuff than Omar Ráhmy, with a sly twinkle of his merry black eyes, quickly answered, "I will have no advocates but those of my brother Arábi." "But will you accept such a task?" said Ismail Eyoub in manifest alarm. "I must warn you before-hand that we shall call English officers to prove Mahmoud Fehmy to be *an habitual liar*, and it is certain, from the testimony of over a score of witnesses, he has dared to say that Effendina should pack up his portmanteau and locate himself at Shepherd's Hotel." A sympathetic chorus of suppressed indignation now ran round the green baize table. "Well," I answered, "with due deference to your Excellency, I don't mind risking even such a deplorable combi-



MAHMOUD FEEMY PASHA.



nation of atrocities as the habitual liar and the Khedive's portmanteau. I will gladly defend Mahmoud Fehmy." An unsympathetic chorus of something like pious horror ran once more round the green baize table. "But won't you take Suleimán Sámi as well?" said Ismail Eyoub. "He may have burned Alexandria, but at any rate has not spoken with open disrespect of His Highness the Khedive." "Certainly not," I answered, and I left the room in company with my client.

When we were alone in his cell Mahmoud Fehmy looked at me for a moment, and said deliberately, "Of course you know I surrendered quite voluntarily to the English." My own expression must have shown such undisguised incredulity that he fairly burst out laughing. "Please excuse me," he said, "but I really wanted to see what sort of Englishman you were." He then told me the whole story of his belief in Arábi, his becoming a member of the National Cabinet, the famous Councils at Alexandria, his earthworks at Kafr-el-Dowár and Tel-el-Kebir, his visit in disguise to the English lines, and his unfortunate capture. "Ah!" he said, with a sigh, "poor Arábi could not do without me. If I had completed the works at Tel-el-Kebir your countrymen would not have taken them so easily." He related an anecdote of the first night he spent as

an English prisoner of war. "They put me," he said, "under an officer's guard, and a lieutenant who was in command of it told me sternly that if I moved I should be shot. 'Sir,' I answered, in French, 'I am a general and know my duty. You have only to do your's.'" Mahmoud Fehmy was one of the ablest of Arábi's colleagues. He never once flinched in his profession of political faith, and he went with all his large family of sons and daughters into exile without a complaint. He laughed both at the loss of rank and property. Although he had been an Egyptian Minister of Public Works his hands were clean, and all his worldly goods were not even worth the selling. His new income as a salaried exile was, in reality, a great increase of fortune. The real loser was the cause he loved, and the chances of Egyptian self-government. Clever, honest, cheerful, Mahmoud Fehmy is the very soul of the Egyptian colony at Colombo. He is bringing up his sons to do their duty as Egyptian citizens when the time comes. I promised Mahmoud Fehmy to do what I could for him, and strongly advised his acting in complete accord with Arábi.

Next morning (29th November) I went to the prison accompanied by Mr. Santillana, and at once straight to Arábi's cell. In as few words as possible I explained to him the turn affairs had taken, and

stated minutely the conditions of the proposed compromise. He seemed a little startled at first, and certainly showed no over-eagerness to concur in any kind of arrangement. He frankly confessed that he would prefer a trial, he wanted to tell all Europe his story, and see his accusers face to face in open court. "Might not," he asked, "the light that would be thus thrown on Egyptian affairs bring about the reforms which his arms had failed to effect?" I then explained my fears as to the probable non-intervention of England if an Egyptian tribunal condemned him to some long term of captivity. "That is true," he said; "I fully recognise that my fate solely depends on England." His next thought was for his fellow-prisoners. "If I accept these conditions you speak of," he asked, "what will become of my brothers?" I told him that I had no doubt they would share in the leniency which would be shown towards him. Again he hesitated. "How can I say I am a rebel?" he again asked me. "Did I not act by the orders of the Sultan and the Khedive? When the Khedive went over to the English, can I be called a rebel for obeying the will of the Egyptian people?" A logical answer to this question could hardly be forthcoming. I merely observed that he had himself admitted that his fate depended solely on England, and as England had just spent some millions of money in putting down

what she was pleased to call his rebellion, it was improbable her Ministers would support any solution which would involve a complete stultifying of their own acts. I added that for my part I was convinced his complete justification was only a question of patience, time, and impartial inquiry. "But," he rejoined, "has England ever treated a fallen foe in such a manner before?" Mr. Gladstone now came to the rescue, and I told him the story of Napoleon just as it had been related in the House of Commons some three weeks before.* Arábi seemed much struck

* Lord Randolph Churchill asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether there was any precedent for the employment of British troops, as had been the case in Egypt, for the repression of a military rebellion against the Sovereign or Government of a foreign State; and whether such precedents established that British troops, having captured the leaders of the insurgents and other similar political offenders, had been instructed by the British Government to hand them over to be dealt with by the Sovereign or Government maintained or reinstated by British arms; and, if so, whether he could state the precedents.

Mr. Gladstone.—In answer to the noble lord I would begin by observing that I do not think the assistance afforded by precedent would carry us beyond a certain point. I am not aware of any precedent in history for an arrangement similar to that which existed in Egypt which led to the course of proceedings which has terminated in the operations. The position which we held in Egypt was one which I do not think exactly corresponds with any positions we have held in any other country within my knowledge. There are two cases which throw a certain amount of light on the subject, and those cases I will mention to the noble lord. One of these is the case of the termination of the great French war at Waterloo. At that time King Louis

by the comparison (he had once carefully studied the life of the great Corsican), but he expressed a doubt, with much humility, as to whether he was not too insignificant a man to be treated like Napoleon. I reminded him that the maker of the comparison was really the arbiter of his destinies.

Again he returned to the question of his companions. How would they fare on the basis of Mr. Gladstone's historical parallel? I could hardly resist saying, "There will only be seven Napoleons in the

XVIII., having been before the Hundred Days established in France, was regarded in the view of the Government of this country as the legitimate Sovereign of the country, and the military movement under Napoleon, and the whole operation of Napoleon, as being in legal strictness resistance to lawful authority. I am not entering into the question of its correctness, but there is a despatch written by Lord Bathurst as then being Secretary for War on the 2nd of July, 1815, to the Duke of Wellington. I will not read the whole passage, which is not relevant. I will read a part of it, which, I think, is material to the question of the noble lord. This despatch refers to a letter received from the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the arrangement that the military commander had made, and it contains this passage:—"It cannot be imagined that in a convention negotiated with these authorities"—namely, the French—"by your Grace you would enter into any engagements whereby it would be presumed that his most Christian Majesty was absolutely precluded from the just exercise of his authority in bringing to condign punishment such of his subjects as had by their treasonable machinations and unprovoked rebellion forfeited all claim to His Majesty's clemency and forbearance." That passage undoubtedly bears upon the question. The noble lord is well aware of the circumstances relating to Marshal Ney. They touch upon the province with which we are at this moment concerned,

present case instead of one, and this is far better than that any of you should complete the parallel by representing Marshal Ney." I again assured him that he need have no fear on this head. He thought a long while, walking up and down his cell, and then, turning towards me, said as follows:—"When you came here I entrusted my life and honour to your keeping. What I did then I confirm to-day. I am, consequently, ready to follow your advice. As for the honours, I do not care to lose them, for I never sought them; as for the property, I have nothing but what my father left me, and it is hardly enough to give us bread.* I cannot expect England to reverse her verdict concerning me at once; but I feel sure she will do so in the future. I will write you a letter empowering you to agree to any terms you think just and honourable; but I call you to witness, I do this more with the hope of saving my brethren from suffering, and not merely for my own advantage." Never did I see Arábi to greater advantage than in this all-important interview.

Without a moment's hesitation, he sat down and wrote the following letter:—

To the Honourable, &c., Messrs. Broadley and Napier, the
Counsel for my defence.

Having surrendered to the honour and loyalty of the

* It turned out to be under 200*l.* per annum.

British people, having full confidence in your honesty and integrity, and in the high honour and loyalty of His Excellency the Earl of Dufferin, I do hereby give full powers to you as to the question of my treatment (always remembering the cases of my political brethren and the other citizens now in prison), and trusting it will be such as behoves the honour of England, we being altogether innocent of the savage facts imputed to us.

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI, the Egyptian.

The proof of trust Arábi had now given me was no common one. On my simple assurance that all would be right he consented to plead guilty to a charge the only penalty for which was death. As to the commutation which was to follow, he had only my bare word to rely on. Mr. Blunt's telegram and Arábi's letter removed all further reason for hesitation, and we accepted in our client's name the proposed scheme of compromise.

Borelli Bey having now retired from the case, I was directed to come to an agreement with Tigrane Pacha* (one of the Egyptian Under-Secretaries) as to the procedure by which the agreement between all the parties could be conveniently carried out. Tigrane did his best to conceal the mortification he felt at such a task, and our work was soon completed.

* Tigrane is an Armenian, and a nephew and disciple of Nubar Pacha. He has managed to please all parties up to the present time (even including Riáz), and is an able man of his uncle's political school. He will probably before long be Prime Minister of Egypt.

The first thing to be done was to find some provisions of the Ottoman Code applicable to the case of simple rebellion. This was not difficult. Articles 96 of the Imperial Ottoman Military Code and 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code sufficiently suited our purpose. They provide as follows:—

Article 96.—All persons who to the number of eight or more revolt, using their arms and refuse to disperse, or do not cease the revolt on receiving the orders of a superior authority, may be punished with death.

Article 59.—Whoever without an order from the Government, or without a legal motive, shall assume the command of a division, a fortified place, or city, &c., and any commander who without a legitimate motive shall persist in keeping his troops under arms after their disbandment has been ordered by the Government, may be punished with death.

The Commission of Inquiry was to write:—

To Messrs. Broadley and Napier, Counsel for Arábi Pacha.
Gentlemen,—

The Commission of Inquiry is of opinion that grounds exist for sending Arábi Pacha for trial before the Court Martial on a charge of rebellion as provided for by Article 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code.

If you have no objection to offer, the Commission will send the accused for trial forthwith before the Court Martial.

(Signed)

ISMAÏL EYOUB.

We were to promptly answer that we had no such objection, whereupon Ismaïl Eyoub (late member of the National Council and Arábi's guest at Kafr-el-

Dowar) was to write to Reouf Pacha (also late member of the National Council) as follows : —

To His Excellency Reouf Pacha, President of the Court Martial.

Excellency,—We have the honour to report that, having heard and examined the evidence against Ahmed Arabi Pacha, we deem such evidence sufficient for his trial before you for the crime of rebellion, as contemplated by Article 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code, and we, therefore, send the said Ahmed Arábi for trial before you on such charges. We submit to you at the same time the evidence in the case.

Nothing else then remained “to settle” but the charge, the sentence, and the decree of commutation. The above formalities were accomplished during the next day (December 2nd), and the form of the last three documents satisfactorily agreed upon. Tigrane left us with a parting injunction against “embracing or any undue demonstration of joy” on the morrow. He, too, felt the unseen influence of the iron hand in the velvet glove. During the afternoon Mr. Napier was admitted for the first time to see several other prisoners who had retained us, including Emín Bey Shemsi, who had been brought up from Zagazig.

After a pleasant drive in the Shoobra Avenue with Mr. Pomeroy, the American Consul-General,* who

* General Wallace, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, also visited Cairo at this time. He formed, after due investigation, a very favourable opinion of the Egyptian Nationalists, in which most of his liberal-minded fellow-countrymen seem to share.

showed us much kindness during our stay in Cairo, I took an opportunity of calling on Nubar Pacha, whose acquaintance I had made in Paris. After a little judicial reform and finance we came to the question of the hour—Arábi. Nubar greatly deprecated the fuss that was being made about him, and suggested that Arábi should be released and relegated to obscurity after receiving personal chastisement in the presence of a representative assembly of Bedouin Sheikhs. The proposal has certainly the merit of originality, but Nubar did not say by what article of his new code it could legally be carried out.

CHAPTER XXV.

THREE SHORT STATE TRIALS.

LATE on the evening of Saturday, the 2nd of December, the various representatives of the European press still in Cairo were informed that the trial of Arábi Pacha would take place next day at eight o'clock precisely. The news had barely time to spread amongst the general public, and it is almost impossible to describe the feeling of surprise it occasioned as it gradually became known. It is true that the best informed of the English correspondents had foreshadowed the probability of some kind of compromise in their telegrams of the previous day, but the good people of Cairo seemed to be absolutely unaware of what was about to take place. The Khedivial Government had dealt somewhat unkindly with its powerful friend, the *Egyptian Gazette*, which for once missed its usual monopoly of exclusive news. It appeared on the morning in question with a second or third instalment of Suleimán Sámi's confession, but it gave no hint of the approaching *dénouement*.

The dawn of the eventful Sunday which was to see the beginning and the end of Arábi's trial broke with the clear and sunny beauty of all Egyptian mornings. It was hardly yet broad daylight when we reached the prison. The great courtyard had been swept and garnished during the night; the Turkish and Circassian sentries had donned their gala attire, and the English corporal's guard seemed fairly at a loss to understand the reason for the unusual stir. Mr. Napier and myself had brought with us in charge of one of our clerks the traditional blue bag containing the usual distinctive costume of our profession. As we got out of our carriage a tall Scotch sentry received us with a military salute, and anxiously enquired if it was true that their duty at the prison would soon come to an end, and whether there was any chance of their speedy return to England.

Osmán Shareef, the prison governor, received us with every demonstration of respectful sympathy, and conducted us triumphantly to the great Court-room, the doors of which were already thrown wide open as if indignantly inviting publicity. Every speck of dirt had been carefully removed from the well-carpeted dais and velvet-cushioned chairs of the judges, and our old friend Ismail Eyoub was busy in superintending the distribution of sheets of blotting paper, and the dusting of the baize-covered desks

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which were intended for the use of the counsel on either side, the press, and the prisoners. Ismail was now resplendent in a grand uniform, the very cloth of which seemed hidden by gold embroidery, and his breast was literally ablaze with a galaxy of decorations and crosses, but he even condescended to assist personally in the necessary arrangements, and the echoes of the clanking of his long Turkish sword filled the empty hall. He was actively assisted in his present duties by no less a personage than the little Turkish officer Rágheb Bey, who (it was whispered) had fought at Tel-el-Kebir, and had a week before arranged with me the transfer of the fortune of the precocious Muhamed Husni from Abd-el-Ál to Hussein Assim Pacha. Ismaïl Eyoub received us with great show of cordiality, and assured us in a whisper that all the necessary papers had been duly prepared the night before. Rágheb Bey (also clad in a smart uniform, with a fair sprinkling of orders) told us with the greatest glee that he had been appointed to act as Master of Ceremonies on the occasion. Two or three servants were actively engaged in providing accommodation for the expected audience by filling up the "well" of the Court with comfortable cane-seated chairs. A little later the correspondent of the *Graphic*, the *Illustrated London News*, the *Monde Illustré*, and the *Illustration* dropped in one after the other,

and began to draw as rapidly as possibly the details of the Egyptian Hall of Justice. Poor Ismaïl Eyoub said with a sigh that it was rather hard on him to have done all the work in vain, and now the Pachas of the Court Martial would sit for five minutes, and, being sketched, would become immortal.

We next ascended to Arábi's cell. He was already dressed in his military trousers and a light drab overcoat, with a white silk scarf twisted round his neck. The costume was certainly not effective, and he looked worn and anxious. Our arrival seemed to cheer him, and he was much interested in our forensic robes, which puzzled him almost as much as *Punch* predicted some weeks before they were likely to do. He signed and sealed readily enough the two short declarations Mr. Santillana had prepared. The first ran as follows :—

Of my own free will, and by the advice of my Counsel, I plead guilty to the charges now read over to me.

The other contained the following words :—

To His Excellency Lord Dufferin.

I engage and give my word as a military man that I will stay in the place *the English* Government has appointed for me on my departure from Egypt in accordance with the sentence passed upon me. *I also offer my thanks to your Excellency.*

AHMED ARÁBI, the Egyptian.

December 3rd, 1882.

By this time it was nearly seven o'clock, and I was informed the members of the Court Martial would like to see me in their room behind the Court, where they were now assembled. Ismail Eyoub Pacha introduced me to several of them, who were all, like himself, *en grand costume de fête*. Reouf Pacha, the President, was a tall, thin, dark-complexioned man of fifty, who looked quite as anxious and uncomfortable as the prisoner. He only wore the Star of a Grand Officer of the Medjidieh. There is nothing particular to record of his colleagues Ibrahim Pacha el Ferik, Ismail Kámil Pacha, Hussein Assim Pacha, (the guardian of the young poisoner Muhamed Husny), Kurchid Pacha, Suleimán Niazy Pacha, Osmán Latif Pacha, and Suleimán Nadjati Bey. Reouf is a Berberine Egyptian; the rest Turkish or Circassian memlouks. The ninth member, Ahmed Hassanín, is an Egyptian, and his merry face and corpulent figure is familiar to every European visitor, for he is Lord High Admiral of the Nile Fleet. All Europe seems to have vied in decorating and redecorating Ahmed Hassanín, and his broad chest bore at least a score of crosses, including that of an officer of the Legion of Honour. He very good-naturedly congratulated me on the result of the trial, and confessed it was a happy solution for all parties concerned. During the time I had been talking to the

Admiral, Ismail Eyoub had been busy writing. He now approached me, and, holding out a paper, said he hoped for the sake of appearances I would not object to the reading of a little indictment of his own composing. I answered firmly that he might exercise his own judgment, but that if any other paper was used except those he was already acquainted with, Arábi would plead *not guilty*. With perfect composure he sighed deeply, put his draft under the blotting paper, and it was never heard of afterwards. The judges then pulled out the seals attached to their respective watch-chains, and proceeded to attest the short formal charge which had been prepared. Sir Charles Wilson, also in uniform, now entered the room.

On rejoining Mr. Napier in Arábi's cell, my clerk brought me a letter from my friend M. Gabriel Charmes. He begged me to secure for him the most eligible seat for taking notes of the proceedings, and asked that I would "extend my favours to his friend Beshara Bey Takhla,* the editor of the *Watan*, in order that one Egyptian at least might have the

* A Syrian of great ability. He supported Arábi till the crisis came, remained quietly in Syria while it lasted, and then returned to champion the policy of the Khedive. He is the cleverest native journalist I ever met, and perfectly candid as to his literary "opportunism." A few days after the trial he published an article to prove Arábi's *complicity* with the English, to whom he is stated to have "sold" the victory of Tel-el-Kebir.

privilege of witnessing the impartiality, fairness, and regularity of justice as administered under English auspices." The audience had now already assembled, and I fear the suddenness of the whole proceeding caused me to forget many promises I had made as to places for would-be spectators. Lady Strangford next morning wrote to remind me that I had assured her "on my faith in Arábi that she should have the best place in the room, and as I had broken faith with her she could no longer believe on my faith in my client." Of course I could only follow Arábi's example and plead guilty. I arranged with Mr. Napier that he should remain with Arábi till the time came for the accused to appear in Court, while I went there at once to see what I could do for Monsieur Charmes. There was no need for any exercise of influence on the question of seats. The whole audience hardly exceeded forty persons. Sir A. Allison, Major Hutton (his secretary), some officers of the Staff, Blum Pacha of the Finance Department, Dr. W. H. Russell, Mr. Mackenzie Wallace, and Lord Charles Beresford occupied seats to the right of the dais. Immediately in front of the judges sat Mr. Bell of the *Times*, Mr. Chirol of the *Standard*, Mr. Macdonald of the *Daily News*, Mr. Goodall of the *Daily Telegraph*, Mr. Bernard of the *New York Herald*, M. Charmes of the *Journal des Débats*, and about fifteen other corre-

spondents, including one lady gallantly doing duty for a Swiss journal. Those who were not in the secret made imposing arrangements of note-books, pencils, &c., and expectation was fairly on tip-toe. All this time the six correspondents of the illustrated papers sketched with feverish rapidity. Precisely at eight o'clock the nine judges filed into the room, and took their places in nine armchairs of mahogany and red velvet at the back of the *daïs*. Sir Charles Wilson occupied a seat at the right of the place destined for the prisoner, and I sat behind a desk just in front of it. The tribune of the Public Prosecutor was empty.

A few minutes later I saw through the open door Arábi crossing the yard with Mr. Napier in his robes, Osmán Shareef and two Circassian guards. He passed round the back of the room, and, having traversed from end to end the long dock (which had been originally planned to contain at least twenty persons), sat down close to me. Mr. Napier at the same time took his place at my side. A dead silence prevailed for an instant. Arábi looked nervous at first, but he rapidly recovered his composure. Reouf Pacha opened a small portfolio, and, holding a paper before him, read as follows:—

Ahmed Arábi Pacha, you are charged before us on the report of the Commission of Inquiry with the offence of rebellion

against His Highness the Khedive, and of thereby committing offences against Article 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code. Are you guilty or not guilty ?”

As soon as Reouf Pacha began to speak, Arábi stood up. When he had finished, Arábi said “My counsel will answer for me,” whereupon I rose and read a French translation of the plea of guilty, tendering at the same time the signed and sealed original in Arabic, which was also read by a clerk seated at a small table before the President. Reouf Pacha looked inquiringly at Arábi, who bowed his head in token of assent. The President then declared the Court adjourned till three o’clock in the afternoon. Within five minutes Arábi was again in his cell, the few spectators quietly dispersed, and the nine gorgeously apparelled judges, some in broughams, some on mules, and some on humble donkeys, returned to their own dwellings in the labyrinth-like streets of Egyptian Cairo.

As many of the cells looked into the central yard, Arábi’s going and coming had been seen by several of the prisoners, and had very naturally occasioned much excitement and surmise. In the interval between the trial and the sentence I paid a visit to those of our clients who were to share, if they desired it, the advantages of the compromise, and without exception

they approved the step Arábi had taken. Poor Mahmoud Sámi winced at the prospective forfeiture of property, but he perhaps understood better than any of his companions the real peril of their situation.

Just before the second sitting of the Court Lord Dufferin's Secretary, Mr. Nicolson (for whose courtesy towards us during our stay in Cairo it is impossible to be sufficiently grateful), arrived with a verbal request that an alteration should be made in the written parole. In order to save the susceptibilities of the Egyptian Government the word "*English*" was struck out, as well as the expression "*I also offer my thanks to your Excellency.*" Neither Mr. Napier or myself understood this modification as introducing any material change in the spirit of the promise which Arábi had voluntarily given.*

* A discussion afterwards arose on this point, which led Mr. Napier to address an explanatory letter to Mr. Blunt, he having actually asked Arábi's consent to the suggested alteration, and otherwise managed the business of the parole. Mr. Napier writes as follows from Cairo on the 16th April:—

"I consented to the change to prevent dispute, as the Court was then waiting my presence, and in no way intending to alter the character of the promise which I did and do now regard as a promise given to and solely at the request of Lord Dufferin as the representative of England. I concluded that the word government in a promise given to the British representative could only apply to the government which he represented.

"The prisoners who were to be sent to perpetual exile were

The ordeal which Arábi now had before him differed widely from the somewhat dull and formal proceedings he had already witnessed. Every one in Cairo now knew that Arábi had been tried that morning before the greater part of its inhabitants had left their beds, that he had pleaded guilty to a charge of rebellion, and that he would receive judgment in the afternoon. I even so far forgave the honest

sentenced at intervals in the following week, and handed to Lord Dufferin separate written paroles in the same words as that of Arábi.

"Finally, shortly before the prisoners left for Ceylon, Mr. Nicolson informed me that Lord Dufferin required, for the sake of convenience, a single document which should also contain a more solemn assertion than a mere promise, and at the same time handed me a draft in Arabic which had been prepared by Lord Dufferin's interpreter.

"This with slight verbal modification the prisoners all sealed, and it was handed back to his Lordship. It contained no allusion to the Egyptian Government, and was regarded by the exiles as a personal parole to Lord Dufferin.

"In none of these documents was the Egyptian Government ever mentioned or contemplated by me or by the prisoners, nor was any parole written or otherwise ever required of the prisoners by any one on behalf of the Egyptian Government; on the contrary, they were informed merely that if they returned without permission to Egypt the penalty of death would revive against them.

"If anything further was required to make the matter plain it would be found in the fact that the original of the final document is now in the possession of the Foreign Office. See Lord Dufferin's Despatch No. 24. Egypt, No. 5, 1883. A copy only was left with the Egyptian Government."

hostility of my good friend Mr. Philip of the "leading journal," as to send him a brief telegram from the Court—"Arábi's trial just beginning." In the interval between the plea and the sentence an answer came asking urgently for "evidence, documents, papers, *et cetera*." It was too late.

An hour later all Pachodom had assembled to hear the doom of Ahmed Arábi. The street before the Daira Saniya was almost impassable; the Court itself was closely packed with spectators, elegantly dressed ladies occupied some of the best places, and Nubar Pacha smiled benignly on the assembled crowd from the vicinity of the dais. Mrs. Napier (who had arrived a few days previously from England) was seated near her husband. Since her arrival she had shown much womanly sympathy with the weeping inmates of the dark, lattice-windowed chambers in the "rebels'" homes, and her kindly presence had greatly helped to cheer the drooping spirits and allay the burning anxiety of the wives and daughters of our clients. The judges arrived as before, and so also came Arábi. He stood quietly at the bar, calmly surveying the scene before him.

Reouf Pacha nervously drew two documents from his black portfolio. He could not trust himself to speak in public now, and, having signified to the



ARABI BEFORE THE COURT MARTIAL, DECEMBER 3, 1882.



accused that the Court would now proceed to pass sentence, requested the clerk to read it aloud. His order was complied with. It was as follows:—

Whereas Ahmed Arábi Pacha has admitted having committed the crime of rebellion in contravention of Article 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code : and whereas, in face of this admission, the Court has only to apply the articles already cited, which punish the crime of rebellion by the penalty of death ; for these motives the Court unanimously condemns Ahmed Arábi Pacha to death for the crime of rebellion against His Highness the Khedive by application of the said articles and orders. That the said judgment be submitted for the consideration of His Highness the Khedive.

A moment of silence followed. Reouf quietly extracted the second paper from his portfolio, and said, addressing the accused:—

Ahmed Arábi, you will receive notification of the decree issued by His Highness the Khedive.

The Clerk then rose again, and read as follows:—

We, Mehemet Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt:—Whereas Ahmed Arábi Pacha has been condemned to death by judgment of Court Martial of this day's date, by application of Articles 96 of the Military Code and 59 of the Penal Code, and whereas we desire for reasons of our own to exercise in reference to the said Ahmed Arábi Pacha the right of pardon which appertains to us exclusively, we have decreed and do decree as follows:—The penalty of death pronounced against Ahmed Arábi is commuted to perpetual exile from Egypt and its dependencies. This pardon will be of no effect and the said Ahmed Arábi will be

liable to the penalty of death if he enters Egypt or its dependencies. Our Ministers of the Interior, War, and Marine are charged with the execution of this decree.

(Signed) MAHOMED TEWFIK.

Then came a pause. The judges rose to retire, and one or two of the newspaper correspondents, who had all along felt an interest in his fate, and who took a different view as to the merits of the National movement than that which was popular in Egypt, shook hands with Arábi. Mrs. Napier had placed a small nosegay of roses on the desk before her. She intended to send them to Arábi after the trial, but a gentleman sitting next her, without any previous intimation of his intention, somewhat thoughtlessly placed them in the prisoner's hands. On this one or two hisses were heard, but the great crowd gradually dispersed. Arábi regained his cell, the lady-correspondent of the Swiss newspaper (as a representative lover of freedom) clamouring somewhat loudly for a personal interview. I lost no time in telegraphing to the "leading journal" the result of the trial. Mr. Philip produced one or two special editions, but the publication of Suleimán Sání's confession ceased for ever. All its interest was gone now.

As soon as he reached his cell, Arábi immediately threw himself on his knees upon his small embroidered camel's-hair prayer-carpet, and, as a good Moslem,

offered up to the Most Merciful a hearty thanksgiving for his deliverance "out of the hands of his enemies." This terminated, he thanked in very touching terms Mr. Napier and myself for what he was pleased to call our valuable services. We left him quietly writing a long letter of gratitude to Mr. Blunt, who had been the means of saving his life.

Mrs. Napier's unintentional public present of flowers to Arábi brought down in a few hours a veritable hornet's nest about our ears. All Cairo was profoundly shocked. The Khedivial Club would willingly have shewn its indignation by censuring or expelling my excellent colleague, but, as it was found he did not belong to it; their loyal demonstration fell to the ground. M. Charmes, however, founded on the incident a legend which I cannot refrain from reproducing.* "A new ovation," he writes, "awaited Arábi. An English Miss presents a bouquet to Mr. Napier, who in turn passes it to the hero. Arábi blushes, and some murmurs of disapprobation are heard. It was only some days afterwards that this imprudent woman was punished for her ridiculous and odious manifestation. A box arrives from Alexandria. She opens it with care. The inside was

* *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1st, 1883, p. 117.

white, spotted with black tears. It contained a large funereal wreath, with the following inscription on the ribbons which bound it: 'With the respectful compliments of the relations and friends of the unfortunate victims assassinated at Alexandria on the 11th June and 12th July, 1882. The length of the list of names which followed is terrible.' I am able to state that this dramatic incident never occurred. It is difficult to know whether one should most admire M. Charmes' fertile imagination or deplore his singular want of that gallantry which his nation lays claim to. In such an attack on England as M. Charmes thinks fit to make in his *Insurrection Militaire en Egypte*, historical accuracy and good taste are of course matters of an entirely secondary consideration.

On the 7th December Mahmoud Sámi, Ali Fehmy, Abd-el-Ál, and Toulba Pachas, appeared before the same judges, offered the same plea, received the same sentence, and were the subject of a similar decree of commutation. Three days later Mahmoud Fehmy and Yácoub Sámi followed their example. They one and all subscribed written paroles in the words used by Arábi. The circumstances which surrounded these proceedings precisely resembled those I have already described at length. If the general interest felt in them was somewhat diminished, it was only because

the great central figure was wanting. A few days later workmen began dismantling the court which had been fitted up with so much care and cost, and the splendid uniforms of the nine Egyptian judges were seen no more at the Daira Saniya. In this manner ended the three great state trials of the Egyptian Revolution of 1882.

CHAPTER XXVI.

AFTER THE VERDICT.

NIGHTFALL on the 3rd December saw all Arab Cairo celebrating in discreet silence the deliverance of Arábi. From motives of self-evident prudence these spontaneous rejoicings were concealed as much as possible under the cover of darkness and closed doors, but I received ample proof at the time that the delight of the people was both general and sincere. Genuine Moslem joy begets little outward demonstration, and, when one sees much visible commotion, real heartfelt enthusiasm is often wholly wanting. In the present instance the poor were clothed, alms were distributed, prayers of thanksgiving were offered up, the fatted calf was killed, and all Egyptian Egypt was glad at the clemency of England. The Palace, the Turks and the Circassians alone refused to be comforted, and the bitterness of their fresh disappointment almost caused them to forget the sweets of their recent victory.

I visited Arábi in his cell early on the following morning. He said he had now only three things

which occupied his mind. He wished, in the first place, to be sure that his fellow-prisoners were no longer in danger; he then desired to find some means of making the public in England and Europe fully understand the motives which led him to adopt a course which might at first sight seem inconsistent with his former declarations on the question of "rebellion," and he was anxious to offer his thanks to those English officials who had taken a part in the recent proceedings. Even before I had arrived, he had already composed a long and eloquent letter of thanks to his best friend Mr. Blunt. After some conversation as to his own position, and the probable future of Egyptian politics, Arábi determined to address me a memorandum on the subject of his "brethren in captivity" (for whom I promised him to do everything in my power); to send a letter to the *Times* in explanation of the plea he had offered at his trial, and to present some expression of thanks in writing to Lord Dufferin, Sir Charles Wilson, and Sir Edward Malet. Late in the afternoon Arábi sent me these five letters.* I think all of them throw considerable light on the best points of Arábi's character.

* M. Charmes has accused me of inventing Arábi's correspondence. (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1883.) He is entirely mistaken. Beyond some general discussion as to the form of one of them, I knew nothing of their composition till they were completed. Their Arab

The first speaks only of the fate of his companions in misfortune :—

DEAR FRIEND MR. BROADLEY,

I should not like people to suppose that I have saved my life without remembering my brothers, the officers, the *Ulemas*, and the *Omdahs* (Notables), who are imprisoned here with me, or in the different provinces of Egypt. Therefore, I pray you, request the Commission of Inquiry to allow you to be present at their interrogatories, because I declare to you there is nothing against these men, for they are guiltless of any violation of the laws of man. As to the accusation against Suleimán Bey Sámi of the burning of Alexandria, I cannot say it is false in the face of the strong evidence against him, and his own declaration on the subject, nor can I say it is true of my own personal knowledge. This I say, however, neither he nor any of the military officers are guilty of the savage facts which happened at Alexandria on the 11th June. Again I implore to you look after the fate of all my fellow-prisoners.

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.
Cairo, December 4th, 1882.

Arábi wrote thus to the *Times* :—

To the Editor of the *Times*.

SIR,

I have followed the advice of my counsel, Messrs. Broadley and Napier, for whose devotion and zeal I can never sufficiently express my acknowledgments, and have pleaded guilty to a

originals are now before me (Arábi wrote them in duplicate), and Mr. Santillana, a most competent judge, informs me he considers Arábi's power of writing elegant Arabic only surpassed by Kheir-ed-Din Pacha amongst all the Arabic scholars he has ever met. M. Charmes speaks of Arábi as if he could neither read, write, or think.

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charge of rebellion against the Khedive. The English Ministers have often proclaimed me to be a rebel, and I cannot expect that they will suddenly change their opinion; nor, indeed, is it possible for them to do so at the present moment. I shall cheerfully proceed to any place which England may be pleased to appoint for my residence, and remain there until the day comes when it will be possible for England to modify her opinion concerning me.

I do not complain of my fate, nor of the sentence which has been pronounced against me, and which, at any rate, establishes my innocence of the charges of massacre and incendiarism—crimes in which I have never taken the slightest part, and which were absolutely contrary to our political and religious principles. I know that my future treatment will depend on England and the generosity of the British people. I leave Egypt with perfect tranquility and confidence in the future, because I know that England cannot any longer delay the reforms which we have struggled for. In a short time the Anglo-French control will be abolished; Egypt will be no more in the hands of a myriad of foreign employés filling every available post, to the exclusion of the Egyptians; our native courts will be purified of abuses; codes of law will be enacted, and, which is more important, carried out; a Chamber of Notables will be instituted with a voice and a right of interference in the affairs of the Egyptian people; the swarm of usurers in the village will be driven out. The English people, when they see all these things, will then be able to realize the fact that my rebellion had a very strong justification.

The son of an Egyptian fellah, I tried, to the best of my power, to secure all these good things for the dear country to which I belong, and which I love. My ill-fortune did not allow of my carrying out these objects. I hope the English people will complete the work which I commenced. If England accomplishes this task, and thus really gives Egypt to the

Egyptians, she will then make clear to the world the real aim and object of Arábi the rebel.

All the Egyptian people were with me, as I was with Egypt, the country I shall love for ever. I hope Egypt will not forget me when England completes what I tried to begin. I say it again, I do not complain of my fate. I am even happy and contented with it, because I know my misfortunes have been the means of securing for Egypt the liberty and prosperity which it deserves to enjoy. When England has carried out her good work she will, I feel certain, in her humanity and high sense of justice, permit me to return to my beloved country, and see with my own eyes the result of her humane and civilizing work before I die.

I am grateful to Mr. Gladstone and to Lord Granville for their interposition on my behalf, and for having saved me from so perilous a situation. They will soon learn that I was no rebel when I set myself at the head of a people who wanted nothing but justice. I also thank Lord Dufferin and Sir Edward Malet for the kindness and generosity they have shown me. I also owe a debt of gratitude, which I can never repay, to my dearest friend Mr. Blunt, who spared neither his efforts nor his money to assist me in the hour of distress and need; when my Egyptian friends of happier days had one and all forsaken me. I can never sufficiently acknowledge the noble and untiring efforts, and the zeal, loyalty, and devotion of Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier on my behalf, and on behalf of my fellow-prisoners. I thank the British people, as I thank you, Sir, and the great English Press, which was unanimous in demanding that I should have a fair trial. I thank those members of the British Parliament who have often and nobly spoken on my behalf; and I thank Sir Charles Wilson for the kind and vigilant care he has bestowed on me in the days of my captivity.

I leave Egypt with the firm conviction that, as days pass by, the justice of our cause will become more and more apparent,

and that England will never have cause to repent of the generosity and humanity she has displayed towards a man against whom she has fought.

AHMED ARÁBI, the Egyptian.

From the prison at Cairo, Dec. 4, 1882.

Arábi's letter to Lord Dufferin was as follows:—

To the Right Honourable the Exalted Lord Dufferin:—

I had set myself at the head of the Egyptian people, to secure liberty and justice for this country. The decrees of Providence not having crowned my efforts with success, I surrendered myself to the generosity of the English people, having full confidence in the loyalty and honour of England. My hopes have been fulfilled. England has allowed me to have a fair trial, and granted me the service of honest and able Counsel. I feel bound to express my complete satisfaction and gratitude for this kind treatment I have received. I ask you, my Lord, to accept my heartfelt thanks for your efforts on my behalf, and on behalf of my fellow-prisoners, and to be the interpreter of my gratitude to Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville. December 4th 1882.

(Signed). AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

He wrote thus to Sir Charles Wilson:—

To Colonel Sir Charles Wilson (May his virtues last for ever!).

The leader of a people who wanted nothing but justice, fair treatment, and the preservation of its rights, knowing full well that I had never violated the laws of humanity during my tenure of office, but had carefully protected the life and safety of all; I surrendered myself to the generosity and honour of the British people, feeling convinced that I should be well treated at the hands of England. This hope has not been in vain; you have been to us kinder than a father to his children in the days of our captivity. Your visits to us, as well as the activity and kindness you have always displayed in ensuring us just and

fair treatment, have imposed upon all of us a debt of gratitude which we can never sufficiently acknowledge. We hope, Sir, you will accept the heartfelt expression of our gratitude and our respect for you.

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

4th December, 1882.

Arábi felt great difficulty in writing to Sir Edward Malet, who he said, and I think with truth, had misunderstood him from the first. If Sir Edward Malet had ever fairly tried to enter into the aspirations, objects, and extent of the National Movement, or had even lent a sympathetic ear to the many tribulations and real grievances of the Egyptians, I doubt whether Alexandria would have ever been bombarded or Tel-el-Kebir fought. Sir Edward Malet erred from a complete want of trustworthy information. People in whom he placed implicit confidence told him "the cause" which Arábi led was a myth, and he believed it. Then a time came when he was obliged to continue believing so *malgré lui*. The result is, that to-day we are still face to face with the great question of Egypt's future, and have little other light to guide us than that afforded by those melancholy memorials of mistakes—the Egyptian Blue-Books. After I reached Cairo I must certainly say that Sir Edward Malet did his utmost to facilitate the various arrangements connected with the trial of Arábi, but a despatch he penned to Lord Granville the day before

I arrived* affords an example of the extraordinary reports which always seemed to reach him, and the not less remarkable opinions he was accustomed to base upon them. Arábi, however, determined to let by-gones be by-gones, and wrote his thanks to Sir Edward Malet:—

To Sir Edward Malet, British Political Agent in Egypt.

I feel bound to present to you my heartfelt thanks for the noble efforts you have made in order to ensure my treatment with fairness and justice, and for all that you have done to

* My Lord,

Cairo, October 17, 1882.

The suppression of the rebellion through the victory of Tel-el-Kebir was followed by complete tranquillity throughout the country, and it is only by degrees that the population is beginning to recover from the blow which made it senseless for a time. According to all tradition, the victors would have made use of the opportunity to ride rough-shod in every direction, and to stifle every voice that did not raise itself in their praise.

The reports now coming in from the country seem to show that the people either did not believe in the capture of Arábi or are convinced that he and the British forces have come to an agreement to his advantage. They cannot understand that, though conquered, he is treated with consideration, while awaiting sentence by a court-martial, because such treatment is unlike anything they have ever seen or heard of. Arábi contrived to inspire the people with the belief that he possessed Divine power to restore the supremacy of Islam, and the common saying among the people is that he cannot be put to death, and that he will yet prove himself the "Mehdi" or Saviour. The more ignorant have a story that he is at present making a forty-days' journey through the heavens, and in general his hold on the sympathy of the lower classes has made rapid and dangerous strides since the time when he became the acknowledged leader of the people against armed Christian invasion.

rescue me from the dangers which surrounded me. I hope, therefore, that you will accept the expression of my gratitude and respect, as well as of the friendly and sincere feelings I shall always entertain towards you.

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

Cairo, December 4th, 1882.

The following letter, addressed to his fellow-prisoner Ahmed Bey Rifát, is a good specimen of Arábi's style when corresponding with one of his own countrymen. It was written in answer to a congratulatory note from Ahmed Rifát:—

To my very dear and respected brother Ahmed Bey Rifát. (May God have you in his holy keeping!) May the blessing of God rest on you, as well as on my dear friend Kadr Bey!

The eloquent letter you have sent me filled me with feelings in which pleasure was mixed with courage. I said to my soul, "remain constant in faith and you will merit commendation, and gain eternal repose." (Korán.) You have doubtless heard of my trial and my sentence. The scene was one new to us Egyptians, for persons of both sexes came to see what went on. They first read a judgment putting an end to a life "the close of which was not yet predestined." (Korán.) Then came a second decree by which this death was changed into perpetual banishment. My enemies had forgotten the words of our common law, "the life of a man is written for him in the book of fate. What the Almighty decrees comes to pass; what he desires not, happens not. All power is with Him." (Korán.) The hearts of those who fought against me seem softened, for I even received a present of roses from a lady who was near me. May God reward you for the courage and strength of soul you displayed when examined by the Commission of Inquiry.

I have declared to my friend Mr. Broadley that nothing could induce me to accept any means of escape from death myself,

unless all my brethren, both at Cairo and in the Provinces, were saved. I have charged him with their defence, and conjured him to see the tribunal weighs their cases with justice and equity, so that no one can say I have bought my own safety with the blood of my innocent brethren. For these reasons I have followed the course proposed to me. I felt in my heart our fate was in the hands of England. Could I expect England suddenly to say her war with the Egyptians was devoid of justice? Time and more knowledge will even bring this about, I verily believe. All your lives are saved! "We have right on our side, and our enemies are in the wrong." (Korán). Providence has not forsaken us, for the free nation with whom we fought has even allowed some of her children to come almost at one time from Constantinople, London, Rome and Tunis, to see justice done concerning us.* Even their writers no longer misunderstand us as before. "These are signs of the work of the All Merciful, be not of those who ever despair."

Your brother,

AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

24 Mohurram, 1300. .

(5 December, 1882.)

On the evening of the trial I was invited to a dinner given at the *Restaurant du Jardin de l'Esbekieh* by Mr. Pomeroy, the American Agent and Consul-General, in honour of General Wallace, the Minister-Plenipotentiary of the United States at Constantinople. Several of our host's compatriots were present, and Sir Edward Malet was also a guest. Arábi afforded, as might be expected, one of the

* I presume Arábi alludes to Lord Dufferin, Mr. Napier. Mr. Santillana, and myself.

principal themes of conversation. Mr. Bernard, of the *New York Herald*, propounded, with perfect gravity, his plan for the "acquisition" of our client by Messrs. Barnum and Gordon Bennett,* and even General Wallace seemed to regard the proposal as worthy of careful consideration. The ideas expressed about Arábi had so strong a taint of republicanism, that I fear they must have been very distasteful to Sir Edward Malet. A great deal was said about Fiji as a place of banishment, the practicability of an American rescue, the daring of American schooners, and the reception which awaited Arábi in the States. Prior to this Fiji had been hinted at in official circles as a possible residence for the rebels, but after Mr. Pomeroy's dinner it was never more alluded to. Amidst much that was mere fun and banter, there was a serious admixture of honest sympathy in the feelings of my American friends in Egypt, for which I shall ever be grateful.

The same evening (December 4th) Mr. Santillana, who had done us such excellent service, left Cairo for Rome. Next morning I called on Cherif Pacha to talk over various arrangements connected with the

* This was not the only curious solution proposed to Lord Dufferin. I am informed on the best possible authority that a Russian lady of rank and wealth offered in writing to marry Arábi if permitted to do so. Lord Dufferin did not, however, feel called on to transmit her letter to the prisoner.

departure of the exiles. He protested his personal satisfaction at the compromise which had been arrived at, and explained to me at some length his own ideas as to the true character of the National movement, of which he assured me he was really the leader until Arábi rudely jostled him from that position, and being only a *fellah* could not possibly succeed. On my timidly expressing regret that the public prints gave a somewhat different version of his sentiments, he shook his head and declared the newspaper correspondents would soon bring him to an untimely grave. On going to the Daira Saniya late in the afternoon I found Ismail Eyoub and his colleagues occupied in interrogating Suleiman Sámi's companion in his flight to Crete, the Cairene merchant Hasan Moosa el Akád. I no sooner sat down than the accused rose and said deliberately, "Hear, oh Pachas! I, too, like Ahmed Arábi, demand the services of the English lawyer, and will speak no more if they are refused me." Ismail Eyoub seemed fairly overwhelmed at the hardihood of the request, while the lesser members of the Court raised their hands to their foreheads in mute token of their loyal deprecation of such unprecedented audacity. "Do you know that this man is an incendiary?" gasped Ismail Eyoub, as soon as he had recovered his breath. "He also distributed the sticks wherewith to beat Europeans

at Alexandria," shouted his colleagues in chorus, "you will not surely defend him?" After some discussion the case was finally adjourned in order that I should have an opportunity of seeing the prisoner, before deciding whether or not to accept the retainer he desired to give me. This accidental meeting with Hasan Moosa el Akád was only the prelude to one of the most curious incidents of the Cairo State Trials.

CHAPTER XXVII.

A PALACE INTRIGUE.

ALTHOUGH Mehemet Ali began to reign in Egypt almost at the commencement of the nineteenth century, two of his children are still alive, and are even younger than some of their relatives of the third generation. Prince Hálím and his sister, the Princess Zeineb Hanem, left Egypt many years ago, and have since resided at Stamboul. They have both surrendered their existence and their fortunes to a common dream,—the accession of the prince to the throne of his father. In accordance with the old rule of Moslem succession, Prince Hálím, as the senior male member of his father's family, would have become Pacha or Khedive of Egypt as a matter of course, but a series of imperial firmáns (which have been tacitly acquiesced in by the whole of Europe) have varied the ancient custom, and the supreme power in Egypt now descends in a direct line from father to son. In addition to these sufficiently formidable obstacles, Prince Hálím always finds himself face to face with his own solemn obliga-

tion, by which he formally relinquished his pretensions, and agreed to give no further trouble in the prosecution of his claim. Both the prince and his sister have always treated this promise as a dead letter, and have consistently devoted their lives and their fortunes to the hopeless pursuit of a phantom crown.

Prince Hálím has now spent well-nigh all his substance amongst his adherents in Egypt, and in the systematic subventioning of continental newspapers; but his sister is still rich and willing to spend more money if occasion requires it. Hálím is at the present time a *persona grata* at the Porte and the Palace, and Turkey would, I think, gladly see him supplant at any moment his unstable nephew. France would not in all probability be now altogether adverse to the change, for such of Hálím's sympathies as are not wholly Turkish are eminently French. Hálím and his sister have on more than one occasion very nearly achieved success. I have heard his hopes frequently ridiculed in Cairo, where he is called in derision "The Perpetual Candidate," but, as a matter of fact, in the spring of last year his firman of appointment was actually written, and the steamer for his conveyance to Egypt chartered, when the project was abandoned owing to the strong joint-opposition of England and France. *meag*

Prince Hálím and his sister were not disposed to sit down quietly under their most recent disappointment. The almost indescribable unpopularity of their nephew Tewfik strengthened their party in the Cairo seraglios, and they saw with satisfaction the rapid progress and growing strength of the National party. It was evident that a great political crisis was approaching in Egypt, and anything might be hoped for from the general scramble which it would undoubtedly occasion, even the impossible itself. At this juncture Hálím and his sister conceived a project of appropriating the ideas of Arábi, coalescing either with him or his friends, and finally coming to power as a popular ruler on the shoulders of the National party. It became, consequently, a matter of great importance to them to open up some sort of negotiations with the Nationalist leaders.

Osmán Pacha Fouzy* was the *vekil*, or general agent, of the Princess Zeineb at Cairo. With him the memory of Mehemet Ali was a fetish: he was willing to imperil everything for the sake of his old master's son. To him was confided the task of sounding Arábi and his companions. To do this effectually, Osmán Pacha Fouzy, Turk *pur sang*, became for the time being, to all appearances, an enthusiastic Nationalist. This was not sufficient. It was abso-

* See *ante*, Chapter XIII. page 143.

lutely necessary for Osmán Pacha to find some political broker who could act as a reliable go-between in Hálím's intended parleys with the chiefs of the National party.

After mature reflection Osmán Pacha Fouzy decided to sound Hasan Moosa El Akád, who had some months previously returned from a second period of exile in the Soudan, and was now very loudly professing his devotion to Arábi and the cause of Egyptian liberty. Hasan Moosa was neither an incendiary nor a fanatic; he had never helped to burn Alexandria, nor had he ever given clubs to an infuriated mob. Hasan Moosa was nothing more or less than a very clever political adventurer, with a keen eye to the main chance, and a strong determination to turn the existing complications to the best possible account. Although a man of considerable means, he looked on politics only as a means of increasing his riches, and he imagined he saw in the friendship of Arábi a veritable El Dorado of intrigue. There is an old story of a Persian king who asked one of his favourites what was the greatest favour he could bestow upon him. "Permit me, sir," answered the courtier, "one minute's whispered conversation with you whenever you take your seat in the Hall of Justice." Hasan Moosa's conduct was but an illustration of the same idea. He frequented

Arábi's society merely in order to pretend to the possession of a certain influence over him which he in reality did not possess. The Persian king understood his favourite's object. Arábi did not fathom the wily scheme of Hasan Moosa, and this made all the difference. Hasan Moosa was, I fear, a weak spot in Arábi's armour, but even here his honour and good faith were most curiously vindicated.

Once and for all I am in a position to assert that Arábi was not only entirely ignorant of the proceedings of Osmán Pacha Fouzy and Hasan Moosa El Akád which I am about to describe, but he had never at any period of his career any direct or indirect communication or connection with Prince Hálim, or any of the other persons interested in the palace intrigue of which he became the central figure. The Commissioners of Inquiry really managed to unravel some of the details of this very tangled skein of Egyptian high treason in a wonderful manner, for the investigation suited their past personal experiences, and helped to give them a little fresh importance after the collapse of the great case. Of all the persons who were brought before them in the course of their labours Hasan Moosa was by far the most astute and the less communicative. He assumed an attitude of persistent ignorance or judicious *non mi ricordo* from first to last. Hasan Moosa absolutely declined

to answer inconvenient questions or implicate either himself or anybody else. A few days before I left Cairo, Ismail Eyoub said that nothing in the whole of their inquiries had impressed him so much in favour of Arábi as the outcome of their investigations into the details of the Hálimist plot. The proof of Arábi's political honesty in the presence of great temptations was not only negative but positive. It was even sufficient to put his enemies to silence.

No sooner had Hasan Moosa reached Cairo than his house was subjected to a rigorous search. Many papers were found there, but no one was any the wiser. All his letters were written in a picturesque kind of cypher in which lions, eagles, flowers, nightingales, and historical personages were mixed up in hopeless confusion. Amongst all the dross was a single speck of gold. On a small slip of paper was found a long list of bills of exchange for large amounts received by him from Osmán Pacha Fouzy. This discovery I feel sure had induced Hasan Moosa to secure my professional services, and the very same afternoon message after message came from Osmán Pacha Fouzy entreating us to come and see him with a view to resume his defence.

"Deli" Osmán and Hasan Moosa occupied cells almost exactly opposite each other in the corridor, which was afterwards partitioned off for the use of

the seven exiles on parole. When I saw them later in the day they were both very uncomfortable, and each hoped to be able to make a scapegoat of the other. "Please advise Osmán Pacha," said Hasan Mooza, "to declare he merely gave me those bills in the course of the most innocent trade transactions, and not under any circumstances to produce the receipt I gave him." "Tell Hasan Moosa," rejoined Osmán Pacha, "his receipt is my only justification, and I really know no more than a babe unborn what the money was paid for. Is not Hasan Moosa a merchant? May not Prince Hálím have had some commercial dealings with him? Cannot you manage to suggest to him such a defence as this?"

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Another remarkable personage was destined also to appear at the approaching confrontation of Hasan Moosa and Osmán Fouzy, which was fixed for the following day (December 6th). In some of Hasan Moosa's books or papers mention was made of the venerable Sheikh Hasan El Edwi, who had now become, owing to the recent death of his senior, the chief of Egyptian ulemas, and the greatest divine of the Azhar university. Hasan El Edwi was a feeble, wizened old man, bent with the weight of his fourscore years, barely five feet in height even in his best days, and with a face so gnarled and wrinkled

question of his papers. He resolved, I suspect, at last to find some, and not to find others. His idea was to prove he had only acted as an agent in paying money or endorsing bills to Hasan Moosa, and at the same time to throw as little light as possible on the views of his employers. The Commission decided to resume their inquiry three days later (December 9th). The evening before Osmán produced a flimsy envelope directed in French "to my father." Inside was the following memorandum :—

Bills on the Imperial Ottoman Bank for the sum of £10,000 to the order of H.E. Osmán Pacha, Agent of Her Highness the Princess Zeineb (widow of Kiámil Pacha), as follows :—

	£
No. 43,736	1,200
„ 43,737	1,250
„ 43,738	1,300
„ 43,739	1,350
„ 43,740	1,400
„ 43,741	1,700
„ 43,742	1,800
	<hr/>
	£10,000

Constantinople, 13th June, 1882.

Below was Hasan Moosa's receipt :—

I have received from H.E. Osmán Pacha the firsts and seconds of Exchange to the amount of £10,000.

(Signed) HASAN MOOSA.

The Court met at 10 o'clock on the day in question. Mr. Villiers was present to gratify Ismaíl Eyoub's


wish of seeing his Commission portrayed in a sketch, for he still felt very jealous of the fame and publicity which had suddenly fallen to the lot of the Court Martial. In the centre of the baize-covered table sat the President, with the Secretaries, Yusef Effendi and Maker Effendi, nearly opposite him. The five or six remaining members were grouped pretty equally round it. I myself occupied a chair next to one of the secretaries, and by the side of Osmán Pacha Fouzy. Hasan El Edwi sat next, almost facing Sir Charles Wilson and his interpreter Mr. McCullogh. Osmán first tendered his paper, which was duly read. Some declarations of the Ottoman Bank were also put in showing the total sum received by Hasan Moosa from the Princess Zeineb to amount to nearly thirty thousand pounds. Hasan El Edwi was again questioned. "Had he received any money from Osmán Pacha Fouzy?" Answer "Never." A sudden inspiration now seemed to strike Ismail Eyoub. He remembered that the picture which was to perpetuate his labours was in progress, and he meditated a sudden and imposing *coup de théâtre*. In a voice of thunder he asked the feeble old sheikh "if he had not dared to sign and seal a decree declaring His Highness the Khedive Tewfik Pacha worthy of deposition?" Hasan El Edwi seemed all of a sudden to recover the pristine vigour of his youth; he leaned

forward, stretched out his hand, and, looking **fixedly** at Ismail Eyoub, said:—"Oh, Pacha! **Without** seeing the document of which you speak I **cannot** say whether I signed it or sealed it, but this I **do say**: If you will bring me a decree drawn up in the **sense** you indicate I will readily sign and seal it in **your** presence even now. If you are Moslems can you **deny** that Tewfik Pacha, having betrayed his country and gone over to the English, is no longer worthy to rule over us?" If a bomb-shell had suddenly fallen into the midst of the room it could not have produced much greater consternation. The blood visibly mantled beneath Ismail Eyoub's swarthy cheek, and for a moment no one spoke. Hasan El Edwi was politely invited to retire, and no further attempt to interrogate him was ever contemplated. A few days later he was released on condition of quietly going back to his native village, where the history of Egypt should know him no more.

It soon became evident, from a further examination which took place in the afternoon, that Hasan Moosa had received a very large sum from Hálím and his sister, on the pretence of inducing by bribery the National Party to proclaim the former as their candidate for the Khedivial throne. It was also equally clear that he placed the whole of the money so obtained to the credit of his private banking



SHEIKH HASAN EL EDWI BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.





SHEIKH HASAN EL EDWI BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.



account, that he had never given a piastre of it to anybody else, and that Arábi knew nothing of his machinations. As a salve to his conscience he seems to have sent Arábi a cheese, and Mahmoud Sámi a present of fruit. His interrogatory stopped short at this point. As in duty bound I did my best to save Hasan Moosa from the consequences of his acts. If he had been tried a formidable case of conspiracy could have been made out against him, but Prince Hálím and his sister must have been condemned as his accomplices. Hasan Moosa was eventually exiled for twenty years to Massowah, from which place he will in all probability soon escape. Sympathy with him I have none. His intrigues placed even Arábi's sturdy honesty in jeopardy, and it was a mere chance his reputation was so thoroughly vindicated. danger

Osmán Pacha Fouzy was neither deprived of his honours or rank. He was compelled to resign his agency for the Princess Zeineb and one or two other members of the Khedivial family, to deposit 4,000*l.* as a security for his good behaviour during four years, and to retire to his country house. Prince Hálím and his sister cruelly abandoned him in his distress. They would neither give security for him, nor repay the expenses Mr. Grosse, of Shepherd's Hotel, had incurred on his behalf; in a word, they left their old and faithful servant to his fate. In

the solitude of his retirement Osmán Pacha Fouzy will have ample time for reflection on the fallacy of putting trust in the promises of princes, but as he is a general favourite he may soon return to Cairo.

I here take leave of Ismaïl Eyoub and the Commission of Inquiry. The latter died a natural death a few days later, but the former was promoted to the post of Minister of the Interior. A career of real usefulness was opened to him, but his weakness and feeble good-naturedness of character caused him to miss the opportunity. Ismaïl Eyoub has now as much disappeared from the sphere of practical Egyptian politics as old Hasan El Edwi. His astute predecessor Riáz had woven a strong web of personal influence, which included not only the Home Office in Cairo but its manifold ramifications in the interior. His son was his private secretary ; his brother-in-law his under-secretary ; his relations, debtors, and dependents mudirs, governors, and provincial sheikhs. This powerful organisation was transferred as it stood to Ismaïl Eyoub, who was too feeble either to resist it or reject it. An intrigue of these subordinates soon brought him to grief, and Khairi Pacha, a palace nominee, was made to replace him. Fortunately perhaps for Egypt the real administration of the Home Office has now passed almost entirely into the hands of Mr. Clifford Lloyd.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

EGYPTIAN LADIES AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM.

IN no part of the world do women contrive to exercise so much real political power as in the East, and there is probably no oriental country in which their influence is so potent a factor in State affairs as in Egypt. It was in Egyptian haríms that Arábi found some of his most patriotic and powerful adherents. The National cause, even in its earlier stages, was warmly espoused by the great majority of Egyptian ladies, and they continued to support it till hope was no longer possible. Princesses of the Khedivial family (Tewfik's mother and wife always excepted) made no secret of their strong sympathy with Arábi. The *Official Gazette*, even on the day succeeding the bombardment of Alexandria, mentions free gifts of horses for the army offered by the aged mother of the Khedive Ismail and his daughter the Princess Jamila Hanem. Associations were also formed under their auspices to succour and relieve the wounded at Kafr-el-Dowar, and prepare supplies of lint and bandages for the use of the surgeons at the front. This feature

in the history of the war certainly affords one of the most striking answers to those who deny either the universality or spontaneity of Arábi's movement.

A few days after the conclusion of the trial I was surprised to receive a visit from a confidential servant of the Princess Injih, widow of the Viceroy Saïd Pacha, and one of the most benevolent and popular women in Egypt. He brought me a letter from his mistress, and several valuable presents both for Mr. Napier and myself. My only excuse for publishing her far too flattering communication is the important internal evidence it affords in favour of Arábi :—

To Mr. Broadley, the lawyer.

After offering you the compliments and thanks due to your honourable person, I take this opportunity of declaring to you that the country of Egypt has been honoured by your coming to it, and I, along with all its inhabitants, rejoice in what you have done, for you have defended the cause of humanity and justice. We Egyptians shall pray for your happiness and success all our days. May justice and mercy come to reign in this land! By defending the sons of Egypt (*who sought her good*) you have now made England dear to us, because Englishmen helped us in our grief and distress. I thank, most sincerely, Mr. Blunt for his goodness towards us. With the news of what has been done all Egypt is delighted, and none with truth dare assert the contrary. I cannot, indeed, express my obligations.

(Signed) INJIH.

Cairo, December 15th, 1882.

Seal.

Some days later I was accorded an audience by the Princess ———, who desired to speak unreservedly of the real sentiments of the Khedivial family as to the causes and consequences of recent events in Egypt.

"Every one of us," said Princess ———, "secretly sympathised from the first with Arábi, because we knew he sought only the good of the Egyptians. At one time we believed Tewfik was also on his side, but when we found out he meant to betray Egypt we cordially hated him, and he has done his best to make our lives miserable ever since. The Princess Injih, whom we all greatly respect, twice told him her mind clearly as to his conduct, but it did no good whatever. Tewfik soon afterwards went away to Alexandria, and we next heard he had gone over entirely to the English. Then we all resolved henceforward to look only to Arábi for the defence of the country. Councils of all the great men of Egypt were held at Cairo. They were attended by Prince Ibrahim, Prince Kiámil,* and Prince Ahmed. It was resolved unanimously to empower Arábi to continue the war. We saw in Arábi a

* Prince Kiámil boldly declared before the Commission of Inquiry that he went to the Council voluntarily, that no kind of pressure was put upon him to influence his opinion, and that he voted deliberately for the continuance of the war because he believed it was his duty to do so.

deliverer, and our enthusiasm for him knew no bounds. We all wrote him letters and telegrams of congratulation and encouragement. The Princess —— wrote Arábi a very foolish letter in which I believe she offered to marry him as the saviour of Egypt. Arábi only told her to mind her own business and stay at home. Every one of us contributed to the war expenses according to our means, and we Princesses were always occupied making lint for the soldiers. One day in September Arábi came back to Cairo. I first heard he had brought with him the heads of General Wolseley and Admiral Seymour, but it turned out not to be true, and that he had suffered a great defeat. We were all much grieved, but not so completely dejected as when Tewfik returned in triumph, for we fully expected some ill-treatment from him. Poor Princess —— was sent for first and upbraided with having written to Arábi. Her mother, however, boldly declared she had written the letter and sealed it with her daughter's seal. They were then dismissed, but the mother loudly reproached a eunuch who had accused them to the Khedive of carrying on a correspondence with Arábi, and struck him over the head with a chair, on which he ran all bleeding up the staircase to Tewfik to make his complaint.

“ At last we were all ordered to go to the Palace. Many of the ladies were crying from fear. Tewfik's

mother loudly reproached us, and said our hero Arábi would be given up to them by the English to be killed slowly with bodkins. She also held up a list in which several of us were marked down for execution.* As it has since turned out, they can do nothing either to us or Arábi without the consent of the English, and now they hate the English far more than they hate us. When it was known at the Palace that Arábi's life was spared, the women gave way to transports of grief, as if a death had just taken place in the family. Our opinion about the future is quite unanimous. After all that has happened, as long as Tewfik reigns there will be no peace either for you, for us, or for Egypt."

I had afterwards an opportunity of seeing Tewfik Pacha on two occasions, when he condescended to receive me in private audience at the Abdin Palace. When I arrived there on the morning of the 12th December, the doors were guarded by British sentries. After taking coffee in the Master of the Ceremonies' room below, I was conducted by Tonino Bey up a broad marble staircase into a large drawing-room adorned with French furniture, many clocks, more candelabra, and the gaudiest of drapery, after the manner of the East. Tewfik was seated on a sofa at the extreme end of the apartment. Another

* I omit a great portion of this part of the story.

person, very much muffled up, occupied a chair a little distance off, to whom he formally introduced me, telling me at the same time "not to mind, as his other visitor could not speak or understand any European language." I afterwards heard accidentally that my companion was the Coptic archbishop. Tewfik is short, stout, nervous, and by no means unintelligent, but both eyes and mouth clearly indicate fatal weakness of character. Although he has been educated entirely in Egypt, he knows French well, and is already very fairly acquainted with English. His thoughts, ideas, and mode of reasoning are, however, entirely oriental. A constant and uncontrollable restlessness of manner affords an unmistakeable indication of great inconstancy of purpose. This deplorable want of decision perpetually leads him to acts wholly contrary to his better nature. Tewfik is simply an oriental constitutional monarch *manqué*. He has unsuccessfully endeavoured to please both parties, and he has conspicuously failed to satisfy either. At one time he might have easily headed the Nationalists, and gained the confidence of the Egyptian people, but he deliberately threw his chance away. From the moment he broke with Arábi, to dally first with Turkey and then with the Powers, he became the most unpopular man in all Egypt. It is impossible to conceal the truth. His future

is almost hopeless: a fair start under his auspices is I fear impossible. His name will be written in history as that of the prince "who brought the English into Egypt," and as such it is already anathematized by every Egyptian betwixt Keneh and Alexandria. Our constant efforts to use him as a decorous and convenient medium for interference (and often beneficial interference) in Egyptian affairs, only intensifies this hatred, and gains for us the very questionable privilege of sharing it. It is as the exhibition of a red rag to an infuriated bull. His present melancholy position recalls a memory of our childhood:—

" Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall,
 Humpty Dumpty had a great fall,
 All the king's horses and all the king's men
 Could not put Humpty Dumpty up again."

Tewfik Pacha was once firmly seated on the wall of Egyptian Nationalism; he not only deserted the cause, but he betrayed it. Then he fell, and not "all the English horses and all the English men" can ever restore to him either the affection or confidence of his exasperated subjects.

After offering me a cigarette, the Khedive began our conversation by assuring me that his ideas as to the recent trials had been wholly misunderstood in Europe, and he was generally the victim of malignant misrepresentation. He had never wanted or advo-

cated the death of the prisoners, and the commutation of their sentence was a willing and cheerful exercise of clemency. I observed with humility that it was to be regretted the talented and trustworthy correspondents of the press had given to the world so very different a version of his views,* and more particularly that the local European and Arab journals had persistently represented him as having his hand forced in the matter of the decree of exile. He did not answer, but asked me if I thought he should be obliged to see many more journalists, as he found it so difficult to receive them cordially and at the same time tell them nothing. He now suddenly changed the conversation to the question of the ingratitude of his own family towards him. He had heaped benefits upon them, but they only "turned and stung him." He knew the Princess — had told Lord Dufferin this, and the Princess — had corroborated what the Princess

* In his remarkable article on the "Restoration in Egypt" in the *Fortnightly Review*, Mr. Ardern Beaman, writing with a special knowledge of his subject, says: "Arábi bore Tewfik no ill-will until it became evident that he was being employed as a stalking-horse for Europe in the suppression of the National movement. His position now appears to have become almost untenable. In the first place, the unpardonable sin of bringing the English to Egypt must ever lie at his door. Curiously enough the vulgar feeling is stronger against the Khedive who called us than against ourselves for responding to the call. We were unwelcome guests arriving at the bidding of an unpopular host." (November 1883, p. 630.)

— had said, but it was all untrue; how happy he might be if it were not for the tongues of the princesses and the pens of the newspaper men. And his father too: even he would not let him alone. He constantly sent him the most dutiful letters, yet Ismaïl Pacha had recently accused him to somebody, who afterwards wrote about it in the *Times*, of possessing *ni tête, ni cœur, ni courage*.* I next tried to talk a little of Arábi. The Khedive said even now he thought Arábi a good man. He never for a moment believed Arábi ever wished to kill him. If he had such an intention, he could have done it a hundred times when they were together at Cairo. The rest of the conversation was taken up in melancholy reflections on the part of Tewfik as to the impossibility of pleasing anybody. He trusted at any rate I could say he was not vindictive or cruel. The impression created by the Khedive on my mind was so painful that I was not sorry once more to be led by Tonino Bey past the great conservatory, down the broad, carpeted stairs, 'to the postern gate, where Thomas Atkins marched slowly up and down watching over the safety of the restored Egyptian Viceroy.

I next went to see him on the 30th December (in company with Mr. Napier) to take leave prior to quitting Egypt. This visit gave me an opportunity

* Chapter II. p. 16.

of making a direct appeal to him on behalf of some of the other prisoners, for Arábi was now on his way to Ceylon. I was surprised to find he knew every detail connected with their cases ; and it so happened that the very persons on whose behalf I desired to interest him were peculiarly obnoxious to him. On the occasion of our first interview I heard much of the misdoings of the princesses in Egypt ; I was now favoured with an account of the treasonable conduct of his relations at Constantinople. We were, I think, all relieved to bring the visit to an end. On this occasion Talát Pacha filled the chair formerly occupied by the Coptic archbishop. After expressing our acknowledgments of the hospitality we had received we left the palace. It is hard to say whether the position of the "protectors" or the "protected" in Egypt presented the greatest difficulties or the most evident anomalies.

CHAPTER XXIX.

INTO EXILE.

FOUR days after the formal trial of Arábi, his companions, Mahmoud Sámi, Abd-el-Ál, Toulba, and Ali Fehmy went through a similiar ordeal. Their appearance before the Court Martial both in the morning and afternoon attracted a very large crowd of spectators, but no incident occurred during the proceedings which in any way merits description.

The judges had hardly risen when it was whispered abroad that Riáz Pacha had resigned his post as Minister of the Interior. It is true he was said to be ailing, and had even taken to his bed diplomatically, but it was an open secret that he had at last come to hopeless grief over one of the many political stumbling-blocks called into existence by the unexpected termination of the State Trials. Riáz Pacha was pledged to a policy of exemplary punishment, but he did not throw up his portfolio, as his friends very adroitly pretended, "in order to offer a dignified protest against the practical acquittal of Arábi." He

of making a direct appeal to him on behalf of some of the other prisoners, for Arábi was now on his way to Ceylon. I was surprised to find he knew every detail connected with their cases; and it so happened that the very persons on whose behalf I desired to interest him were peculiarly obnoxious to him. On the occasion of our first interview I heard much of the misdoings of the princesses in Egypt; I was now favoured with an account of the treasonable conduct of his relations at Constantinople. We were, I think, all relieved to bring the visit to an end. On this occasion Talát Pacha filled the chair formerly occupied by the Coptic archbishop. After expressing our acknowledgments of the hospitality we had received we left the palace. It is hard to say whether the position of the "protectors" or the "protected" in Egypt presented the greatest difficulties or the most evident anomalies.



YOU ARE TO GO TO CEYLON, ABABU.

had already countersigned the decrees of commutation, and was perfectly prepared to swallow his great disappointment, but he was told to go. Riáz then made a virtue of necessity, sent in a humble request to be relieved of the cares of office, and became for a time very seriously indisposed. The precise nature of the ailment he suffered from never transpired. An able special correspondent telegraphed that it was "suppressed bloodthirstiness," but, when prudently edited, people in London only read "suppressed indignation."

It was manifestly impossible for Lord Dufferin to tolerate the brisk campaign of Franco-Egyptian intrigue which immediately followed the trial of Arábi. Riáz was known to be one of its chief inspirers, and the unseen but "masterful" hand patted Cherif encouragingly on the back, while it firmly withdrew Riáz from a post in which he was doing us as much mischief as possible. Unfortunately for the future of Egypt, Riáz was almost as powerful out of office as in.

It was now decided that Arábi was to go to Ceylon, so I procured a small atlas, and, accompanied by Mr. Beaman, went to the prison (December 8th) to impart this information to Arábi and his friends. We found Arábi writing letters in his cell. As soon as he heard the news of which I was the bearer he



YOU ARE TO GO TO CEYLON, ARAB.



quietly smiled (I never saw Arábi laugh), and said, "This is really too much honour; not content with simply decreeing my exile, my adversaries seem actually bent on sending me to Paradise as well. Have you never heard that when our first parents parted in the plains of Mesopotamia after being driven out from Eden, our common father went to Ceylon, since called 'the Paradise of Adam,' while our common mother reached Hedjáz, since known as 'the Paradise of Eve'? Nothing could be more just. I am driven out of Egypt—'the garden of the world,'—I go to Ceylon,—'the Paradise of Adam'; I hail it as a happy omen." Leaving Arábi's room to visit the other prisoners, I met Ismaïl Eyoub in the corridor, and told him Arábi's ideas about Ceylon. He looked at me incredulously, and then said with perfect sincerity, "My dear friend, nothing will induce me to believe that a peasant like Arábi can be so well versed in ancient history as to know such facts as these!"

Lord Charles Beresford was now in Cairo, where he spared no pains to obtain accurate information as to the real causes of the "warlike operations" in which he had himself taken so conspicuous a part. Few Englishmen ever became more popular in Egypt than he did, and certainly none have had

greater facilities for finding out the whole truth * about the last chapters of her history. As Lord Charles Beresford was anxious to hear Arábi's own story of the bombardment, Mr. Napier mentioned the matter to him. Next day (December 9th) he requested Mr. Napier to transmit the following letter to Lord Charles :—

To the most respected Lord Charles Beresford, &c.

I have the honour to assure your Excellency that no hatred or animosity ever existed between the Egyptians and the English people to cause what has happened ; and what is still more astonishing is, that no Egyptian knows the causes of the war which has taken place between England and Egypt ; and, up to the hour of the bombardment of Alexandria, the Egyptian nation certainly guarded the rights of the English, and not only of the English but those of all their brethren, the Europeans. What I think also is, that the causes of the war are not known to the English people as well.

When the war commenced we were obliged to fight for our own country in obedience to what had been decided in the Cabinet Council, which sat under the presidency of the Khedive and Dervesh Pacha ; and so we did fight, and therefore our fighting was not in violation of the law, because it was declared by the Khedive, the legal governor, and by all the head men of the Government. During the time the war was going on in Alexandria we received many messages from the Khedive, encouraging us to fight, and to be patient and active, though the forts were not strong enough and the arms were bad.

* See *post*.

When the forts were rendered ruinous by the fire of the ships, I withdrew the troops under my command, because I considered my flank and rear threatened, but I always supposed that the English would have landed a force to occupy the town after they had rendered it untenable by bombardment.

I have also the honour to state that had English marines landed on the 11th July, 1882, a terrible engagement would have taken place between both parties, because the English force, at that time, was limited, and there was a comparatively large number of Egyptian soldiers in Alexandria, and you are aware of the difficulties which soldiers encounter when coming to attack troops fortified in their town. But if they had landed on the next day when we retreated they would have been able to do so in the afternoon easily, and they would have preserved the town from being burned and looted.

I have given your Excellency this information in compliance with the request of Mr. Napier, my lawyer, begging you at the same time to accept my best regards.

Believe me,

My Lord, to be

Your friend,

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

Arábi manifested during the latter part of his tedious imprisonment (it must be always remembered he was kept in strict solitary confinement broken only by our daily visits) considerable anxiety to know what was written about him in Europe and the East. His bitter mortification at the altered tone of the Arab press was almost painful to witness. He had not yet sufficiently learned the difference between success and failure. In order to cheer him a little one of our interpreters used to translate into Arabic extracts from

the *Times*, *Standard*, and *Daily News*, which he used to read with great interest. This slight familiarity with European newspapers gave Arábi the first idea of writing himself, for publication in England, some short statements in self-defence. Hence his two letters to the *Times*. Nothing perhaps pleased him more than some of the brief paragraphs about Egypt in *Truth*. He took a great fancy to the name of the paper, and was delighted to see that Mr. Labouchere could always manage to see the Egyptian Question through Egyptian spectacles. The very day before his solitary confinement came to an end, he said he was anxious to tell the truth (*el hakk*) in *Truth*, and so wrote the following letter to Mr. Labouchere:—

SIR,

Cairo, Dec. 11, 1882

I beg to offer you my sincere thanks for having often said the truth about me and my brothers in misfortune. I am perfectly convinced of your pure intentions, and that you have always wanted us to have justice in accordance with truth and equity. There is no doubt that just people help the unfortunate in the time of distress.

Now, as nothing interests me more than the well-being and progress of my native land, and the fortune of its inhabitants, notwithstanding that I am now on the point of leaving it forever, I should like to mention to you some essential matters which, if taken into account, would do the country much good, and would greatly benefit its population. You cannot, I think, get better or more disinterested information than that which an experienced man, and one who has lost all for the love of his country, can give you:—

1. There should be a Chamber of Notables to the Egyptian nation, in order that all laws, decrees, and orders, should not be passed arbitrarily and without its sanction. The members of the Chambers should be granted a perfect freedom in discussing matters, and their election ought to be left entirely to the people, just as it is in other civilized nations; they should also have a right to give their opinion on matters of state, and to give decisions on public matters. The Government, however, should not be compelled to carry out the decisions of the Chamber until the lapse of such time as is necessary to ascertain the capacity of the people for representative institutions. The discussions should be made public by their being published in the Arabic and English newspapers. The Ministers should be responsible to the Chamber of Notables, which should be convoked for a fixed time, not less than five years.

2. There ought to be equality between all the inhabitants of Egypt, and no difference should be made between a foreigner and a native, either in treatment or in taxes. By this equality the Government will be able to abolish the *Verghi* (or land tax), which injures the poor exceedingly.

3. Justice should be done to the peasantry in such works as cleaning the canals, building bridges, carrying out public works, &c.; the workmen should be paid for their labour, and not be forced to work for nothing, for this is the cause of ruin and destruction to the poor, whose existence depends entirely on their daily work.

4. The most essential thing is to put a limit to usury, and to stop people from deceiving the fellaheen and taking their money and property.

5. There should be the same laws in all Courts of Justice in Egypt, and the laws should be carried out without exception and without the interference of any one.

6. The natives should be eligible for all posts in the administration, whether high or low, as long as they are capable of

holding them; and those who have been dismissed for having been mixed up in recent events should have a right to re-employment if worthy of it.

7. It is better to employ as few Europeans as possible, taking into consideration the financial state of the country. These Europeans should be paid in fair proportion to their native colleagues, and not more than they deserve, as is now the rule.

These are my opinions. I ask you to put them before the public, which will judge whether I have right and reason on my side or not. If England will agree with me on these points, I care nothing for exile or any other fate which may be awarded to me.

(Signed) AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

The cases of Mahmoud Fehmy and Yácoub Sámi having been disposed of (December 10th), it now became necessary for the seven exiles to prepare for their departure. At my suggestion it was decided that the corridor at right angles to Arábi's cell should be partitioned off, in order to allow the seven prisoners to circulate without restraint in the rooms it contained. It was manifestly desirable that they should be permitted to discuss freely the various arrangements for their approaching voyage. We were terribly perplexed by the incessant visits we now received from agents, servants, and eunuchs, in search of information as to their masters' plans; and it was plain that no progress could be made till the exiles were allowed to communicate with their families. Ismaïl Eyoub (now Minister of the Interior) good-naturedly came down

to see the carpenters blocking up the end of the corridor, and decided that when the inmates were removed to the new quarters their families should no longer be denied access to them. All this promised well, and our clients were really grateful for the manner in which they had been treated.

During the time which had elapsed between the trial of Arábi (December 3rd) and that of Yácoub Sámi (December 10th) Lord Dufferin had received more than one striking proof of the satisfaction felt by the Egyptians at the policy of clemency. Even Sultán Pacha had been good enough to express his approval of the course which had been pursued,* while Nubár frankly admitted to everybody that in presence of the "universality of incrimination," any other conclusion would have been impossible. From this moment, however, the Egyptian Government, for some inexplicable reason, seems to have resolved to do their utmost to vary the details of the compromise to the prejudice of our clients, and we again

* Lord Dufferin to Lord Granville.

MY LORD,

Cairo, December 7, 1882.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Sultán Pacha called on me to-day to express his great satisfaction at the way in which the trial of Arábi and his fellow-prisoners had been brought to a close. As Sultán Pacha possesses considerable influence in the country his expression of opinion is important.

found ourselves unwillingly involved in a perpetual contest, which only ended when they finally embarked for Ceylon.

Before proceeding further with my description of the going into exile of Arábi and his friends, it is well that I should, even at the risk of being tedious, clearly place once more before my readers the terms upon which we accepted the arrangement which put an end to the proceedings. They can hardly be better stated than in the very language used by Lord Dufferin himself :—

Arábi and his associates will be charged simply with rebellion before the Court Martial. To this charge they will plead guilty. In the event of the Court pronouncing a capital sentence, it will be submitted to the Khedive, who will commute it into perpetual exile. The prisoners will give their parole that they will proceed to any locality which may be indicated to them, and that they will there remain, unless invited to remove. Should they return surreptitiously to Egypt, the capital sentence may be enforced against them, without a new trial. By a subsequent Decree of the Khedive, their property will be confiscated; but the property of their wives will not be touched. The Egyptian Government undertakes to provide each prisoner with an allowance sufficient for his maintenance.

By another Edict, the military prisoners will be degraded from their respective ranks.

These words will be found to furnish an appropriate text for the rest of my narrative.

By the morning of the 13th December the rough wooden partition and door erected at the end of the



PREPARING FOR EXILE. WHO SHALL WE TAKE WITH US?



corridor were completed, and the apartments within swept out and prepared for their inmates. The servants of the prisoners had been informed of what was to take place, and were now ready and waiting to assist in the business of removal. In a very short time carpets, mosquito curtains, beds, brass utensils, and crockery were transferred to the new rooms, and Arábi crossed the passage and stood inside the screen to greet each of his "brethren in captivity" on their arrival. The ten weeks' tribulation which had separated them had apparently intensified their regard for each other, and the first meeting of the seven Nationalist leaders was as cordial as the manners of the East could make it. There was much embracing, touching of hands, and a few tears; Toulba alone continued to suffer from his asthma and would not be comforted. It was curious to see Arabi's self-evident leadership now assert itself; he seemed to tower above his fellows, and nothing was ever done or said without his opinion being first sought for. They were all accustomed to hang on his very words, and even Toulba tried to forget his pain when Arábi told him to be of good cheer and not vex them with his down-cast looks. Arábi's apartment became, by tacit consent, their common place of meeting, and at my request they lost no time in preparing the lists of the persons who they proposed taking with them to the Paradise of Adam.

Next morning (December 14th), on arriving at the Daira Saniya, I found these memoranda had been already completed. As might be expected they varied very greatly in extent, from that of Mahmoud Sâmi, comprising only his body servant, down to Ali Fehmy's, which included even eunuchs and poor relations. The Egyptian household has many remote ramifications, and in the first enthusiasm of the idea some of our clients seem to have meditated a wholesale migration to Ceylon.

As soon as I obtained the lists I took them to Ismail Eyoub in his new office. The *Dakhaliyeh* (Ministry of the Interior) was once one of the pleasant palaces of Ismail Sadyk the Mufettich. Its great airy central hall and double staircases had served for the National Councils of July and August, but nothing had been either destroyed or disturbed. The delicate silk draperies which still ornament the windows and doors are now the only memorials of the time when its original owner held high revel within its walls. Patient antichambering is an essential feature of the daily routine of all Eastern Governmental Departments, and the peculiar construction of the Egyptian Home Office is admirably adapted to assist it. The upper and lower halls afforded a cool and pleasant lounge, where coffee, cigarettes, and gossip helped kill the passing time; while in a cosy retreat beyond the Minister's own Master of

Ceremonies sat in state, and ushered the most favoured guests, one after another, through a double line of *janissaries* in scarlet and gold, into the august presence of his chief. I found Ismail Eyoub seated on a velvet divan behind a small lacquered table, busily engaged in applying the seal which was attached to his watch-chain to numerous Arabic documents, obsequiously presented to him by his predecessor's son-in-law. I gave him the lists I had brought with me. He told me that they must be shortened, and that no exile could be allowed to take more than one male and one female servant. I promised to see his wishes complied with. He then said quietly, "We are thinking of sending four of your clients to Ceylon, and three to Hong Kong; I suppose you will not make any difficulties?" I at once answered that such a change was a gross breach of our original arrangement, and that I should certainly offer it all the opposition in my power. I told him at the same time that I was morally responsible to my clients for the strict observance of the terms of the compromise; and that I had no intention of losing their confidence.* I went back to the Daira Saniya with my lists, feeling very uncomfortable indeed.

* After much negotiation the idea was abandoned. The exiles never even knew the danger which threatened them.

The scene in the exiles' corridor was now entirely changed. Stalwart eunuchs were guarding three of the inner rooms, in which Arábi, Abd-el-Ál and Ali Fehmy were receiving visits for the first time since their imprisonment from their wives and other female relatives; *vekils* were making up accounts, *fellah* brethren from the interior were discussing grievances and the crops, tradesmen were importunately seeking for the settlement of outstanding bills, vendors of red caps were offering their wares, one of the prisoners was executing a power of attorney in favour of Reouf Pacha, the President of the Court Martial, while a goodly band of "rebel" olive branches were alternately embracing their parents and getting in everybody's way. As soon as the ladies were gone I called a council in Arábi's room. The news of the proposed restriction caused some little lamentation: there was no help, however, but to comply with it. After much consultation fresh lists were prepared. The following are specimens taken at random from amongst my duplicate copies:—

List presented by Abd-el-Ál.

Abd-el-Ál.

Saïd Hilmy (son).

Suleimán (brother).

Ali Elmas (servant).

Zakieb Hanem (sister).

Doulfara (female servant).

List presented by Ali Fehmy.

Ali Fehmy.
 Aziz Fehmy (son).
 Muhamed Ali Fehmy (son).
 Lady Aideel (wife).
 Hamideh Hanem (daughter).
 Zeineb Hanem (daughter).
 Roujkoul Hanem (sister-in-law).
 Fatmah (daughter).
 Halimeh (female servant).
 Moharam (eunuch).

In consequence of the limitation now imposed the wives of two or three of the exiles declined quitting Egypt. The Egyptian Government was well versed in these refinements of annoyance which no ordinary European could be expected to understand. To the oriental mind there is little difference between the dishonour of their women and the absence of eunuchs, and so our clients pleaded energetically for the company of their trusted Nubians. I went back to Ismail Eyoub with my new lists, and extemporized a touching appeal to his Moslem sympathies on the subject of the eunuchs. For two whole hours the business of the Home Office was suspended while I discussed with the Secretary of State the momentous question as to whether one eunuch was to be counted as the equivalent of two female servants or *vice versa*. In the result all the exiles who were accompanied

by their wives, managed to take a eunuch in their train.

The Egyptian Government knew better than anybody else that the houses occupied by the families of our seven clients were, without exception, either rented from strangers or the private property of their wives, and therefore exempt from seizure. Four out of the seven exiles had married ladies from the Khedivial harím, and every Egyptian was perfectly well aware that the dwelling they lived in, the furniture it contained, and the jewels which adorned their persons, formed the dowry which they brought their husbands. Common delicacy of feeling would in any ordinary case have been sufficient to protect these unfortunate women from insult and outrage, to which I fear they were not altogether unaccustomed, but it soon became evident that no pity was to be shown either to the "rebels" or their defenceless families.*

On the 15th December a decree was issued not only forfeiting the property of the seven exiles, *but declaring them civilly dead, and incapable of inherit-*

* Yácoub Sámi solemnly declared, in a written statement, that on returning home one night in the early summer of 1882, he found his wife (who had been an ex-inmate of the vice-regal seraglio), lying in the garden, almost insensible from a castigation she had received from the Palace eunuchs for revealing secrets to her husband and Arábi. From that moment Yácoub Sámi (although a Turk) became a most ardent Nationalist.

ance. Here was the first flagrant violation of the terms of our compromise as noted by Lord Dufferin himself. That very same evening Turkish and Circassian guards were let loose on the houses occupied by the prisoners' families. The next morning a select committee from the *Dakhaliyeh* was sent to each of them for the ostensible purpose of making an inventory of the contents. To the eternal shame of the Egyptian Government the sanctity of the *harím* was violated, and the privacy of the women rudely intruded upon. At a very early hour I received letters on the subject from my clients. *Arábi* wrote:—

To my friend and defender Mr. Broadley.

I am informed that guards have been put on the doors of our houses to prevent people from going in and out, and to keep guard over the furniture. My house is only hired, and all the the goods in it are my wife's property. Nothing in it belongs to me but my clothes. Please tell the Government this, that they may remove the guards. (December 16th 1882.)

AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

Ali Fehmy also wrote:—

My servants tell me guards sent by the Prefect of Police have entered my house and insist on remaining in it. The said house, and all the furniture therein, is the property of my wife. They were her dowry when I received her from the *harím* of Ismail Pacha, my master. I pray you protect us from this great injustice.

(Signed) ALI FEHMY.

Mr. Napier immediately went to the *Daira Saniya* to allay, if possible, the anxiety of the prisoners. I

started in search of Ismaïl Eyoub, while Mrs. Napier offered to undertake the task of consoling the ladies in their different homes. Ismaïl Eyoub protested complete ignorance of what had taken place, and gave me a letter to the Prefect of Police.

I now called for the first time on Osmán Pacha Gháleb, who had contrived to obliterate all recollection of "the hearty congratulations and 10,000 measures of wheat" he had offered to the defenders of his country at Kafr-el-Dowár, by doing his utmost to harass and vex the very same defenders of his country when they had fallen into the hands of their enemies. He has since managed to arrive at very high rank indeed, and his loyalty is now entirely beyond question. Osmán Pacha received me civilly enough, and even entered into a lengthy explanation as to why he had supported Arábi up to a certain point, and was then conscientiously unable to go with him any further. Osmán Pacha Gháleb impressed me unfavourably. He is essentially a courtier, incapable of looking you straight in the face, and perfectly ready to do anything which he imagines would be agreeable to the party in power. Osmán Pacha is by no means devoid of ability, and, if Arábi had succeeded, would doubtless have made his mark as a patriot. He seemed anxious to talk of everything except the immediate object of my visit.

While sitting on a sofa in his office, and discussing his coffee and cigarettes, he showed me a drawer full of photographs of Arábi. He said that a few days previously, "acting on superior orders," he had destroyed over a dozen negatives in the different photographers' shops in Cairo, and seized some thousands of printed copies; but in spite of all this the portrait was still being reproduced all over Egypt. He protested he was quite unable to understand it: "Arábi had failed—what could the people want any more with Arábi?"

The Cairo Prefecture of Police is in itself a great curiosity. A squalid court-yard which leads to it is surrounded by a two-storied prison of a rabbit-warren-like character, wholly unventilated and undrained. Inside the main entrance is a hall crowded always with clerks, policemen, witnesses, and people "hungry after justice." Beyond is the Prefect's own room, with a long low divan running round it, a fine mahogany office-table behind which the great man sits, and narrow windows looking into a little green garden full of verdure and rustling palm-trees. At last, after much discussion, I induced Osmán Pacha to promise he would withdraw all the guards from the prisoners' houses save one, that no kind of intrusion into the building itself would be permitted, and that persons going in and out should be spared the indignity of a personal search.

On my road home I met Mr. Napier. It now seemed things were really worse than I imagined. He had just got a letter from his wife who informed him that "two civilians and some soldiers had entered Ali Fehmy's house, gone all over it, and had even seen the ladies without their veils." Mrs. Napier begged we would come there at once, as she was not sure whether the guards at the door would allow her to pass out. We lost no time in complying with her request, but before we had arrived there a fresh incident had occurred. The Khedive was accustomed to pass Ali Fehmy's door each day at noon on his way from his official residence at Abdín to his palace in the Ismalia suburb. Maddened by what had happened, Ali Fehmy's wife waited for him, and when his carriage appeared, rushed unveiled and bare-headed into the street, holding her youngest child in her arms, and cried out, "Oh Tewfik! you have insulted a woman of your father's harím. Have you forgotten that before I became the wife of Ali Fehmy I was of the harím of Ismail? Dishonoured and unveiled as I now am, the shame is as much yours as mine!" The spectators gently led her back through the garden of jasmine and orange-trees to her house. Tewfik changed his route the next day, and the wife of Ali Fehmy was never molested afterwards. When we got there peace had been in a

measure restored, and the poor woman consoled herself by pouring out her griefs to us from behind a screen in a voice often broken with sobs. As her misfortunes had been by no means exceptional (some ladies going to Mahmoud Sâmi's house had been actually searched by the guards), we made the strongest representations in the quarter from which alone any satisfactory redress could be expected. Once more "the iron hand in a velvet glove" made itself felt; Major Chermiside was deputed to calm the Prefect's loyal ardour, and the functions of his policemen at the gates of the "rebels" were henceforth confined to the attributes of ordinary door-porters.

Preparations for departure now went slowly on. The exiles decided to leave me a procuration to liquidate their affairs, which I transferred for the time being to Mr. Beaman. Arrangements for a coming journey seem hardly to enter into the usual ideas of Egyptian domestic economy, and the outfit which the wives of the exiles now set about providing themselves with was certainly rather extraordinary. As far as I could ascertain it chiefly consisted of warm coats and vast supplies of sugar and coffee—all somewhat superfluous in Ceylon. Each successive visitor seemed to display fresh ingenuity in retailing to the exiles the most fantastic legends as to the climate and inhabitants of their destined abode. Somebody sent Arâbi by post

Punch's cartoon of "Araby the Blest," and it exercised him greatly. He could not forgive (he who never smoked or tasted wine) the cigar depicted in his hand or the soda-water and brandy on the table beside him. His fellow-prisoners gave our interpreters no peace till the text was translated, and Mr. Punch's account of the Sultan's imaginary reflections on the result of the trial was highly appreciated in a quarter probably little dreamt of by the writer.

A day or two later the Egyptian Government lighted on a new difficulty. The exiles might go to the same place, but not in the same ship. The accommodation on board the vessel which had been chartered was insufficient; the passengers would be cramped, and make all Europe ring with their complaints. Such was the theory propounded to me somewhat timidly by Ismail Eyoub, when I called on him at the *Dakhaliyeh* a few days later.

Now the Egyptian Government had hired a very large steamer—the "Mareotis"—to convey our clients and their families to Colombo, and it was actually being fitted up for the voyage under the care of Captain Bloomfield, the Port-Superintendent at Alexandria. I must do the Egyptian authorities the justice to say that all these arrangements were carried out wholly regardless of expense, but this only made the plea of want of room all the more ridiculous. It

afterwards turned out that the "Mareotis" could have taken three times as many passengers. The bare idea of a separation filled the minds of the prisoners with suspicion and dismay. Nothing but sheer force could induce them to go on board under these circumstances.

It was suggested that they should write to the Egyptian Cabinet through me declaring their willingness to put up cheerfully with even the most straitened accommodation provided they could all go together. One of their *vekils* (agents) accordingly drew up this rather obsequious letter:—

To Mr. Broadley the Lawyer, our Defender.

As we are going together, we do not think of any want of accommodation there may be in the steamer, seeing that we can only be happy together and accompanied by our wives and children in the same boat. And we offer our best thanks to His Highness the Khedive for his handsome treatment towards us, which we shall not forget in all time, and shall pray for his prosperity.

One or two of the exiles put their seals to it, when it was brought to Arábi. "Have you," he asked, turning to Yácoub Sámi, "signed this? I would rather be cut in pieces first. I have said, and say, that Tewfik is unfit to reign over us. How then can I lie and promise to pray for his prosperity? We have, at any rate, not fallen so low as this." I never remember seeing Arábi to greater advantage. He then drafted himself the following note, which I afterwards sent to Cherif Pacha:—

To our Counsel Mr. Broadley.

We beg to call the attention of the Egyptian Government to our unanimous wish to make the voyage together to the place appointed, and, since it is our own desire to go in company with our families, we should never think of complaining of want of accommodation in the steamer. At the same time we are anxious to express our thanks to the Egyptian Government for its treatment of us here, and the measures taken to arrange for our departure from Egypt. Dec. 21st, 1882.

(Signed) MAHMOUD SÁMI.
AHMED ARÁBI.
YÁCOUB SÁMI.
MAHMOUD FEHMY.
ALI FEHMY.
TOULBA OSMAT.
ABD-EL-ÁL HILMY.

The last days of our clients' stay in Egypt were approaching. Their lists of companions in exile were now finally settled and approved, and the inmates of their houses were busy in packing up their various belongings. Mr. Beaman and Major Chermiside assisted Sir Charles Wilson in securing them freedom from molestation while so doing; but the Egyptian Government once more illegally interfered, and declared none of the ladies must take with them a larger sum than 200*l*. By dint of unusual activity on all sides, the morning of Christmas Day saw all the baggage duly secured and approved by the police in anticipation of the order to start which was every moment expected.

My readers will remember* that it had been agreed between all parties that at some time subsequent to the formal trial the exiles were to be deprived *by decree* of their rank and dignities. No man ever cared less for outward pomp and glitter than Arábi, and nothing affected him less than the prospect of the loss of his title and decorations. Just a week before the compromise was concluded, he wrote the following very characteristic letter to Mr. Blunt:—

To my friend, the preserver of my life, Mr. Wilfrid Blunt.
May God keep, &c.

After presenting to you my salutations, &c.,

Now I have to tell you that I care nothing for the position I am in—for prison, for insults, or for what may happen after, since I have offered myself a legacy (*wakf*) to the freedom of my country, nor does anything interest me except the deliverance of the people of my native land from the pit of those vipers, and from the fangs of that great dragon (where they lie),—this by the wisdom of the enlightened men of the English nation, who are zealous for their nation's honour.

And next, if there is time in the term of my life, I should wish to live free at Damascus with my children, keeping aloof from political affairs as long as I am out of Egypt; and, if the Sultan and the Moslems will not permit my dwelling among the Moslems, then I should prefer to live in London among our brethren the helpers of humanity, as a free man in the land of freedom—not under custody or supervision. Thus, also, my comrades do, who laid down their souls in the path of their country. They desire to live free. And I solemnly pledge my

* Vide page 315 and page 392.

word not to interfere in political matters while I remain far from my country and "until God shall have completed what he has decreed." (Korán).

Then, as to how the enemy has attempted to cast suspicion on me for the events of the 11th of June and the 12th of July, this is mere evil-speaking, nor can it be supported by the least title of evidence or proof, since such acts are contrary to our honourable performance. By this they endeavoured to excite Europe to dissolve as atoms of the air the liberties we had gained for our country. And yet, perhaps, some good may come out of this to our people so that they may obtain the completion of their freedom, and be delivered by the turning of the hearts of the English to them, and in spite of the efforts of their open enemy.

I care nothing for accidental titles of honour (his title of Pacha, of which he had been deprived), for I never at all desired them. I am satisfied with my own honour, for that will accompany me through life and after death. I wish to be called only by the name of

AHMED ARÁBI the Egyptian.

Cairo, Nov. 23.

On the 24th of December I read with no surprise the following Decree in the *Official Journal* :—

NOUS, KHÉDIVE D'EGYPTE,

Vu les Arrêts de la Cour Martiale en date des 22, 26, et 29 Moharem 1300 (3, 7, et 10 Décembre 1882);

Vu nos Décrets en date des 22, 26, et 29 Moharem 1300 (3, 7, et 10 Décembre 1882);

Notre Conseil des Ministres entendu ;

DÉCRÉTONS:

ARTICLE PREMIER.

Ahmed Arábi, Toulba Osmat, Abd-el-Ál Hilmy, Mahmoud

Sâmi, Ali Fehmy, Mahmoud Fehmy et Yâcoub Sâmi sont déclarés déchus de tous leurs titres, grades et dignités et rayés à jamais des cadres de l'armée Egyptienne.

ARTICLE 2.

Nos Ministres de l'Intérieur et de la Guerre et de la Marine sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent Décret.

Fait au palais d'Abdine, le 10 Seffer 1300 (21 Décembre 1882).

(Signé) MÉHÉMET TEWFIK.

Par le Khédive.

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,

(Signé) CHERIF.

Le Ministre de l'Intérieur,

(Signé) ISMAÏL EYOUB.

Le Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine,

(Signé) OMAR LOUTFI.

The deprivation of honours was fully expected, but it was certainly a little anomalous to dismiss the exiles from an army which had already been officially declared non-existent.

On the morning of Christmas Day I had a long last talk with my clients. Arâbi gave me his little black rosary and his carpet as a souvenir, and I exchanged photographs with all the exiles. They had made up their minds to cheerfully accept the inevitable; to put their firm trust in England; to loyally observe the parole given to Lord Dufferin, and to show themselves in every way worthy of the cause

for which they suffered. Their words were full of hope for Egypt, and confidence in England. Their expressions of gratitude to Mr. Blunt were both heartfelt and touching. I left the Daira Saniya delighted with the language and demeanour of the friends I was so soon to see no more.

The Egyptian authorities could not resist aiming one last blow at the prestige and *amour propre* of their departing foes. Without our knowledge they meditated celebrating Christmas Day with a ceremony which constituted a direct violation of the terms we had both agreed to. This unhandsome act on their part was all the more wantonly malicious because the spectacle they had improvised was so objectless and meaningless that it only served to bring down on its authors the ridicule of the whole European press. Quite apart from our own assurances, the language of Lord Dufferin's despatch * makes it sufficiently evident that neither Mr. Napier or myself ever imagined that the deprivation of our clients' "accidental honours," *by decree*, would be made the occasion of a public exhibition by the Cherif Cabinet. It deeply wounded the feelings of the exiles at the time, but it gained no advantage or glory for the persons who invented it. Every impartial spectator regarded it in no other

* Vide p. 392.

light than that of a virtual confession of political impotency.

This is what happened. Shortly after two o'clock on the afternoon of Christmas Day two hired carriages were suddenly driven up to the Daira Saniya. The prisoners were directed to put on their overcoats, and follow the jailer Osmán Shareef. They did so with trepidation fearing some really serious treachery. On arriving at the gateway they were ordered to enter the carriages in company with a police-officer. Arábi and friends were dressed in their private clothes, and one or two of them had not even time given them to put on their boots. They were then driven by the most unfrequented streets to the Kasr-el-Nil barracks. Here a small body of Egyptian troops was drawn up in square, while the British soldiers sauntering about the great quadrangle and occupying the galleries above did duty as spectators, and cheered at intervals. The prisoners were placed in the centre, and an officer somewhat tremulously read out the Khedivial Decree. An order was then given to the Egyptians to shout "Long live the Khedive!" The exiles were formally asked for their swords and orders, but it was manifest from the first that they had been left at home. The prisoners were then requested to re-enter the carriages. Just as Arábi was about to do so, a

“loyal” Kaimakan (Captain), named Elfi, cried out “Oh Arábi, you have brought the English to Egypt!” This ill-timed reproach may be well taken as a keynote to Egyptian feeling concerning us. A crowd of natives was now gathering, and there was hardly one who did mutter “God save you!” as the seven Egyptian Nationalists passed by on their way back to prison. Under similar circumstances the Egyptians were accustomed to see the epaulets torn from off the shoulder, the decorations snatched from the breast, and the sword broken on the knee; but all this was missing here. Our faithful Hasan’s commentary was not singular: “God is great! You see even the Khedive dare not touch Arábi.”

As soon as we heard what had taken place Mr. Napier and I went to the prison and endeavoured to restore, as best we could, our clients’ disturbed equanimity. After what had happened I must confess we were much relieved to hear that the “Mareotis” had already passed through the Canal, with orders to start for Ceylon on the following evening. An uncomfortable dread of fresh surprises had taken possession of our mind, and our confidence in the fair dealing of the Egyptian Government was hopelessly shaken. In the best interests of our clients it was advisable to hasten the end.

There was, however, yet another matter of extreme

urgency which we were compelled to arrange with the Home Office on the very eve of the exiles' departure. All of them wanted money; some of them were absolutely penniless. We at last succeeded in obtaining for each of them an advance of 30*l.* on their allowance in Ceylon.*

The great ladies of Cairo did not forget Arábi at the moment of his going into banishment. Silently and cautiously, for fear of Tewfik, they set about providing him with a goodly outfit; one sent two English portmanteaus; a second contributed a large

* Mr. Beaman says most truthfully:—

"It is a significant fact that whilst a subordinate post enables a man at present to lay by sufficient riches in the course of a few months to guarantee him against the future, the seven exiles now in Ceylon, who for the space of a year may almost be said to have held Egypt in fee simple, left their country in actual penury. Arábi, who might easily have amassed over a million, was dependent on friends for a portmanteau filled with clothing sent to him at the railway station, and for some time past his family have been reduced to accept a monthly charity of 10*l.* which others, not wishing to make themselves known, have transmitted through my hands. Yácoub Sámi, Arábi's *alter ego*, commandant of Cairo during the months of the war, and for some time in a position to have accumulated enormous wealth, left Egypt in debt for the furniture of his small house, and absolutely penniless. And so with the others. It is in no spirit of hero-worship of the exiles, or of inuendo against their successors, that this is written. But it scarcely seems to be sufficiently known and appreciated why the Egyptian people elected as one man to throw in their lot with those who had risen from among their own ranks, who knew their bitter wrongs, and who were ready to defend their new-found rights rather than remain loyal to the hereditary sovereign."—*Fortnightly Review*, November 1883, p. 636.

Korán; another an embroidered prayer-carpet; a fourth a dressing-bag; a fifth a picnic-basket, and so on. It was originally planned that the special train for Suez should start from the siding in the middle of the Kasr-el-Nil barracks punctually at nine o'clock at night on the 26th December. During the afternoon all the baggage (including Arábi's trousseau) was conveyed thither, and the wives remaining in Egypt were allowed to bid farewell to their husbands at the prison. The hour and place of departure were kept a profound secret. At the last moment an intimation was sent to us that the voyage would be postponed owing to the prevalence of bad weather at Suez. As a precaution against possible surprises we had fortunately placed Hasan on sentry duty at the prison. It was nearly ten o'clock when he rushed breathlessly into our room to say that Arábi and his friends had already left the Daira Saniya. Mr. Napier (who was going as far as Suez) went to fetch his luggage, while I drove as rapidly as I could to Kasr-el-Nil.

The scene at the "Castle of the Nile" was a very picturesque one. It was bright moonlight, and as I entered the great square I saw the train had already drawn up. Three sides of the quadrangle are made up of the soldiers' barracks, lofty buildings with fronts of arched verandahs, piled one above the other; the fourth comprises the gilded saloons of the Kasr-

el-Nil Palace and the Egyptian War Office. A line of railway sharply bisects the square in its centre, from right to left, just enough of the surrounding structures being cut away on either side to leave room for a train to pass. There is no kind of platform, and the rails of the siding are on a level with the pavement. The arcades of the barracks and the more florid architecture of the Palace stood out distinctly in the clear moonlight, which seemed to almost dim the flames of the torches held by some of the soldiers of the Egyptian guard. Immediately in front of the carriages a small knot of interested spectators, including Sir Charles Wilson, Mr. Mackenzie Wallace, and Osmán Pacha Ghaleb, had collected. The train was a very long one, almost stretching across the square from one side to the other. In front were the ladies with their children and luggage; behind, the servants, the heavy baggage, and a guard of the King's Royal Rifle Corps (60th regiment) under the command of Major Fraser. Some Egyptian officers and a few soldiers were also there to accompany the exiles to Suez. A first-class carriage in the centre was reserved for Arábi and his companions. When I reached Kasrel-Nil they had already taken their seats. Arábi, Mahmoud Fehmy, and Abd-el-Ál were in one compartment; Toulba, Ali Fehmy, Mahmoud Sámi, and Yácoub Sámi in another. They seemed far more

cheerful than any ordinary set of Englishmen would be under similar circumstances. I clambered up to the windows to wish them good-bye, and Arábi once more said a few grateful words.

The order to start was on the point of being given when Mr. Beaman brought the news that the policeman at Arábi's house would not allow his son's wife and her sister to leave it. What was to be done? It was becoming late, the Cairo station-master deprecated any further delay, and the quarter of the city in which Arábi's people lived was some distance off. Sir Charles Wilson, however, clearly told Osmán Pacha Ghaleb with some decision of tone that the train could not leave till the missing ladies arrived, whereupon the Prefect of Police made a virtue of necessity, and sent his own carriage to fetch them. Then followed a long and awkward pause. Some of the servants came up to say good-bye to me. Mr. Napier secured a place for himself and Arábi's portman-teaus, one or two of the English officers on duty shook hands with Arábi, and Major Fraser himself (to our clients' very evident satisfaction) took a seat by his side. At last the two women, clad entirely in white, arrived, and quickly disappeared in one of the carriages set apart for the ladies of the party. The door was barely closed upon them when the signal to start was given, and in an instant the train which bore

Arábi and his friends into exile vanished behind the walls of Kasr-el-Nil. It was now nearly midnight, but I remained behind for a time, at the invitation of some of the officers of the second battalion of the Highland Light Infantry, to see the splendidly-decorated apartment which was now their mess-room, and had served only four months previously for the sittings of the Egyptian National Committee.

I can very appropriately bring my narrative of Arábi's trial to a close with his departure from Kasr-el-Nil. The same building which witnessed his earlier successes and later triumphs saw him disappear, for awhile at least, from the stage of Egyptian history. It was here he was liberated from imprisonment by the indignant soldiery; from Kasr-el-Nil the regiment he commanded marched to the *pronunciamento* of Abdin; at Kasr-el-Nil he laboured as Egyptian Minister of War, and it was here also sat the *Medjlis-el-Orfi*, which confided to him the defence of his country. At Kasr-el-Nil I may well let the curtain fall on that portion of his story I have tried to tell. How strange must have been Arábi's own reflections and thoughts as he sat in the moonlit courtyard of Kasr-el-Nil patiently waiting for the departure of the train which was in a few minutes to take him away from the scene of all the most striking episodes of his career into exile!

CHAPTER XXX.

THE FATE OF THE RANK AND FILE.

No sooner had the formal sentence of the Court Martial been passed on the last of the "accused of the first category" than the Egyptian Government began somewhat leisurely to concern itself about the fate of the rank and file. Not only were the prisons of the interior filled to overflowing, but nearly one hundred persons were still confined on a general and undefined charge of high treason in the *Daira Saniya*. Some of the accused in the provinces had sent their agents to the capital for the purpose of securing our services, and we had also accepted retainers on behalf of several of the prisoners detained in the extemporized jail at Cairo, although we were only allowed to see our clients after the final acceptance of the compromise concerning Arábi and his most prominent associates. Almost the last words spoken by Arábi while waiting at *Kasr-el-Nil* were to remind me of his oft-repeated request to watch over the fate

of his comrades, and we certainly spared no exertion to follow his instructions, and secure for his adherents as favourable conditions as it was possible to expect.

At this time (December 25th) Mr. Napier and I were jointly charged with the interests of the following prisoners:—Sheikh Muhamed Abdú, Colonel Abdul Gaffár Bey, Ahmed Bey Rifát, Osmán Pacha Fouzy, Hasan Moosa El Akád, Colonel Kadr Kadr, and Sheikh Hasan El Edwi (of whom I have already spoken at length), besides Emin Bey Shemsi and Ahmed Bey Abáza (the two principal merchants and landowners of Zagazig), Ahmed Mahmoud and Ibrahim Vekil (two members of the Egyptian Chamber), Hasan Pacha Sherai (ex-Minister of Religious Endowments), Mohana Effendi Omar (a notable of Assiout), Hasan Pacha Drámanli (ex-Under-Secretary for the Interior), Suleimán Gomor and the brothers Elfi (also of Zagazig), Muhamed Sadr, a native lawyer, and Colonel Ibrahim Fouzy: nineteen persons in all.

It was at first intended to perpetuate the system of nominal trials, and pass sentences of imprisonment, exile, or fine on all the lesser offenders who should be found guilty. With the exception of the charge against Hasan Moosa and Osmán Pacha Fouzy, the other cases were almost identical. Our clients had, along with the rest of the Egyptians, taken a more

or less prominent part in the struggle for freedom, and not being Turks or Circassians, or possessed of powerful friends at Court, they had been selected to pay the penalty of their patriotism. As the case of Arábi had settled technically the plea of rebellion, it was clear we had nothing to hope from the Egyptian tribunals. While we were taking counsel with our clients as to the most advantageous course to pursue, the Commission of Inquiry released unconditionally Hasan Pacha Sherai, the brothers Elfi, and Colonel Ibrahim Fouzy.

In the best interests of the accused I made a proposal to the Egyptian Government that the whole matter, as far as the individuals we represented were concerned, should be dealt with by an administrative decree of exile. The idea was not only adopted but extended to pending cases generally. A modification favourable to the prisoners was subsequently introduced providing for the immediate release of a great number of persons either on giving security for good behaviour or undertaking to reside on their estates.

The Minister of the Interior (with the concurrence of the Commission of Inquiry and Sir Charles Wilson) was charged with the preparation of a classified list of the prisoners preparatory to the issue of the decrees, and we were to be allowed every facility for the making of any representations we might think fit as to the

merits of the different cases entrusted to us. Not only did our clients approve the arrangement, but many of them were delighted to escape the ordeal of a public trial and the necessity of pleading guilty.

Hasan Drámanli and Hasan Pacha Sherai I saw for too short a time to pronounce any opinion as to their personal worth. Emín Bey Shemsi, Ibrahim Vekil, Ahmed Mahmoud, and Muhamed Sadr, were men of intelligence, perfectly capable of assisting in the self-government of their country, and all four zealous Freemasons. Ahmed Bey Abáza I never met. He was released at Zagazig, and hundreds of his tenants dragged the boat which bore him homewards in triumph to his great country-house in the Sharkieh. Old Suleimán Gomor and Colonel Ibrahim Fouzy had fought during the war.

As nobody was able to specify the exact charge against each individual "rebel," the task of the Commissioners of Preliminary Inquiry was a very difficult one. Their perplexity was increased by a schism which had broken out in their ranks between the new President and another member, who thought he had the best right to the place. When the list was at last presented to Ismail Eyoub and Sir Charles Wilson it was almost useless. Those prisoners who were not charged with "going to the war" were gravely indicted for "wanting to go to the war," "sympathizing

with the war," distributing the *Taif* newspaper, "dressing up animals as General Wolseley," "wishing Arábi success," "blaspheming the name of the Khedive," &c.

In fairness to Ismaïl Eyoub I must say he did his best to do impartial justice at the eleventh hour, and gave us every opportunity of urging all we could on behalf of our clients. These final negotiations were tedious in the extreme, and my remaining days in Egypt were almost entirely spent in endless and weary pilgrimages from the office of Ismaïl Eyoub in the *Dakhaliyeh* to the Cabinet of Cherif Pacha in the *Kharajiyeh* (Foreign Office). At last, when I had almost come to be regarded as a permanent haunter of these Egyptian antechambers, I had the extreme satisfaction of seeing Cherif and Ismaïl Eyoub seal the decrees which were to bring our mission in Egypt to an end. Riáz's son, Mahmoud Bey, Cherif's son, Ahmed Bey, and Tigrane Pacha, on many occasions did their best to help me in hastening a solution.

At last all was settled. By the decrees now issued (December 29th), Sheikh Abdú was exiled from Egypt for three years, Abdul Gaffár Bey for eight, Ahmed Rifát Bey and Colonel Kadr Kadr for five, Hasan Moosa for twenty (at Massowah), and Muhamed Sadr for twelve months. Osmán Pacha Fouzy, Emin Bay Shemsi, and the rest of our clients, were released, with or without bail, on undertaking to live

for the time to come on their *abádiehs*, or country estates. In several cases the amount of bail fixed was large, and the persons who gave it were required to deposit it in hard cash, but we took every possible precaution to guard against an ultimate forfeiture, and saw copies of the receipts for it deposited in the British Consulate.

In this manner the end of the year 1882 saw the close of our labours. I decided to leave Cairo on the evening of the 1st January. Urgent business in Tunis compelled me to postpone till a more convenient season a visit to the Pyramids, the mosques rich in tracery and fret-work, the Tombs of the Caliphs, and the Citadel. Even honest Hasan's tempting offer to show me Cairo in eight hours, according to a special process he had invented for the benefit of Anglo-Indian travellers, was powerless to wring from me an extra day. I was in no mood for sight-seeing. No other pilgrim to the Nile valley had, perhaps, ever seen so little of Egypt, and at the same time so much of the Egyptians. The knowledge I felt I had acquired of the sentiments and ideas of the Egyptian people, and of the innermost workings of Egyptian hearts, more than compensated me for my imperfect acquaintance with the beauties of material Egypt. Nay, more—I am not even ashamed to say that, during the ten weeks we were engaged in the defence

of Arábi and his friends, all I saw of outward and visible Cairo was strictly limited to two palaces, two public offices, two streets, and one prison.

When I told those amongst our clients who had not yet been released of my approaching return to Tunis, Ahmed Rifát Bey prayed me most earnestly that I would allow both him and his family to accompany me. After the revelations he had made, Egypt was no longer a possible place of residence, and he felt sure my going would be the signal of some fresh indignity. It was in vain Osmán Pacha Ghaleb in person endeavoured to persuade his wife that Tunis under French rule was little better than *dar-el-harb*, or infidel territory. Madame Rifát plainly told him that what was good for her husband was good for her and her children, and she would brave a much worse journey for his sake. This brave little Turkish matron, who had never travelled before, quietly packed up her belongings, and sent to tell me ten thousand Prefects of Police would not prevent her joining the Bey before the night-train for Alexandria started. The barest hint to Ismail Eyoub that I might possibly postpone my departure was sufficient to get Rifát's passports signed and sealed with the greatest possible despatch.

This accomplished I paid farewell visits to Cherif Pacha and Riáz. During my stay in Cairo I had many

opportunities of studying the character of the statesman selected by Lord Dufferin to guide under his ægis the destinies of Egypt. Cherif Pacha has been as a rule either over-rated or under-rated by those who have described him. He has no claim on the one hand to many of the essential qualities of a European politician, nor on the other does he in any way deserve to be depicted as a mere frivolous and Frenchified Turk. Cherif is intelligent, painstaking, and well-educated; he has, moreover, for better or for worse, thrown in his lot with England. Lord Dufferin's choice was a good one. Cherif, as far as the new order of things is concerned, is as superior to Riáz as Riáz is to Nubar. But with all his *savoir faire* Cherif sadly wants energy, stability, and the courage of his opinions. He is wholly unable to stem the tide of Turkish or European intrigue, and he takes refuge in a system of placid inaction. He missed for a time the "masterful hand" which for awhile served him both as a guide and a prop, but it is to be hoped that he may have since found some such necessary support in Sir Evelyn Baring. Policy of his own he has none: so far as English moral assistance, French intrigues, and Turkish machinations (all pulling different ways) will permit him, he will discharge his duties as Lord Dufferin's testamentary executor in a decorous and respectable manner. His unvarying courtesy and

kindness will ever soften the recollection of my official intercourse with the Egyptian Government.

Having paid my respects to Cherif, I called with the same object on Riáz. The very great assistance given me by his son, Mahmoud Bey, in my weary antichambering days at the *Dakhaliyeh*, made me anxious to show him this small mark of attention before quitting Cairo. I found the ex-Minister of the Interior reclining on a sofa apparently deep in the perusal of a large Korán. He seemed glad to see me, and, after the preliminary clearing of the voice, began a set speech in French which he speaks with a kind of German accent. "Tunis," said Riáz, "is, I believe, watered entirely by rain, whereas Egypt depends for its irrigation wholly on the overflow of the Nile. I should be extremely obliged by your telling me the essential difference between the agriculture of the two countries?" I replied that "I had lately written a book about Tunis, where he would find all the information he required, and of which I would at once send a copy to his son;" but I suggested for the moment a little talk about Egypt as more to the purpose. He looked steadily at me, I returned his gaze, and then we both laughed. We now understood each other perfectly. His Excellency had probably forgotten he had experimented on the Tunisian water-supply at our last meeting. Riáz

then began to speak of past events in Egypt, of the hollowness of Egyptian Nationalism, of the stern necessity for autocratic rule, of the hopelessness of any other constitution than that of the stick and the *courbash*, and of the ungrateful nature of the viper he once thought safe under his heel. It was difficult to imagine that this man of feeble body and mean presence wielded a personal influence second to none in Egypt; an influence strong enough and powerful enough to allow him to pose in his retirement as the head and representative of that same National cause which, in his heart, he loathed and despised. His favourite theme was the weakness of others—the vacillation of the Khedive, the feebleness of Cherif, and the incapacity of his former colleagues. Did he think it was likely the Khedive openly or tacitly connived at the September *pronunciamento* which led to his downfall? *C'est bien possible*, was his ready answer. He knew how Egypt must be ruled, but he must follow his own devices and choose his own subordinates. He must have a maximum of internal power, and a minimum of external interference. Granted these conditions, he, Mustapha Riáz, was as a strong man armed. "Tell me honestly," he said, "which do you think is best, despotism (if you like to call it so) and order, or leniency and anarchy?" His conversation was most interesting, but the possibility of such a

plan as he fearlessly advocated had passed away. Arábi had, during his brief hour of power, shown the Egyptians the possibility of an administration founded on the principles of liberty, justice, and honesty. England was pledged to carry out in their entirety the very reforms she would not allow Arábi to complete. Riáz had consequently become an impossible Minister, but he was far more dangerous in opposition than in office. As long as we seek to work our improvements alone, unaided, and by half measures, he will ever be a thorn in our side.

By the time these farewell visits were completed it was necessary to prepare for my journey. At the Kourbán Bairám Europeans pay complimentary visits to the Egyptians, on New Year's Day the Egyptians are expected to call on the Europeans. When I reached the *maison du mufti* I found that Ismail Pasha Eyoub, Osmán Pacha Gháleb, and others, had done me the honour to leave their cards. Hasan performed wonders in the way of packing up, and we gave him a satisfactory certificate and a well-earned gratuity of ten pounds. He wept profusely at our separation, but has since consoled himself by adding two donkies to his stud, which I hear he has been considerate enough to name after Arábi's counsel. Mr. Napier resolved to remain behind a week longer to settle our bills, and watch the interests of one or two remaining clients.

After our farewell dinner, when all was ready for a start, I drove for the last time through the familiar street to the half-deserted Daira Saniya, now only tenanted by some thirty prisoners. I woke up the head-jailer and gave him the following order I had obtained from the *Dakhaliyeh* :—

To Osmán Shareef Effendi, in charge of the prison at the
Daira Saniya.

Allow the prisoner Ahmed Bey Rifát freely to depart with Mr. Broadley the English lawyer and the officer from the Prefecture of Police who will accompany him.

(Signed) ISMAÏL EYOUB,
Minister of the Interior.

At the gate I had met by appointment Ali, a tall, awkward, and very forbidding-looking policeman, who had been appointed by the authorities to see my client on board, and prevent any conspiring on the way. Ali had already put himself in communication with his prisoner's friends, and was entrusted with the carrying of a large padlocked tin case full of cigarettes. Osmán Effendi led us upstairs, and before going to Rifát's room I took a last glance at the empty cells of Arábi and his friend. Rifát had been dressed and waiting these three hours. Poor old Kadr Kadr wept bitter tears at parting, Sheikh Abdú, Hasan Moosa, and one or two others, said good-bye in the dark, Osmán Shareef pleaded for some recognition of his valuable services by way of a

recommendation to the authorities, and the Highland soldiers on guard gave me a parting salute. A minute later Rifát and I were being rapidly driven through the silent streets to the *maison du mufti*. He could hardly persuade himself his freedom was not a dream after all. After pausing a few minutes to express my acknowledgments for the attentions shown us by Mr. Grosse and Signor Luigi at Shephard's, we all moved to the station, where Messrs. Cook and Co.'s agent brought us our tickets for the French steamer "Asie" bound for Malta.

The unexpected departure of Rifát's family had been the signal for a great gathering of Cairene ladies, who came to the terminus in their neat broughams accompanied by their eunuchs. One waiting-room was perfectly full, and the crying and embracing was almost bewildering. Madame Sara, a very beautiful woman, and Rafát's divorced wife, had come to take leave of her children, and I rather suspect meant to detain one of them if she could manage to do so. Her cries and the lamentations of her friends added materially to the prevailing confusion. Madame Hamdy, Rifát's sister, the wife of my old enemy of the blotted telegrams,* threw herself on her brother's neck, and would not be comforted, while Madame Sara wept over her eldest boy. The second

* See *ante*, Chapter XIII. p. 155.

Madame Rifát, however, managed to secure the three children (in spite of some obstruction on the part of her more attractive predecessor), and get them safely into the train. Rifát took his seat opposite to me, and did not seem much moved at the tumult which was raging around him. Hamdy sent me a message by his wife, to say I should ever have a place in his prayers for having saved the honour of his family, but that for fear of Tewfik he could not come to thank me in person.

Messrs. Napier, Chirol, Beaman, Villiers, Macdonald, Evans, and many other friends came to the station to see the last of us, and I much regret not being able to reproduce here the graphic and picturesque description of the scene afterwards published by Mrs. Macdonald. We started some three-quarters of an hour late, Madame Rifát with her children and servant in one compartment; Rifát, Ali, and I in the next. Ali made himself generally useful, put up his great sword in the netting, lighted matches when they were required, nursed the children at intermediate stations, and in the grey light of early morning told us an agreeable story of how he had murdered a man in his own country and come to Egypt as a soldier of fortune. This honest policeman gave us no trouble, and accepted a present of three dollars at parting with every demonstration

of delight. Day dawned just as we were passing through Arábi's lines at Kafr-el-Dowar. To my great relief we were met at Alexandria by the dragoman of Messrs. Cook, who secured our luggage, put us into carriages and drove us down to the wharf. All seemed to be included in the price of the tickets, and our conductor even refused a *bakhshish*. It is difficult to exaggerate the convenience of such an arrangement. Messrs. Cook's agency has become almost as important an institution for the Egyptian traveller as the balcony of Shepherd's Hotel is for the Egyptian politician.

An hour later the "Asie" put to sea. The weather was execrable and the rollings of the "Asie" indescribable. Let future travellers avoid her if possible. For five long days my only occupation consisted in listening patiently and helplessly to political discussions and domestic wrangles of a very diverting nature, and which went on incessantly between the captain, the doctor, and the steward. The first said he was by conviction a democratic Legitimist, and declared his ship was generally known as *Le Yacht de Marseilles*; the second was a radical and free-thinker, who practised what he called *la médecine maritime*, as a diversion; the third was often drunk, smelled terribly of garlic, and sometimes agreed with the doctor, and sometimes with the captain, both of

whom insisted on treating him as a sort of Court of Appeal. Gentle reader, again let me advise you not to travel by the Yacht de Marseilles !

At last, late in the afternoon of the 7th January, we saw the welcome light of St. Elmo. Before it was quite dark we landed. Poor Rifát * went off in fear and trembling to find the Turkish Consul who had formerly been his subordinate. I once more mounted the "streets of stairs" to the Grand Hotel. Salvo, the head waiter, was there to meet me, as before : "Maltese people," he said, "very glad see Signor Avvocato safe back. Good thing English General did not hang Arábi before Signor Avvocato arrived."

* The Sultan refused Rifát permission to come to Constantinople, so he and his family journeyed to Tunis, where they were hospitably received by General Hamida Ben Ayád, the head of a noble Arab family. A short time after his father died, and through the good offices of Dervesh Pacha he was allowed to return to Stamboul. If I am not much mistaken Ahmed Bey Rifát will make his mark in oriental politics yet.

CHAPTER XXXI.

PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF ARÁBI AND HIS FRIENDS.

ARÁBI and his cause can hardly be judged separately; it follows, almost as a matter of course, that in the long run they must either stand or fall together. I fear it is difficult to say whether the character of Arábi himself, or the nature of the movement which he led, was for a time at least the subject of more misconception and more misrepresentation. In order to avoid concluding with a political sermon, I have throughout my narrative, and during the progress of the story of Arábi's defence, cited fact after fact to prove that Egyptian Nationalism was a genuine, spontaneous, and universal expression of the aspirations of the whole Egyptian people; that Arábi was elected by the tacit and unanimous vote of five millions of his fellow-countrymen to be its recognised chief and exponent; and that the aim and object of the cause truly

called National was to satisfy a perfectly legitimate craving for justice, administrative honesty, personal security, and political equality. The reason for this misconception and misrepresentation is at once apparent. All the parties to the Egyptian War are in a high degree interested in proving Arábi and his friends to be in fault, for the very simple reason that if they do not succeed in doing so it is perfectly clear that they must either be in the wrong or be mistaken themselves. As one side is strong and powerful, and the other weak and broken, it was not difficult to disseminate a belief that Egyptian Nationalism could have no possible defence. The verdict of the moment has already been partly impeached; in all probability history will reverse it altogether. The feelings of a whole country cannot possibly be hid under a bushel for ever.

Very shortly after the end of the brief struggle an English officer,* who had gained both fame and distinction in the war itself, and who could have no possible motive for proving the military operations in which he had personally taken so conspicuous a part to be without justification, set about discovering for himself an answer to the question: "Were Arábi's

* Lord Charles Beresford, Captain R.N. In *The Times* of January 8.

demands legitimate?" He thus sums up the result of his labours:—"Surely the movement might be called National. Many Englishmen gave it this title in May, 1882, when matters began to look serious—among them being several well-known naval officers belonging to the English squadron sent to Alexandria at the time To look at the question from an Egyptian, and not a European, point of view, there can be no doubt that Arábi had the sympathies of the Egyptian nation with him. The Europeans were naturally unable to take an impartial view of the agitation, as any alteration in the state of affairs . would have materially affected their position. Arábi and his party can state they were fighting for reforms, and the proof they can adduce as to the righteousness of their cause is, as stated above, that England is now going to commence these very reforms. They can also point to the fact that, while they were in power, not one shilling was taken from the public purse whatever, except for what they regarded as necessary for the public benefit—a singularly uncommon circumstance in the East The method of raising taxes in the country must appear very unfair to the native Egyptian. The administration of justice is another cause of discontent, as well as the fact of Europeans holding all the responsible positions of

trust." Mr. Mackenzie Wallace arrives substantially at a similar conclusion.*

So much, then, for the cause Arábi suffered for. I now advance a step farther. I not only contend that "all Egypt was with Arábi," but I assert, without fear of contradiction, that in the execution of this national mission Arábi and his friends displayed a scrupulous honesty, a moderation, and a spirit of humanity, which will be honourable to them for all time. Shortly after the banishment of Arábi a meeting of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders assembled in London to discuss their affairs. Thus spake their Chairman, Mr. Bouverie: "The question of Egyptian stock had occupied the attention of the Council, and until the political difficulties in Egypt arose they were working satisfactorily, and he had always believed that the difficulties came from the success of Egyptian finances. A full exchequer held out great temptation. All the talk about Egyptian nationality, Arábi, and the long string of sentiment circulated, really meant that Arábi and his followers desired to get some of the money." Is it possible to conceive any accusation more unfounded or more monstrous? I have already mentioned several facts in illustration of what Lord Charles Beresford calls their "singularly

* Vide *ante*, Chapter XXII. pages 284-5.

uncommon honesty.”* Even Blum Pacha, no friendly witness on their behalf, attests the extraordinary regularity with which one of his employés, the late Seligman Bey, was enjoined to keep, and actually did keep, the Treasury accounts during the administration of the National Council at Cairo. The expenses of the war were nearly entirely defrayed by voluntary subscriptions. All Arábi and his friends did was to draw their usual allowance of military pay. As a matter of fact, when they surrendered on the 15th September a whole fortnight's income was actually due to them. Not satisfied with assuring the correctness of the Government registers, similar precautions were adopted as regards the railway, telegraph, and other kindred services.† Arábi and his chief associates, after seeing for months the whole wealth of Egypt literally at their feet, went into exile with little more property than the clothes they stood in, and the pittance grudgingly doled out to them by the Khedivial Government.

I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind that Arábi and his friends were perfectly able to assist in the intelligent self-government of their country, and carry out efficiently the changes and improvements

* See *ante*, Chapter XXIX. page 413.

† Vide *ante*, Chapter XV. page 84.

they have bequeathed to us as their heirs and successors. Arábi was no mere dreamer or enthusiast. He was, as seen from an Egyptian point of view, an educated and naturally able man, well acquainted with his country and his country's wants, endowed with much energy and a thorough honesty of purpose. Egypt needed nothing more than this. His lack of political knowledge and ignorance of the refinement of European politics would disqualify him as a supreme ruler; but with a patriotic and strong-minded sovereign as his chief he could have helped the Egyptians to walk alone, and given them the justice, equality, and security they craved for. Egypt required neither a Talleyrand nor even a Cavour; what she wanted was a chief from amongst her own children who would do right as between man and man, treat the rich and poor alike, and so carry out her bloodless revolution of reform. All this Arábi could do better than any one else, and might have effected but for — ? Let us say with Arábi himself, "the decrees of Providence not seconding his efforts." During their brief hour of power the Nationalists tried undoubtedly to put their principles in practice.*

* The article in the *Fortnightly Review* I have previously quoted says :—"In the time of the National party's supremacy the poor were never turned away, and their cases were carefully examined. An extor-

Lord Dufferin came to Egypt confessedly to save the situation. He spent some months in the careful study of Egyptian requirements, and he devoted his industry, his rare intelligence, and his mature experience to discover a remedy. The result of his labours as presented to both Houses of Parliament is before me; beside it lies the translation of a sketch of "necessary reforms for the well-being of Egypt," written by Arábi in his cell a week before his trial. Let us for a moment compare the two, and so judge Arábi by the light of Lord Dufferin.

LORD DUFFERIN'S SCHEME for the
REORGANISATION of EGYPT.

February 6th, 1883.

ARÁBI'S MEMORANDUM ON
EGYPTIAN REFORM.

November 25th, 1882.

Although I am in a prison and in the hands of my enemies, I am comparatively little anxious about my present state of humiliation,

tionate official met with no mercy, and the party in power cared for power and not for money. It was the first struggle in the East against bribery and its attendant evils; and the cause of the unprecedented popularity of Arábi undeniably lay in the personal attention he gave to the poor equally with the rich, and in his invariable refusal to accept money for acts of justice. I remember one lady who had been deprived of some property worth about 4,000*l*. She laid her case before the Minister, and shortly afterwards he called her, and informed her that in a day or two he would restore the land. Scarcely able to believe her good fortune, she entreated him, as a matter of course, to accept ten *feddans*, or acres, as a present. The suggestion very nearly cost her the case."

Lord Dufferin's Scheme.

"It ought to be no difficult task to endow the Egyptian people with good government. On the contrary, there are many circumstances which indicate the present moment as propitious for the inauguration of a new era."

Arábi's Memorandum.

and I do not think only of what may happen to me in the future. As I have from the very first only sought to ensure the freedom of my country, my constant concern even now is about its happiness, and its rescue from certain venomous and powerful vipers with which it is struggling. One of the greatest of Egypt's difficulties and dangers comes from the usurers and money-lenders, who have sucked the very blood of the peasants, and illtreat the natives whom they despoil, and whose hardly acquired gains they carry away by handfuls. Another of the lamentations of Egypt is on account of the foreigners, who fill the highest posts, receive the largest salaries, and leave no room anywhere for the natives of the country. The non-Egyptian Moslems who surround the Government on every side seek to keep the Egyptian in the lowest state of degradation and ignorance, in order that they may always continue to oppress and tyrannise over the free inhabitants of the country, without themselves possessing any real superiority of knowledge, natural talents, or civilisation. These, then, are the enemies of progress, always striving, even as serpents, to tear to pieces the body of a defenceless

Lord Dufferin's Scheme.

"As a consequence, responsibilities have been imposed upon us. Europe and the Egyptian people, *whom we have undertaken to rescue from anarchy*, have alike a right to require that our intervention should be beneficent and its results enduring; that it should obviate all danger of future perturbations, and that it should leave established on sure foundations the principles of justice, liberty, and public happiness."

Arábi's Memorandum.

people, who tried in vain to escape from their relentless grasp, and who can now only hope for succour from the champions of truth and liberty amongst the English nation, which, in the past, set herself before the world as the constant defender of every worthy cause.

I have thus tried to describe in a few words some of the more violent symptoms of the chronic disease under which Egypt is suffering, in order that a wise physician may find an appropriate remedy for it. Now the English nation has taken upon itself spontaneously the special care of Egyptian affairs, which is verily a task of great responsibility before the civilised world, and before the history of this critical age. It consequently behoves the wise men amongst them to devise carefully the means of coping most effectually with the disease. My knowledge of the real state of affairs in my country, and my ardent desire to promote its happiness, have induced me therefore, even in captivity and surrounded with trouble, to make a few remarks by way of appeal to the calm reflection and impartial judgment of the champions of right in England.

1st. The ruler of Egypt must

Lord Dufferin's Scheme.

"Her actual rulers are still supplied, indeed, from a foreign stock, but the progenitor of the race was one of the most illustrious men of the present century, who proved his right to found a dynasty by *emancipating those he ruled from the arbitrary thralldom of an imperious suzerain*. His successors have carried the liberation of their adopted country still further, and the Prince now sitting on the Khedivial throne represents, at all events, the principle of autonomous Government, of hereditary succession, and commercial independence."

"I would press upon Her Majesty's Government a more generous policy—such a policy as is implied by the creation, within certain prudent limits, of representative institutions, of municipal and communal self-government, and of a political existence untrammelled by external importunity, though aided, indeed, as it must be for a time, by sympathetic advice and assistance. Indeed, no middle course is possible. The

Arábi's Memorandum.

be an Egyptian, well acquainted with the country, popular amongst the Egyptians, of sufficient influence to impose his authority by moral force, and wholly unconnected with the recent events. The present Khedivial family could give us, I believe, such a ruler, but he must fulfil all the above conditions. If England really desires it she can find such a man. The Sultan of the Osmanlis can never hope to regain his ancient hold over the minds of the Egyptians. He encouraged us in our search for freedom, approved our resistance to invasion (all this, it now appears, from selfish motives), and at last deserted us in our misfortunes. Turkey has never done good to Egypt. The further interference of the Sultan with her internal affairs can only be for the evil of that country.

2nd. The Government of Egypt ought to be a Constitutional one. There should be a council of Ministers, each of whom must be responsible for his acts towards the whole Cabinet, and the Ministry, as a body, to be responsible to the country.

Lord Dufferin's Scheme.

Valley of the Nile could not be administered with any prospect of success from London. An attempt upon our part to engage in such an undertaking would at once render us objects of hatred and suspicion to its inhabitants.

"Though hitherto Eastern society has only been held together by the coercive forces of absolutism, it must be remembered that, on the one hand, the Mahomedan religion is essentially democratic; and, on the other, that the primitive idea of the elders of the land assembling in council round their chief has never altogether faded out of the traditions of the people. Even the elective principle has been to some degree preserved amongst their village communities. If, therefore, we found ourselves upon what already exists, and endeavour to expand it to such proportions as may seem commensurate with the needs and aptitudes of the country, we may succeed in creating a vitalised and self-existent organism, instinct with evolutionary force. In order to obtain our ends, we must lay the foundation broad and deep."

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Arabi's Memorandum.

3rd. There should be an *Elective Chamber* and a *Council of Notables* (or "old men"). All laws and legislative measures should be submitted to them, and they must be allowed full liberty of discussion and criticism. Elections must be free, as in civilised countries. For five years those Chambers might only have a consultative voice, and during that time the Government might not be bound to always act on their advice. I fully believe by that time the Egyptians would learn to deserve more extended powers.

*Lord Dufferin's Scheme.**Arábi's Memorandum.*

"SYNOPSIS OF PROPOSED EGYPTIAN INSTITUTIONS.

"1. *The Village Constituency.*

—Composed of representatives of each circumscription, chosen by manhood suffrage, who are the depositaries of the village vote.

2. *The Provincial Councils.*—

(Varying in number from four to eight members.)—Chosen by the spokesmen of the villages.

3. *The Legislative Council.*—

Consisting of twenty-six members, of whom twelve are nominated by the Khedive on the advice of his Ministers, and sixteen are elected by the Provincial Councils.

4. *The General Assembly.*—Of

eighty members: eight ministers, twenty-six members of the Legislative Council, forty-six delegates elected by the spokesmen of the villages.

5. *Eight Ministers.*—Responsible to the Khedive.

6. *His Highness the Khedive.*"

"It may be objected that the foregoing machinery does not really embody the Parliamentary principle in the true acceptation of the term, both the Council of Legislation and the General Assembly being consultative rather than law-making bodies; but few people would be prepared to main-

Lord Dufferin's Scheme.

tain that Egypt is yet ripe for pure popular government."

Arábi's Memorandum.

4th. The proceedings of the two Assemblies to be public, and inserted in Arabic and French papers—this would accustom the natives to take part in their own affairs, and prepare them for political life. At the expiration of five years, powers of Assembly to be definitely fixed according to what experience may suggest—and these Ministers would be wholly responsible to the Chamber.

5th. Political laws ought to be made, determining the powers and special privileges of the ruler, the duties of Ministers—no act of the ruler to be valid unless approved by the Cabinet, or by the special Minister whom it may concern. The ruler shall have no direct communications with Foreign Representatives or their Governments except through his Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"There is no doubt that the fact of foreigners in Egypt being exempt from taxation to which its inhabitants are subject is extremely galling to the native mind. The removal of so glaring an injustice would do much towards suppressing the very general feeling that the philanthropy

6th. Perfect equality between all the inhabitants of Egypt; no difference to be made between foreigners and natives with regard to general treatment, to the payment of taxes, and so on.

Lord Dufferin's Scheme.

of foreign Governments towards the Egyptians becomes paralysed the moment the pecuniary interests of their own subjects are affected."

"The chief requirement of Egypt is justice. A pure, cheap, and simple system of justice will prove more beneficial to the country than the largest Constitutional privileges. The structure of society in the East is so simple that, provided the taxes are righteously assessed, it does not require much law-making to make the people happy; but the most elaborate legislation would fail to do so if the laws invented for them were not equitably enforced."

"At this moment there is no real justice in this country. What passes under that name is a mockery, both as regards the tribunals themselves, and the *corpus juris* they pretend to administer."

"It is evident that all our efforts to provide Egypt with appropriate administrative machinery will be vain unless we can depend upon the various parts of which that machinery is composed performing with efficiency the duties allotted to them. Nor have the Egyptian people a right

Arabi's Memorandum.

7th. A thorough reform of judicial administration being accomplished, a uniform body of laws should be applied in all the Courts of Justice in Egypt; those laws ought to be in accordance with the customs and nature of the inhabitants; the execution and proper carrying out of the law to be accurately watched over, in order to leave no room for undue influence, and the old system of observing the law apparently and evading it in reality.

8th. Special care to be taken of national education, and the diffusion of knowledge to all parts of the country—and more particularly the knowledge of the laws and institutions of the land, in order to increase the number of those who are able to apply the laws.

*Lord Dufferin's Scheme.**Arábi's Memorandum.*

to complain that the Departments are unduly crowded with foreign officials if it is impossible to find native employés possessing the necessary education and other qualifications for occupying the posts now, through the sheer necessities of the case, intrusted to strangers. If this grievance, and it is undoubtedly a legitimate one, is to be got rid of, it can only be by the Egyptian Government taking in hand, in an energetic and conscientious manner, the education of the rising generation."

"But there are other radical reforms which will have to be inaugurated before the Civil Service of Egypt can become either efficient or economical. Unfortunately, the introduction of these will occasion much dissatisfaction, and may inflict some individual hardship."

× "In his Report of the 18th September last, transmitted to your Lordship by Sir Edward Malet, Mr. Fitzgerald has shown that the number of employés in the service of the Egyptian Government is ridiculously in excess of the public needs."

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"Nevertheless, it is very desirable that the European staff should be considerably reduced, especially

9th. The unnecessary European employés to be dismissed, and only such of them to be kept as may be really useful and necessary; their salaries to be fixed in accordance with the resources of the country, and a proportion to be observed between their salaries and those allowed to natives, in order to avoid jealousy and discontent by undue partiality.

*Lord Dufferin's Scheme.**Arábi's Memorandum.*

where it has been duplicated for political reasons."

"There is no service in Egypt of which the people have more just reason to complain than that by which the cadastral survey of the country has been conducted, and it is not surprising that it attracted the attention of the Chamber of Notables.

"The cost has been excessive, the results small; and the service has been crowded with European employes, whose technical knowledge has not always been of a high order.

"I now proceed to call your Lordship's attention to one of the most distressing subjects connected with the present social condition of this country. It is a question of recent growth, namely, the encumbered condition of a considerable proportion of the fellahen lands, especially in the Delta."

"Unfortunately, the 5,000,000*l.* of mortgage debt above referred to does not by any means represent the whole of the fellah's indebtedness. I am told, on good authority, that he owes at least another 3,000,000*l.* or 4,000,000*l.* to the village usurer, who holds his bond, and is able to sell him

10th. Natives ought not to be kept back from employment, and from occupying any official post, so long as they possess the necessary qualities; persons excluded from Government functions on account of their association with the late events ought also to be allowed to compete for employment, if they are capable enough to do so.

11th. Special attention ought to be paid to the question of usury, and the means of preventing usurers from employing the most unfair means to despoil the nation.

Lord Dufferin's Scheme.

up with the same sinister expedition as the mortgagee."

"Having thus satisfied the moral requirements of Egypt by providing her with domestic security, freedom, and justice, we may now turn to consider her material needs. The wealth of Egypt springs from the soil, whose fertility is entirely dependent upon irrigation. Year after year the Nile conveys in its affluent waters richer treasures than did ever the fabled Pactolus."

"At the present moment we are labouring in the interests of the world at large. The desideratum of every one is an Egypt peaceful, prosperous and contented, able to pay its debts, capable of maintaining order along the Canal, and offering no excuse in the troubled condition of its affairs for interference from outside. France, Turkey, every European power must be as anxious as ourselves for the attainment of these results, nor can they be jealous of the means we take to secure them.

"The very fact of our having endowed the country with representative institutions is a proof of our disinterestedness."

Arabi's Memorandum.

12th. Care must be taken of the irrigation works and other means of fertilising the soil. These have been greatly neglected, and they touch the very life of Egypt.

12th. All the foregoing measures under existing circumstances must be adopted and carried out under the supervision and direction of Directors specially appointed by the British Government for a certain time, until those reforms have produced their effect, and the Egyptians become capable of conducting their own affairs.

If these reforms are carefully studied and carried out, the Egyptian people will see the end of the long and painful disease under which it has been labouring, through the wisdom of its medical advisers, and England will have accomplished her task in a manner which will reflect great honour upon her.

(Signed) AHMED ARABI the
Egyptian.

I leave my readers to draw their own conclusions. Lord Dufferin may have improved on Arábi's plan, or even invented a more complete one, but in the result he has been compelled to leave to restored Pachadom the almost impossible task of working out a Nationalist programme without the Nationalists.

Arábi was by no means the only Egyptian Nationalist of character and capacity. He certainly possessed the best qualifications to lead, but others showed more than ordinary ability in giving practical effect to his plans. Máhmoud Sámi's letters and official documents are evidence of no mean intellectual powers. Yácoub Sámi was unquestionably an excellent administrative officer, with a great facility for arrangement and organisation. Ali Fehmy and Abd-el-Ál were both good soldiers, and Mahmoud Fehmy the best engineer Egypt could boast of. I need not seek further instances amongst the rank and file of their adherents. My own personal impressions of Arábi and his friends leave little doubt on my mind that if they had only received that sincere and hearty co-operation of their immediate sovereign which they once expected, and had escaped the misfortune of an armed foreign intervention, they could have satisfactorily accomplished, in their own way and according to their own lights, the mission which all Egypt confided to them.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SOVEREIGNTY OR SUZERAINTY ? *

IN oriental politics it has almost become an axiom that "the impossible is most likely to happen." I one day heard an Egyptian personage say with every appearance of sincerity that there were two apparently impossible things connected with our recent "warlike operations" which he never had been able to understand. The first was why we ever wanted the Turks to go to Egypt; the second was, when we did ask them to go, why they never went. When one reflects for an instant on the incalculable harm Turkey has wrought to Egypt, it certainly does seem strange that we ever regarded Turkish intervention as a sort of patent remedy for her misfortunes. It is also equally extraordinary, when we recall the tortuous intrigues which Turkey resorted to during two entire years to provide an excuse for her interference, to comprehend the reason why she failed at the last moment to gather the fruit which was ripe for her plucking.

* A portion of this chapter has been reprinted from an article in the *Fortnightly Review* (December 1883), entitled "Turkish Intrigues in Egypt," by special permission of Mr. T. H. S. Escott, the Editor.

Sovereignty or Suzerainty? Shall Turkish influence be a political reality or a diplomatic fiction? These are the questions with which we are face to face to-day. The importance of this particular problem has led me to detach it from the general discussion as to Egypt's future. England will apparently soon have to make up her mind on the subject, for we learn that an envoy of the Sultan has already found his way to the Soudan and that an Imperial Commission may be shortly expected at Cairo.*

If one would realize the baneful consequences of Turkish misrule, the state of the adjacent *vali* of Tripoli affords a convenient opportunity of doing so. There we have as the result of half a century of pure and unadulterated Turkish administration only misery, desolation, and ruin.

The two most able members of the Egyptian Khedivial family in Egypt very clearly realized the meaning and the consequences of Turkish suzerainty in that country. They saw in the all-absorbing, nothing-yielding "protection" of the Sultan-Caliph, the inevitable destruction of the land over which they ruled. Ottoman supremacy has certainly never done,

* This was written prior to the news of Hicks Pacha's disaster. We are now told that Turkey must undertake the reconquest of the lost provinces.

and in all human probability will never do, anything for the good of Egypt; it has paralysed her efforts for freedom in the past, and, if still powerful and unchecked, will undoubtedly exercise a still more fatal influence in the future.

It is worse than useless to describe the hopeless corruption and anarchy which day by day increasingly pervades every department of the Turkish executive, both at home and abroad. In 1877, Mr. Gladstone admits,* “that the arts of falsehood have received a portentous development in Turkey;” and he proceeds to speak of the “falsehood, chicane, mockery, perversion of justice, and denial of redress,” which characterised the conduct of the Porte in regard to certain important events which were then occupying public attention. A change for the worse has come since then. The Pan-islamic vagaries of the Father of the Faithful have failed to set Europe by the ears, but they have increased in a remarkable manner the confusion, corruption, and “portentous development of falsehood,” of which Mr. Gladstone six years ago complained. During the reigns of the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz and his predecessors, the dual administration of the Porte and the Palace worked fairly well, at any rate as far as outward appearances

* “Aggression in Egypt,” *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1877, p. 165.

were concerned. It resembled, doubtless in many ways, a game of battledore and shuttlecock (the two great departments being the battledores and the business in hand the shuttlecock), but then the end did come at last, and a solution was sooner or later obtainable. The Palace has now almost entirely absorbed the functions of the Porte, and the reins of government are consequently, for all practical purposes, in the hands of one man. It is true that his friends assert mysteriously that Abdul Hamid is the greatest diplomatist in Europe. Not only are the proofs of his transcendent ability entirely wanting, but the visible consequences of his acts lead to a very different conclusion. It is almost impossible to deny that under the auspices of the present Sultan-Caliph misgovernment at Stamboul has reached a climax it would be difficult to surpass.

The founder of the Egyptian vice-regal family soon discovered the pernicious effects of active Turkish interference in the affairs of his country. In accordance with his own nature, and the ideas of the times in which he lived, Mehemet Ali sought to sever the connection between Egypt and Turkey at the point of the sword. His son Ibrahim led a victorious army to within almost a hundred miles of Stamboul, his troops occupied the holy places of Islam, and the very existence of the empire was threatened. Mehemet Ali paused only at the com-

mand of Europe. The firman of the 13th February, 1841 (which finally defined his powers as Viceroy of Egypt) was preceded by a Convention, in the preamble of which it is stated that the Sultan had appealed to the Powers for "their support and assistance in the midst of the difficulties in which he found himself involved, in consequence of the hostile conduct of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt, which menaces the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the throne of the Sultan." During the rest of the reign of Mehemet Ali, the Sultan-Caliphs prudently limited their "protection" of Egypt to the receipt of a fixed annual tribute amounting to about 325,000*l*.

The succeeding administrations of Abbas and Saïd witnessed repeated attempts on the part of Turkey to renew her ancient policy of active internal interference in Egypt. Ismaïl Pacha, however, was keenly alive to the necessity of maintaining the semi-independence striven for by Mehemet Ali. He did not attempt to follow in the militant path of his grandfather, but sought to keep his suzerain at a distance, and obtain such further immunities and privileges as would guarantee the practical autonomy of Egypt by a process which he himself, euphoniously enough, describes as "kissing the carpet."* By the firman of the 27th

* See Chapter II. page 16.

May, 1866, he secured the succession for his eldest son, the transmission of the *pachalik* of Egypt in the direct line for ever, together with complete freedom of action as regards the internal administration of the country; the firman of the 8th June, 1867, gave him the title of Khedive and the power to conclude commercial treaties, grant concessions, &c.; other important rights were acquired by the firmans of the 25th September, 1872, and the 10th September, 1873, and finally the whole of the privileges and immunities thus granted were solemnly ratified and confirmed by a general firman issued on the 8th June, 1873. So far did Ismail Pacha succeed in attenuating the power of the Sultan of Turkey in Egypt, that in the *Kutba*, or Friday prayer, the officiating *imám* invoked the blessing of Allah on "the arms of Islam," and not, as formerly, on "the armies of the head of the Ottoman Empire." The process of "kissing the carpet" was unfortunately a most expensive one, and Ismail Pacha was only the "dearly beloved son" of the Sultan-Caliphs as long as he had something to give. In his prosperous days Turkish envoys or commissioners rarely appeared at Cairo, and then only as the bearers of complimentary letters or decorations; Ismail rendered cheerfully the military assistance required of him; paid his yearly tribute, now increased to 750,000 Turkish pounds, and gave costly presents

to the Sultan and his ministers whenever they desired them. The "kissing the carpet" became more and more onerous, but the system answered admirably while it lasted. It helped most materially the financial ruin of the Khedive Ismail, but he rightly or wrongly thought the practical liberation he hoped to obtain for himself and his people worth the great sacrifice he made.

In the early days of last May I journeyed to Constantinople. I do not propose to allude in detail either to the indescribable political confusion which reigns there, or to the equally indescribable social misery which seems to result from it. Their indirect connection with the subject of Turkish suzerainty in Egypt would hardly justify my doing so. I may mention, however, that while I was at Stamboul, the Sultan's chief eunuch, his Highness Behrem Agha, possessed supreme influence at the Yildiz Kiosk; the whole native population could be conveniently subdivided into those who were permitted to kiss the palm of his hand, and those condemned to embrace the sole of his foot; while three days had been spent in serious diplomatic deliberations as to whether the Ambassador of the Emperor of Germany was to first pay his respects to Behrem Agha, or whether Behrem Agha must first call on the German Ambassador. I believe Behrem ultimately triumphed. It is also

interesting to know that His Majesty the Sultan employs three thousand spies in Constantinople alone, and that the secret police service costs him 18,000*l.* a month, that he spends all his time in reading the reports of this department, and that no kind of business, however simple, can be transacted without recourse to a well organised and thoroughly recognized system of *bakhshish*. While I was in the Turkish capital, people were congratulating themselves that some firman connected with a tobacco monopoly had at last been issued at the moderate cost of 3,000*l.*, and this it seems was the first affair which had been successfully carried through for a very long time. The Sultan is personally most industrious, and insists on every State paper passing through his hands. During the acute stage of some recent political crisis, an Ambassador found him before a table piled up with documents, and busily engaged in reading them. It transpired that His Majesty was correcting the rules and regulations for the *café-chantants* in some obscure town on the banks of the Bosphorus.

I took an early opportunity of calling on Kheir-ed-Din Pacha, who left Tunis five years before in disgrace, "kissed the carpet" effectually at Stamboul, became Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, and has now retired to a new and splendid palace in the outskirts of Constantinople. He was only in power

during a few months, as the Sultan declined, and still declines, to accept an elaborate project for an Ottoman Constitution, which Kheir-ed-Din had compiled when winning his spurs as a Tunisian Statesman, and which he has tenaciously clung to ever since. Our conversation very naturally turned on Egypt. "You English," said Kheir-ed-Din, "have a terrible difficulty *là bas*, but we can settle it for you with the greatest possible ease. You must come to us sooner or later if you would avoid a squabble with your European allies. All his Majesty the Sultan wants is for England to recognize fully, unreservedly *and effectually*, the position of Egypt as a Turkish province, and to be allowed to assist in its re-organisation. This arrangement would save you an infinity of trouble, and would enable you to avoid all responsibility, and at the same time to steer clear of international complications. Do not be deceived—the name of Islam and the prestige of the Caliph will have a magical effect on the minds of the Egyptians. Ismail Pacha endeavoured to lessen our hold on Egypt. We taught him a lesson. He tried to walk alone, but when he ceased to lean on Turkey he lost his throne." Seeing I was hardly convinced, he continued, "What I propose is very easy to carry out. Mr. Gladstone, our former foe, has now become a just man. He calls His Majesty the Sultan the *Sovereign* of Egypt. All

he has to do is to submit his plans to us, and we shall assist him in carrying them out. Once agreed on the subject of Egypt, and the most important consequences must of necessity flow from our fresh alliance. We shall present a united front to our common enemy, Russia, and we may even join in compelling France to follow your example in the matter of Tunis. If you persist, however, in disregarding our rights you must not complain if we enter into other combinations."

The ideas of Kheir-ed-Din Pacha on the subject of the Egyptian question and its solution found favour at Stamboul, and a few days after I saw him I learned he was summoned to the Yildiz Kiosk, but his obstinacy in the matter of the Constitution once again prevented the possibility of his return to power. Comfortable solutions of diplomatic difficulties are now-a-days so much in favour that I have but little doubt some suggestion akin to the one made me by Kheir-ed-Din Pacha has been or will be heard in Downing Street. It is, therefore, all important at the present juncture that England should understand the true meaning of Turkish influence in Egypt, and nothing can illustrate it better than to trace its action in that country during the past four years. To completely unravel the tangled skein of Turkish intrigue would be, I think, impossible; but during the time I was

engaged in the defence of Arábi and his friends I had an exceptional opportunity of attempting the task, being to some extent (and certainly as much as any European ever can be) behind the scenes. The fatal consequences which resulted from the temporary ascendancy and success of Turkish influence and intrigue in Egypt are such as, I am convinced, will cause England and Europe to hesitate before allowing that unfortunate country, by a grave political error, to become once more the prey of Pachadom and the 'vantage ground of the tortuous diplomacy of the Yildiz Kiosk. Her present position is an unenviable one, but, if possible, I think Egypt is better off as a bone of European contention than as the unprotected victim of Turkish and Circassian rapacity.

I shall now resume the story of the relations between Egypt and Turkey, which I have brought down to the general firman obtained by Ismail Pacha in 1873. Six years later England and France were pleased to desire the removal of the Khedive Ismaïl. As I have already pointed out, one of the principal aims of his policy had been the gradual release of Egypt from the ties which united her to Turkey. He used to say that he desired to make Egypt the point of contact between the civilisation of the East and that of the West. His shrewd common sense convinced

him very early in his career that the idea of progress was wholly incompatible with that of an all-absorbing Sultan-Caliph. To get rid of Ismail, England and France most unfortunately made the fatal mistake of appealing to Abdul Hamid. The Porte hastened to comply with their request, for the fountains of Ismail's lavish generosity were dried up. The Khedive Ismail retired from the scene, and Turkey—arbitrator between him and the Powers—regained her lost ascendancy. Kheir-ed-Din was then in office as Grand Vizier. In my interviews with him at Constantinople he repeatedly alluded to the fate of Ismail as a signal warning to everybody who would ignore the power of the Sultan-Caliph, in what was described last year as “the brightest jewel of the imperial crown.”

The vizirial telegram of the 27th June, 1879, which requested the Khedive Ismail to retire, nominated his eldest son, Mehemet Tewfik Pacha, in his stead. Nothing could have suited better the views of Abdul Hamid. The new Khedive—young, inexperienced, educated entirely in Egypt, an honest lover of intrigue for its own sake, and, as we have seen, wholly wanting in any stability of character—at once looked to the Sultan for protection against that foreign European influence which had proved fatal to his father and at the same time sought to conceal the diminished prestige involved in his acceptance of the Anglo-

French *condominium* by ostentatiously parading his liege lord the Sultan as a consenting party to the transaction. The opportunity was too good to be lost. A few words insidiously introduced into the new firman of investiture, issued on the 30th July, 1879, almost entirely destroyed the effects of Ismaïl Pacha's costly efforts for practical autonomy. It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, Abdul Hamid conceived the idea of making Egypt a centre of the Pan-islamic movement, then in its infancy.

The source of this latest phase of Moslem politics is involved in mystery. It is generally supposed to have originated in a common league against Russian and English interests in Central Asia; to have next assumed for its objective the separation of the Caliphate from the Ottoman Sultanate; and, finally, to have been in self-defence adopted by the Sultan-Caliph himself in the form of a general union under his auspices for the defence of Islam.

After the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty, the Sultan seems to have turned his attention to the outlying provinces of the empire in Africa. He expressed unreservedly to the Baron de Ring his hopes that "Africa would compensate him for the loss of his fairest European provinces," and declared he should "do his best to regain in those parts the influence

and prestige of the past." The unexpected events of 1881 in Tunis gave a practical shape to the abstract theory of Pan-islamism, and the energy of its militant propagandists found a congenial sphere of action on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. I have already told in *Tunis Past and Present* the story of the hopeless struggle maintained by the Arabs on the Tripolitan frontier.*

During the course of my present narrative I have to some extent sought to reserve the proceedings of the Turkish missions in Egypt for description in the chapter I am now writing. My readers will doubtless remember that one of the earliest consequences of the Abdín *pronunciamento* was the disembarkation of Ali Fuád Bey and Ali Nizámi Pacha at Alexandria. They were accompanied by several other important personages, such as Cadri Bey and Ahmed Rátib Pacha, who were carefully kept in the background. In order that their conduct might be efficiently controlled, each member of the mission was furnished with a separate code of telegraphic cypher, and ordered to correspond directly with Stamboul. The politicians of the Yildiz Kiosk, however, seem to have forgotten the old French saying of "*qui s'excuse s'accuse*," for an article of the semi-official *Vakit* heralded their arrival by the announcement that the

* See Chapter I., page 6.

Commissioners were the bearers of nothing more than the "innocent messages of simple courtesy."

Our old acquaintance Ahmed Rifát* is fortunately able to give, as an eye-witness, an account of their doings in Cairo :—

"Ali Nizámi Pacha," writes Rifát, "is a Turkish General of Division, about fifty years of age, and had been, up to the time of his coming to Egypt, exclusively employed on military service. Ali Fuád Bey is the son of the late Ali Pacha, the best known of Turkish Grand Viziers. He is still a young man, and is, or was, one of the Sultan's confidential secretaries. Their attaché and clerk was one Cadri Effendi (afterwards Cadri Bey). Cadri was perhaps the ablest of the three, although (like Ahmed Ráhib, the Sultan's aide-de-camp) he was not considered an official member of the mission. He is a native of Aleppo, a writer of considerable ability, and was, as second secretary of the Sultan, in charge of the voluminous correspondence carried on with the North African Sheikhs and the heads of the different religious confraternities. Cadri was rarely either seen or mentioned, but when the mission was abruptly withdrawn he silently took up his residence at Cairo as the secret agent of the Sultan. A few days only before the Commissioners

* See Chapter XIII., page 147.

arrived, Cherif Pacha, who was then President of the Council, told me that, as I was personally acquainted with Ali Nizámi and Ali Fuád, I should be allowed to visit them, but that I must make good use of the opportunity thus afforded me of finding out the exact object of their presence in Egypt. The same evening I received a message that the Khedive, Tewfik Pacha, wished to see me immediately. Although it was past midnight I repaired to the Ismailia Palace. He told me that as I was going to see the Turkish Commissioners he wished to tell me that I was to preserve the most complete silence as to past events, but requested I should use every argument I could think of to demonstrate to them his own complete and unalterable devotion to the person and interests of the Sultan. Next day I went to the Kasr-el-Nousa Palace, where the Commission were lodged in a sort of political quarantine, nobody being at first allowed to visit them without special permission. I had a very long private interview with them. Our conversation turned on three points, viz., the military demonstration, the person of the Khedive, and the status and prestige of the Sultan in Egypt. I noticed that the Commissioners were extremely anxious as to the first point. They wished to know if they might consider what had happened *as the prelude of a general Arab movement*, and

whether or not the fall of Riáz and the accession to office of Cherif had really put an end to the *pronunciamentos*. They expressed a great desire for an interview with Arábi, but I pointed out that Arábi had gone with his troops to Rás-el-Wádi (Tel-el-Kebir), and Abd-el-Ál to Damietta, and observed that this was a sign of the submission of the army. They then professed to agree with me that the proposed interview might excite suspicion, and apparently abandoned the idea. They then spoke at length about the Khedive. I soon saw they were far from convinced as to his sincerity, and were uneasy on account of his weakness of character. The evening before they left they presented to him a somewhat lengthy document for his signature. I know he signed it, but I could obtain no clue to its contents. Both Cherif and Haider Pachas expressed much anxiety about it. The Commissioners told every one that nothing could save Egypt but the most complete recognition of the *sovereignty* of the Sultan. They expressed great resentment at the efforts of the Powers to obtain their recall, but during the last days of their stay assumed an attitude of complete reserve. Ali Nizámi haranged the soldiers at the citadel. I afterwards learnt that they secretly sent one of their suite, a naval officer, Ahmed Rátib Pacha, the Sultan's aide-de-camp, to Zagazig to see Arábi."

In No. 1233 of the Arabic *Official Journal*, I find an account of Ali Nizámi's address to the troops. It is interlarded copiously with texts from the Korán, and commences thus :—"Know ye that the Khedive is but the representative to whom the Sultan has given a general power, and that the representative is like unto him whom he represents. By obeying the Khedive you are obeying the Sultan, and you will carry out God's precept when he says, 'Obey God and his prophet, and those who have power amongst you.'" It seems pretty clear that the Commissioners quitted Egypt with the intention of advising the Sultan to increase his influence by opening up communications with the most prominent officers of the Egyptian army, and especially with Arábi.

Another Turkish emissary now appears upon the scene,—Ahmed Essád.* He soon made the acquaintance of Arábi, impressed on him the important lesson to be learned from Tunis, and adroitly pointed out the additional strength which the National cause would derive from the prestige of the Sultan-Caliph.

During all this time Tewfik Pacha continued to maintain his relations with the Sultan through Cadri Bey and his own special agent at Constantinople. Arábi is at length informed that in one of his letters to the Sultan the Khedive has accused him

* See Chapter XIV. page 170.

of "conspiring to sell the country to the English, and acting against the interests of the Caliph." Four months have passed since the departure of the Commission, and Arábi is now Minister of War and all powerful in Egypt. He still rejects firmly the idea of Turkish troops coming to Egypt, but he recognised the advantages to be gained for his cause by the support and approval of the Caliph, a fact which had already been hinted at by Ahmed Rátib Pasha at the time of the Ali Nizámi mission. I fail to see that the patriotism of Arábi is in any way tarnished when, as a good Moslem, he sought to obtain the moral help, sanction, and encouragement of the chief of his creed in his spiritual capacity.* As late as the 8th July, 1882, the *Official Journal* publishes a letter from Arábi on the subject. "I have never said," he writes, "I would fight the Turks more strenuously than I would the English if they came to Egypt; for it is not conceivable that the Commander of the Faithful should send soldiers to Egypt when there is no motive for it, and simply to please a foreign Government." In order to counteract the accusations brought against him by the Khedive, Arábi appears to have written two letters in his defence through Ahmed Essád to Muhamed Zaffer, the Sultan's private chaplain, who was then actively engaged in encouraging the

* See Chapter XIV. page 172.

Tunisian refugees to maintain their guerilla warfare on the Tripolitan frontier. The answers which Arábi received have been already placed before my readers.*

The form which the policy of the Yildiz Kiosk assumed in Egypt during the spring of last year can be easily understood. Arábi was to be played off against the Khedive, and the Khedive against Arábi, until such a complication should be brought about as would justify the Sultan in taking the initiative in some decisive settlement of Egyptian affairs. The accession of Rágheb Pacha, under German auspices, to the post of Egyptian Premier, seemed calculated to further the plan.† The following telegram was addressed by the Grand Vizier to the Khedive a few days before Rágheb took office, and was found amongst Arábi's papers: "Your telegram has been submitted to the Imperial presence to the effect that you await with great eagerness a special commission from the Ottoman Government, and that the officers there publicly declare in different places that they will reject the command of the Ottoman Government if it be not in accord with their ideas. Consultation is going on here as to what it is necessary to do with Egypt. Any command that may be issued on the part of the Ottoman Government is not compatible with

* See Chapter XIV. pages 166-70. † See Chapter X. page 91.

rejection and non-acceptation thereof in relation to those who believe and assert the unity of the Godhead, and who say, 'There is no god save God, and Muhamed is the apostle of God.' For verily religion and community canonically among professors of Islam are one sole thing, as is nationality among the nations other than Islam. Therefore all believers are commanded by God to rally round the word of God."

Ten days later a second Imperial Commission arrived in solemn state at Alexandria. It consisted of Dervesh Pacha, an old Albanian field-marshal, and the "sweeper-substitute," Ahmed Essád. Dervesh was a past-master of oriental duplicity and cunning, which he adroitly concealed by a certain brusqueness of manner and venerable appearance. His particular duty was to look after the Khedive and to endeavour to persuade Arábi to go voluntarily to Constantinople. Ahmed Essád, on the other hand, was instructed to conciliate and encourage the National Party, and generally check the proceedings of his senior. Each possessed a separate telegraphic code, and each sought to turn his position to the best possible personal profit. Dervesh managed to sell an estate in Bulgaria to the Khedive for a fortune; while the "sweeper-substitute" contrived to turn an honest penny by the sale of his cypher. Ahmed Rifát Bey's note on his visit to Dervesh at Alexandria will illustrate fairly this extra-

ordinary phase of Turkish intrigue in Egypt. "On the 6th July," he writes, "I went from Cairo to Alexandria to pay my respects to Dervesh Pacha, intending to return on the following day. He requested me however to postpone my departure. The next day he asked me to suggest in a friendly way to Arábi that the latter should go to 'live with the Sultan' at Constantinople, and thus end the difficulty. I did as he told me, but Arábi declined to take the hint. I called on him again next day. On this occasion he put into my hands a patent from the Sultan, raising me to the civil rank equivalent to that of a general of brigade. He said it would be prudent not to make my promotion public for a time.* I afterwards found he had secretly distributed similar favours to many." Rifát also told me an anecdote to illustrate the unblushing duplicity of Dervesh. One day he made a long speech on the subject of the Khedivial family, in which he asserted in the presence of Toulba Pacha and others that it had become impossible to maintain any of the descendants of Mehemet Ali on the throne. Shortly afterwards he told the same persons in the presence of the Khedive that no more worthy ruler than he could possibly be found. A few hours before Rifát visited him he had invested Arábi with the Grand Cordon of the Medjidieh, and presented him

* See Chapter XIII. page 157.

with his *berat* or letter of appointment.* Dervesh Pacha's connection with the bombardment has been already sufficiently explained. During those eventful days he was in hourly telegraphic communication with the Yildiz Kiosk. No sooner had the Khedive returned to the Ras-el-Tin Palace than he went on board his yacht, affected to misunderstand Lord Alcester's signals to stop, and in due course arrived at Constantinople.

During the war, in accordance with specific instructions, and as long as communication remained open, every defensive movement was telegraphed both to the Porte and the Yildiz Kiosk. The National Council at Cairo (the *Medjlis-el-Orfi*) transmitted daily minutes of their proceedings and resolutions in a similar manner. His Imperial Majesty, however, was now far too prudent to make any further sign than that of asking very often for information. At last, however, the telegraph wires across the desert were cut, and the Yildiz Kiosk missed its daily budget of news from the faithful at Cairo.

I have endeavoured to show the true meaning of Turkish influence and Turkish intrigue in the land concerning which we have so lightly incurred so great a responsibility. Ever since the signing of the Berlin Treaty, Turkey has been on her trial. She

* See Chapter XIV. page 171.

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has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. Her corruption is greater than ever, the confusion of her administration is more complete, and the venality of her officials is more unblushing. No attempt has been made to redeem her fair promises of reform. I will not say it is the duty of England to rescue Egypt from what a well-known English Minister has called "the swindling government at Constantinople," but I contend it behoves her to save the country if she can from the baneful effects of a renewal of Turkish intrigue, and the almost equally disastrous consequences of any development of Turkish influence beyond the receipt of a stipulated tribute and the existence of a purely nominal sovereignty. The future of Egypt must not depend on Turkey.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

EGYPT PRESENT AND TO COME.

WAS Arábi, let me ask once more, the leader of a National Party having its roots deep in the hearts of the people throughout the length and breadth of the land? Was the movement he headed the spontaneous and genuine outcome of the grievances, wants, and aspirations of the Egyptians? Were the various items of Arábi's Popular Charter (to borrow a wholly Western idea) capable of actual application; or, in other words, was there any possibility of the inhabitants of Egypt trying to walk alone with a fair chance of success? The latest European writers who have undertaken to tell us all about the land of the Nile, and to provide at the same time a solution for the Egyptian difficulty, insist on examining these practical questions just as they would some long-forgotten phase of Greek or Roman thought. They seem to assume at the very outset that Egyptian Nationalism, real or fictitious, has once and for all passed away from the sphere of the politics of actuality. The whole matter, they

admit, affords an interesting study for the historian, but they declare with the same breath that the object of the investigation is dead—dead and put away for ever out of sight—as lacking in vitality as any of the mummied potentates in the courts of the Boulak Museum at Cairo. In the end we are presented only with an ingenious post-mortem examination of the politically defunct bodies of Arábi and his friends, with the result of which the proposed panacea or solution is seen at once to be wholly and hopelessly at variance.

Mr. Mackenzie Wallace answers very satisfactorily to my mind the three questions I have just put to my readers, but he also starts (I think unfortunately) with the assumption that his investigations are only of a purely historical importance. “Never,” says Mr. Wallace,* “since the days of Mehemet Ali, or perhaps from a much earlier date—was there a man in Egypt who had such a firm hold of the country as Arábi, for he had not only the army and police at his disposal, and consequently was in position to terrorize to any extent he chose, but he also enjoyed, as I have shown, the sympathies of nearly every section of the native population. . . . Arábi† did not acquire and preserve his influence by terrorism, for at the commencement he had no power to injure any one,

* *Egypt and the Egyptian Question*, p. 379. † *Idem*, p. 397.

and during the whole time of his power he never caused a single individual to be beheaded, hanged, or shot. If he had gone to the poll with Tewfik, and all corrupt practices had been excluded, he would have obtained the votes of an overwhelming majority of the free and independent electors. . . . If we did not mean* to create something like permanent order in Egypt, why did we go to Egypt at all? If we did not mean to create really good government—why did we destroy the National Party, *which had a far better chance of preserving order of some kind than the Khedive whom we reinstated?*”

Mr. Wallace does not stop here; he proceeds to discuss impartially the merits of the Khedive Tewfik. I will again use Mr. Wallace's own words: “Tewfik,” he writes, “never possessed the faculty of inspiring his subjects with affection or enthusiasm, and he became decidedly unpopular when he sided with the foreigners against Arábi.”† Once more he tells us: “The Khedive (Tewfik), in so far as he awakens any feelings in the population, is decidedly unpopular, partly on account of certain personal characteristics, and partly because in the recent struggle he sided with the foreign invader. Tewfik has none of the qualities of a farseeing, energetic ruler.”‡

* *Egypt and the Egyptian Question*, p. 377.

† *Idem*, p. 397.

‡ *Idem*, p. 383.

Mr. Wallace, therefore, agrees with me that Arábi had "all Egypt with him," and might have succeeded in establishing a good government if he had been let alone, and there is no diversity of opinion between us as to the apparent impracticability of the ruler we have forced back on the Egyptians against their will. We are, however, singularly at issue as to the remedy we would each prescribe for the mortal sickness which still hangs over Egypt, and seems every now and then to threaten fatal consequences. A few words lately spoken by Mr. Gladstone furnishes me with an appropriate text: "Having gone to Egypt," says the Prime Minister of England, "we are bound to set the Khedive on his legs, and to *give him a fair start*. To remain one day longer, after our pledges to Europe, would be acting in bad faith."

Mr. Wallace and I are quite unable to concur in a definition of the nature and conditions of Mr. Gladstone's "fair start." He says (if I understand him aright) that Arábi's movement was, as nearly as possible, universal, that Arábi had the whole of Egypt at his back, that he was honest and just, that his chances of setting up a good government were the best, but that we helped to crush him. He admits that the Khedive Tewfik is weak, inexperienced, and unworthy, but that, nevertheless, we assisted him to regain a hold over his rebellious subjects. Our action in the matter was probably a mistake,

but, according to Mr. Wallace, there can be no "looking back." We must perforce go on putting new wine into old bottles, new cloth into the most tattered of garments, tinkering here and mending there, till some turn in the wheel of fortune sets the Egyptian machinery once more in motion, and enables us to leave the country to take care of itself. Yet Mr. Wallace confesses we have thrown away the instruments best fitted for the work we profess to have undertaken, and are to-day employing others of a doubtful or useless character. Mr. Wallace seems to think a change of material plans might be possible, but that it must not be permitted to involve a policy of retracing our footsteps. Here is the radical difference in our lines of argument. I say with Mr. Wallace (and perhaps feel it stronger than Mr. Wallace does) that on the whole Arábi was in the right and we were in the wrong, but I protest against the perpetuation of the consequences of our mistake by any system of tinkering and half-measures however ingenious it may be. I boldly say we must act on the information—the valuable and impartial information—Mr. Wallace has given us on the subject of Egyptian Nationalism and mend the error of our ways. We must now do just what Sir Edward Malet wanted us to do in the crisis which began with the Dual Note and ended in the bombardment,* WE MUST FALL

* Vide Chapter X., page 91.

BACK ON THE NATIONAL PARTY. Arábi and his friends must be allowed to return from Ceylon, and assist us in giving "a fair start" to Egypt,—an undertaking which differs essentially from a mere personal "fair start" for the Khedive. They would certainly give us no cause to repent our generosity. The conspicuous loyalty they have shown in exile would, I feel sure, be persisted in, nor would the experience of adversity be altogether thrown away. A moral protectorate, founded on the sympathies of the Egyptian nation, would not, I believe, be less strong than the physical predominance won by superior might in battle, the very existence of which depends, to a great extent, on the show of force we may maintain in order to keep its memory green in the minds of the vanquished. If English influence in Egypt came thus to rest on a basis of affection and gratitude it might defy at once both Turkish intrigue and the militant animosity of rival powers.

My first suggestion for the happiness of Egypt to come will be, I fear, received with a shout of disapprobation on all sides. If, however, my readers will patiently examine the question for themselves, they will see I have really only arrived at a logical conclusion, quite as much justified by the premises Mr. Wallace has furnished us with as by my own knowledge of the history of Egyptian Nationalism. I am

at the same time aware that logical conclusions in politics are often inconvenient and generally disliked.

One of my late clients, Ahmed Rifát Bey, gave me at parting a short statement of the nature and extent of the Egyptian National movement, accompanied by some practical illustrations of the administrative capability he says it engendered. I publish it as the sole appendix to this volume.* It will perhaps assist my readers in forming an opinion as to the probability of the recall of the Nationalists being as great a success as the restoration of the Khedive has proved a signal failure and mischief-producing calamity.

If my reader has sufficiently recovered his breath after the enunciation of so unwelcome a heresy as a proposed falling back on the National Party by way of a condition precedent to a "fair start" for Egypt, I will explain the idea I have crudely stated at somewhat greater length. In the first place let me observe that the return of the Nationalists involves no sweeping revolution. It is perhaps unlikely that Tewfik Pacha and Arábi could sail in the same boat, and it is consequently probable that His Highness would find himself compelled either to submit or resign. As the impossible often happens in the East, a *modus vivendi* between them might be established, but it would almost inevitably

* *Post*, Appendix, p. 501.

put an end to all real chance of a satisfactory result. For my part I am content to leave the Khedive Tewfik to the calm judgment of the reader of these pages. Mr. Wallace's verdict as to his merits is more than sufficient for my purpose. Tewfik being the sand on which we have elected to build our house in Egypt, we must not be surprised that it is already falling about our ears. Whether we will it or not, Tewfik is destined sooner or later to drop quietly out of any rational programme for the future of his country. As no party can trust him, all parties are more or less interested in his downfall. If rumour is to be believed, he is already preparing for a comfortable and honourable exile far away from the Nile Valley, where he will be only remembered as the weakest descendant of Mehemet Ali, the most unpopular sovereign of a dynasty, and the nominee of a foreign invader.

The withdrawal of Tewfik by no means involves any change in the reigning family. Amongst its princes more than one might be found willing and able to accept the principles which Arábi upheld in deed as well as in word. In the restoration of Egyptian Nationalism it will not be sufficient to write effusive letters approving and adopting a policy, but the Khedive of this phase of Egyptian history must himself bear the standard, whose device is "Egypt for the Egyptians," and share in the risks

and hardships of the battle. Arábi never sought to overthrow the throne which Mehemet Ali had set up,* or to become the ruler of Egypt himself. He laboured long and vainly to work hand in hand with Tewfik. It was not till he received proof after proof of insincerity on the part of the Khedive that he realized the futility of any further effort. Even then he loyally protected and guarded his sovereign's life and person as his own, up to the very hour when Tewfik left his palace at Ramleh to join the invading force against which he had ordered the waging of war only a few short hours before. Arábi having no personal ambition would cheerfully work for the common good of Egypt under the guidance of any political superior who would be faithful to his trust. The coming of such a sovereign to power must form part and parcel of the restoration of Egyptian Nationalism.

Before entering into other details connected with this second restoration which England must sooner or later bring about in order to give Egypt the "fair start" she has promised her, I cannot forbear alluding to two other points in which I venture to dissent from the conclusions arrived at by Mr. Wallace. I think that his estimate of the relative characters of Nubar Pacha and the Khedive Ismail is to a great extent

* See *ante*, Chapter XXXI. page 434.

erroneous. Nubar Pacha, I feel sure, can never hope to be allowed to share in the coming restoration. His whole existence has been one continued opposition to the very essential idea of Egyptian Nationalism. Nubar and Nationalism can no more travel in the same boat than Arábi and Tewfik. My own impression of Nubar would place him even intellectually in a lower rank than either Cherif or Riáz; in every other respect he is immeasurably their inferior. Nubar Pacha is the most expert dealer in epigrammatic platitudes I ever met. He knows the taste of those he has to cater for to perfection; the material out of which he is made is susceptible of a finer European polish than the nature of his two rivals can admit of, and the casual observer consequently fancies he finds in him convincing signs of superiority. Nubar represents a dead and gone influence, which has little or no concern with Egypt to come. He was in the past little more than the titular guardian of the traditional fleshpots. Once upon a time Nubar told Lord Beaconsfield that nothing was wanting to restore the pristine vigour of the Turkish empire but Law Courts and Police, and nobody laughed more heartily than he did when the English Premier quoted his dictum as that of "a great Oriental Statesman" either in Parliament or elsewhere. "*Mon cher ami,*" he said to a friend, "*que voulez vous?*" the English only understand something short and pointed,

so I always try to please them." Nubar now poses, I believe, not only as an ardent patriot, but as a financial purist of the most uncompromising type. He is, however, at the present moment, richer than the whole of the Khedivial family collectively, although he began his career as a humble Syrian clerk, received his first start in life from the Khedive Ismaïl's bounty, and has never been known to engage in commercial transactions. He now reviles his old master, and fondly dreams of a Nubar-Tigrane Ministry in the future, but he is mistaken. The veil has fallen from the altar of Egyptian money-making. "Egypt for the Egyptians" can no longer remain a mere idle saying. It is perfectly clear at any rate that Nubar Pacha has no part to play in its practical realisation.

It has been said that "the absent are always in the wrong," and so it has happened with the Khedive Ismaïl, who has lived long enough, not only to hear himself spoken ill of by his former friends, but to witness the unedifying spectacle of one whom he has especially benefited unblushingly take credit for having systematically undermined him with a view to his overthrow. Ismaïl committed many mistakes, but he will make a better figure in history than either Tewfik or Nubar. He went too rapidly and too recklessly ahead in his wild career of developing Egypt by what he called European Contact; his plan of concentrating commercial enterprise in his own person was an

error of the first magnitude ; but the greatest blunder of all was to entrust to foreigners like Nubar Pacha the government of the country in the very teeth of a growing national sentiment, in a great measure of his own creating. Mr. Wallace holds Ismail to be mainly answerable for the misfortunes of these latter days. I am inclined to think he casts the blame upon the wrong shoulders. He tells us that Ismail created the national debt, but he forgets how much of the borrowed money miscarried before it reached Egypt ; and to what extent it was spent in public works, including the Suez Canal, which pays Egypt nothing, but is alone exclusively responsible for one-fifth of her liabilities. Ismail it is true inherited great estates and purchased others. The members of his family also habitually acquired land in the same way, but the public works upon which the money was so lavishly spent were by no means confined to the localities in which the Khedivial properties were situated, but benefited more or less the whole of Egypt. Ismail expropriated no one, nor did he take any man's land without payment. The parallel of Naboth's vineyard is hardly a just one. The reproach is a still harder one for Ismail to bear now, when all his possessions, along with those of his family, have been surrendered as the guarantee for two public loans. If the *fellahs* paid more taxes in his time, their interests

were certainly more efficiently protected than at present. Vigilant and constant care as to irrigation made them better able to bear the greater burden then, than the lesser burden now. The collection of taxes after or at the time of the harvest was far more suited to the character and circumstances of the *fellah* than a monthly or quarterly cess. An Egyptian peasant is proverbially improvident. He is fond of spending freely the outcome of his toil, and, unless the taxes are gathered when he is in funds, as of yore, he will soon ruin himself with the village money-lender now.

The best answer to the allegation is a reference to the crying question of the *fellahs'* debts.* When Ismaïl went into exile they amounted to two millions sterling; to-day, as I write, they probably exceed twelve. They have thus increased and multiplied since Ismaïl was replaced by his son, yet Mr. Wallace would even hold him responsible for this misfortune as well.

Then as to the tyranny of Ismaïl. The *courbash* existed before his time, and it has survived his departure. There was, however, more banishment, exile, and imprisonment during the two years of Riáz's paternal administration than in all Ismaïl's

* Mr. Wallace speaks of Arábi's emissaries proclaiming the liberation of the *fellah* from his just or unjust obligations to the usurer. No kind of proof of any such proceeding was ever attempted at the trial. If it was true nothing could have been more easily substantiated.

reign. If the soles of the peasants' feet can testify against the father, the shores of the White Nile are equally eloquent witnesses against the son. Ismaïl, like many other rulers, only just missed achieving a great success. When he realized his errors and the extent to which he had been betrayed, he resolved to give Egyptian Nationalism a fair trial. Europe refused to allow him to complete the experiment, and he went into exile. Darker days have overtaken Egypt since he quitted it, and amidst the prevailing anarchy the once strong ruler is now regretted.

"I have not been able," writes Mr. Wallace, almost at the close of his book, "to discover in Egypt any native element desirous and capable of spontaneously undertaking, and successfully carrying through, the reforms which are in my opinion absolutely essential to the permanent preservation of order and the general welfare of the country." But the reforms Mr. Wallace speaks of are, as I said before, identical with the items of Arábi's Popular Charter, and he frankly admits that Arábi was more capable than any one else of giving them effect. I am therefore at a loss to understand why Mr. Wallace ignores the inevitable consequences of his own admissions, and fails to find the solution of the difficulty he raises in the restoration of Egyptian Nationalism, the extent and force of which he clearly recognizes.

There is increasing danger in delay. A twelve-month's dearly purchased experience has taught us that our last restoration was a great political blunder. If England had supported Arábi and the Nationalists she might have won the sympathy of all Egypt, and become by the most just of all titles her Protector. As it is we share only the deep-rooted detestation of our unpopular protégé, and are regarded in Africa as the enemy of the very institutions we have helped give to half Europe. Even the Egyptian bondholders themselves will scarcely benefit by the manner in which we have looked after their pecuniary interests, for the country is drifting slowly but surely towards inevitable bankruptcy. The record of the year's work in Egypt is a melancholy story of failure, and the outlook for the future is not a whit more cheering. The fundamental errors and fallacies which underlie all our plans for reform and improvement are always as millstones round about our necks. Our only chance of safety lies in generous recantation and in the frank undoing of much that has been done. The task is a difficult one, but Mr. Gladstone does not seem to shrink from it:—

“Avernus’ gates are open night and day,
Smooth the descent and easy is the way.
But to return to heaven’s pure light again,
Such is a work of labour and of pain.”

In coming back once more to the ideas about Egypt which he entertained in 1877,* Mr. Gladstone will only be true to the traditions of his youth and the practice of his riper years. The restoration of the Egyptian Nationalists will ever remain as a lasting memorial of political consistency, and our promise of giving Egypt a "fair start" will at last be intelligently fulfilled.

A calm review of the events of the year 1883 (be it ever so cursory) shows at once the difference between a "fair start" for the Khedive, recently set on his legs, and a "fair start" for Egypt, not set on her legs at all. If we went to Egypt with the former intention, we committed something akin to a political crime; if we honestly wished to free Egypt from anarchy we have a fair plea in extenuation. I am afraid, if the truth must be told, the "fair start" for Tewfik was the main feature of the first Egyptian Restoration; the "fair start" for Egypt must be the basis of the second if "to abdicated duty we would not have to add a chapter of perpetrated wrong." Let us glance at the past.

The era of the Khedivial restoration began with the State Trials. These had no sooner come to an end than the solemn session of the International

* *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1877. "Aggression in Egypt," by the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone.

Indemnity Commission at Alexandria began. Once more is Egypt bade to prepare for the sacrifice. The losses inflicted on certain inhabitants of Alexandria were occasioned in a war formally declared by the Khedive, in which both the Egyptians and the English were belligerents. Such damage gives no *right* of indemnity. The moral claim of the sufferers is hardly stronger, for they contributed nothing by way of taxation to the support of the Egyptian State. When the French caused the Tunisians to grant a small and inadequate compensation for the injury done to the foreign colonists in the shelling of Sfax, they exacted a declaration from each recipient that the money was paid by favour and not under legal compulsion. The Alexandria Commission in the course of its labours has condemned the Egyptian Government to give compensation to the amount of nearly *four millions of pounds sterling*. The most preposterous claims were admitted without even a pretence of resistance, and the Egyptians have once more to pay for what Mr. Wallace calls the "smashed crockery." Each member of the Commission conceived it to be his duty to energetically support the demands of his compatriots, and no individual delegate could be guilty of so unpardonable an act of impoliteness as to oppose the wishes of a colleague. A system of reciprocity was at once established, the Khedivial legal advisers put

forward a merely platonic *non possumus*, and Egypt has to contract one loan more in consequence. If Egypt is to have a "fair start," let us help her at once to obtain a revision of the proceedings of this most accommodating International Commission.

We have heard a great deal of the debts of the *fellaheen*.* The peasantry of Egypt have fallen into the grip of the usurers, and their liabilities are almost sufficient to bring about a crisis of the most serious description. The Egyptian *fellah* seems to need a sort of perpetual guardianship in order to escape extinction. We hear now and anon of this bank and that bank coming philanthropically to the rescue of the *fellah*, and lending him money at six or seven per cent. to pay off his creditor who has made him an original loan at fifty or sixty, but nothing seems to come of it. Banks and other financial companies have no special liking for a business which only brings them the bones from which Dimetri and his friends have already picked the flesh with tolerable completeness, and so matters never advance beyond the stage of an undigested scheme. The question must one day be settled by a close local investigation, a sweeping reduction of the usurious interest, and the creation of special courts to determine the merits of individual cases. I regret

* See *ante*, page 488.

to see that a subject of so much real importance has been postponed for a season, but it will doubtless receive due attention after the restoration of the Nationalists. Arábi will greatly assist Mr. Edgar Vincent in bringing his old friends the village usurers—the vipers as he used to call them—to terms, and Yácoub Sámi's powers of organization could also be advantageously utilized.

At present the events of last year seem to be repeating themselves in a very wonderful manner. The comedy of the first restoration seems well nigh played out. M. Barrère, the recently appointed French Consul-General, has brought new crosses from Paris for Blum Pacha and my old friend Borelli Bey; E. T. Rogers Bey is investigating bastinado cases at Tantah notwithstanding the official abolition of the *courbash*; the *Burhan* has been suppressed for abusing the English; and “although Borelli Bey's relations with a French journal bitterly hostile to England are no secret, he is about to be made a Pacha by the Khedive as a reward for the services he has rendered the country.” But there is yet balm in Gilead,—the Credit Foncier of Egypt offers to lend the peasants money to pay off old scores at seven per cent. provided the Government engages to collect their interest for them at the same time as the taxes, while the twelve Dutch jurists who have been recruited for the new

tribunals are expected to return shortly to Cairo to recommence their studies of the Arabic language with a view to the ultimate discharge of their official functions!

While this volume has been passing through the press, England and Egypt have at last come face to face with another difficulty of unprecedented magnitude and gravity, which has been looming mysteriously in the distance during the past year. I have already described * how, on the eve of the Kourbán Bairám festival (October 23rd, 1882), the news reached Cairo that a pretended Mehdi,† or Messiah, had gained a decisive victory in the Soudan. The rising he headed was only the natural result of the weakness and disorganisation of the administration which has replaced the autocratic and vigorous rule of Ismail. The absence of the once "masterful hand" was felt alike in Egypt and in her more remote dependencies, and we are now beginning to realize the consequences. The Mehdi has nothing in common with the Egyptians of the Nile Delta; he aims at the establishment of a new political and religious supremacy, and he would sweep Tewfik and Arabi alike into the sea. Any attempt to attribute a community of ideas to Arábi and the Mehdi must arise either from a wilful intention to mislead or a pro-

* See Chapter IX. page 75.

† Generally written Mahdi. I think Mehdi the more correct rendering of the Arabic.

found ignorance of the subject. I remember talking over the matter with Arábi at the time. He said that the disbandment of the army laid all Egypt at the mercy of the Mehdi, except so far as she could rely for protection on the British troops. "The Mehdi of the Soudan," said Arábi, "is the enemy of the Arabs because we know him to be an impostor. We are Sunnis, and believe that the Saviour of Islam will come of the Arab tribe of Koreish, to which myself belong. The Egyptians must all resist the Mehdi as a dangerous foe, but the disorder which reigns throughout the country will give even the African dervish a chance of success."

It at once became imperatively necessary to send reinforcements to the disturbed districts. How was this to be done? The whole Egyptian army had been formally dissolved with the object of crushing out beyond hope of revival every spark of latent Nationalism. It was not deemed sufficient to exile and degrade Arábi. The shame and disgrace of the chief, it was said, must be shared by every subordinate officer, and even by every common soldier who followed the standard he had raised: no measure of amnesty must for a moment be allowed to temper the fate of the vanquished Egyptian troops. The suicidal policy of retaliation was in its first vigour when it became necessary to think of the Soudan. Colonel Hicks and his gallant comrades were hastily

commissioned; the process of disbanding and disgracing was interrupted, and as many of the disbanded and disgraced soldiers as could be conveniently collected were ordered to follow the flag of Colonel Hicks. I saw myself the nucleus of the Soudan contingent leaving Cairo for Suez. It was a sorry and not easily-to-be-forgotten spectacle. The Egyptian soldiers were placed in vans and cattle-trucks like animals. They quitted the capital without arms, as prisoners, and with all the circumstances of dishonour. Their native officers were selected from those who were most obnoxious to the new régime, and their very appointment was an avowed and undisguised measure of punishment and repression. On the 1st of January, 1883, two steamers were moored alongside the wharf at Suez. The deck of one was crowded by the disgraced and disbanded soldiers of the First Regiment, of which Arábi had been colonel; upon the deck of the other stood Arábi and his six companions. An hour or two later the disarmed Egyptian soldiers were forced to witness in sullen silence the *Mareotis* steaming down the Red Sea, bound for Ceylon. When subsequently it became necessary to send further reinforcements to the Soudan, they were provided after the same fashion. Soldiers were again despatched to the front unarmed, beaten, and in chains. Even Abd-el-Ál's black regiment, once considered the flower of the Egyptian

army, were sent to fight against the Mehdi with every aggravation of ignominy, and thereby predisposed to desertion and mutiny. It is not surprising that Colonel Hicks was unable to hold his own with the aid of such unpromising material. The end soon came. Exactly thirteen months after the news of the Mehdi's first success reached Cairo, all England learned that the Egyptian army, with its European officers, had been annihilated on its march to Obeid. There can be no doubt that the inordinate thirst for vengeance which characterised the earlier days of the Egyptian Restoration has mainly contributed to this untoward disaster.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to say what turn things will next take. The victorious Mehdi may advance on Khartoum, or he may be satisfied with his recent success. Even the details of the fatal conflict are as yet nearly wholly wanting. Little good can result from conjecture. Sir Samuel Baker has placed the whole situation clearly before our eyes.* He says us it is useless to blame the wrong persons for what has happened, and that the abandonment of the Soudan is fraught with difficulty and danger. We have been told that the present misfortunes are the indirect result of Ismail Pacha's ambition. Sir Samuel Baker, on the other hand, declares that Ismail resolved

* *Pall Mall Gazette*, November 27th, 1883.

to put down the slave trade "out of pure respect for English sentiment." "His Highness Ismaïl Pacha," he writes, "had a great idea: to suppress the slave-trade, to establish legitimate commerce in its place, and to lay the foundation for future civilisation by bringing under his rule those savage haunts which had hitherto been unknown to history. No country was ever annexed by Ismail Pacha which had not been previously devastated by the slave-hunters." The calamity which has happened demonstrates sufficiently the absolute necessity of strong rule in Egypt, and the desirability of placing the government of the country as soon as possible on a national basis. Half measures will only increase the peril of the situation. We cannot save Egypt by sending a police force to Suakim, even if we could rely on the loyalty of every individual member of it. When, however, we hear that nearly half the first contingent deserted between Cairo and Suez, we may form some idea of the difficulties we must expect to encounter.

Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Evelyn Wood, Baker Pacha, Mr. Edgar Vincent, and Mr. Clifford Lloyd, may do their utmost, but I fear as matters now stand their toil will be in vain. The question of the possible restoration of Egyptian Nationalism must sooner or later imperatively claim our attention. England will I think in the end declare that Egypt is to be for the Egyptians.

The example of rare political honesty which England will thus set can but strengthen her position in the councils of Europe for all time. Let France by all means remain the undisputed claimant to the laurels of the Last Punic War. The fame which English statesmen will gain by the Second Egyptian Restoration would soon cause the misfortunes of the first to be forgotten. When the story of Tel-el-Kebir comes to be no longer remembered, the "fair start" we voluntarily gave to the country we conquered will be assuredly the proudest memorial of our success. I am putting forward no startling paradox. I honestly believe that if England intends to persevere in her plans for the reorganization of Egypt, and at the same time observe the pledges she has given to the face of all Europe, she can only do so by restoring Egyptian Nationalism, in its widest sense, to the pedestal from which it has been cast down. In order to effect this she will recall from exile Arábi and his friends, and will allow them, under the auspices of a popular, vigorous, and capable Sovereign, to work out in their own manner, and according to their own lights, the prototype of Lord Dufferin's scheme,—the constitutional programme of Egyptian Nationalism.

APPENDIX.

LETTER FROM AHMED RIFÁT BEY TO THE AUTHOR.

IN a few days you will return to Tunis and we shall go into exile. People will doubtless ask you much about Egypt, for any decision as to her ultimate destiny is as far off as ever. Our National aspirations are for the moment crushed, but do not believe they are dead. Our enemies are for the moment triumphant, and their voice has all the strength and loudness of success. They say Egyptian Nationalism (which I describe as the banding together of the oppressed in search of justice) has never existed at all; even if they admit there was such a spirit abroad they deny that Ahmed Arábi was its legitimate exponent, and they maintain, moreover, that Egyptian aspirations are aimless, because the people of Egypt are incapable of self-government, and must consequently be condemned to perpetual leading-strings (*tutelle*). Others go even further than this, and say Arábi frightened all Egypt into patriotism. Before we separate, let me, I pray you, leave you a few notes, which will help you to answer our critics from the testimony of an eye-witness. Do not forget to tell them your authority is a Turk; a man whose whole interests should be on the other side, and who has wrecked a promising career by his sympathy with his Egyptian co-religionists.

I. *As to the National Movement in general.*

1. The *Official Journal* only contains a portion of the list patriotic gifts in money and provisions sent voluntarily from parts of Egypt to Arábi. Volunteers enrolled themselves combatants by thousands. No conceivable force or knowledge of intimidation could create an army of one hundred thousand men in a few days. This unprecedented result must be solely attributable to unanimity of feeling.

2. If it had been otherwise, the resistance must have collapsed at once in the face of the superior strength of England. As it was, it lasted for two entire months.

3. Another noticeable feature was the spontaneous sympathy shown for Arábi (as the representative of the National Movement) by the highest personages in the country. The princesses, and others, all sent him telegrams, letters, and complimentary presents of fruit, &c., always designating him as "defender of his country." The Princesses — and — widows of —, sent their eunuchs to Kafr-el-Dowár with contributions to the general defence funds. The gifts of horses seemed never to come to an end. Prince Ibrahim, not content with his first quota, insisted on sending four more animals of finest breed. He also used to visit in state the wounded in Abassieh hospital. Madame Ahmed Pacha Nachát was honor president of an association of princes and ladies who worked indefatigably at the manufacture of lint for the wounded.

4. The enthusiasm of the religious bodies must not be forgotten. Prayers were offered up night and day in all mosques (and especially in those of Hasanein and El Azhar) for the victory of Arábi and the Egyptian army.

5. The love of the whole Egyptian population for Arábi knew no bounds. It extended to the very *gamins* of the streets. Little children and grown-up people shouted alike, *Allah ya*

surak yá Arábi. The following popular refrain was on everybody's lips :—

Yá Tewfik yá wejh ennamla

Man kállek táamel hadh elámila ?

Oh, Tewfik, thou ant-faced one !

Who on earth told you to do what you have done ?

(i. e. to bring the English to Egypt).

In a very few days the name of Tewfik was abandoned in Egypt, and a whole generation of young Egyptians were called Arábi.

II. *As to the First National Assembly at Cairo.*

You can safely assert it was spontaneous, free, and wholly uninfluenced by intimidation of any kind, for the following reasons :—

1. The summons to attend it was issued by the Ministry of the Interior. The letters of invitation were sealed and signed by the Under-Secretary for the Home Department, and not by his colleague of the War Office. Those invited, including a vast number of private individuals, came of their own accord and without any kind of pressure.

2. There was no word of command, no exhibition of armed force, and the doors were left open during the deliberations. After reading the letter in which Arábi asked for the decision of the Nation, and the documents annexed to it, a great number of those present, especially the Ulema and ecclesiastics, were indignant at the conduct of the Khedive, and wished immediately to depose him, in accordance with strict Moslem law. The Armenian patriarch, Latif Pacha, an admiral of the time of the great Mehemet Ali, and others, advocated an appeal to the Sultan, to whom the conduct of the Khedive should, in their opinion, be submitted. Akouche Pacha, a warm partisan of the Khedive Tewfik, without attempting to attenuate the gravity of the facts alleged against him, expressed an opinion

that further inquiry was advisable. Ali Moubarek Pacha cannot, any more than the Armenian, Greek, and Copticarchs, pretend that he was in any way compelled to attend (meeting) proposed that a Commission be sent to Alexandria to ascertain if the Khedive and his Ministers were really prisoners, and, if not, to invite them to return to Cairo to assume the reins of government. The assembly decided in accordance with the suggestion, and resolved at the same time to send a full report of the circumstances to the Porte and the Yildiz Kiosk. The moderation of the conclusion arrived at, and the freedom of discussion which characterised the proceedings, are a sufficient proof in themselves of the entire absence of terrorism.

III. *Of the Second National Assembly at Cairo.*

1. The summons for this meeting also emanated from the Under-Secretary for the Interior, and was only issued when measures decided on in the former assembly were seen to be fruitless and the situation became radically changed.

2. It was composed of about 400 persons, including princes, the heads of the different religious communities, with a single exception, and the pachas who had been memlouk of Abbas Pacha, and were devoted to the interests of Tewfik Pacha who had married the grand-daughter of their old master.

3. The three Princes—Ibrahim, Ahmed, and Kiámil, the Chief Judge of Cairo, the Mufti now in office and his predecessor, the above-mentioned pachas-memlouk, and all the official and non-official persons present, expressed spontaneously, and in the most open manner, their indignation against the Khedive. In my statement of defence I have alluded to my conversations with Yácoub Pacha Sabri, memlouk of the Viceroy Abbas, and the Chief Judge. I will here quote the exact words used by Pri

Kiámil in the apartment of the Minister of the Interior, and in the presence of a large number of persons. "For us," he said, "the Khedive to-day no longer exists. We would recognise him if he were here at the head of his Government and his country, but where is he? He is either the prisoner or the ally of a foreign power which has invaded Egypt." His hearers applauded these words as being in strict accordance with their religious and civil duties.

4. The resolution that, as the Khedive had transgressed both the firmans and the principles of Moslem law, he was no longer capable of giving orders, and that Arábi should be confirmed in his post of Minister of War, and entrusted with the task of national defence pending the receipt of orders from Constantinople, was voted unanimously by show of hands. The *procès-verbal* was sealed by everybody with perfect freedom and evident enthusiasm. The decision arrived at was regarded as the termination of the palace intrigues, which had brought such incalculable mischief to Egypt during the past year.

5. Arábi was not present at either of those meetings. Yácoub Sámi, his under-secretary, had even enjoined the Colonel Obeid Bey to absent himself, lest it should be alleged or even imagined that military influence had anything to do with the expression of the national will. I heard Yácoub Sámi himself give this order in the small room at the back of the great saloon in the Kasr-el-Nil Palace.

IV. *Of the Medjlis-el-Orfi, or Committee of National Defence.*

1. Ismaïl Eyoub Pacha himself admits he resigned his position as a member of it. If it were not entirely free and under no sort of constraint, how was he able to do that?

Especially after his complimentary visit to Arábi by special train at Kafr-el-Dowar.

2. You will also note the continual presence of Reouf Pacha, (the President of the Court Martial) at its meetings. His signature and seal are appended to most of their minutes. If the Committee had not perfect liberty of action why did Reouf come back from Alexandria to join it? If he disapproved its action why did he not follow the example of Ismail Eyoub and resign?

3. The *Medjlis* freely exercised constitutional control over the actions of Arábi. When Ali Moubarek proposed to enter into negotiations with him, Arábi submitted to the *Medjlis* the draft of his reply, which underwent several modifications.

4. The question of the imprisonment of the Mudír of the Garbieh was referred also to the *Medjlis*.

5. The *Medjlis* decided to maintain Osmán Pacha Gháleb in his post of Mudír of Assiout, although Arábi was in favour of his recall.

6. Arábi never was present at a sitting of the *Medjlis*. Mahmoud Sámi was not even a member. The persons who composed it were, for the most part, wholly independent of party considerations. It is sufficient to cite Giaffer Pacha, Ismail Pacha Abú Gebel, Sámi Pacha of the Slave Trade Suppression Department, who had received his education in England and America, and whose son-in-law had been mixed up as an enemy of Arábi in the Circassian Plot.

7. The day of the defeat at Tel-el-Kebir, and previous to the arrival of Arábi at Cairo, the *Medjlis-el-Orfi* met at Kasr-el-Ni and decided unanimously not to continue the war, which in principle might be expected to last as long as the line of retreat afforded by the country between Cairo and the Soudan remained to the Egyptians.

8. Arábi at once expressed his willingness to accept this resolution of the *Medjlis*.

9. The *Medjlis* prepared the letter to be addressed to the Khedive. The draft composed by Ibrahim Pacha Khalil and Boutros Pacha was freely discussed in Committee.

10. Even the Princes Ibrahim and Kiamil took part in these deliberations.

These notes may help you to make known the truth concerning us when we see you no more.

AHMED RIFÁT BEY.

Cairo, December 21st, 1882.



HOW WE DEFENDED ARÁBI AND HIS FRIENDS.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

Mr. Broadley's book is a lively résumé of the story of Arábi's trial, together with some documents not previously published, including Arábi's scheme of reform for Egypt.—*Times (Leader)*, December 13th, 1884.

Mr. Broadley enjoyed exceptional opportunities for arriving at facts as distinguished from fictions.—*Morning Post*.

The object of this instructive and entertaining volume is at once to relate a story and to plead a cause. The author groups around his central figure and chief episodes a variety of personages and events, arranged with consummate skill, and producing in their combinations a series of picturesque and impressive effects. Mr. Broadley is as shrewd an observer of character as he is an acute reasoner and vivacious delineator of men, manners, and places. It is his keen sense of humour which enables him to comprehend what may be called the true *ethos* of Egyptian life. He has succeeded in producing a pleasant and a most serviceable volume.—*Standard*.

Mr. Broadley tells his story with humour, and makes an exceedingly readable book. He contrives to leave on our minds a very strong sense of the mistake which was made in treating Arábi as a rebel. He writes in a lively and agreeable style with full knowledge of his subject. The illustrations add to the interest of the record of a remarkable passage in English as well as Egyptian history.—*Daily News*.

The volume is graphic. It will be as popular with legal specialists as the general public.—*Daily Telegraph*.

The book supplies a fair and temperate account of the trial of Arábi and his friends, enlivened by many amusing anecdotes of its progress and the persons connected with the proceedings, and written in the same lively vein as the author's "Tunis Past and Present." Our author is at his best when describing the examination of witnesses before the Commission. Nothing could be happier than the manner in which he tells. . . . Mr. Broadley has written an entertaining and interesting book which cannot be passed over.—*Athenæum*.

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I advise all to read Mr. Broadley's book. The story is well and clearly told, and Mr. Broadley has contrived to make his book amusing as well as instructive.—*Truth*.

Everybody who cares to look a little behind the scenes of the Egyptian drama should study carefully "How we defended Arábi." Mr. Broadley's well-written and well-printed volume will probably attract many readers. The anecdotes he garnishes it with are both novel and entertaining.—*Vanity Fair*.

An entertaining and politically instructive book. Much truth is told under the cover of anecdote and good humour.—*Cologne Gazette*.

In this volume Mr. Broadley describes fully every phase of the trial which resulted in Arábi's exile to Ceylon, enlivening his account by many bright and vivid pictures of life in the Levant.—*Pall Mall Gazette*.

Everyone with the facility of enjoying a well-told tale, may read with pleasure Mr. Broadley's story of how he defended Arábi. The clever narrator seems to be afraid that he has allowed himself to be a little too amusing. Mr. Broadley has not given us this delightful volume purely for our amusement.—*Saint James' Gazette*.

Mr. Broadley's book loses little in interest because twelve months have elapsed since Arábi pleaded guilty.—*Globe*.

"How we defended Arábi," may appropriately rank as a Christmas gift-book, for it affords a rich and constant fund of humour and

merriment. Mr. Broadley's satire is amusing, but not unkind, and he has contrived to bring everybody he met and everything he saw vividly and distinctly before his reader.—*Evening News*.

The work is published opportunely. . . . Mr. Villiers' sketches, taken on the spot, materially add to its interest and value. Arábi was singularly fortunate to obtain so able, so energetic, and so enthusiastic a champion as Mr. Broadley.—*Graphic*.

A most interesting work. . . . Mr. Broadley possesses a lucid style, his narratives run easily and are interspersed throughout with humorous descriptions of men and things.—*Fair Play*.

It is impossible to read Mr. Broadley's book without acquiring considerable respect for Arábi and his friends, or without being impressed with the cleverness of their defenders. Mr. Broadley has achieved a very remarkable feat and written a most interesting book.—*Whitehall Review*.

Mr. Broadley's style is delightful and his sketches of Eastern life and manners unsurpassed in their vivid reality. He is a clever humorist, and his art is that of the accomplished diplomatist who knows how to treat of the weightiest matters with the most charming ease, grace, and wit. Its pages are full of freshness and interest.—*St. Stephen's Review*.

There is a charm about the writer's style which stamps his book as one of the most readable that has come under our notice.—*Freemason*.

It is difficult to decide whether the matter the book contains or the manner in which the author has set it forth is the more worthy of commendation.—*Freemason's Chronicle*.

This volume appears at the most timely hour when the Nile Valley threatens to be the burning question of 1884. Mr. Broadley speaks of events *quorum pars magna fuit* and his able special pleading utters no uncertain note. The tale is told in a chatty, readable style which conceals a variety of sharpish stings. I must compliment Mr. Broadley on his exceptional freedom from mistakes.—*The Academy*.

Few can fail to read with pleasure this eminently instructive and entertaining volume. Around Arábi are grouped with masterly skill the various personages whose names are familiar to the student of recent Egyptian history. Not less happy than his portraiture are the other delightful sketches to be found in his pages. The result is a remarkably readable book.—*Dorset County Chronicle*.

A most interesting book.—*Yorkshire Gazette.*

If Mr. Broadley is reasonably right in his conclusions and fact English opinion has been unreasonably wrong about Egypt and Aráb. The author's style is full of charm. His narrative never flags. The book is admirably illustrated by Mr. Villiers and is excellently got up by the publishers, Messrs. Chapman and Hall. — *Central Press Association.*

Certainly in Mr. Broadley Arábi found a devoted advocate and he now finds in him a warm supporter and skilful interpreter to the European mind.—*Christian Million.*

We recognize in the author a power of marshalling his facts combined with a dry humour which is irresistible. The book is a rare specimen of the *ars celare artem*, and written so that it may be taken up at any page and read with interest by all classes of readers. Aráb counsel maintained the independence of the English Bar. . . . We confidently recommend the book to our readers as one that will be found interesting from every point of view.—*Pump Court.*

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